Dismissed

Smt. v. Visalakshi, v The Special Court under a.P.Land Grabbing (Prohibition Act)

Telangana HC7 Mar 2012WP/5174/2012

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court dismissed a writ petition challenging a Special Court's declaration labeling respondents as land grabbers in Andhra Pradesh. Upholding the Special Court's findings on property identification and illegal occupation as factually supported, the Court held that writ jurisdiction is limited to errors in the decision-making process, not mere factual disputes.

What the court decided

AI extract

Smt. v. Visalakshi, Vs The Special Court under a.P.Land… — Land Acquisition | Telangana HC (2012)

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***** THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE V.V.S.RAO AND THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY

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+ WRIT PETITION No.5174 of 2012

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%Date: 7.3.2012

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# Smt.B.Visalakshi

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... PETITIONER

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VERSUS

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$ The Special Court under A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, Hyderabad, and another.

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...RESPONDENTS

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! Counsel for the Petitioner: MR. P.V.SANJEEV RAO

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^ Counsel for the Respondents: G.P FOR REVENUE

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<GIST:

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>HEAD NOTE:

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? Cases referred 1. (2002) 3 SCC 258 2. (2003) 10 Supreme Court Cases 121 3. (1976) 2 SCC 868 : AIR 1976 SC 232

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THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE V.V.S.RAO AND

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THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY

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WRIT PETITION NO.5174 OF 2012

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ORDER: (per Hon’ble Sri Justice G.Krishna Mohan Reddy)

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This writ petition is directed against common judgment dated 23.6.2011 passed in L.G.C.Nos.5 and 25 of 2003 on the file of the 1^st

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respondent-Special Court under A.P. Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act, Hyderabad, 1982 (‘the Special Court’) (‘the Act’).

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The petitioner is the 9^th respondent in L.G.C.No.5 of 2003 and sole respondent in L.G.C.No.25 of 2003 and the 2^nd respondent-State is the applicant in both the Land Grabbing Cases on the file of the Special Court.

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L.G.C.No.5 of 2003 was filed to declare the applicant (State) as the owner of land admeasuring 1958 sq.mtrs. equivalent to 2342 sq.yards out of 13,104 sq.mtrs. situated in Sy.No.227/P correlated to T.S.No.43/3/A part, Block-E, Ward No.87 of Khairtabad Village and Mandal, Hyderabad District and the respondents therein as the land grabbers of the property and direct the respondents to handover the property to the applicant and award compensation of Rs.5,000/- per month towards the wrongful possession of the respondents over the property from 1994 onwards and also to punish the respondents under the relevant provisions of the Act. Likewise, L.G.C.No.25 of 2003 was filed for exactly similar reliefs against the respondent therein in respect of land admeasuring 237.6 sq.yards or 284 sq.yards out of 13104 sq.mtrs. or 15,672 sq.yards in Sy.No.227/P correlated to T.S.No.43/3/A, Block-E, Ward No.87 of Khairatabad village and mandal, Hyderabad district.

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The claim of the applicant in L.G.C.No.5 of 2003 is as follows:

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Khairtabad village forms part of Khairatabad mandal. During Nizam’s Regime, survey was conducted in accordance with the provisions of Hyderabad Land Revenue Act, in 1317 Fasli i.e., in the year 1924-A.D and it became final. During 1964-71 town survey was conducted under A.P. Survey and Boundaries Act, 1923 duly issuing notification under Section 6(1) of the same Act. Then the schedule property was demarked as Town Survey No.43/3/A Block “E” Ward No.87. Then it was also classified as Government Land (Gairan) under

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Section 9(2) of the Act and consequential final notification was issued under Section 13 of the Act which was published in A.P.Gazette No.60 dated 25.9.1976. The entries in the town survey records became final and conclusive. As the things stood thus, during physical verification of the Government lands, the erstwhile Mandal Revenue Officer, Secunderabad mandal noticed that the respondents in the case occupied and grabbed the schedule property to an extent of 1958 sq. meters. Thereby notices were issued under Section 7 of the A.P.Land (Encroachment) Act, 1905 on 24.6.1994 in consequence of which, the respondents submitted documents claiming the property, but those documents were found pertaining to certain extent in Survey Nos.223 and 225 of Khairtabad village. Further, necessary orders were passed and notices were issued for their eviction, but the respondents having received the notices on 22.7.1994 filed appeal under Section 10 of the Act before the erstwhile Revenue Divisional Officer, Hyderabad Division, which was dismissed for default, following which they approached the District Collector by filing revision, which was also dismissed.

