Dismissed

P.Shashidhar Goud, v. D. Ashok

Telangana HC10 Sept 2014CRLA/1470/2006

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

In this appeal against an acquittal under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the court examined whether the accused could rebut the presumption of legally enforceable debt. Finding the complainant failed to prove the source of loan or date of transaction, the court held the defense of a forged/empty cheque was reasonably probable and upheld the acquittal.

What did the court decide?

Criminal Appeal dismissed, order of trial court acquitting the accused confirmed.

P.Shashidhar Goud, Vs D. Ashok — Cheque Dishonour | Telangana HC (2014)

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THE HONOURABLE Dr. JUSTICE B.SIVA SANKARA RAO CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1470 of 2006

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JUDGMENT:

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The appellant-complainant seeks to assail the judgment of acquittal dated 14.08.2006 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Special Mobile Court, at Mahaboob Nagar, in the private complaint case C.C.No.222 of 2004 filed by said complainant against the accused Ashok

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(1^st respondent herein), for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for brevity 'the Act').

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2. The facts before the trial Court are that the accused borrowed Rs.1,50,000/- from the complainant for his legal necessities and for the said debt, the accused issued Ex.P.1 cheque No.930771, dated 15.05.2003 from his account in favour of the complainant drawn on Andhra Bank, Mahaboobnagar branch, that the complainant when presented the same for collection in Canara Bank on 03.06.2003, the same was returned dishonoured on the reason of ‘insufficiency of the funds’ covered by Ex.P.4 cheque return memo, dated 04.06.2003, and the same is intimated to the accused through legal notice, dated 28.06.2003 covered by Ex.P.5, issued by the complainant to the accused evidenced by Exs.P.6 and 7 postal receipt and acknowledgment, and though the accused received notice not responded which made the complainant to file the private complaint case.

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3. The accused appeared before the Court pursuant to the summons and after supply of case copies under Section 207 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, when questioned on substance of accusation under Section 251 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for brevity, “The Cr.P.C.”) he pleaded not guilty.

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4. On behalf of the complainant during the course of trial besides himself as PW1 cause examined PW2 P.Shankar Goud and got marked

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Exs.P.1 to P.11(Ex.P.1 to P.7 detailed supra), Viz., original cheque bearing No. 930771, dated 15.05.2003, original saving voucher, dated 03.06.2003, original debit invoice endorsement, dated 16.08.2003, original cheque return memo, dated 03.06.2003, office copy of legal notice, dated 28.06.2003, postal receipt, acknowledgment, final report in Cr.No.136 of 2003, dated 03.03.2004, copy of compromise petition, dated 08.11.2003, documents pertaining to the retirement benefits of P.W.2 dated 19.08.2002 and attested copy of registration of firm, dated 26.06.1999 and on defence side the accused examined himself as D.W.1 only and got marked Exs.D.1 to D.7 viz; settlement deed of Sai Teja Finance company, dated 08.09.2002, due list of G.Satyanarayana, dated 18.01.2005, five empty cheques, dated 13.01.2005, registration of firm, dated 27.09.2005, reply notice, dated 09.01.2003, postal acknowledgment, dated 08.08.2003 and complaint.

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5. After closure of evidence, the accused was examined under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C. who denied the incriminating material put to him. No more oral or documentary evidence adduced by accused.

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6. Appreciating the evidence, both oral and documentary, the Court below ultimately held that the complainant could not prove guilt of the accused for the offence under Section 138 of the N.I.Act and thereby not found guilty and acquitted the accused with findings that there is material alteration under Section 87 of the N.I.Act, and when there is no supporting document to show that the accused paid an amount of Rs.1,50,000/- to the complainant, it can be presumed that Ex.P.1 cheque not issued towards legally enforceable debt, that the complainant also failed to prove source of payment of Rs.1,50,000/- to the accused and the Ex.P.5 legal notice and also the complaint does not disclose on what date the complainant paid an amount to the accused.

