Allowed

M/s Sri Tulasi Industries v. M/s Sri Sapthagiri Industries

Telangana HC9 Jun 2021CMA/496/2020

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court allowed an appeal by the appellant, a registered trademark owner of 'TASTY GOLD'. The court set aside the trial court's order dismissing an interim injunction application and restoring the earlier injunction against respondents using similar marks. The appeal was allowed based on prima facie evidence of goodwill, similarity, and likelihood of deception.

What did the court decide?

The Civil Miscellaneous Appeal was allowed. The impugned order dismissing the interim application was set aside, and the prior interim injunction was restored until the disposal of the original suit.

M/s Sri Tulasi Industries Vs M/s Sri Sapthagiri… — Intellectual Property | Telangana HC (2021)

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HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA

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AT HYDERABAD

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WEDNESDAY, THE NINTH DAY OF JUNE TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY ONE

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PRESENT

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THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA KODANDA RAM

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CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 496 OF 2020

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Appeal Under Order 43 Rule 1 & 2 of Code of Civil Procedure against the Order and Decree in 1.A.No.2190 of 2019 in O.S.No.210 of 2019 dated 08.06.2020^{on the file} of the Court of the Principal District Judge, Mahabubnagar.

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Betwee n:

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M/s Sri Tulasi lndustries,^(a regd. Partnership firm)^{D.No.1-5-499,SircillaRoad,} Kamareddy - 503 111 (T.S). Represented by its Partner^{N.Uday,S/o. N. Maruthi,} aged 63^years.

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...APPELLANT/PLAI NTIFF

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AND

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M/s Sri Sapthagiri Industries, H.No.3-1-277, Sircilla Road,^{Kamareddy (T.S).} Rep. by its Managing Partner K. Surya Prakash, Sio. Govind, aged^{45 yrs.}

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Mls. Sri Srinivasa Kiranam General Stores, D. No.^{4-4-62, BrahmanVadi, Ram} Mandir, Mahabubnagar (T.S). Rep. by tits Prop. Y. Pramod Kumar,^S/o. Timmaiah, aged 45^yrs.

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...RESPONDENTS

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Counsel for the Appellant: SRI K. HEMA PRAKASH RAO

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Counsel forthe Respondent No.1: SRI ASHOK RAM KUMAR

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The Court delivered the following: JUDGMENT

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THE HON'BLE^{SRI JUSTICE CHALLA KODANDARAM}

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]UDGMENT

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in this appeal, challenge^{is to the order dated 08'06'2020 passed} by the learned Principal^{District Judge, at Mahabubnagar,in I'A'No'2190} of 2019 in O.S.No.210^{of 2OLg, dismissingthe applicationfiled by the} appellant/plaintiff^{under Order 39 Rules land 2 of Code of Civll} Procedure, seeking^{temporary injunctionagainstthe respondentsfrom:}

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"(a) infringing^{the exclusivestatutory right to the registered trade} mark 'Tasty Gold';

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(b) copyright o the appellant^{to the artisticfeaturesincludingthe} colour scheme, layout^{andthe trade dress appearing on the label;} and

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(c) passing off their oils^{bearing the impugned trademarks 'Tasty} Drop' & 'Tasty Plus+'^{and otheraestheticfeatures includingthe} colour scheme, layout^{and trade dress or any mark which is} identical with or similar or^{deceptivelysimilarto theregistered} trademark, 'Tasty^{Gold'as oils of the appellant'smanufacture'"}

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It is the case of the^{a ppella nt/plaintiff that the appellant is a flrm} dealinginedibleoilsundertheregisteredtrademarkstyledas"TASTY GOLD"; that the^{predecessorof the appellant-firm had surveyedthe} market and only^{after satisfying that no other firm has the trademark} with the unique^{design and style as depictedin "TASTY GOLD"Iogo'} obtained the registration^{videNo.3136998datedt6'72'2016 in Class-29} under the Trade^{MarksAct, 1999;that the predecessorof the appellantis} the originator of^{aestheticfeatures on the labelas appearingin "TASTY} GOLD" logo and^{enjoys copyrightfor the trade mark; that the trademark} was assigned to the^{appellantfirm vide Deed of Assignmentdated} ll.lo.2018therebytheappellantbecamethe'.subsequentproprietors,,of thetrademark;thattheappellantfirmobtainedregistrationofthe