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The respondents 1 to 5 and 7 claim ownership and possession by way of purchases in respect of plot No.6 admeasuring 540 sq.yards, plot No.5 admeasuring 540 sq.yards, plot No.4 admeasuring 430 sq.yards, plot No.3 admeasuring 533 sq.yards, plot No.2 and 382 sq.yards all in Sy.Nos.223 and 225 of Somajiguda village respectively, which is endorsed by the remaining respondents. According to them, the schedule property is only part of Sy.Nos.223 and 225 belonging to them. They also claim title over the property by adverse possession. They also claimed that S.No.227 or 227-P never existed and no localization of that property took place and the applicant made false claim which should be dismissed.

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Similar pleas are taken in L.G.C.No.25 of 2003 in respect of the property scheduled therein. According to the respondent therein, her

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husband purchased 250 sq.yards in S.Nos.223 and 225 of Khairtabad village and they accordingly have been enjoying the property by constructing rooms and compound wall.

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Common issues were framed in the two cases with regard to the questions of title, including acquiring title over the properties by adverse possession and grabbing of the properties.

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In L.G.C.No.5 of 2003, for the applicant, P.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Exs.A1 to A4 were marked and for the respondents, R.Ws.1 to 4 were examined and Exs.B1 to B74 were marked. Further, the Deputy Director of Survey and Land Records was examined as C.W.1 and Exs.C1 to C6, C-6A and C-6B were marked through him. In L.G.C.No.25 of 2003 for the applicant, the then Mandal Revenue Officer, Khairtabad and Surveyor were examined as P.Ws.1 and 2 respectively and Exs.A1 and A12 were marked. In this case also, the Deputy Director of Survey & Land Records was examined as C.W.1 and through him Exs.C1 to C6 were marked. In fact, C.W.1 was appointed as Commissioner to visit and survey the properties and file his reports and plans and accordingly, he carried out his work. On the basis of the evidence adduced in particular, the evidence of C.W.1 and his reports, the Special Court upheld the claim of the applicant and declared the respondents as the land grabbers of the scheduled properties respectively, aggrieved by which the present writ petition has been filed.

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Learned Counsel for the respondents contends that there is substantial documentary evidence placed by the respondents to establish that the schedule lands are located in Survey Nos.223 and 225 of Khairtabad village belonging to the respondents. He claims on the other hand that the properties claimed by the applicant are not identified and the evidence of C.W.1 in that regard is inaccurate, contradictory and inadmissible. He has stressed in that context that C.W.1 admitted that relevant original maps and corresponding tippons

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were not available, while emphasizing that thereby C.W.1 got no basis to locate the properties. He asserts that only on the basis of assumptions and presumptions, C.W.1 prepared and filed his reports and plans before the Special Court, by reason of which no credibility can be attached to them and his evidence. He also contends that when there is only the dispute regarding the identification of the properties, thereby the application filed by the applicant before the Special Court does not make out a case of land grabbing. In that context, the applicant must aver and prove the factum as well as the intention of land grabbing, whereas there is no element of occupying the property unauthorizedly or without any lawful entitlement. When the essential ingredients of invoking the jurisdiction of the Special Court are not made out, the Special Court ought to have rejected the application at the stage of inception.

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In fact, in this writ petition, no dispute is raised with regards to the ownership of the applicant over the properties claimed by the applicant apart from the question of identification of those properties. Hence this question of ownership need not be deliberated here again. On the other hand, Learned Counsel for the applicant contends that the report of C.W.1 is comprehensive and credible. It was not questioned earlier by the respondents, by reason of which they are precluded and estopped from questioning the reports in this writ petition. According to him, in fact, C.W.1 on the basis of relevant material, correctly identified the schedule properties. Thereby he seeks to uphold the evidence of C.W.1. He also contends that the writ petition is not maintainable as this is not an appellate forum and the extraordinary jurisdiction can be invoked only when there is apparent error in the order. He pleads at the end that the Special Court passed a well reasoned order and there are no grounds to interfere with that.

