Dismissed

V Narayana Reddy (Died) v. The State of Telangana

Telangana HC14 Oct 2024CRLRC/768/2024

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Petitioners sought condonation of a 1733-day delay in filing a criminal revision against fines imposed for offences under Sections 447 and 427 IPC. Citing Esha Bhattacharjee, the court found the affidavit gave no sufficient explanation and dismissed the application.

What the court decided

AI extract

V Narayana Reddy (Died) Vs The State of… — Civil Procedure and Limitation | Telangana HC (2024)

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[^32se ]

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IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD

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MONDAY, THE FOURTEENTH DAY OF OCTOBER TWO THOUSAND AND TWENry FOUR

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PRESENT

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THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE E.V. VENUGOPAL

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l.A.No.1 of 2O24

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IN/AND

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CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 768 Of 2024

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Criminal Revision Case filed under Sections 397 &⁴⁰¹ of^{CrPC against} the Judgment dated 28-06-2019^passed in Criminal Appeal^{No.S14of 2016 on the} file of the Court of the V Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Rangareddy District at LB Nagar, Hyderabad,^preferred against the Judgment^{dated 16-05-} 2016 passed in C.C.No.997 of 2009 on the file of the Court of the XV Metropolitan Magistrate, Cyberabad at Medchal, Rangareddy.

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Between:

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V Narayana Reddy, (died)

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V. Goverdhan Reddy, S/o. Narayana Reddy, Age: 45^years, Occ: Agriculture,

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V. Bhoopal Reddy, S/o. Narayana Reddy, Age: 44^yeas, Occ: Agriculture,

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Appellant No.2 and 3 are Rl/o. Kistapur Village, H/o. Medchal^Village, Medchal Mandal, Medchal Malkajgiri District.

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...AppellanUAccused No.2 and 3

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AND

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The State of Telangana, Represented by its Additional Public Prosecutor

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...Respondent

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lA NO: 1 OF 2024

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Petition under Section 5 of Limitation Act^praying that^{in the circumstances} stated in the affidavit filed in support of the^petition, the^{High Court maybe} pleased to condone the delay of (1733) days in filing the above Crl. Revision.

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Counsel for the Petitioners: M/s. M.V. Raj Kumar Gabriel

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Counsel for the Respondent: Assistant Public Prosecutor

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The Court made the following: COMMON ORDER

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THE HOIVOURABLE SRI JUSTICE E.V.VENUCTOPAL

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I.A.NO. 1 OF 4 IN AND CRIMINAL REVISION CASE N0.768 0F 2024

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COMMON ORDER:

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I.A.No. 1 of 2024 is frled seeking to condone the delay of 1733 days in liling the Criminal Revision Case No.768 of 2024.

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Crl.R.C.No 768 of 2024 is {iled challenging the Judgment dated 28.06.2O19 passed in Criminal Appeal No.514 of 2016 to the extent that the petitioners/accused Nos.2 and 3 are sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.500/- each for the offence under Section 447 of Indian Penal Code, 186O, in default of payment of fine, they shall suffer simple imprisonment for ten (10) days and further, they are sentenced to pa-y a fine of Rs. 1O,0OO/- each for the offence under Section 427 of IPC, in default of payment of hne, thev shall suffer simple imprisonment for fifteen (15) days.

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Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned Assistant Public Prosecutor and perused the record.

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Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that a-lthough there rs long delay in frling this crimina-l revision but t.I.e <sup>same has been duly explained in the aflidavit filed in support of the \ delay condonation application and as the same has not been

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intentional and deliberate, and therefore, the delay in hling this revision is liable to be condoned.

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Perusal of the averments made in the aJfrdavit Iiled in support of delay condonation application, it is revealed that after passing of Judgment dated 28.O6.2019, which is impugned herein, the petitioner hled this re',.ision against the said sentence of payment of fine. However, since 28.06.2019 the petitioners. /accused kept silence over the matter for a period of approximately four years, nine months, three days and only on LO.O7.2O24, the deponent of allidavit frled in support of delay condonation application, who is petitioner No.3, contacted their counsel and thereafter the present criminal revision along wittr this delay condonation application has been preferred against tl.e impugned Judgment.