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7. P.W.1 and his father P.W.2 even deposed about accused is known and borrowed the amount from P.W.1 of Rs.1,50,000/- for his

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necessities but they did not speak much less mentioned anywhere including in the notice or complaint or even in the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 as to on which date the said borrowal by the accused made from P.W.1 and out of what means of P.W.1. It is for the said debt as per the case of the P.ws.1 and 2, the accused issued Ex.P.1 cheque supra in favour of P.W.1 and when the same presented for encashment returned dishonoured (Ex.P.4) for insufficiency of funds in the account of accused. Ex.P.5 is the office copy of the legal notice dated 28.06.2003 within 30 days (amended for 15 days with effect from 06.02.2003 as per Amended Act,55 of 2002) in the wording of Section 138 Proviso-B) and thus within time. As per cross-examination of P.Ws.1 and 2 by accused and also from his evidence as D.W.1 he was ex-partner of Sai Teja Finance Corporation, Mahaboobnagar (for short, ‘corporation’) to which there are other partners even and P.W.1 is managing partner and P.W.2 is chairman of the corporation and they as partners invested capital of Rs.50,000/- each and of managed joint accounts in the bank. It is the evidence of the accused as D.W.1 that P.Ws.1 and 2 misappropriated the amount of the finance business and never shown records to the other partners including him having collected deposits from customers and when the partners insisted for payment of the amount, they filed a false case by taking advantage of empty cheque which was preserved in the finance Company and there is no borrowal of any amount much less any cheque for any amount and there is nothing due to P.W1/complainant by accused and having given to P.W.1 mis-utilised the empty cheque and the accused gave a reply notice to return the empty cheque and not to present the same in the bank and he also filed a private complaint case and the same was registered in Cr.No.163 of 2003 for the offence punishable under Sections 306, 409 and 420 of I.P.C. against the complainant and his father-P.Ws.1 and 2 and in the account settled with the corporation as per Ex.D.1 dated 08.09.2002 as admitted by the P.W.1, the corporation had to pay an amount of Rs.1,08,810/- to this accused-

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D.Ashok and P.W.1 also admitted in Ex.D.3 of 5 empty cheques contains his writing on the reverse side of the cheuqes and P.W.2 also deposed that there is no proof regarding any withdrawal of amount for so called giving to P.W.1 and any lending by P.W.1 to accused of alleged Rs.1,50,000/- much less in April 2003 and P.W.2 admitted that the accused filed a private complaint against him and P.W.1 for misuse of cheques. The trial Court further observed that D.W.1 admitted of said corporation partnership business by registration of the same in 1988 and as a partner he deposited Rs.50,000/- in two occasions. It is suggested to P.W.1 by accused that the cheque case is a counterblast to the case filed by the accused herein against the P.Ws.1 and 2. The trial Court therefrom observed is though D.W.1 deposed about he did not issue any letter to the bank about the issue of cheques while closing the account, having admitted the signature that of him on Ex.P.1 cheque. Since denied receiving of any amount much less Rs.1,50,000/- from P.W.1-complainant on issuance of cheque later for its repayment, the version of P.W.1complainant of accused issued the cheque for the said loan is belying for handwritings with regard to contents and signature on the cheque are entirely different that probablises the defence of empty cheque given by the accused in relation to the firm business like other partners joint operation of the account of the firm that was taken advantage under managing capacity by P.W.1 and his father-P.W.2 and misused from the demand by the partners including the accused for settlement of accounts and to discharge the debts due by firm by amounts collected as deposit from the customers and in that account admittedly Rs.1,08,800/- fallen due to accused by the complainant and his father-P.Ws.1 and 2 and that probablises the defence in rebutting the presumptions. The trial Court also held that as per the Apex Court’s expression in C.Anthoni Vs. K.G.Raghavan Nai r^[1] with the blank cheque allegedly obtained and that probablises from the ink used in the body of the cheque different from the ink used in the signature on the cheque to doubt the case of the

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complainant. Therefore in the expression the another circumstance was non-examination of the person who obtained the blank cheque as per the accused that was misused by the complainant in collusion with that person in drawing adverse inference. It was also observed that even the complainant placed reliance upon the expression of the Apex Court in K.N. Beena Vs. Mniyappa m^[2] , the burden is on the accused to rebut the presumptions, here held that the accused discharged the burden showing the accused was one of the partners in the finance business to which the complainant was working with salary of Rs.5,000/- p.m. acting as managing partner and his father-P.W.2 as chairman and if really the complainant paid Rs.1,50,000/-, that too, allegedly shown borrowed from his vendor for such lending there should be some proof and there is nothing to prevent obtaining of pronote or other document. There is no proof regarding so called lending much less date of lending mentioned with amounts later on set up and when the complainant failed to prove on what date he paid the amount to the accused of Rs.1,150,000/- and there is no mention even in the legal notice or complaint much less evidence of P.W.1 and his father-P.W.2 and there is clear probability to the defence from the ink difference in writing the contents ( date and amount) of the cheque and signature of the accused on empty cheque obtained in relation to the business transactions of the partnership firm and it is misused by taking advantage of the position in the business by the complainant and his father suffice to hold that there is nothing to show the accused borrowed amount from the complainant and issued the cheque. It is impugning the same, the present appeal is filed with the contentions in the grounds of the appeal that the trial Court went wrong in putting the burden on the complainant as if shifted from defence of accused though the business transactions and the loan business are independent and it is handloan out of acquaintance and for its discharge issued the cheque that is unconnected to the finance business of the firm and when the cheuqe

