Allowed

Mohd. Jahangir v. The State of Telangana

Telangana HC5 Jul 2022CRLRC/71/2022

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Revision against refusal of discharge in a corruption case. The Government had earlier decided to initiate only a departmental enquiry against the public servant on the same material, but two months later the Managing Director accorded sanction for prosecution without any fresh material. The High Court held the sanction bad in law, set aside the order and discharged the accused.

What did the court decide?

Criminal Revision Case allowed; order dated 18.10.2021 in Crl.M.P.No.165 of 2015 in C.C.No.8 of 2014 set aside; petitioner/accused discharged of offences under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with Section 1

Mohd. Jahangir Vs The State of Telangana — Corruption | Telangana HC (2022)

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IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT HYDERABAD

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TUESDAY ,THE FIFTH DAY OF JULY TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY TWO

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PRESENT

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THE HONOURABLE DR. JUSTICE CHILLAKUR SUMALATHA

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CRIMINAL REVISION CASE NO: 71 OF 2022

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Crl. Revision case Under Sections 397 & 401 of Cr.P.C. aggrieved by the order dated 18-10-2021 in Crl.M.P.No. 165 of 2015 in C.C.No. 8 of 2014 on the file of the Court of the Principal Special Judge for Trial of SPE & ACB Cases , Hyderabad.

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Between:

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Mohd. Jahangir, S/o Mohd Osman, Aged 62 years, Technical Officer (Works) (Retired HMWS and SB, Hyderabad R/o 1-136, Vemkunta, Chanda Nagar, Miyapur, ...PETITIONER Hyderabad

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AND

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The State of Telangana, ACB, City Range-1 , Hyderabad Rep. by its Addl. SC cum Spl PP for ACB Cases, For the State of Telangana, High Court at Hyderabad.

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...RESPONDENT

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lA NO: 1 OF 2022

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Petition under Section 397 (1) of Cr.P.C.^praying that in the circumstances stated in the affidavit filed in support of the^petition, the High Court may be pleased grant stay of all further proceedings in C.C.No.B/2014 on the file the Principal Special Judge for SPE and ACB eases, Hyderabad^{pendingdisposal of} the main Criminal Revision .

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Counsel for the Petitioner: SRl. BADETI VENKATA RATHNAM

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Counsel for the Respondents: VIDHYA SAGAR RAO CHITNENI^{( SC SPLPP} FOR ACB)

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The Court made the following: ORDER

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HOI{BLE Dr. JUSTICE CHILLAKUR SUILIALATHA

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CRIMINAL REVISION CA SE No .71 OF 2022

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JUDGMENT..

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Challenge in this Criminal Revision Case is the order that is rendered by the Court of Principal Special Judge for trial of SPE and ACB Cases, Hyderabad in Crl.M.p.No.165 of 2015 in C.C.No.8 of 2Ol4 dated 18. tO.2O2t.

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The petitioner is arrayed as accused in C.C.No.B of 2014 wherein proceedings in the said Calendar Case were initiated basing on the allegation that he committed offences punishable under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. On taking cognizance of the offences against him by the Special Court, the petitioner moved an application for discharge. The said application uide Crl.M.P.No.165 of 2015 stood dismissed through order dated lB.lO.2O27. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner preferred the present Criminal Revision Case.

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DT.CSL,J

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Heard the submission of Sri Badeti^{Venkataratnam,} the learned counsel for the^{petitioner and the learned} Standing Counsel-cum-Special^{Public Prosecutor for ACB.} 4. The case of the prosecution in capsule^{is that the} sister of the defacto complainant^{appliedforwater} connection for her^{house and in that regard, for processing} the application frled by her, the^{petitioner/accused,who} was working as Work Inspector by then,^{demandeda sum} of Rs. 14,000/-, inctusive of taking a^{Demand Draft in} favour of Water Board, towards fee^{payable for water} connection. On request, the^{petitioner/accusedreduced} the amount from Rs.14,O0O/- to^{Rs. 1O,OO0/-.He informed} that a Demand Draft has to be taken^{for Rs.6,538/- for} sanction of water connection and that the^remaining amount would be taken by him as bribe.^{On further} request, the bribe amount^{was reduced to Rs.2,O0O/-and a} sum of Rs.6,600/- was ordered to^{be paid for Demand} Dra-ft including Demand Draft making charges.^{On a} complaint given, a trap was laid.