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The delay so caused in filing of this criminal revision is not of short duration of a few days but is seriously inordinate. The position of law to condone the delay to avail any statutory remedy is no more res integra and the Apex Court in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee v.

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Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academyr, has expatiated upon this issue at length and has considered several authorities of Apex Court and has ultimately summarized -^the principles governing the issue at hand. ,(2013) 12 SCC 649

For ready reference, paragraph Nos.21 and 22 of the judgement rendered in Esha Bhattacharjee (supra) are being quoted herein below :-

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"2 l. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are:

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(i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice_oriented, non- pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice.

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(ii) The terms^,'sulflcient cause,, should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to t,.e obtaining factsituation.

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(iii) Su bstantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis.

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(iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on tre part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.

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(v) tack of bona fides imputable to a parlr se.eking condonation r:f delay is a significant arld relevant fact.

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(vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not alfect public justice and cause public mischief because tl:e courtl visr]ant so taat in the urrimate eventuate lere ts no real failure ofjustice. ":-:::"-t::::1fo..te

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(vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be a.llowed a totally unfettered free play.

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(viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short durat. ot few days' for to the former doctrine bf gyejudice is .,o'o' acted whereas to t}Ie latter it may

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not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation.

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(rx) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to.be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of bot1l parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach.

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(x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts shouid be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation.

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(xi) It is to be bome in mind that no one gets away witJ:r fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of lirnitation.

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(xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach shouid be based on t}le paradigm ofjudicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception.

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(xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude.

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To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: -

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(a) An application for condonation of delay should be dra-fted with careful concem and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the^principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to^justice dispensation system.

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(b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective.

(c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judiciat discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate in stitutional motto.

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(d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a nonserious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensi\z can be exhibited in a non-challan manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.,,

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Keeping in perspective the above noted principles as have been laid down by the Hon,ble Apex Court, this Court has adverted to the averrnents made in the aflidavit liled in support of the application seeking the condonation of delay. It is so clear that the delay after which the present revision in question has been filed is not of a few days but is inordinately prolix and therefore while adjudgrng the matter of dealing with the explanation as has been sought to be given in the application preferred by the petitioners, the same as such warrants a strict approach of the Court and not an extravagantl5. 1i5"., view. The allidavit frled on behalf of the petitioners only contains t}le chronological dates showing the delay and not the actual explanation as to why the delay has been caused. But why a diligent and carefur attitude was not shown. or could not be adopted in the matter and the reasons as to why dilferent steps by different authorities were taken after long gaps has not been explained at all. The factum of delay is already known

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and is not a mystery.^{Wtrat the Court is concernedabout is to know} the reasons of delay in^{liling of the revision,because itis only} thereupon that tJle^{Courtcan sit upon judgment and adjudge tl.e} genuineness or otherwise of^{the same. It appears to be a classic} case in which the application^{for condonation of delay has been put} forth "in a haphazard^{mannerharbouring the notionthat in all} events the Courts are^{simply requiredto condonethe delay on the} bedrock of the^{principlethat adjudication of a lis on merits is} seminal to^justice dispensation^{system." After allthe law as} contained in the^{Limitation Act is not just a paper tiger nor can the} statute book be treated^{as a toothlessvolumeenactedby the} legislation unmindfully^{without any purpose or aim to be achieved.} If scales of^justice ane^{to be balancedthen the courts cannotafford} to have a unilateral^{approach which should invariablybe} unfavourable to the^{partieswhichare likely to benefitby the order} under challenge.

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In the present case the^{explanationgiven in the alfidavit filed} in support of delay condonation^{applicationdoes not fall withinthe} terms 'sufficient cause',^{as is required for condonation of delay'} Mere contacting the^{counselto file alfidavitand toget the} documents typed cannot^{be treated to be suflicientcause for} condonation of delay of about^{1773 days by any stretch of}

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imagination. The total facts and circumstances of the case with regard to tJ,e delay in question and the hopelessly poor explanation with regard to same are such that the exercise of judicial discretion when founded on objective reasoning does not swing in favour of the petitioners and this Court feels constrained not to allow the application seeking the condonation of delay.

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