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bears his signature even issuance of a blank cheque signed by the accused is sufficient to draw presumptions for accused could not prove non-existence of the liability for so to conclude by trial Court; hence to set aside the acquittal judgment and allow the appeal by convicting the accused. Learned counsel for the appellant reiterated the same in the course of hearing.

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8. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent, on the other hand, represents that it was a clear case of misuse of old blank cheque obtained at the time of starting of finance business and the present cheque is one among them but there is no transaction under promissory note which not make out any offence and thereof there are no merits of the appeal, hence to dismiss.

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9. Perused the material on record. The parties are hereinafter referred to as they are arrayed in trial Court for the sake of convenience. 10. Now the points that arise for consideration are:

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(1). Whether the accused did not issue the cheque in favour of the complainant for discharge of legally enforceable debt to make liable for the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act and if not, the trial court’s acquittal judgment is unsustainable?

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(2). To what result?

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Point No.1:

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11-(A). Before advert to the merits of the matter, it is beneficial to quote; the provisions incorporated in Chapter XVII of the N.I. Act make a civil transaction to be an offence by fiction of law and with certain (rebuttable) presumptions that shall be drawn. Sections.138 to 142 are incorporated in the N.I.Act,1881 as Chapter XVII by the Banking Public Financial Institutions and Negotiable instruments Laws (Amendment) Act,1981 (66 of 1988) which came into force w.e.f.01-04-1989 and the N.I.Act was further amended by Act,2002 (55 of 2002) which came into force w.e.f.06-02-2003 incorporating new sections 143 to 147 in this

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Chapter XVII and further some of the existing provisions not only of the Chapter XVII but also of other Chapters amended to overcome the defects and drawbacks in dealing with the matters relating to dishonour of cheques.

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11-(B). The object and intention of these penal provisions of the Chapter XVII (Sections 138 – 147), in particular, Sections 138 & 139 (besides civil remedy), are to prevent issuing of cheques in playful manner or with dishonest intention or with no mind to honour or without sufficient funds in the account maintained by the drawer in Bank and induce the Payee/Holder or Holder in due course to act upon it. The remedy available in a Civil Court is a long drawn matter and an unscrupulous drawer normally takes various pleas to defeat the genuine claim of the payee. Since a cheque that is dishonoured may cause uncountable loss, injury or inconvenience to the Payee due to the latter’s unexpected disappointment, these provisions incorporated are in order to provide a speedy remedy to avoid inconvenience and injury to the Payee and further to encourage the culture of use of cheques and enhancing credibility of the instruments as a trustworthy substitute for cash payment and to inculcate faith in the efficacy of Banking operations - GOA PLAST (PVT.) LTD. v. CHICO URSULA D’SOUZA^[3] .

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11-(C). To fulfill the objective, the Legislature while amending the Act has made the following procedure:

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In the opening words of the Section 138 it is stated: "Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid,---------, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act (See Sec.143), be punished ----.

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Provided, nothing contained in this section shall apply unless,-(a), (b); and (c) Explanation---(supra)."

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"(i) Under Section 138 a deeming offence is created by fiction of law.

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(ii) An explanation is provided to Section 138 to define the words "debt or other liability" to mean a legally enforceable debt or other liability."

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(iii) In Section 139, a presumption is ingrained that the holder of the cheque received it in discharge of debt or other liability.

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(iv) Disallowing a defence in Section 140 that drawer has no reason to believe that cheque would be dishonoured.

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(v) As per Section 146(new section) the production of the Bank’s slip or Memo with official mark denoting that the cheque has been dishonoured is prima facie evidence for the Court to presume the fact of dishonour of such cheque unless such fact is disproved by the accused.

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11-(D). Further the provision for issuing notice within thirty days under section 138 after dishonour is to afford an opportunity to the Drawer of the cheque to rectify his mistakes or negligence or in action and to pay the amount within fifteen days of receipt of notice, failing which the drawer is liable for prosecution and penal consequences.