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trademark full label^{.TASTY GoLD,,vide No.4039640in Class-29under} the Trade Marks Act;^{that the appellant has been spending huge moneyin} promotingitsgoodswhichhelpedintheirsubstantialturnoverandalso considerable^{goodwill and reputation of the trade mark;that to ensure} quality of the edible oils, the appellant^{periodically sends the same for} testing; that the respondent^{is a newcomerinto the business of edible oils} andlocatedneartheappellantfirm;thattherespondent'sapplication No.3999625 for^{registration of mark.TASTYDRoPS, has a mentionthat} thesameis'proposedtobeused'ason16.11'2018;thattheapplication of the respondent has^{beenrefused by the authorities; that the appellant} having noticed that the^{respondent is using similarpouches containing the} mark 'TASTY DROPS' amounts^{to infringement of the rights of the} appellant under the^{Trade Marks Act and CopyrightAct and the} respondent has been^{passing off his goods as the goods of appellant firm;} that the appellant issued^{"Ceaseand Desist" noticedated 15'12'2018to} the respondent, to^{which the respondent issued a vague reply dated} 25.L2.20L8; that the^{appellantfiled the suit on 11'11'2019andan} lnjunction order was^{granted against the respondentin I'A'No'2190of} 2019; that after hearing^{boththe parties,the Court below dismissed the} I.A.No.219O of 2019 and^{vacatedthe injunctionorder.}

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It is the case of the respondent^{No'l that it is a partnership firm} registered under the^{IndianPartnership Act dealinq in manufacture,} processing and marketing of edible oits^{under varioustrademarks,more} specifically "TASTY DROPS"^{and *'TASTYPLUS+"; that the contention of} the appellant that the trademarks^{of the respondentare deceptively} similar is false; that the^{word "TASTY" is a descriptiveword and the} appellant cannot claim^{exclusive rightover the same; that the words are} phonetically identical cannot be maintained as^{the words "Drops,Plus+} are not found in the appellant's^{trade mark;that the words "Drops" and} "Plus+" are completely different^{suffixes and are not identical to the word}

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cfia _496 _2020 CKR, J

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"Gold" suffix of the^{appellant;that the mark of the appellant "TastyGold"} is a generlc word having individual^{meaningfor each word and such word} is a usual term and can^{be used by anybody and thereFore cannot quallfy} for any protection; that the^{appellant cannot claim monopoly over the} word "Tasty"; that the^{respondent has not copied on its pouchesthe} artistic and aesthetic features and^{design of the appellantand the} respondent's mark pouches contain an artifact^{of a} lady which cannot be seen in the packaging pouches of the appellant; that as per the Trade Marks Act, the whole trade mark has to be seen and not the ind ivid ua^I elements inasmuch as the^{word "Tasty" is only an elementof mark of} appellant and not the complete^{trade mark; that the applicationof the} appellant vide No,4376849 dated^{L3'12.2019for registration of the word} "Tasty" has been objected to^{and kept pendingby the authorities; that} Section 30 of the^{Trade Marks Act, 1999, limits the rights in the} Registration to use the^{marks (words)/images (logos) which are common} to trade and adopted by^{the respondent with honest practices; that the} respondent filed various^{pouchescommonly used in the trade that uses} the words "Tasty" as^{well as "Gold" as well as the oil and palm seeds,} groundnut, Sunflower in common^{parlance for edible oil; that Section} 30(2)(a) clearly exempts the^{usage of the word which indicateskind,} quality, quantity, intended^{purpose,value,geographicalorigin,the time} of production of^{goods or of renderingof servicesor other characteristics} of goods or services; that^{the word "Tasty" is indicative of the} characteristics of the^{goods being cooked using the oil; that thoughthe} word '.Gold,, also ind|cates^{the quality of the product and does not extend} any protection, the^{respondentdid not choose to use "GOLD"thoughits} usage is^{permitted;that a combined readingof Sections 17,27} '^{28' 29'} 3Q,clearly establish^{that there is no infringementof the appellant mark} "Tasty Gold" by the^{respondent'susage of marks"Tasty Drops" or "Tasty}

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CKR, ]

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Plus+"; that the words "Tasty" and^"Gold" being^generic in nature, the appellant cannot claim any protection or monopoly.

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Heard the learned counsel for the appellant; and the learned counsel for the respondent.