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The* main grievance that is exhibited by the petitioner/accused is' h^t.the prosecution initiated against

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Or CSI- , CrIRC No 7l of?0?2

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him is basing on the sanction order which was issued by the Managing Director, Hyderabad Metro Water Supply and Sewerage Board, Hyderabad (for brevity "HMWS&SB") dated 21.4.2014. But, two months prior to the issuance of the said proceedings, the Government issued proceedings dated 24.0220 14 deciding to initiate departmental enquiry instead of prosecution against him arld therefore, the subsequent sanction proceedings dated 21.4.2OI4 for prosecution against him is bad in law. Thus, tJle limited question involved in this Criminal Revision Case is:

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Whether th-e proceedings issued bg tLLe Managing Director, HMWS&SB, Hgderabad., uide proceedings No.9138/ 83/ 2010, d.ated 21.4.2014, u.tlwrein and uh.erebg sanction tuas accorded fo, prosecution of the petitioner/ acatsed, is ualid in the ege of la u.t.

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It is not in dispute that the respondent/complainant initiated prosecution against the petitioner/accused by pressing the charge sheet into seryice that he committed offences punishable under Sections 7, 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corn:ption Act, 19gB on the basis of the salction order, uid.e proceedin&_s-

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D. CSI I canc No rr or aoii

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No.9138/83 /2o1O, d,ated 27.4.2014 that was rssued by the Managing Director, MHWS&SB, Hyderabad.

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The whole contention of the petitioner/accused is that two months prior to the issuance of the above referred proceedings, the Government of A.p., Municipal Administration and Urban Development Department issued Proceedings dated 24.O2.2O14 deciding to initiate departmental enquiry instead of prosecution against him ald therefore, the subsequent proceedings issued for prosecution is bad in law. In this regard, the learned counsel for the petitioner/ accused submitted that the set of facts that were ta]<en into consideration for issuance of the proceedings dated 24.O2.2ll4,whereby a decision was taken to initiate departmental enquiry instead of Prosecution against t]le petitioner/accused and the facts and circumstances b aslng on which subsequent proceedings dated 21.4.2014 were issued for prosecution of the petitioner/accused a_re one and the same and therefore, exhibiting contrary views and thereby, driving the petitioner/accused to unnecessar5r hardship is bad in law.

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I
I
I

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DTCSL, CrlRC.No.Tl oa2l)22'

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Learned counsel furt-her contended that no further investigation was conducted between the interregnum period and no additional material or information was brought on record and therefore, taking a different view has to be condemned.

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Contradicting the said submission, learned Standing Counsel-cum-Special Fublic prosecutor for ACB contended that the Managing Director, HMWS&SB, Hyderabad is the competent authority to remove the petitioner/accused and the said authority, after carefully examining the material placed before him and on the basis of final report in respect of the allegations laid, issued proceedings d.ated. 2L.4.2O14 for prosecution of the petitioner/accused before the Court of law and accordingly, charge sheet was filed and therefore, no error whatsoever is committed by the Department of Anti Cormption Bureau. The learned Special Public prosecutor also contended that the petitioner/accused had got enough time to represent before the Anti Corruption Bureau about the earlier proceedings issued b5z the Government ald the Anti Cormption Bureau

Dr CSL, J

was not aware of the earlier proceedings dated 24.02.20L4 issued by the Government, wherein a decision was taken for initiating departmental enquiry instead of prosecution against the petitioner/accused. The learned Special Public Prosecutor further contended that when the appropriate authorit5r has accorded sanction basing on which prosecution was initiated against the petitionerT'accused, it is not desirable for the petitioner/accused to seek for discharge and in case, the charges that would be framed against him could not be proved by the prosecution, he would automatically get acquittal and therefore, agitation in this regard before the Special Court as well as before the High Court is unjustifiable. The learned Standing Counsel also stated that the Anti Corruption Bureau has nothing to do with the proceedings dated 24.02.2014 issued by^tJle Government as the same were not communicated to the Anti Corruption Bureau and therefore, the^proceedings issued by the Managing Director, HMWS&SB, Hyderabad holds good.

