Dismissed

V.S.D.M.B.G.Tilak v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh, rep. by its

Telangana HC27 Oct 2014WP/15871/2006

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

This court dismissed a writ challenging an order denying prospective regularization of daily wage employees. It held the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests lacked power to revise regularization dates, but the Government had authority to correct the illegality and no salary recovery would be ordered due to the white-collar nature of the employees.

What did the court decide?

Writ petition dismissed; Government directed regularization; No recovery of salary to be entertained.

V.S.D.M.B.G.Tilak Vs The Government of… — Pension and Retirement Benefits | Telangana HC (2014)

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THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C.BHANU AND THE HON’BLE SMT JUSTICE ANIS

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WRIT PETITION NO.15871 OF 2006

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ORDER: (per the HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C.BHANU)

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This writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, challenging the order, dated 05-02-2003 in Original Application No.3008 of 1996 (for short ‘O.A.’) on the file of the Andhra Pradesh Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad (for short ‘the Tribunal’), whereunder and whereby the O.A. was dismissed as there were no valid grounds to interfere with the orders impugned in the O.A.

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2. G.O.Rt.No.228, Establishment Forests Science & Technology (FOR.V) Department, dated 22-05-1996 was under challenge before the Tribunal. By virtue of the said orders, the Government directed to regularize the services of the daily wage employees in question prospectively with effect from the date of issue of orders of regularization as issued by the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests in his Ref.No.S.O.No.107/91/T4, dated 1006-1991 and S.O.No.108/91/T4, dated 10-06-1991.

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3. The Tribunal after considering the material on record dismissed the O.A. holding that question of violation of principles of natural justice does not arise and the provisional conclusions can be reached at any number of times and that earlier direction given by the Tribunal in R.P.No.761 of 1987, dated 24-10-1989 ordering that the services of daily wage employees be regularized in terms of G.O.Ms.No.81, G.A. (Ser.A) Department, dated 13-021986 from the next date following the date on which the last appointment in the category of Junior Assistants is made. Challenging the same, the present writ petition is filed by the applicants 1 ,4 and 6.

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4. The Government in Memo, dated 25-03-1985 accorded permission to the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests to fill up the vacant post of Typist, Junior Assistants etc., on daily wage basis. It is not in dispute before this Court that 1^st petitioner was appointed as Junior Assistant on

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27-05-1985, 2^nd petitioner was appointed as Typist on

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03-06-1985 and the 3^rd petitioner was appointed as Typist on 1107-1985 on daily wage originally drawn from the Employment Exchange. When their services have not been regularized, the individuals filed R.P.Nos.759 of 1987 and 761 of 1987 for regularization of their services. The Tribunal by its order, dated 24-10-1989, directed the official respondents to regularize their services in terms of G.O.Ms.No.81, General Administration (Ser.), Department, dated 13-02-1986 from the next date following the date on which, the last regular appointment in the category of Junior Assistant/Typist was made.

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5. In G.O.Ms.No.81, General Administration (Services-

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A) Department, dated 13-02-1986, Ad-hoc Regulation reads thus: “It shall not be necessary fort he Andhra Pradesh Public Service Commission to be consulted as respects any of the matters mentioned in Clause (3) of Article 320 of the Constitution of India in the case of all appointment made by direct recruitment during the period between the 6^th March, 1982 to the 1^st January, 1986 to any posts in any category at any level in the State and Subordinate Services.”

