Dismissed

P.Mukunda Reddy v. P.Rukminamma

Telangana HC12 Dec 2014CRLA/1137/2009

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

In a criminal appeal against the acquittal of an accused sister for cheque dishonour under Section 138 NI Act, this Court held that the trial Court correctly discharged the burden on the accused by showing a dispute over the existence of legally enforceable debt and the accused's own means, thereby sustaining the acquittal and dismissing the appeal.

What did the court decide?

The appeal is dismissed. The acquittal of the accused is upheld. Miscellaneous petitions stand closed with no order as to costs.

P.Mukunda Reddy Vs P.Rukminamma — Cheque Dishonour | Telangana HC (2014)

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THE HON’BLE Dr. JUSTICE B. SIVA SANKARA RAO

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CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1137 of 2009

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JUDGMENT:

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The complainant/appellant having been unsuccessful in the private complaint case filed under Section 200 Cr.P.C. against the accused, who is no other than his sister, based on Ex.P.1 cheque dated 27.10.2005 for Rs.5,10,000/- claiming when presented returned dishonoured as per Ex.P.2 memo dated 06.12.2005 and from the office copy of legal notice Ex.P.3 issued on dated 09.12.2005 the accused having acknowledged under Exs.P.4 and P.5 issued a reply falsely denying any borrowal or liability and from the cause of action accrued for non-payment within the statutory period the complaint filed that was taken cognizance and when the accused was secured on summons supplied copies and when questioned pleaded not guilty, from which the parties were put to trial.

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2. During the course of trial, on behalf of the complainant, he came to the witness box as PW.1 and placed reliance on Exs.P.1 to P.6 supra and after Section 313 Cr.P.C. examination, the accused entered defence and besides herself as D.W.1 cause examined as D.W.2 the Branch Manager of Indian Overseas Bank, Kurnool and placed reliance upon Exs.D.1 to D.8. Ex.D.1 is the SBI Account statement, Ex.D.2 statement of account copies issued by S.B.I., Ex.D.3 notarised copy of sale deed, Ex.D.4 Four notarized copies, Ex.D.5 notarised copy of engineering certificate, Ex.D.6 Notarised copy of provisional certificate, Ex.D.7 notarised copy of employment letter and Ex.D.8 statement of account of which the Notarized copy of Engineering certificate, provisional

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certificate, employment letter of the son of the accused covered by Exs.D.5 to D.7 and also Ex.D.4 in relation thereto. The defence of the accused is that she never borrowed any amount muchless the so-called sum covered by Ex.P.1 cheque and there was no need of borrowal as her husband for the so-called construction of house borrowed amounts from the bank and not from the complainant and she got sufficient means, her husband is a doctorate and professor. Her further defence is that it is herself that entitled to the compensation of the acquired land along with her two brothers and even the amounts of her were taken by the complainant and the other brother of her. She contends that having regard to the above and for no means, muchless proof of the alleged lending by the complainant to the accused under socalled Ex.P.1 cheque and there is no legally enforceable debt to recover and thus to dismiss the complaint therefrom. The trial Court having scanned the evidence came to the conclusion in dismissing the complaint holding that complainant could not prove his case to convict the accused for the said offence under Section 138 of the N.I.Act.

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3. Impugning said acquittal judgment of the trial Court, the present appeal is maintained with contentions in the grounds of appeal that the trial Court gravely erred in dismissing the complaint case even the evidence of the accused no way rebutted the presumptions available in favour of the complainant under Sections 118 and 139 of the Act, hence, to allow the appeal by setting aside the acquittal judgment and to convict the accused according to law.

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4. Whereas, it is the contention of the counsel for the accused-respondent to the appeal that the trial Court having scanned the evidence fresh in mind the facts with opportunity of

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recording evidence, when came to the conclusion supported by reasons in acquitting the accused, merely because some other view is also possible, for this Court while sitting in appeal, there is nothing to interfere, that this Court cannot disturb easily from the double presumption available in favour of accused one from the general principles of innocence till guilt is proved and the other confirmed by the acquittal of the accused by trial Court, and sought for dismissal of the appeal.