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orCSL., CrIRC No 7l ol2022

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Vehemently opposing the said submission, the learned counsel for the petitioner/accused stated that the earlier proceedings dated 24.O2.2014, by which a decision was taken to initiate departmental enquiry instead of prosecution against the petitioner/accused, were issued by the Principal Secretar5r to Government who is higher in rank and authority to that of the Managing Director, HMWS&SB, Hyderabad and in the light of the said proceedings, the Managing Director, HMWS&SB, Hyderabad has got no authoritli or power to take a contrary view and therefore, the subsequent proceedings dated 2 1.4.2O L 4 are unsustainable.

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The learned counsel for the petitioner/accused further contended that according sanction for prosecution is not an empty formality and it is the basis for the Anti Cormption Bureau to initiate criminal proceedings against the petitioner/accused and therefore, the proceedings issued according sanction for prosecution of the petitioner/accused formed basis for the case to stand. i 1. The Prevention of Cormption Act, 1988 is a

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legislation aimed at preventing corruption among the

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Dr CSt- ,

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public servants so that they adhere to the norns and discharge their duties without accepting or demanding any gratification or illegal remuneration or taking undue advantage of their position.

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Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 envisages that previous sanction is necessa-ry for prosecution and that, no Court shall take cogrrizance of offence punishable under Sections 7, 70, 11, 13 and 15 that are alleged to have been committed by a public servant except with the previous sanction.

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i3. For proper understalding, the said provision^is extracted as under:

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"Previous sanction necessary^{for prosecution.-} (1) No court shal1 take cognizance of an offence punishable under sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a^public servant, except with the previous sanction,-

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{q}^{in the case of a personwho is employed in} connection with the affairs of the Union andⁱ⁹ not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of that

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-Government;

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{b)^{in the case of a personwho is employed in} connection with the affairs of a State and is not removable from his oflice save by or with the^. '

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D. CSL, , CnRC No 7l 012022

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sanction of the State Government, of that Government; {9.}^{in the case of any other person,} of the authorit5r competent to remove him from his office."

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The fact that remains undisputed is that grant or refusal of sanction for prosecution is not an empty formality arld that the act of according sanction for prosecution must be preceded by proper application of mind by the competent authority.

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Making a submission that in the case on hand, the competent authority as well as the officials of the Anti Corruption Bureau have proceeded without application of mind and thereby, violated the mandate of law, the learned counsel for the petitioner/accused relied upon the decision that is rendered by the Honourable Apex Court in the case between the Stqte of Himachal Pradesh Vs. Nisho;nt

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Sareent. In the said case, the Principal Secretar5r (Heafth) on the basis of ttre material placed before her and on examination of the case found no justification in granting sanction to prosecute the accused officer. However, the Vigilance Department again took up the matter with the

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'^zorr illnsD 1a.,.)^s95(sc)

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D. CSI-, CdRC No.7l of2022

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Principal Secretary (Health), reconsidered the matter and thereafter, sanction was granted to prosecute the accused offrcer. Basing on the aforementioned facts and discussing the law governing the field, the Honourable Apex Court at para 8 of the order observed as follows:-

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"The object underlying Section 19 is to ensure that a public servant does not suffer harassment on fa-lse, frivolous, concocted or unsubstantiated allegations. The exercise of power under Section 19 is not an empty formality since the Government or for that matter the sanctioning authorit5r is supposed to apply its mind to tJ.e entire material and evidence placed before it and on examination thereof reach conclusion fairly, objectively and consistent with public interest as to whether or not in the facts and circumstances sanction be accorded to prosecute the public servant."