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By relaxing the said G.O, the Government issued G.O.Ms.No.168, Energy Forests Environment Science & Technology (For.V) Department, dated 08-06-1990, whereunder the Government formally relaxed the condition contained in G.O.Ms.No.81, dated 03-02-1986 in favour of the 8 employees mentioned in para 1 above to enable the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests to regularize their services from the next date following the date on which the last regular appointment in the category of Junior Assistants/Typists was made as directed by the Tribunal. The present writ petitioners are shown at S.Nos.1, 5 and 8 in para 1 of the above order. In pursuance of the said G.O., the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests has to take necessary further action and implement the orders of the Tribunal, dated 2610-11989. In pursuance of the said G.O. the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests in S.O.No.107/91-T4, dated 10-06-1991 in exercise of powers under Rule 23 (a) of General Rules for A.P. State and Subordinate Services Rules, the services of petitioners 1 to 3 were regularized w.e.f. 14-06-1990. Rule 23 (a) of A.P. State and Subordinate Services Rules reads thus:

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“ 23 (a) Date of commencement of probation of persons first appointed temporarily:- If a person, having been appointed temporarily under sub rule (a) or sub-rule (c) of Rule 10 to post borne on the cadre of any service, class or category or having been appointed to any service, class or category otherwise than in accordance with the rules governing appointment thereto is subsequently appointed to any service class or category in accordance with the rules, he shall commence his probation from the date of such subsequent appointment or from such earlier date as the appointing authority may determine.”

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From the above, it is clear that the appointing authority has power to determine the date of commencement of probation, but that should be done in terms of G.O.Ms.No.81, dated 13-02-1986 and G.O.Ms.No.168, dated 08-06-1990.

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6. 3^rd respondent in the writ petition was appointed as Junior Assistant on compassionate grounds on 05-07-1986, 4^th respondent was appointed as Junior Assistant on 16-07-1986, 5^th respondent was appointed as Typist on 27-071986, 6^th respondent was appointed as Junior Assistant on 13-041988 and 7^th respondent was appointed as Junior Assistant on 0907-1981.

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7. On the representation of the 1^st petitioner and another, the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests in S.C.No.177/92-Z1, dated 05-05-1992 issued partial modification of the orders issued in Prl.C.C.F’s.S.O.No.108/91-T4, dated 10-06-1991 under Rule 23 (a) of General Rules for A.P. State and Subordinate Service, modifying the date of regularizing the services of the 1^st petitioner from 14-06-1990 to 06-10-1988. Similarly in respect of petitioners 2 and 3 the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests in his proceedings in S.C.No.178/92-Z1, dated

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05-05-1992 issued modification of date of regularization of their services from 14-06-1990 to 06-10-1988. No source of power of Principal Chief Conservator of Forests has brought to the notice of this Court about modification of the date of regularization of services of the writ petitioners. So, it can safely be said that these two orders, dated 05-05-1992 is without jurisdiction. On further representation, the services of the petitioners were regularized

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from 14-05-1986 instead of 06-10-1988. The unofficial respondents 3 to 7 made a representation to the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests and filed a petition before the Government with regard to change of date of regularization of services of the writ petitioners and others. The Government directed the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests to issue show cause notice to the persons who are likely to be affected due to the above provisional decision. In pursuance of the same, the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests issued show cause notice to the petitioners calling for objections with regard to the provisional decision taken by the Government in G.O.Rt.No.84, dated 05-051995, for which all the petitioners submitted objections. The objections have been considered by the Government and there was no tenable grounds directing the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests to regularize the services of daily wage employees in question only prospectively with effect from the date of issuance of orders of regularization.

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8. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners contended that the Government before taking a decision on an appeal filed by the unofficial respondents and before issuing G.O.Rt.No.84, dated 05-05-1995 ought to have issued a notice to the petitioners and it is a post decisional notice, which is bad in law and the order under challenge before the Tribunal is not in conformity with the principles of natural justice, that the Government has no power to entertain any representation from the unofficial respondents, that in the absence of source of power, the Government cannot pass the orders impugned in the O.A. and therefore, the order in G.O.Rt.No.228, dated 22-05-1996 is without power or jurisdiction, that Rules 23 to 25 of the A.P. State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1996 (for short ‘the Rules’) have no application as they deal with order of appointment or list of approved candidates, but these Rules will not deal with to the date of regularization and hence, he prays to set aside the order of the Tribunal.