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5. Perused the material on record. The parties are referred to as they are arrayed before the trial Court, for the sake of convenience, as “the complainant” and “the Accused”, respectively.

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6. Now, the points that arise for consideration are:-

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(1) Whether the Accused issued the Ex.P.1 cheque for legally enforceable debt and, if so, the trial Court’s acquittal judgment is unsustainable and requires interference by this Court, while sitting in appeal, and with what observations and conclusions?

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(2) To what relief?

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7. Point No.1:

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Before adverting to the facts, it is apt to refer legal position from the following settled propositions of law:

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7.(A). Before advert to the merits of the matter, it is beneficial to quote; the provisions incorporated in Chapter XVII of the N.I.Act make a civil transaction to be an offence by fiction of law and with certain (rebuttable) presumptions that shall be drawn. Sections.138 to142 are incorporated in the N.I.Act,1881 as Chapter XVII by the Banking Public Financial Institutions and Negotiable instruments Laws (Amendment) Act,1981 (66 of 1988) which came into force w.e.f.01-04- 1989 and the N.I.Act was further amended by Act,2002 (55 of 2002) which came into force w.e.f.06-02-2003 incorporating new sections 143 to 147 in this Chapter XVII and further some of the existing provisions not only of the Chapter XVII but also of other Chapters

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amended to overcome the defects and drawbacks in dealing with the matters relating to dishonour of cheques.

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7.(B). The object and intention of these penal provisions of the Chapter XVII (Sections 138 – 147), in particular, Sections 138 & 139 (besides civil remedy), are to prevent issuing of cheques in playful manner or with dishonest intention or with no mind to honour or without sufficient funds in the account maintained by the drawer in Bank and induce the Payee/Holder or Holder in due course to act upon it. The remedy available in a Civil Court is a long drawn matter and an unscrupulous drawer normally takes various pleas to defeat the genuine claim of the payee. Since a cheque that is dishonoured may cause uncountable loss, injury or inconvenience to the Payee due to the latter’s unexpected disappointment, these provisions incorporated are in order to provide a speedy remedy to avoid inconvenience and injury to the Payee and further to encourage the culture of use of cheques and enhancing credibility of the instruments as a trustworthy substitute for cash payment and to inculcate faith in the efficacy of Banking operations - Goa Plast (P).Ltd. vs. Chico UDS.

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7.(C). To fulfill the objective, the Legislature while amending the Act has made the following procedure:

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In the opening words of the Section 138 it is stated: "Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that Bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act (See Sec.143), be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years (amended by Act, 55 of 2002 with effect from 06.02.2003 for one year as two years ), or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of cheque, or with both:

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Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless,-

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(a) The cheque has been presented to the Bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;

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(b) The payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the

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case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice, in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days (amended by Act, 55 of 2002 with effect from 06.02.2003 for fifteen days as thirty days ), of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and

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(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.

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"(i) Under Section 138 a deeming offence is created by fiction of law.

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(ii) An explanation is provided to Section 138 to define the words "debt or other liability" to mean a legally enforceable debt or other liability."

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(iii) Section139: Presumption in favour of holder - It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in Section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.

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In Section 139, a presumption is ingrained that the holder of the cheque received it in discharge of debt or other liability.

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(iv) Disallowing a defence in Section 140 that drawer has no reason to believe that cheque would be dishonoured.

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(v) As per Section 146(new section) the production of the Bank’s slip or Memo with official mark denoting that the cheque has been dishonoured is prima facie evidence for the Court to presume the fact of dishonour of such cheque unless such fact is disproved by the accused

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7.(D). Further the provision for issuing notice within thirty days under section 138 after dishonour is to afford an opportunity to the Drawer of the cheque to rectify his mistakes or negligence or in action and to pay the amount within fifteen days of receipt of notice, failing which the drawer is liable for prosecution and penal consequences.

