domain of the very same Officer; that is, the Joint Registrar; to feel aggrieved and file a writ petition challenging the order which the Cooperative Tribunal had passed. The reasons for this view are vivid; but not, even, enumerable with precision to be ordained with the cloak of finality. Yet, firstly, it amounts to insubordination of the Tribunal itself. Secondly, it amounts to the statutory decision making authority trying to justify its order before the Tribunal, where its decision is under challenge; and even before the superior Courts. This is impermissible except in cases where making of the order challenged before the superior Tribunal or Court is charged with allegations of personal malice, malafides or arbitrariness or bias referable to that individual who delivered the order which has been subjected to challenge. Thirdly; and more importantly; the authority of the first instance to challenge the superior statutory authority’s verdict; notwithstanding the applicability of the doctrine of merger; smacks not institutional insubordination; but, an endeavour to assert that the first authority was correct. This would, in such cases, evince subject matter prejudice. The order of supersession was set at naught by a superior authority through an interlocutory order within the statutory provisions. All these factors taken together would show that there is no legal right for the Joint Registrar to file the writ petition, from which this writ appeal arises, to challenge the order of the Co-operative Tribunal suspending the supersession order of the Committee of the Society. What we have stated here are fundamental. See for support: Manmohan Deo vs. State of Bihar1 , Syed Yakoob vs. K.S.Radhakrishnan2 , Metropolitan Properties Co., (F.G.C.) Ltd., vs. Lannon and others3 , Cassell & Co., Ltd., vs. Broome and