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Proceeding with the case, the Honble Apex Court at

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para 11 of the order held as under:-

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"11. Recently, in the case of State of punjab and Anr. v. Mohammed Iqbal Bhatti {2010 AIR SCW 1186) this Court had an occasion to consider the question whether the State has any power of review in the matter of grant of sanction in terms

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D.CSL.l

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of Section 197 of the Code. This Court observed as under:

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Although the State in the matter of grant or refusal to grant sanction exercises statutory jurisdiction, the same, however, would not mean that power once exercised cannot be exercised once again. For exercising its jurisdiction at a subsequent stage, express power of review in the State may not be necessary as even such a power is administrative in character. It is, however, beyond any cavil that while passing an order for grant of sanction, serious application of mind on the part of the concerned authority is imperative. The legality and/or validity of the order granting sanction would be subject to review by the criminal courts. An order refusing to grant sanction may attract^judicial review by the Superior Courts. Validity of an order of sanction would depend upon application of mind on the part of tJ:e authority concerned and ttre material placed before it. AII such material facts and material evidences must be considered by it. The sanctioning authority must apply its mind on such material facts and evidences collected during the investigation. Even such application of mind does not appear from the order of sanction, extrinsic evidences may be placed before the court in that behalf. While granting sanction, the authority cannot take into consideration an irrelevant fact nor can it pass an order on

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Dr.CSl.,.I

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extraneous consideration not germ€rne for passing a statutory order. It is also well settled that the Superior Courts cannot direct the sanctioning authority either to grant sanction or not to do so. The source of power of an authority passing an order of sanction must also be considered."

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Continuing the same, at paras 12 and 13 of the order the Hon'ble Apex Court observed as follows:-

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"12. It is true that the Government in the matter of grant or refusal to grant sanction exercises statutory power and that would not mean that power once exercised cannot be exercised again or at a subsequent stage in the absence of express power of review in no circumstalce whatsoever. The power of review, however, is not unbridled or unrestricted. It seems to us sound principle to follow that once the statutory power under Section 19 of the 1988 Act or Section 197 of the Code has been exercised by the Government or the competent auttrorit5r, as tJre case may be, it is not permissible for t.l'e sanctioning authority to review or reconsider the matter on the same materials again. It is so because unrestricted power of review may not bring finality to such exercise and on change of the Government or change of the person authorised to exercise power of sanction, the matter concerning sanction may be reopened by

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D.CSL,

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such authority for the reasons best known to it and a different order may be passed. The opinion on the same materials, thus, may keep on changing and there may not be any end to such statutory exercise. In our opinion, a change of opinion per se on the same materials calnot be a ground for reviewing or reconsidering the earlier order refusing to grant sanction. However, irt a case where fresh materials have been collected by the investigating agency subsequent to the earlier order and placed before the sanctioning authority and on that basis, the matter is reconsidered by the sanctioning authority and in tight of the fresh materials an opinion is formed that sanction to prosecute the public servzrnt may be granted, there may not be any impediment to adopt such course.

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Insofar as the present case is concerned, it is not even the case of the Appellant that fresh materials were collected by the investigating agency and placed before the sanctioning authority for reconsideration and/or for review of the earlier order refusing to grant sanction. As a matter of fact, from the perusal of the subsequent order dated March 15, 2008 it is clear that on t'Ilre same materials, the sanctioning authority has changed its opinion and ordered sanction to prosecute the Respondent which, in our opinion, is clearly impermissible."

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t4 Or CSL. J

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Making a submission that the facts and crrcumstalces under which the above decision was rendered are distinguishable to the facts and circumstances of the present case, the learned Speciat Public Prosecutor submitted that when the earlier order refusing to accord sanction was issued, one political party was ruling the State ald when the Government changed, another order was issued according sanction for prosecution and therefore, the analogr appted in the said decision cannot be applied to the facts of the present case. The learned counsel for the petitioner/accused submitted that such facts are no where narrated in the decision referred supra.