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7.(E). Reasonability of cause for non-payment is not at all a deciding factor. Mensrea is irrelevant. It is a strict liability incorporated in public interest.

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7.(F). Availability of alternative remedy is no bar to the

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prosecution

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7.(G). In the words-where any cheque, the word any suggests that for whatever reason if a cheque is drawn on an account maintained by him with a Banker in favour of another person for the discharge of any debt or other liability, the liability cannot be avoided in the event of the cheque stands returned by the Banker unpaid.

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8 . (a) The Apex Court in NARAYAN MENON v. STATE OF KERALA^[1] held that once the complainant shown that the cheque was drawn by the accused on the account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount in favour of the complainant from out of that account for its discharge and the same when presented returned by the Bank unpaid for insufficiency of funds or exceeds arrangement, such person shall be deemed to have been committed an offence under Section 138 of N.I. Act. What Section 139 of the Act speaks of the presumption against the accused to rebut is the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred in Section 138 of the Act for discharge of debt. For rebutting such presumption, what is needed is to raise a probable defence. Even for the said purpose, the evidence adduced on behalf of the complainant could be relied upon. Accused need not enter into the witness box and examine other witnesses in support of his defence. Accused need not disprove the prosecution case in its entirety. Therefore, the rebuttal does not have to be conclusively established but such evidence must be adduced before the court in support of the defence that the court must either believe the defence to exist or consider its existence to be reasonably probable, the standard of reasonability being that of the "prudent man"."

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(b) The presumption that further applied among clauses (a) to (g) of Section 118 of N.I. Act also, like the presumption under Section 139 of the Act, as per Section 4 of the Evidence Act, is a rebuttable presumption for which the burden is on the accused, however, to rebut the presumption if a case is made out by accused either by pointing out from the case of the complainant including very documents and cross-examination or by examining any person and need not be always by coming to witness box vide decision in KUMAR EXPORTS

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PVT. LTD. V. SHARMA CARPETS^[2] .

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(c) Further, as per the expression of the Apex Court in RANGAPPA vs. MOHAN^[3] (3-Judges Bench) paras-9 to 15 referring to Goa Plast’s case (supra), KRISHNA JANARDHAN BHAT v.

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DATTATRAYA G. HEGDE^[4] by distinguishing at para-14 saying the observation in KRISHNA JANARDHAN BHAT (supra) of the presumption mandated by Section 139 does not indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability is not correct, though in other respects correctness of the decision does not in any way cause doubted; by also referring to HITEN P. DALAL v. BRATINDRANATH BANERJEE^[5] holding at paras-22 and 23 therein of the obligation on the part of the Court to raise the presumption under 138, 139 and 118 of the N.I. Act, in every case where the factual basis for raising the presumption has been established since introduces an exception to the general rule as to the burden of proof in criminal cases and shifts the onus on to the accused, as a presumption of law distinguished from a presumption of fact as part of rules of evidence and no way in conflict with presumption of innocence and the proof by prosecution against the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but for saying to rebut the accused can discharge the burden showing reasonable probability of non-existence of the presumption of fact and to that proposition, the earlier expression in BHARAT BARREL & DRUM MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. AMIN CHAND

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PYARELAL^[6] para-12 showing the burden on the accused is to bring on record by preponderance of probability either direct evidence or by referring to circumstances upon which he relies, rather than bare denial of the passing of the consideration; apparently that does not appear to be of any defence, to get the benefit in discharge of the onus against, also held referring the M.M.T.C. LTD. AND ANOTHER v.