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11-(E). Reasonability of cause for non-payment is not at all a deciding factor. Mensrea is irrelevant. It is a strict liability incorporated in public interest.

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11-(F). Availability of alternative remedy is no bar to the prosecution

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11-(G). In the words-where any cheque, the word any suggests that for whatever reason if a cheque is drawn on an account maintained by him with a Banker in favour of another person for the discharge of any debt or other liability, the liability cannot be avoided in the event of the cheque stands returned by the Banker unpaid.

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12-A. The Apex Court in NARAYAN MENON v. STATE OF

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KERALA^[4] held that once the complainant shown that the cheque was drawn by the accused on the account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount in favour of the complainant from out of that account for its discharge and the same when presented returned by the Bank unpaid for insufficiency of funds or exceeds arrangement, such person shall be deemed to have been committed an offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act. What Section 139 of the Act speaks of the presumption against the accused to rebut is the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred in Section 138 of the Act for discharge of debt. For rebutting such presumption, what is needed is to raise a probable defence. Even for the said purpose, the evidence adduced on behalf of the complainant could be relied upon. Accused need not enter into the witness box and examine other witnesses in support of his defence. Accused need not disprove the prosecution case in its entirety. Therefore, the rebuttal does not have to be conclusively established but such evidence must be adduced before the court in support of the defence that the court must either believe the defence to exist or consider its existence to be reasonably probable, the standard of reasonability being that of the "prudent man".

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12-B. The presumption that further applied among clauses (a) to (g) of Section 118 of N.I. Act also, like the presumption under Section 139 of the Act, as per Section 4 of the Evidence Act, is a rebuttable presumption for which the burden is on the accused, however, to rebut the presumption if a case is made out by accused either by pointing out from the case of the complainant including very documents and cross-examination or by examining any person and need not be always by coming to witness box vide decision in KUMAR EXPORTS PVT. LTD. V. SHARMA CARPETS^[5] .

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12-C. Further, as per the expression of the Apex Court in RANGAPPA vs. MOHAN^[6] (3-Judges Bench) paras-9 to 15 referring to Goa Plast’s case (supra), KRISHNA JANARDHAN BHAT v. DATTATRAYA G. HEGDE^[7] by distinguishing at para-14 saying the observation in KRISHNA JANARDHAN BHAT (supra) of the presumption mandated by Section 139 does not indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability is not correct, though in other respects correctness of the decision does not in any way cause doubted; by also referring to HITEN P. DALAL v. BRATINDRANATH BANERJEE^[8] holding at paras-22 and 23 therein of the obligation on the part of the Court to raise the presumption under 138, 139 and 118 of the N.I. Act, in every case where the factual basis for raising the presumption has been established since introduces an exception to the general rule as to the burden of proof in criminal cases and shifts the onus on to the accused, as a presumption of law distinguished from a presumption of fact as part of rules of evidence and no way in conflict with presumption of innocence and the proof by prosecution against the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but for saying to rebut the accused can discharge the burden showing reasonable probability of non-existence of the presumption of fact and to that proposition, the earlier expression in BHARAT BARREL &

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DRUM MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. AMIN CHAND PYARELAL^[9] para-12 showing the burden on the accused is to bring on record by preponderance of probability either direct evidence or by referring to circumstances upon which he relies, rather than bare denial of the passing of the consideration; apparently that does not appear to be of any defence, to get the benefit in discharge of the onus against, also held referring the M.M.T.C. LTD. AND ANOTHER v. MEDCHL CHEMICALS & PHARMA (P) LTD^[10] that where the accused able to show justification of stop payment letter even from funds are there, but no existence of debt or

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liability at the time of presentation of cheque for encashment to say no offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act made out in discharge of the burden. It was concluded referring to the above, including of MALLAVARAPU KASIVISWESWARA RAO v. THADIKONDA RAMULU FIRM & ORS^[11] paras-14 and 15 that the initial presumption lays in favour of the complainant and Section 139 is an example of a reverse onus clause, which has been included in furtherance of the legitimate objection of improving the credibility of the negotiable instruments. While Section 138 specifies a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. Bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions and the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clause and the accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard or proof and in the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden to discharge by preponderance of probabilities by raising creation of doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability to fail the prosecution and for that the accused can rely on the material submitted by the complainant also in order to raise such a defence and he may not need to adduce any evidence of his own.