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9. On the other hand, learned Government Pleader for Services I (Telangana State) contended that in pursuance of the directions given by the Government, the services of the writ petitioners were regularized w.e.f. 10-06-1991, that thereafter, the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests has no power or authority

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to review the said order, that further modifying the date of regularization is contrary to G.O.Ms.No.81, dated 13-02-1986 as well as G.O.Ms.No.168, dated 08-06-1990 and having come to the notice of this fact when the unofficial respondents brought it to the Government, the Government has power under Rule 23 of the Rules and hence, he prays to dismiss the writ petition.

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10. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners relied on a decision reported in K.I.SHEPHARD AND OTHERS V UNION OF

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[1] INDIA AND OTHERS , wherein it was held thus:

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“On the basis of these authorities it must be held that even when a State agency acts administratively, rules of natural justice would apply. As stated natural justice generally requires that persons liable to be directly affected by proposed administrative acts, decisions or proceedings be given adequate notice of what is proposed so that they may be in a position (a) to make representations, on their own behalf (b) or to appear at a bearing or enquiry (if one is held); and (c) effectively to prepare their own case and to answer the case (if any) they have to meet.”

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11. He further relied on a decision reported in STATE OF [2] ORISSA V DR. (MISS) BINAPANI DEI AND OTHERS , wherein it

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was held thus:

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“We think that such an enquiry and decision were contrary to the basic concept of justice and cannot have any value. It is true that the order is administrative in character, but even an administrative order which involves civil consequences as already stated, must be made consistently with the rules of natural justice after informing the first respondent of the case of the State, the evidence in support thereof and after giving an opportunity to the first respondent of being heard and meeting or explaining the evidence.”

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12. He further relied on a decision reported in [3] A.K.KRAIPAK AND OTHERS V UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS , wherein it was held thus:

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“The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice or to put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rules can operate only in areas not covered by any law, validly made. In other words, they do not supplant the law of the land but supplement it. The concept of natural justice has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. In the past it was thought that it included just two rules namely (1) no one shall be a judge in his own cause (Nemo debet esse index

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propria cause) and (2) no decision shall be given against a party without affording him a reasonable hearing (Audi alter partem). Very soon thereafter a third rule was envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must be held in good faith without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably.”

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13. He further relied on a decision reported in OLGA TELLIS AND OTHERS V BOMBAY MUNICIPAL CORPORATION AND OTHERS^[4] , wherein it was held thus :

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“It must further be presumed that, while vesting in the Commissioner the power to act without notice, the Legislature intended that the power should be exercised sparingly and in cases of urgency which brook no delay. In all other cases, no departure from the audi alteram partem rule ('Hear the other side') could be presumed to have been intended. Sec. 314 is so designed as to exclude the principles of natural justice by way of exception and not as a general rule. There are situations which demand the exclusion of the rules of natural justice by reason of diverse factors like time, place, the apprehended danger and so on. The ordinary rule which regulates all procedure is that persons who are likely to be affected by the proposed action must be afforded an opportunity of being heard as to why that action should not be taken. The Hearing may be given individually or collectively, depending upon the facts of each situation. A departure from this fundamental rule of natural justice may be presumed to have been intended by the Legislature only in circumstances which warrant it. Such circumstances must be shown to exist, when so required, the burden being upon those who affirm their existence.”

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14. He further relied on a decision reported in NATIONAL TEXTILE WORKERS UNION V P.R.RAMAKRISHNANA AND OTHERS [5] , wherein it was held thus:

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“THE audi alteram partem rule which mandates that no one shall be condemned unheard is one of the basis principles of natural justice and if this rule has been held to be applicable in a quasi-judicial or even in an administrative proceeding involving adverse civil consequences, it would a fortiori apply in a judicial proceeding such as a petition for winding up of a company. It is difficult to imagine how any system of law which is designed to promote justice through fair play in action can permit the Court to make a winding up order which has the effect of bringing about termination of the services of the workers without giving them an opportunity of being heard against the making of such order. It would be violative of the basic principle of fair procedure and unless there is express provision in the Companies Act, 1956 which forbids the workers from

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appearing at the hearing of the winding up petition and participating in it, the workers must be held entitled to appear and be heard in the winding up petition.”