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Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the trial Court erred in observing that there is no prima facie case established by the appellant in support of exclusive usage of the mark "TASTY GOLD" and that it erred in observing that the mark "TASTY GOLD" is^generic in nature, by relying on the decision of Delhi High Court in Time Incorporated v. Lokesh Srivastaval, Learned counsel further contended that the learned Court below failed to notice the trademark in the citation relied on by the respondent is "SUGAR FREE" and not "TASTY GOLD". It that the Court below had failed to appreciate that the suit relates to grant of injunction and not for declaration and the Court below had overstepped in holding the mark TASry GOLD as generic thereby made it open to public at large for use; that the Court below failed to assign reason as to how the interim order granted on prima facie case on 11.11.2019 can be vacated where there is no change in prima facie case; that the Court below ought to have considered the law settled by the Supreme Court in Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutt Sharma v, Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories2, the marks "rVAtlAR ATNA PHARMACY" and "NAVARATNA PHARMACEUTICAL LABORATORIES", and in Ruston and Hornsby Ltd v. Zamindara Engg. Co.3, the marks "RUSTOIV" and "RUSTAM INDIA" were held to be confusingly slmilar.

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Learned counsel for the appellant further contended that the Court below failed to appreciate the appellant is the registered proprietor of

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'zoos 1:1^erc a 1oet1

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'^{unruu/sc/ot gzlt964} = =^ArR 1965 sc 980 t atR tgzo sc r6a9

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c"r,a _496 _2420 CKR, J

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trademark "TASTY GOLD"^{and ignored the provisions of Section 29(3) of} the Trade Marks Act; and the^{Court belowfailed to noticethe action of} infringement under the Copyright Act^{basing on the "artistic work"} contained on the^pouches used by^{it for packing edible oils. It is further} contended that the Court^{below failed to considerthe rights of the} appellant firm who is the^{prior userand has completely ignored the huge} turnovers clocked by it from^{the year 2000 and that the respondenthas} also not denied that the appellant^{is the prior user of the mark "TASTY} GOLD", and the Court below^{erred in comparing the registeredlabel} marks Exs.P1 and P13 of the^{appellant ratherthan comparingthe} appellant's mark and respondent's mark,^{Learned counsel further} contends that the Court below erred^{in not taking into considerationthe} enormous^goodwill that has been^{built over the mark of the appellant} while deciding the^passing off action,^{and that the Court below failed to} consider that even descriptive^{mark is entitled for the relief of injunction} under common law.

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7, Per contra, learned counsel for^{the respondent,while supporting} the order of the learned^{PrincipalDistrictJudge,submits that the learned} Judge had elaborated the respective^{pleadings and found that the claim} of the appellant that he^{is the user of the trademark TASTY GOLD since} the year 2000 was not established^{by the appellantand thereare a large} number of edible^{products manufacturers using the wordsTASTYand} GOLD with respect to their^{respective products and therefore there is no} distinctness associated^{with the trademark TASTY GOLD as espousedby} the petitioner and therefore^{the court below had found that there is no} prima facie case made out by the appeliant,^{and had rightlyvacated the} ex parte injunction order^{passed in favour of the appellant on} ]-7:IL.2ot9.

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CKR, J

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B. Learned counsel for the respondent would also, by placing reliance on the judgment of the High Court of Madras in Patanjali Ayurved

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Limited v. Arudra Engineers Private Limiteda contend that the protection afforded in terms of Section 17 of the Trade Marks Act is not for "individual pa rts/co m pon ents" of a trademark but for the "whole and entire trade mark". Learned counsel places particular reliance on paragraphs 79, 81, 82 and 83 of the said judgment, which are extracted hereu nd er:

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"79.^Further, even under Section 17 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999, protection is only afforded to the entire trademark as rogistered, and not to mere parts of the trade mark. In the instant case, registration has been obtained by the plaintiff over the label with the words and alpha numeral Coronil 92B and Coronil 213 SPL as a composite mark and not as a word for "Coronil" as envisaged under Section 15. Thereforo, for the purpose of Section 29 (a) of the Trade Marks Act, '1999, the respondenuplaintiff cannot claim monopoly over the word "Coronil" as it was registered as a part of composite mark. We also wish to observe that when each part of a label mark is capable of being individually registered, we cannot dissect and split up into its component parts and grant an injunction. ln this regard, we are fortified by the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Rhizome Distilleries case, mentioned supra and useful reference can be made to the observations made therein:-