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P.W.1-Mandal Revenue Officer, Khairtabad mandal and P.W.2Deputy Director of Survey and Land Records, Hyderabad and R.Ws.1

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to 4 (Respondents 4, 1, 5 and 7 respectively) in L.G.C.No.5 of 2003 and P.W.1-Tahsildar, Khairtabad mandal and P.W.2-Mandal Surveyor, Khairtabad mandal and R.Ws.1 to 4 deposed in support of the respective claims. In fact in support of the claim of the respondents, number of documents were marked. But what is significant here is that the lands claimed by the parties are different and there is no overlapping of the claims of ownerships.

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On the overall assessment of the claims made and the evidence adduced in the present context, it is only to be determined now as to whether the properties claimed by the appellants are located in Survey No.227 of Khairtabad village or they form part of the lands belonging to the respondents in S.Nos.223 and 225 of Khairtabad village and whether the writ petition is maintainable and whether there is good evidence of grabbing of the properties. In view of the rival claims, it is to be ascertained whether sufficient evidence was placed with regards to the localization of the schedule properties. In this context, the evidence of C.W.1-Deputy Director of Survey and Land Records in both the cases is relevant and clinching. It is emphatical that learned counsel for the respondents only asserts that C.W.1 failed to identify the schedule properties while claiming that the scheduled properties form part of the lands claimed by the respondents.

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In fact, C.W.1 filed two reports marked as Exs.C2 and C6, the second one being additional report with regards to the location of the schedule land. In fact the second one is more comprehensive. These reports amply provide that the scheduled properties were identified on the ground as shown by the interested parties as H.Nos.6-3-1100/2, 6- 3-1100/4/4, 6-3-1100/4/3, 6-3-1100/4/5, 6-3-1100/4/3/A, 6-31100/4/3/C, 6-3-1100/4/3/B within Northern and Western boundaries of S.No.199, part of boundary between S.Nos.199 and 200, and Northern

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boundary of S.No.200 near Begumpet Railway Station. He identified that T.S.No.42 and 43/3 of B-Block and Ward-87 correlate to Sy.No.227 of Khairtabad village. Boundaries of T.S.Nos.32/1, 33, 41 and 42 of Block-E and T.S.No.126/1 of Block-C-, both of Ward No.87 o f Khairtabad village were identified on ground by tallying the measurements of the boundaries recorded in the Town Survey Record of Measurements (RoM). According to him, the identified boundaries were measured or observed with Total Station, an electronic distance measuring instrument compatible with computer. On the basis of xerox copies of village maps of Khairtabad and Somajiguda of 1324 Fasli, Tippans of Survey Nos.201 to 205, 207 and 208 of Khairtabad village, which were available, and Tippans of Survey Nos.219 to 226 which were prepared by him from available pucca book as the original Tippans of those survey numbers were not available and RoM of Block C&E of Ward 87 which were available, he located the schedule properties. The Tippans of Survey Nos.201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 207 and 208 of Khairtabad village were superimposed over the village maps duly correlating the boundaries given in the RoM of T.S.Nos.32/1, 33, 41 and 42 of Block-B and T.S.No.126/1 of Block-C of Ward No.87 and also Sy.Nos.199 and 200 with the observed/measured data so as to achieve optimum correlation. Tippans of Sy.Nos.219 to 226 were also plotted and superimposed with the plotted survey numbers in Khairtabad village map. He marked the properties under occupation as ‘A’ (with 477.50 sq.mtrs.) ‘B’ (with 437.6 sq.mtrs.), ‘C’ (with 365.80 sq.mtrs.), ‘D’ (with 446.60 sq.mtrs.) ‘E’ (with 519.30 sq.mtrs.), ‘F’ (with 533.80 sq.mtrs.) and ‘G’ (with 359.80 sq.mtrs.) as per the enjoyment of individuals. Accordingly, plan 2A was prepared. But as per the Plan 2A, as found by him, the extent of the disputed properties is 1789.60 sq.mtrs with boundaries North: T.S.No.129/3 and T.SNo.43/2 in part, South: Road, East: land allotted to DIL and West: Parts of respondents lands in

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T.S.No.43/2 as against 1958 sq.mtrs given in the schedule. According to him, further an extent of 200 sq.mtrs of the scheduled properties falls in T.S.No.43/2 and an extent of 1474.70 sq.mtrs of the properties fall in T.S.No.43/3 and an extent of 134 sq.mtrs. of the properties falls in T.S.No.47. Exs.C4 to C6 plans reflect the same data.