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Keeping aside the political drama due to change of Governments, this Court is of the considered yiew that even if the sarne Government issues proceedings contradictory to each other, the same would be amenable for challenge before the Court of law.

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Making his submission that the proceedings issued without application of mind is unsustainable and that the

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Dr CSL. ,

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earlier proceedings issued by the Government wherein sanction was not accorded for prosecution of the petitioner/accused was due to non_application of mind, the learned Special Public prosecutor relied upon the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case between K.Srlnloasulu Vs. Goaer.nment, of A.p.2, wherein discussing the legal position at length at para 15 of the order, it is observed as follows:-

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"While t}le order of sanction need not contain detailed reasons, the basic facts tJ at constitute the olfence must be apparent on the impugned order and the record must bear out the reasons in that regard. Proper application of mind to the existence of a prima facie case regarding the commission of the olfence is a precondition for the grant or the refusa-l to grant sanction."

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Further, discussing the requirement of obtaining sanction arrd envisagrng that grant of sanction is not an idle formality, ttre Court at paras 10 to 13 of the order held as under:-

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" lo.The requirement of obtaining sanction is to ensure that no public servant is unnecessarily

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'?zoro1z;elg^{1crt.) 147 (DBXAe)}

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Dr CSL.., CiIRC No 7r of2oi2

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harassed. Such protection is, however, not absolute or unqualified. While a public servant should be not subjected to harassment, genuine charges and allegations should be allowed to be examined by the Court. (State Vs. Krishanchand Khushalchand Jagtiani {AIR 1996 SC t91O}). The object of the provision for sanction is also that the authority giving the sanction should be able to consider for itself the evidence before it comes to the conclusion that the prosecution, in the circumstances, be sanctioned or forbidden. (Jaswant Singh v . State of punjab) {AIR 1958 SC 124]}. 11. Sanction lifts the bar for prosecution. Grant of sanction is not an idle formality or an acrimonious exercise but a solemn and sacrosanct act. (Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of A.P. {AIR lg7g SC6Z} It is a weapon to ensure discouragement of frivolous and vexatious prosecution and is a safeguard for the innocent, not a shield for the guilty. (Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan Vs. State of Gujarat { lgg1(Z) SCC 622}. 12. An order of sanction should aot be construed in a pedantic manner. The purpose for which an order of sanction is required to be passed should always be borne in mind. The order granting sanction must be demonstrative of the fact that there had been proper application of mind on the part of the sanctioning authority.

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D. CSL, J

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(State of Karnataka v. Ameerjan {(2OO7) 1 1 SCC 273|.

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Before sanction is granted, under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the competent authority should peruse the concerned documents and come to a dehnite conclusion that it is a case for prosecution or otherwise. It will be a futile exercise if the sanction order is passed in a routine manner. (Mohd.Jaffrullah Khan v. State QOOO^{(2) ALT (Crl.) 9 (AP)).The authorityentitled} to grant sanction must apply its mind to the f,acts of the case, evidence collected and other incidental facts before according sanction. The Legislature has conferred on the authority, competent to remove the public servant from ofiice, the power to grant sanction for the reason that he is competent to judge whether, on the facts alleged, there has been an abuse or misuse of the offrce held by the public servant. That authority would be in a position to know what was the power conferred on the oflice which the public servant hoids, how that power could be abused for corrupt motive and whether, prima facie, it has been so done. (R. S. Nayak Vs. A.R.Antulay {AIR 1984 SC 684}."

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Thus, even the decision that is relied upon by the learned Special Public Prosecutor also narrates the fact that the order of sanction must demonstrate that there had

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Dr CSL, -I CrIRC No 7l of2022

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been proper application of mind on part of the sanctioning authority. Undoubtedly, the sanctioning authority shoutd go through all the relevant documents that are produced by the Anti Corruption Bureau for perusal and thereafter, it has to come to a definite conclusion whether to accord sanction or not.

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The learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, in this regard, also relied upon the decision that is rendered by -this combined High Court in the case between Mohd.