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"Conflicting composition marks are to be compared by looking at them as a whole, rather than breaking the marks up into their component parts for comparison. This is the'anti- dissection' rule.... A mark should not be dissected or split up into its component parts and each part then compared with corresponding parts of the conflicting mark to determine the likelihood of confusion. lt has been held to be a violation of the antidissection rule to focus upon the 'prominent' feature of a mark and decide likely confusion solely upon that feature, ignoring all other elements of the mark. Similarly, it is improper to find that one portion of a composite mark has no trademark significance, leading to a direct comparison between only that which

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remains."

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" mnruu/rr'r/oaaz/zozr

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cma_495_2020 CKR, ]

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Though the respondent's/plaintiff's label registered as a trademark and incorporates the word "Coronil", it cannot be said that the word "Coronil" adopted by the appellants/defendants was similar to that of the registered labels of the respondenUplaintiff.

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lt would have been different if the respondenuplaintiff had obtained a registration of the word "Coronil" or any other word which was phonetically similar or identical with the aforesaid word. Therefore, it cannot be said that the respondenuplaintiff had established a prima facie for the purpose of grant of interim relief for the alleged infringement of trademark under Section 29(4) of the Trademarks Act, 1999. That apart, respondenuplaintiff was also required to satisfy reputation in India and that the use of the offending word as a trademark by the appellants/defendants was "without due cause" and was intended to take unfair advantage by using the offending mark and that such use was detrimental to the distinctive character or reputation in the registered trademark. These are matters which are to be determined only after trial.

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As the respondenUplaintiff had not claimed any monopoly over the word "Cornonil" by obtaining a separate registration of the aforesaid word as a word mark, we are of the prima facie view that the impugned order is liable to be set aside even if respondenuplaintiff may have a case for dilution of its trademark by the appellants/defendants, ln case, there is dilution of the trademarulabel of the respondent/plaintiff, the respondenupla intiff can clalm damages which has to be determined only after a trial."

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Learned counsel for the respondent would further contend, by placing reliance on the order of the Supreme Court in Bajaj Auto Limited v. TVS Motor Company Limiteds, that in cases relating to trade marks, the Courts shall endeavour to dispose oF the main suit itself rather than deciding the interlocutory applications and the said rationale in the Civil Appeal before the Supreme Court would equally apply to the present CMA as well. It is Further contended that as the Court below found that there is no prima facie case made out by the appellant, the ex parte interim injunction was vacated and therefore this Hon' ble Court may dispose of this civil miscellaneous appeal by directing the Court

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'^{G\4l'lppeal No.639Oof2OO9}

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CKR,.I

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below to dispose of the Original^{Suit itself within a specifictimeframe as} may be set by this Court and^{his client is readyto cooperatewith the} trial.

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Having considered the^{respectivepleadings and perusing the} material on record, at the outset,^{it cannot be said that the appellant had} failed to establish his claim^{of registered user of the markTASTYGOLD} from the^year 2000. It may^{be noted that it is not the case of eitherthe} respondent or the finding^{recordedby the Courtbelowthat the trade} mark itself was not^{registered as pleaded by the respondent, and the} registration of trade^{markvide certificatedated 15'06.2019, and the} appellant was using the^{mark TASTY GOLD at least sincethe year 2002} as evidenced by few of^{the sale invoices placed beforethe Court below} are not in dispute.

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The case^pleaded by the^{appellant is that the respondentis} marketing similar^{productsthat are being manufacturedand markedby} the appellant, in the^{form ofpouches/packag ing, andthe} packag ing/pouches are deceptively similar to^{that of the appellant} thereby^passing off the^{goods as if they are manufactured andmarketed} by the appellant.

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In this context, the^{prayersought/reliefclaimed by the appellant in} the Original Suit No.210^{of 2019 requires to be noticed:}

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"The^{plaintiffpraysthat the Hon'bleCourtwill be pleasedto pass a} decree:

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(a) granting permanent in,iunction^{restraining the defendants'their} servants, subordinates,^{assignees, licensees,representatives,} stockists, dealers,^{agents, successors-in'interest and all other persons} claiming under them or^{acting in concert with them or acting at their} instance from infringing the^{exclusivestatutory right of the plaintiffto} the trademark,^{TASTY GOLD under the Trademarks Act,1999.}

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(b) granting permanent injunction restraining the^{defendants,their} servants, subordinates,^{assignees, licensees,rep res e ntatives,}

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cma_496_2020 CKR, J

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stockists, dealers, agents, successors-in-interest^{and all other persons} claiming under them or acting in concert with^{them or acting at their} instance from infringing copyright of the^{plaintiff to the aesthetic} features, colour scheme, layout and the trade dress^{appearingon the} label under the Copyright Act, 1957.