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15. He further relied on a decision reported in I.J.RAO ASSTT. COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS AND OTHERS V BIBHUTI BHUSHAN BAGH AND ANOTHER^[6] , wherein it was held thus:

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“There is no doubt that the words "on sufficient cause being shown" in the proviso to S. 110(2) of the Act indicates that the Collector of Customs must apply his mind to the point whether a case for extending the period of six months is made out. What is envisaged is an objective consideration of the case and a decision to be rendered after considering the material placed before him to justify the request for extension. The Customs Officer concerned who seeking the extension must show good reason for seeking the extension, and in this behalf he work probably want to establish that the investigation is not complete and it cannot yet be said whether a final order confiscating the goods should be made or not. As more time is required for investigation, he applies for extension of time. The Collector must be satisfied that the investigation is being pursued seriously and that there is need for more time for taking it to its conclusion.”

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16. He further relied on a decision reported in SWADESHI [7] COTTON MILLS ETC., V UNION OF INDIA ETC., , wherein it was held thus:

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“ In short, the general principle - as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application - seems to be that where a statute does not, in terms, exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits, then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule atthe pre-decisional stage. Conversely, if the statute conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of a pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature, and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided, courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless, viewed pragmatically, it would paralyse the administrative progress or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. In short, this rule of fair play "must not be jettisoned save in very exceptional circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands".

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THE court must make every effort to salvage this cardinal rule to the maximum extent possible, with situational modifications. But, to recall the words of Bhagwati,J., the core of it must, however, remain, namely, that the person affected must have reasonable opportunity of being heard and the hearing must be a genuine hearing and not an empty public relations exercise.

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17. He further relied on a decision reported in MANAGEMENT OF M/S M.S.NALLY BHARAT ENGINEERING CO LTD., V STATE OF BIHAR AND OTHERS^[8] , wherein it was held thus:

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“. IT may be noted that the terms 'fairness of procedure', 'fair play in action', 'duty to act fairly' are perhaps used as alternatives to "natural justice" without drawing any distinction. But Prof. Paul Jackson points out that 'such phrases may sometimes be used to refer not to the obligation to observe the principles of natural justice but, on the contrary, to refer to a standard of behaviour which, increasingly, the courts require to be followed even in circumstances where the duty to observe natural justice is inapplicable" ("Natural Justice" by Paul Jackson, 2nd edn., p. 11)

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WE share the view expressed by Professor Jackson. Fairness, in our opinion, is a fundamental principle of good administration. It is a rule to ensure that the vast power in the modern State is not abused but properly exercised. The State-power is used for proper and not for improper purposes. The authority is not misguided by extraneous or irrelevant consideration. Fairness is also a principle to ensure that statutory authority arrives at a just decision either in promoting the interest or affecting the rights of persons. To use the timehallowed phrase "that justice should not only be done but be seen to be done" is the essence of fairness equally applicable to administrative authorities. Fairness is thus a prime test for proper and good administration. It has no set form or procedure. It depends upon the facts of each case. As Lord Pearson said in Pearlberg v. Varty ((1972) 1 WLR 534, 547 : (1972) 2 All ELR 6) (at p. 547), fairness does not necessarily require a plurality of hearings or representations and counter representations. Indeed, it cannot have too much elaboration of procedure since wheels of administration must move quickly”

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18. He further relied on a decision reported in H.L.TREHAN

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AND OTHERS V UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS^[9] , wherein it was held thus:

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“It is however, contended on behalf of CORIL that after the

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impugned circular was issued, an opportunity of hearing was given to the employees with regard to the alterations made in the conditions of their service by the impugned circular. In our opinion, the post-decisional opportunity of hearing does not subserve the rules of natural justice. The authority who embarks upon a post-decisional hearing will naturally proceed with a closed mind and there is hardly any chance of getting a proper consideration of the representation at such a postdecisional opportunity.”