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Aleemuddin Vs. State of A.F wherein discussing about the same set of facts as that of the present case, the Court at para 15 of the order observed as follows:-

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"I would like to state that t1le earlier order passed by ttre competent authority only directing departmental enquiry and not to initiate any criminal prosecution against the petitioner and the subsequent order passed by the competent authority according sanction to prosecute the petitioner are on the very same material. Moreover, in the earlier order, the sanctioning authority having considered the entire material placed before it in the form of final report Iiled by the A.C.B. specifically mentioned t-leat it seems to

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'zol+ 1r;^aLo 1crl.)^{l20 (Ap)}

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DTCSL,l

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be a case of foisted trap. Only after the letter dated 29.10.2010 addressed by the Director General, A.C.B. to reconsider the final report of A.C.B. dated 07.O2.2OO8 passed the second order directing the sanction to prosecute the petitioner. Absolutely no fresh material was placed before the sanctioning authority and no special reasons were assigned for according sanction to prosecute the petitioner in the second order. It would clearly appear to me that the sanctioning authority while passing second order was unable to apply its independent mind on account of tJ.e request made by the Director General, A.C.B. to reconsider the final report and has not exercised its discretion properly while according sanction contrary to its earlier order. The sanction order, therefore, seems to have been passed mechanically without application of mind. Further, as per the judgments relied on by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, the sanctioning authority cannot revise or review its own order on the same materia,l. In the present case, the sanctioning authority reviewed its own order on the same material. It also has not assigrred any cogent reasons as to why it took a different stand having earlier been thoroughly convinced that the case seems to be a case of foisted trap and that the petitioner in his explanation gave cogent and convincing reasons. This Court while acting under Section 4a2 Cr.P.C. . -

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DT CSL, '

if reaches the absolute certainty that the trial would only be a futile exercise, for the sanction being void, making the accused to undergo ordeal of trial would be an abuse of process of law and it would result in miscarriage of justice."

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In the case on hand, it is clear that the Principal Secretar5r to Government uide proceedings No.25287 I Vig.l(4/2A10-6 dated 24.O2.2OL4 came to a conclusion to initiate departmental enquiry instead of prosecution against the petitioner/accused. Paras 4 and 5 of the said proceedings are extracted as under:

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"4. Gover-nment after careful examination of the matter, have decided to initiate departmental enquiry instead of prosecution against Sri Mohd. Jahangir, Technical Officer, HyCerabad Metro Water Sewerage Board, Hyderabad.

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The Director General, ACB, Hyderabad is therefore, requested to lvithdraw the prosecution orciers of Sri Mohd. Jahangir, Technical Officer, Hyderabad Metro Water Serverage Board, H)derabad and furnish draft article of charges for initiating departmental enquiry against the AO, immediately."

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For the reasons best known, within two months i.e.,

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on 21.4.2014, the Managing Director, HMWS&SB,

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DTCSL, J

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Hyderabad, through proceedings No.9l3g/B3/2OtO accorded sanction for prosecution of the same person i.e., the petitioner/accused basing on the sarne set of facts and the same material that is produced. para 7 of the said proceedings is extracted as under:_

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"7. Now, therefore in exercise of the powers conferred by clause (c) of sub section(1) of Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 19Bg (Central Act 49 of 1988), I Sri J. Syamala Rao, Managing Director, HMWS&SB hereby accord sanction for prosecution of Sri Md. Jahangir S/o Md. Osman, Technical Oflicer (Works), HMWSSB, for the offences punishable under Sections 7, 13(21 rlw 13(1) (d) of the prevention of Corn-rption

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Act, 1988 and for any other cognate offences punishable under any other provisions of law for the time being in force in respect the above said acts and also for taking cognizance of the said offence by the court of competent jurisdiction."

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Though in the counter-affidavit filed and during the course of submission, the learned Special public Prosecutor contended that the Director General, Anti Cormption Bureau had no knowledge about the earlier proceedings issued by the Government dated 24.02.2074,

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D. CSL, ' CrlAC No 71012022

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this Court is not inclined to appreciate the said submission.