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(c) granting permanent injunction restraining the defendants from passing off their oils bearing the impugned trademarks, "TASTY DROPS" and "TASTY PLUS+" and other artistic features, the colour scheme, the layout and the trade dress or any^{markwhichis identical} with or similar, or deceptively similar to the registered^trademark, TASTY GOLD as oils manufactured by the^plaintiff.

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(d) granting damages against the defendants for having caused loss to the business, reputation and^goodwill to the^registered trademark and other a(istic features appearing on^{the label of the} plaintiff;

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(e) to deliver up for destruction of all the impugned^{labels of the} defendants containing the trademarks, TASTY^{DROPSand TASTY} PLUS+ and other artistic features, the colour^{scheme,the layoutand} the trade dress.

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(0 costs of the suit;

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(s) such other and further reliefs as the^{nature and circumstances} of the case may require."

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Having perused the^{pictures/photographs/imagesproducedby} both the learned counsels, this Court though^{findscertain dissimilarities,} however, in the light of the^fa ctors/pa^{ra mete rs laid down by the Supreme} Court in Cadita Health Care Ltd. V. Cadila^{PharmaceuticalsLtd6, the} learned Principal District Judge failed to examine^{and give a flnding with} respect to similarities, which were required^{to be taken into} consideration, as emphasised in^{paragraph35 of the judgment,which} reads as under:

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"Broadly stated in an^{action for passing off on the basis of} unregistered trade mark^generally for^{deciding the questionof} deceptive similarity the following^factors to^{be considered:}

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o 1rR 2oo1 sc t9s2

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a) The nature of the marks i.e. whether the marks are word marks or label marks or composite marks, i.e. both words and label works.

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b) The degree of resembleness between the marks, phonetically similar and hence similar in idea.

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c) The nature of the goods in respect of which they are used as trade marks.

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d) The similarity in the nature, character and performance of the goods of the rival traders.

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e) The class of purchasers who are likely to buy the goods bearing the marks they require, on their education and intelligence and a degree of care they are likely to exercise in purchasing and/or using the goods.

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f) The mode of purchasing the goods or placing orders for the goods and

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g) Any other surrounding circumstances which may be relevant in the extent of dissimilarity between the competing marks.

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L4. Further, in paragraph 29 of Kaviraj pandit (2 supra), the Hon, ble Supreme Court held as under:

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"29. When once the use by the defendant of the mark which is claimed to infringe the plaintiffs mark is shown to be ,,in the course of trade, the question whether there has been an infringement is to be decided by comparison of the two marks. Where the two marks are identical no further questions arise; for then the infringement is made out. When the two marks are not identical, the plaintiff would have to estabtish that the mark used by the defendant so nearly resembles the plaintiffs registered trade mark as is rikery to deceive or cause confusion and in relation to goods in respect of which it is registered (Vide s. 21). A point has sometimes been raised as to whether the words,,or cause confusion" introduce any element which is not already covered by the words "likely to deceive,' and it has sometimes been answered by saying that it is merely an extension of the earlier test and does not add very materially to the concept indicated by the earlier words ,,likely to deceive". But this apart, as the question arises in an action for infringement the onus wourd be on the praintiff to estabrish that the trade mark used by the defendant in the course of trade in the goocts in respect of which his mark is registered, is deceptively similar. This has

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)

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cfia _496_2020 CKR, J

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necessarily to be ascertained^{by a comparisonof the twomarks-the} degree of resemblance^{which is necessary to existto cause deception} not being capable of definition^{by layingdown objective standards'} The persons who would^{be deceivedare,of course,thepurchasersof} the goods and it is the^{likelihoodof their beingdeceivedthat is the} subject of consideration.^{The resemblance may be phonetic,visualor} in the basic idea represented^{by the plaintiffsmark. Thepurpose of the} comparison is for determining^{whetherthe essential featuresof the} plaintiff's trade mark are to be found in^{that used by the defendant'The} identification of the essential^{featuresof the mark is in essencea} question of fact and depends on the^{judgmentof the Court basedon} the evidence led before it as^{regards the usage of the trade.lt should,} however, be borne in mind^{thatthe objectof the enquiry in ultimate} analysis is whether the mark^{used by the defendantas a wholeis} deceptively similar to^{that of the registered mark of the plaintiff'"}