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12-D. It was also observed in para-15 that the accused appear to be aware of the fact that the cheque was with the complainant, furthermore the very fact that the accused has failed to reply to the statutory notice under Section 138 of the Act leads to the inference that there was merit in the complainant’s version. It was also held by this court way back

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i n Chapala Hanumayya Vs Kavuri Venkateshwarlu^[12] that having received and acknowledged the statutory legal notice after dishonour of

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cheque, non-giving of reply to said legal notice, improbablises the defence version, as any prudent person under the said circumstances should have, but for no defence to reply.

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13-(A). From above legal position, coming to decide on the facts from oral, circumstantial and documentary evidence, how far it is proved the case of the complainant and from drawing of presumptions and inferences if any, how far rebutted by accused concerned:

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The particulars like date etc., of so called amount of Rs.1,50,000/given by the complainant to the accused neither mentioned in the notice nor in the complaint much less in chief examination of P.W.1/complainant even. There is also no month even mentioned and also how long after so called lending, the Ex.P.1 cheque dated 15.05.2003 said to have been issued by the accused. It is one of the important circumstances, as pointed out by the trial Court, in doubting the so called lending. The complainant could not able to show how he got the said cash for lending whether from the business if so withdrawal from any bank account of him or got cash if so, from whom and even to introduce his father that his father who retired from service some months before and received terminal benefits from which he lent amount to accused but even P.W.2 failed to show proof that he drawn Rs.1,50,000/- from his bank account and any proof that he paid to his son-P.W.1 said amount. That is also one of the circumstances against the complainant, as pointed out by the trial Court, in doubting this so called borrowal by the accused from the complainant with means of the complainant’s father. Apart from it, the version of the complainant is the accused issued the cheque on 15.05.2003 for the amount due under the so called hand loan of earlier borrowal. As stated supra, there is no date or month of mentioned for the alleged borrowal for the alleged issuing of the cheuqe. Admittedly, the accused was one of the partners among others in the corporation to which the complainant is the managing partner and P.W.2 is the chairman and

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Ex.D.3 shows 5 empty cheques with writings of complainant on its reverse side to say there were empty cheques written in practice in the partnership finance business and version of the accused is in connection with the persons from the joint operation of the bank accounts by the partners of the firm, empty cheques obtained by the partners, kept in the custody of complainant and his father and the same were misused by them. Regarding the finance business from alleged misappropriation of amounts by collection of deposits from customers by P.Ws.1 and 2 disputes arose and eventually led to closure of the business. It is the case in substantiating further by said version of the accused supra that taking advantage of custody of one of the empty cheques obtained from the partnership business, misused by P.W.1. with a version as if there was alleged lending by handloan without stating date or month and without showing its means and for which the alleged cheque issued and the writing of the person who filled the contents of the cheque is not that of the accused as difference in the writing of signature of the accused and contents and also difference in pen used which also probabilises the defence version, as rightly concluded by the trial Court as also in such contextual matrix held by the Apex Court in C. Antony(supra).

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14. Having regard to the above, when the trial Court’s acquittal judgment is supported by reasons to the conclusion after detailed discussion by scanning of the evidence on facts in appreciation with reference to law when that shows the accused discharged the burden in rebutting presumptions and rebutting the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 that probablises the defence version as required by law shown by the accused as held Narayana Menon supra that was also reiterated in as held in Narayan Menon, Kumar Exports Private Limited Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra) which are followed in Rangappa(supra). Therefore, for this Court while sitting in appeal there is nothing to interfere with the said acquittal judgment of the trial Court. Accordingly, point No.1 is answered.

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Point No.2:

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15. In the result, the Criminal Appeal is, therefore, dismissed by confirming the order of the learned Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Special Mobile Court, at Mahaboob Nagar, in the private complaint case C.C.No.222 of 2004. Consequently, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this appeal shall stand closed.

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_____________________________ Dr. JUSTICE B. SIVA SANKARA RAO Date: 10.09.2014 vvr

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[1] 2003(1) ALT (Crl) 218 SC [2] 2001(2) ALD Crl.824 SC [3] AIR 2003 SC 2035 [4] (2006)3 SCC 30 [5] (2009) 2 SCC 513 [6] AIR 2010 SC 1898 [7] AIR 2008 SC 1325 [8] AIR 2001 SC 3897 [9] AIR 1999 SC 1008 [10] AIR 2002 SC 182 [11] AIR 2008 SC 2898 [12] 1971 (1) An.W.R. 65

P.Shashidhar Goud, v. D. Ashok

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

P.Shashidhar Goud, v. D. Ashok

Case brief

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What the court decided

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