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A perusal of the said proceedings reveals that basing on the material produced by the Director General, Anti Corruption Bureau, Hyderabad through letter dated 19.3.2013, the said proceedings were issued. Further, the said proceedings discloses that a copy of the sarne was marked to the Director General, Anti Corn_rption Bureau. Subsequently, the proceedings dated 21.4.2014 were issued by the Managing Director, HMWS&SB, Hyderabad. But, when the earlier proceedings issued by the principal Secretary to Government dated 21.O2.2O14 is perused, this Court finds that a copy of the same was marked. to the Managing Director, HMWS&SB, Hyderabad also. When the said proceedings by which a decision was taken by the Government to initiate departmental enquiry instead of prosecution against the petitioner/accused was communicated to the Managing Director, HMWS&SB, Hyderabad, it is not known how subsequenfly the Managing Director, HMWS&SB, Hyderabad through

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DrCSL.,

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proceedings dated 27 .4.2014 accorded sanction for prosecution of the petitioner/accused. A copy of the said proceedings was also marked to the Director General, Anti Corruption Bureau. When two contradictory proceedings were before the Director General, Anti Corruption Bureau, why the said authority has not taken steps to get clarification or taken legal steps required under law is not mentioned any-rvhere. It is not the case of the respondent that further investigation was done during the interregnum period i.e., from 24.02.2014 to 21.4.2OI4 or that, other relevant material was produced before the Managing Director, HMWS&SB, Hyderabad by which he came to a different opinion or has taken a different decision. No doubt, grant or refusal to grant sanction is an exclusive prerogative. That would not mean that the power granted by the Prevention of Cormption Act, 1988 can be exercised at the whims and falcies of the concerned. However, it cannot be said that the order refusing to accord sanction cannot be revoked. It can be revoked only under special circumstances arrd salction can be accorded through subsequent proceedings only if additional material was

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D, CSL, , CiIRC No 7l of2o22

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brought on record by which a different opinion could be taken. But, in the case on hand, absolutely no fresh material was placed before the sanctioning authority. No special reasons whatsoever were assigrred for according sanction to prosecute the petitioner/accused. The earlier proceedings which were communicated. demonstrate in clear terms that after careful consideration of the material available on record, the principal Secretar5z to Government has taken a decision to initiate departmental enquiry against the petitioner/accused, refusing to accord sanction for prosecuting him though the Director Generat, Anti Cormption Bureau has made such a request.

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The points narrated above were also taken into consideration by the learned principal Special Judge for trial of SPE and ACB Cases, Hyderabad in the impugned order. However, the learned judge opined that in similar circumstances, in the cases filed under Section 4g2 Cr.P.C., the proceedings were quashed by the High Court and the Honourable Apex Court and therefore, that power cannot be exercised by the Specia_l Court for quashing the

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Dr CSL. ' CiIRC No?t ol2022

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t t

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proceedings. With the said observations, the. reqrrest of the petitioner/accused seeking discharge was negatived.

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This Court, by a_11 the discussion that went on supra, is of the view that the act of the Managing Director, HMWS&SB, Hyderabad, in according sanction for prosecution of the petitioner/accused, as required under Section 19 of the prevention of Corruption Act, 19gg, itself is bad in law. No Iruitful purpose would be served even if the proceedings are permitted to be continued against ttre petitioner/accused. Therefore, this court is of the view ttrat this Criminal Revision Case is liable to be allowed by setting aside the order under challenge.

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Resultartly, the Criminal Revision Case is allowed. The order that is rendered by the Court of principal Special Judge for trial of SpE and ACB Cases, Hyderabad in Crl.M.P.No.165 of 2015 in C.C.No.8 of 2Ot4 dated 78.LO.2O21 is set side. Consequently, the petitioner/accused is discharged of ttre offences under Sections 7, 13(1Xd) read with Section l3(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

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Dr CSII I

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