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It is the evidence of C.W.1 in his cross-examination that usually boundaries are fixed for village lands as per the village maps and Tippans. It is also according to him that if there is any difference between the boundaries given in the Tippans and village maps, those given in the Tippans would prevail. It is further according to him that the total extent of Sy.No.227 is Ac.113-22 guntas as per relevant pahanies and out of that Ac.5-37 guntas is accounted in Khairtabad village and the rest is accounted in Somajiguda village as per the record. He denies that the scheduled properties fall in Sy.Nos.223 and 225 and his report and plans are false.

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Nothing was elicited from his evidence which is favourable to the respondents and against the claim of the applicant. His evidence and also plans and reports are comprehensive. He took lot of pains in order to ascertain and localize the disputed properties. Significantly he considered the relevant Tippans already available, Tippans prepared by him on the basis of relevant book along with the copies of village maps and identified the properties having taken necessary steps exhaustively as referred. Though the original village maps were not available, pertinently he made use of relevant Tippans which were available and also the Tippans prepared by him for the identification of the properties. He also took the help of the parties for the identification of the properties physically at the outset.

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Emphatically there is nothing to show that the respondents questioned the correctness of the report and the plans of C.W.1 before the Special Court. If the respondents were aggrieved by that, definitely they could have taken necessary steps for re-entrusting the

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warrant of commission to the Commissioner with a direction to take necessary further measures, for not doing so an adverse inference is to be drawn. The report and plans of C.W.1 coupled with his evidence are hence proved to be adequate to locate the scheduled properties.

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The circumstances enumerated amply establish that the respondents have been in the occupation of the scheduled properties in Sy.No.127 of Khairtabad village belonging to the Government without legal entitlement.

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With regards to the question of land grabbing and the maintainability of the writ petition, Section 2(d) of the Act contemplates;

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“Land grabber” means a person or a group of persons who commits land grabbing and includes any person who gives financial aid to any person for taking illegal possession of lands or for construction of unauthorized structures thereon, or who collects or attempts to collect from any occupiers of such lands rent, compensation and other charges by criminal intimidation, or who abets the doing of any of the above mentioned acts; and also includes the successors in interest;

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Section 2(e) of the Act contemplates;

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“Land grabbing” means every activity of grabbing of any land (whether belonging to the Government, a local authority, a religious or charitable institution or endowment, including a wakf, or any other private person) by a person or group of persons, without any lawful entitlement and with a view to illegally taking possession of such lands, or enter into or create illegal tenancies or lease and licences agreements or any other illegal agreements in respect of such lands, or to construct unauthorized structures thereon for sale or hire, or give such lands to any person on rental or lease and licence basis for construction, or use and occupation, of unauthorized structures; and the term “to grab land” shall be construed accordingly”.

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[1] In Konda Lakshmana Bapuji v. Govt. of A.P . , the Supreme Court considered the definition of ‘land grabbing’. The Supreme Court held as follows:

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“A mere doubt raised by the State on the title and possession of the occupant of a land does not make him a land grabber. Whenever the right of the occupant is questioned by the State, it is enough for the occupant to show that he has a prima facie bonafide claim to the land occupied but a burden is cast on him to prove that he is in occupation or possession of the land under a lawful title.”

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“40. To make out a case in a civil case that the appellant is a land grabber the first respondent must aver and prove both the ingredients-the factum as well as the intention-that the appellant falls in the categories of the persons, mentioned above [clause (d) of Section of the Act], has occupied the land in dispute, which belonged to the first respondent, without any lawful entitlement and with a view to or with the intention of illegally taking possession of such land or entering into the land for any of the purposes mentioned in clause (e) of Section 2 of the Act, summarized above.”

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“41. What needs to be looked into in the present controversy is: whether the appellant has any lawful entitlement (Proprietary or possessory) to the land in dispute and had come into possession of the land in dispute unauthorisedly.”