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In the case on hand,^{whilethe descriptive words used though are} different, the First word^{TASTY being common in the products of both} appellant and respondent,^{and the second word being different, and} further the respondent's^{label on the pouches depictan image of a} woman, the differences are^{required to be viewedin the light of the} pa ra meters/fa ctors laid down by the^{SupremeCourt as extractedin} paragraph 35 (c), (d) and (e) of Cadila Health^{Care Ltd (6 supra),and} also^paragraph 29 of the^{judgmentof Supreme Courtin Kaviraj Pandit} (2 supra).

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l6.Inthepresentcase,thepleadingwhichlsnotindisputeisthatthe appellant is in the^{businessof manufacturing and marketingof edibleoils} slnce the^year 2000^{and their mark was registeredin the year 2000} initially, whereas the respondent^{commencedthe business in edibleoils} onlyintheyear2018andtherespondenthadappliedforregistrationof the trade mark in the^{year 2018. Thereis also no disputethat the} respondent is manufacturing^{and marketingthe product in the same} place, within the same area/locality^{in Kamareddy, and the marketing is} also within the same area.^{In that view of the matter, at this stage, it} cannot be^gain said^{prima faciethat there is no goodwillgained by the}

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CKR, ]

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appellant in the edible oil business since the^year 2000 and^the respondent is trying to ride on that^{goodwill gained} by the appellant. Prima facie it cannot be said that there is no^loss that^{is being caused to} the appellant though the measure of loss is a matter which^{is requiredto} be established in the trial,

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The^judgment of the High Court of Madras in Patanjali Ayurved (4 supra) relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent^is distinguishable on facts, as in that case the^{products manufacturedand} marketed in Patanjali Ayurved⁽⁴ supra)^{were entlrely different,one} being an engineering/industrial^product, and^{the other being an immunity} booster. In the^present case on^hand, the^{extent to which there is} similarity or dissimilarity between the^products of the^appellantand respondent is an aspect that is required to be^{considered in duringthe} course of full fledged trial.

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In the facts of the^present case, as^{stated supra, the learned} Principal District Judge failed to consider the^{aspects of balance of} convenience, and irreparable loss, and the^{learnedJudge wascontent} with dismissing the interlocutory application^{holdingthat there is no} prima facie case made out.

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Having regard to the facts^placed on^{record, prima facie, this Court} is of the opinion that there are certain similarities^{betweenthe registered} trade mark/label of the appellant and the mark^{being usedby the} respondent; and the appellant being a^prior user of^{the trade mark,in} point of time, the appellant cannot be said to have not established some goodwill in the area/locality of operation of business oF appellant^and thus cannot be said to be^put to loss and thus the balance^{of convenience} is in favour of the appellant for continuation of the^{injunction initially} granted by the learned Principal District Judge, till the disposal of the main case.

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cfia_496-2020 CKR, J

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20, Accordingly, the Civil Miscellaneous Appeal is allowed by setting aside the impugned order dated 08.06.2020 in I.A.No.2190 of 2019, and restoring the injunction order passed on 11.11.2019 against the respondent herein till the disposal of the Original Suit. The learned Principal District .Judge shall dispose of the Original Suit within a period of six months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. It is made clear that the observations made in this civil miscellaneous appeal are only for the purpose of disposal of the appeal, and the learned Principal District Judge shall dispose of the Original Suit strictly on merits basing on the oral and documentary evidence that may be adduced by both the parties, uninfluenced by the observations made by this Court in this civil miscellaneous appeal. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending in this appeal, shall stand closed.

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//TRUE COPY//

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SD/. B.S. CHIRANJEEVI JOINT REGISTRAR ^r/

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SECTION OFFICER

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One Fair Copy to^{the Hon'bleSRIJUSTICE CHALLA KODANDARAM} ' - (For His LorshiP's Kind Perusal)

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To,

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