Dismissed

Yerri Vishnu Vardhan Reddy v. The State of Andhra Pradesh

Telangana HC1 Aug 2017CRLRC/2197/2017

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

In this criminal revision, the single judge held that an order recalling a witness and allowing receipt of documents at the trial stage is interlocutory in nature. Upholding it would not terminate the trial. Consequently, revision under Section 397 Cr.P.C. was not maintainable and the petition was dismissed.

What did the court decide?

The revision petition is dismissed; liberty granted to the petitioners to seek appropriate authorization before the Authority.

Yerri Vishnu Vardhan Reddy Vs The State of… — Civil Procedure and Limitation | Telangana HC (2017)

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THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE M.SATYANARAYANA MURTHY

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CRL. R.C. NO.2197 OF 2017

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ORDER:

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This criminal revision case is filed under Sections 397 and 401 of Cr.P.C. challenging the order dated 13.06.2017 in Crl.M.P.No.36 of 2017 in S.C.No.364 of2011 Assistant Sessions Judge, Proddatur, YSR Kadapa District in an application filed under Sections 231, 311 r/ w Section 294 and 2(Wa) of Cr.P.C.

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It is only an order under Sections 231 and 311 Cr.P.C. and the petition was allowed by the trial Court and received the documents subject to proof and relevancy. The objection raised about the maintainability is that the application is an interlocutory in nature and against the order passed in a petition under Section 311 Cr.P.C., no revision is maintainable in view of interdict contained under Section 397(2) Cr.P.C. This question is clearly covered by Apex Court in SETHURAMAN v. RAJAMANICKAM¹ and another judgment in MOHANLAL SHAM LAL SONI v. UNION OF INDIA AND ANOTHER² .

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This order of receiving documents and recalling witness would not culminate the entire proceedings, if the order is allowed to sustain.

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In Mohan Lal Magan Lal Thacker Vs. State of Gujarat³ , Their Lordships Chief Justice K.N.Wanchoo, Justice J.M.Shelat, Justice R.S.Bachawat, Justice G.K.Mitter and Justice C.A.Vaidyialingam, after considering various judgments of Federal Court and Privy Council, defined the word ‘interlocutory order’ and held (Per Wanchoo C.J., Shelat J. and Vaidialingam J.) as follows:

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1 2009 Crl.L.J. 2247

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2 AIR 1991 SC 1346

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3 AIR 1968 S.C. 733

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“ (i) A judgment or order may be final for one purpose and interlocutory another or final as to part and interlocutory as to part. The meaning of the two words ‘final’ and ‘interlocutory’ is, therefore to be considered separately in relation to the particular purpose for which it is required. However, generally speaking a judgment or order which determines the principal matter in question is termed final. It may be final although it directs enquiries or is made on an interlocutory application or reserves liberty to apply. [687 H; 688 A, B].

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Salaman Vs. Warner [1891] 1 Q.B. 734, Standard Discount Co. Vs. La Grange [1877] 3 C.P.C. 67, A.Great Eastern Rail Co. [1879] 27 W.R. 759, Shutrook Vs. Tufnell [1882] 9 Q.B.D. 621, Bozson Vs. Altrincham Urban Council [1903] 1 K.B. 547, Abdul Rehman Vs. The Kind [1947] Cassim & Sons Vs. 60 IA 76, S.Kuppusami Rao Vs. King [1497] F.C.R. 180, Mohammad Amin Brothers Ltd. Vs. Dominion of India [1949] F.C.R. 842, Sardar Svedna Taher Saifuddin Saheb Vs. The State of Bombay [1958] S.C.R. 1007, Jethainand and Sons Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh [1961] 3 S.C.R. 754, Premchand Satramadas Vs. State of Bihar [1950] S.C.R. 799, State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Sujan Singh [1964] 7 S.C.R. and State of Orissa Vs. Madan Gopal [1952] S.C.R. 28, referred to.

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(ii) The order of the High Court in the present case disposed of the controversy whether the filing of the complaint against the appellant was justified. The finality of that order was not to be judged by co-relating that order with the controversy in the controversy viz., whether the appellant had committed the offence charged against him therein. The fact that the controversy remained alive was irrelevant. Consequently the order passed by the High Court in the revision filed by the appellant was final order within the meaning of Art. 134(1)(c). [693 D-H] Ramesh Vs. Patni [1966] 3 S.C.R. 198, relied on.

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……………”

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In decision reported in Amar Nath and others Vs. State of Haryana and others⁴ , Their Lordships Justice N.L.Untwalia and Justice S.Murtaza Fazal Ali held as follows:

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“ The term ‘interlocutory order’ in Section 397(2) has been used in a restricted sense and not in any broad or artistic sense. It merely denotes orders of a purely interim or temporary nature which do not decide or touch the important rights or the liabilities of the parties. Any order which substantially affects the right of the accused or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order, because that would be against the very object which formed the basis for insertion of this particular provision in S.397. Thus, for instance orders summoning

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4 AIR 1977 S.C. 2185

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witnesses, adjourning cases, passing orders for bail, calling for reports and such other steps in aid of the pending proceeding, may no doubt amount to interlocutory orders against which no revision would lie under section 397(2). But orders which are matters of moment and which affect or adjudicate the rights of the accused or a particular aspect of the trial cannot be said to be interlocutory order so as to be outside the purview of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court case law referred to.”

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In another decision reported in Bhaskar Industries Limited Vs. Bhiwani Denim & Apparels Ltd & others⁵ , the Hon’ble Apex Court laid down certain guidelines to determine whether the order under challenge is a final order or an interlocutory order, and Their Lordships Justice K.T.Thomas and Justice K.G.Balakrishnan while deciding revision, defined the word ‘interlocutory order’ in para ‘a’ as follows:

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“ The interdict contained in Section 397(2) is that the powers of revision shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order. Whether an order is interlocutory or not, cannot be decided by merely looking at the order or merely because the order was passed at the interlocutory stage. The safe test is this: if the contention of the petitioner who moves the superior court in revision, as against the order under challenge is upheld, would the criminal proceedings as a whole culminate? If they would, then the order is not interlocutory in spite of the fact that it was passed during any interlocutory stage.”

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In similar situation, Their Lordships Justice K.T.Thomas and Justice D.P.Mohapatra in the decision reported in K.K.Patel and another Vs. State of Gujarat and another⁶ , held as follows:

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“ It is now well-neigh settled that in deciding whether an order challenged is interlocutory or not as for Section 397(2) of the Code, the sole test is not whether such order was passed during the interim stage. The feasible test is whether by upholding the objections raised by a party, would it result in culminating the proceedings, if so any order passed on such objections would not be merely interlocutory in nature as envisaged in Section 397(2) of the Code.”

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5 (2001) 7 S.C.C. 401

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6 AIR 2000 SC 3346

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The ultimate conclusions arrived at both the courts in all the judgments is that if the order under challenge is allowed to sustain, would it culminate the entire proceedings against the petitioners. If it would culminate its final order and revision is maintainable against such order under Section 397 Cr.P.C. if not no revision is maintainable in view of bar under Clause 2 of Section 397 Cr.P.C. But, in the present case, on account of receiving documents and recalling witness, the proceedings against these petitioners in the main case would not culminate if the order is allowed to sustain. Therefore, the order under challenge is only interlocutory in nature. Consequently, the revision under Sections 397 and 401 Cr.P.C. is not maintainable in view of interdict contained in Clause 2 of Section 397 Cr.P.C. Accordingly, I hold that the revision is not maintainable and the revision is liable to be dismissed. However, the learned counsel for the petitioners requested to grant liberty to adjudicate the same before the appropriate authority.

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