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MEDCHL CHEMICALS & PHARMA (P) LTD^[7] that where the accused able to show justification of stop payment letter even from funds are there, but no existence of debt or liability at the time of presentation of cheque for encashment to say no offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act made out in discharge of the burden. It was concluded referring to the above, including of MALLAVARAPU KASIVISWESWARA RAO v. THADIKONDA RAMULU FIRM & ORS^[8] paras-14 and 15 that the initial presumption lays in favour of the complainant and Section 139 is an example of a reverse onus clause, which has been included in furtherance of the legitimate objection of improving the credibility of the negotiable instruments. While Section 138 specifies a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption under Section 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. Bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial

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transactions and the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clause and the accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard or proof and in the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden to discharge by preponderance of probabilities by raising creation of doubt about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability to fail the prosecution and for that the accused can rely on the material submitted by the complainant also in order to raise such a defence and he may not need to adduce any evidence of his own.

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(d) It was also observed in para-15 that the accused appear to be aware of the fact that the cheque was with the complainant, furthermore the very fact that the accused has failed to reply to the statutory notice under Section 138 of the Act leads to the inference that there was merit in the complainant’s version. It was also held by this court

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way back in Chapala Hanumaiah Vs. Kavuri Venkateshwarlu^[9] that having received and acknowledged the statutory legal notice after dishonour of cheque, non-giving of reply to said legal notice, improbablises the defence version, as any prudent person under the said circumstances should have, but for no defence to reply.

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9.(A). From above legal position, coming to decide on the facts from oral, circumstantial and documentary evidence, how far it is proved the case of the complainant and from drawing of presumptions and inferences if any, how far rebutted by accused concerned:

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10. From the above prepositions of law, coming to the further facts as laid down by the Apex Court in Krishna Janardhan Bhat v G.Hegd e^[10] followed NARAYAN MENON (SUPRA), the burden on the accused to rebut the presumption is by preponderance of probability and for that the accused need not disprove the entire case of complainant but for to support the defence to that limited extent if able to show by preponderance of probability as that is sufficient in discharge of the burden. No doubt, as held in Rangappa (supra) once there is a cheque issued with the signature of the accused and routed from his/her account, the presumptions under Section 118 and equally for the debt is a legally enforceably debt or other liability under Section 139 of the

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Act are available. Here, the accused could rebut the presumptions by denying borrowel and giving of cheque for Rs.5,10,000/- and also showing her other means and that there was no necessity of the alleged brorowal. It is important to note as laid down in Krishna Janardhan Bhat (supra) that once it is the dispute by the accused, including from the burden shifts on complainant to establish the so-called lending of the amounts. Here for the alleged lending neither in Ex.P.3 legal notice nor in the complaint, muchless even in the evidence of PW.1 in chief examination no dates or particulars even mentioned, even that are the material facts required to be mentioned. There is nothing even from PW.1 in his cross-examination as to when and on what different dates that so-called Rs.5,10,000/- was lent by him to his sister which is the accused. There are no even means produced as to what are his sources for the alleged lending to the accused and the socalled house construction by the accused and her husband that too when the defence evidence show accused/husband is a directorate and a Professor having other means and they are having bank accounts and for the house constructions availed a bank loan when that is also proved; further it is proved that it is the accused out of her affection towards her two brothers including the complainant, way back in the year, 1994, given away what is the portion of the land acquisition compensation of her share and therefrom withdraw by her two brothers. Having regard to the above and from the defence version that as there is a dispute between the two brothers of her inter se including the complainant herein when she is supporting the just cause of the other brother, with enmity the complainant maintained the false complaint by misusing the so-called cheque. The trial Court’s finding thereby no way requires interference by this Court merely because some

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other view is possible. Accordingly, Point No.1 is answered. Point No.2:

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11. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in this appeal shall stand closed. There is no order as to costs.

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_____________________________________ Dr. JUSTICE B. SIVA SANKARA RAO

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12^th December, 2014.

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PNV

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[1] (2006)3 SCC 30 [2] (2009) 2 SCC 513 [3] AIR 2010 SC 1898 [4] AIR 2008 SC 1325

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