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19. There is no dispute about the law laid down by the Supreme Court. From the above decisions, it is clear that the requirement audi alteram partem rule is that the person likely to be adversely affected by an action to be taken against him must be afforded an opportunity of being heard before such action s taken. The object is affording an opportunity to the pe4rson against whom allegations have been made and a notice is issued as to why actions should not be taken against him. If no opportunity of hearing is provided, the action would be bad in law and unlawful. Where hearing is given by the decision making authority before taking a decision or passing an order, it is called ‘ore0decisional’ hearing, where passing an order, it is called ‘post-decisional or remedial’ hearing.

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20. But, in this case, the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests committed illegality in modifying the dates of regularization of the writ petitioners in S.O.Nos.177/92-Z1 and 178/92-Z1, dated 05-05-1992. Absolutely, the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests has no source of power so as to revise the date of regularization in the first instance from 14-06-1990 to 06-10-1988 and further to revise w.e.f. 14-05-1986. The said orders issued by the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests are whimsical and illegal. It is not in dispute that inb view of the general orders of Government in G.O.Ms.No.193, General Administration (Ser.A) Department, dated 14-03-1990, the services of petitioners were taken on temporary basis under Rule 10 (a) (i) of A.P. State and Subordinate Services Rules in the office of Principal Chief Conservator of Forests, Hyderabad. It is also not in dispute that from the aforesaid mentioned Government order, the services of the writ petitioners have to be regularized only prospectively with effect from the date of issue of the order of regularization. The said Government order was not under challenge by the writ

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petitioners. That order has become final. The Government in G.O.Ms.No.168, dated 8-06-1990 relaxed the condition contained in G.O.Ms.No.81, dated

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03-02-1986 to enable the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests to regularize the services of the writ petitioners from the next date following the date on which the last regular appointment in the category of Junior Assistants/Typists was made. Accordingly, the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests prepared provisional seniority list on 29-02-1992. In this seniority list, the unofficial respondents were shown as approved probationers, whereas the petitioners were shown as probationers. The unofficial respondents were shown at Sl.Nos.18,19,20,21,22,23 and 25, whereas the writ petitioners were shown at Sl.Nos.33,35 and 38. By virtue of the illegal orders passed by the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests, the services of the writ petitioners have to be regularized over and above the approved probationers in the category of the L.D.Clerks/L.D.Stenos/L.D.Typists. G.O.Rt.No.84, dated 05-05-1995 is a direction given to the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests to give a show cause notice to the affected parties calling for representation. Therefore, the Government provisionally decided to allow the representation of the unofficial respondents to set aside the orders of the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests in S.O.Nos.107/91-T4 and 108/91T4, dated 10-06-1991. It cannot be presumed that it is a final decision. As a matter of fact, the writ petitioners also admit in their explanation that it is a provisional decision. The representation given by the writ petitioners and some others, dated 03-11-1995 reads thus:

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“In view of the above facts, we therefore request the Government to re-examine the provisional decision taken in G.O.Rt.No.84, Environment Forests, Science & Technology (For.V), Department, dated 05-05-12995 with reference to the files indicated ……..”

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Therefore, the contention of the learned senior counsel for the writ petitioners that the Government has already taken a decision cannot be accepted. It is only a provisional decision taken by the Government, for which, the Government can modify or vary the provisional decision depending upon the explanation that may be given by the respondents.

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21. Regularization in law connotes official formalization of

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an appointment, which was made (on a temporary or ad hoc or stop gap or casual basis or the like) in deviation from the normal rules or applicable norms of appointment. The effect of such regularization would depend on the object or purpose for which the regularization is made or the stage at which it is made. The question of regularization of services arises mainly in relation to persons employed on ad hoc or casual or temporary or stopgap basis without adhering to the normal recruitment rules or criteria. Date of regularization is relevant as far as relative seniority between the regularized employees and the subsequent regular entrants is concerned. There cannot be any dispute that the illegality cannot be perpetuated. The illegality in this case is the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests has no power to revise the date of regularization under any one of the Rules.

