executing a mortgage decree. Years thereafter, a partition suit had to be filed among the party-defendants in the earlier suit. Thus both the suits are entirely unconnected and relate to entirely different subject matter. While in the earlier suit, the defendants were interested in defeating the claim of the bank, the present suit is one for partition among the parties. There is not even slightest allegation that any confidential and privileged communication between the defendants in the earlier suit and their counsel has anyway been used or relied upon for the purpose of the present suit by the said counsel. I am, therefore, at a loss to appreciate as to how an order imposing restraint can be passed by the learned District Judge on the counsel, who is now a senior counsel, especially, when the same counsel is appearing in the suit for partition right from 1984 onwards and the litigation twice reached this Court in an appeal suit and twice before the Supreme Court and ultimately, the preliminary decree is sustained. Thus, moving of the present application by the respondent/defendant No.6 at the stage of final decree proceedings was wholly inappropriate and unsustainable, as held by the Supreme Court i n BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA’s case (1 supra) placing reliance upon a Constitution Bench judgment of the Supreme Court SUPREME COURT BAR ASSN. v. UNION OF INDIA [(1998) 4 SCC 409] holding that the jurisdiction of the regulatory body of the State Bar Council and the jurisdiction of Court in conduct of cases before itself are entirely different. It was, therefore, improper for the learned District Judge to apply Rule 33 of the Bar Council of India Rules and pass a restraint order against the counsel when such a matter, at best, could have been within the jurisdiction of the Bar Council of India.