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22. Learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners did not brought to the notice of this Court about source of power of the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests to revise the date of regularization of the writ petitioners. When the Government permitted the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests to fill up the posts on temporary basis due to exigency of administration, the writ petitioners were appointed. The Government has specifically directed to regularize the services of the writ petitioners prospectively with effect from the date of issuance of order of regularization and also next date following the date on which the last regular appointment in the category of Junior Assistants/Typists was made. These proceedings have become final. No challenge was made by the petitioners at any point of time. By virtue of the proceedings in S.O.Nos.107/91-T4 and 108/91-T4, dated 10-06-1991, the entire seniority list of 1992 in the category of L.D.Clerks/L.D.Stenos/L.D.Typists would be seriously affected. All the persons were not made as parties to the O.A.

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23. Learned counsel appearing for the unofficial respondents relied on a decision reported in PRABODH VERMA AND OTHERS V STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND OTHERS^[10] , wherein it was held thus:

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“THE real question before us, therefore, is the correctness of the decision of the High court in the Sangh case. Before we address ourselves to this question, we would like to point out that the writ petition filed by the Sangh suffered from two serious, though not incurable, defects. THE first defect was

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that of non-joinder of necessary parties. THE only respondents to the Sangh's petition were the State of Uttar Pradesh and its concerned officers. Those who were vitally concerned, namely, the reserve pool teachers, were not made parties not even by joining some of them in a representative capacity, considering that their number was too large for all of them to be joined individually as respondents. THE matter, therefore, came to be decided in their absence. A High court ought not to decide a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution without the persons who would be vitally affected by its judgment being before it as respondents or at least by some of them being before it as respondents in a representative capacity if their number is too large, and, therefore, the Allahabad High court ought not to have proceeded to hear and dispose of the Sangh's writ petition without insisting upon the reserve pool teachers being made respondents to that writ petition, or at least some of them 274 being made respondents in a representative capacity, and had the petitioners refused to do so, ought to have dismissed that petition for non-joinder of necessary parties.”

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24. By virtue of the orders issued by the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests, final seniority list prepared in pursuance of the provisional seniority list in the year 1992 would impliedly varied or set aside. The same is not permissible. Admittedly, there is no challenge made to the provisional seniority list prepared in the year 1992 and its final seniority list. Basing on the directions given by the Government, the petitioners were appointed on daily wage basis. Therefore, the Government has power to take decision when its subordinate officers committed a grave illegality in changing the date of regularization. Such a power need not necessarily be emanated from the Rules. Therefore, the Government has rightly corrected the illegalities committed by the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests by duly giving opportunity to the writ petitioners to represent the same. Even the representations given by the writ petitioners do not justify the action of changing the date of regularization in terms of the Rules. Therefore, the findings of the Tribunal are not shown to be perverse or contrary to law. The findings are based upon proper appreciation of material on record. Therefore, the writ petition is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed.

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25. However, seniority of the petitioners has been affected by issuing proceedings on the representations of the petitioners.

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The authority ought not to have passed the orders, contrary to the instructions given by the Government. It is not a case of misrepresentation of facts by the petitioners. It is a case of illegal exercise of powers by the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests. Though seniority has been affected, no recovery shall be entertained in view of decision of the apex Court reported in STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AND OTHERS V G.SRINIVASA RAO

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AND OTHERS^[11] , wherein it was held that the respondents are white-collared salaried persons and it may be too harsh for them to refund the salary already paid to them.

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26. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. However, it is made clear that in pursuance of the impugned order in O.A., no recovery shall be entertained. No order as to costs. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this writ petition shall stand closed.

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K.C.BHANU, J

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ANIS, J

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DATED: 27^th DAY OF OCTOBER, 2014 Hsd

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[1] AIR 1988 SC 686 [2] AIR 1967 SC 1269

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[3] AIR 1970 SC 150

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[4] AIR 1986 SC 180 [5] AIR 1983 SC 75