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What emerges thereby in the context is that in order to declare a person as land grabber of a property, there should be clear allegation of land grabbing and proof of illegal occupation of the property without lawful entitlement and with a view to illegally taking possession of the land or enter into the land for any of the purposes contemplated in Section 2(e). Such intention can be implied by virtue of relevant evidence including the evidence about the conduct of the party who occupied the property which can be gathered.

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What is significant here is that the respondents have been in the possession of the property which is not legal. It cannot be said that they have been doing so innocently. Before they occupied the property at the inception by virtue of their purchases, they were bound to ascertain the identification of those properties and then only should have occupied the properties. If that was done the controversy in

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question and the consequential proceedings would not have arisen at all. It is to be very much emphasized that even after the applicant made the claim and demanded the respondents to vacate the properties and filed the land grabbing cases as the respondents failed to comply with the demands, the respondents just ignored that and continued their possession of the properties resisting the claims. This manifests that their conduct therefore is deliberate and not according to law which clearly infer that they occupied the properties and continued to be in the occupation of the properties with the dishonest intention of having permanent enjoyment and acquire rights over the property. Under the circumstances enumerated, the irresistible conclusion to be drawn is that the ingredients of the definitions of land grabber and land grabbing are satisfied with reference to the respondents.

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Then what remains of the claims of the respondents is the question of acquiring rights over the property by adverse possession.

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In this context, the respondents must show and prove that they were in the possession and enjoyment of the properties for more than the statutory period of 30 years adverse to the interest of the true owner of the property (i.e., the government) openly and uninterruptedly, prior to approaching the Special Court. It is a mixed question of law and fact. Mere possession of the land, which may be even longer, would not convert into possessory title unless the possessor got animus possidendi to hold the land adverse to the title of the true owner. Assertion of title to the land in dispute by the possessor of it would be sufficient indication of animus possidendi to hold it adverse to the title of the true owner. In Konda Laxmana Bapuji v. Government of A.P, with reference to the plea of acquiring title over a government land, the Supreme Court in fact held in those lines as follows;

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“The question of a person perfecting title by adverse possession is a

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mixed question of law and fact. The principle of law in regard to adverse possession is firmly established. It is a well-settled proposition that mere possession of the land, however long it may be, would not ripen into possessory title unless the possessor has animus possidendi to hold the land adverse to the title of the true owner. It is true that assertion of title to the land in dispute by the possessor would, in an appropriate case, be sufficient indication of the animus possidendi to hold adverse to the title of the true owner. But such an assertion of title must be clear and unequivocal though it need not be addressed to the real owner. For reckoning the statutory period to perfect title by prescription both the possession as well as the animus possidendi must be shown to exist. Where, however, at the commencement of the possession there is no animus possidendi, the period for the purpose of reckoning adverse possession will commence from the date when both the actual possession and assertion of title by the possessor are shown to exist. The length of possession to perfect title by adverse possession as against the Government is 30 years.”

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But the respondents have failed to show existence of such factors or substantiate those factors in order to uphold their claim of acquiring title to the properties by adverse possession. Their assertion without the support of legal evidence is not suffice to uphold their claim, though no doubt the circumstances here amply prove their adverse possession over the properties.

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Apart from that quite contradictory pleas are taken by the respondents, one claiming that they acquired the properties under purchases from the rightful owners and the other by claiming that they acquired title to the properties by adverse possession, which do not agree with each other. If there is acquisition by purchase, the question of acquisition by the other mode does not arise and vice versa. Therefore, one of the pleas vitiates the other and vice versa. Hence, the respondents are precluded from taking the plea of acquiring title to the properties by adverse possession. With regards to the maintainability of the writ petition, it is relevant to examine the scope of the relevant provisions of the Act and also when a writ petition lies against an order passed by the Special Court.

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Section 8 of the Act provides for Procedure and Powers of the Special Courts. It empowers the Special Court to take cognizance of the cases of land grabbing. Rule (1) thereunder empowers the Special Court either suo motu, or on application made to take cognizance of and try every case arising out of any alleged act of land grabbing, or with respect to the ownership and title to, or lawful possession of, the land grabbed. Rule (1-A) enjoins that the Special Court for the purpose of taking cognizance of the case, shall consider the location, or extent or value of the land alleged to have been grabbed or of the substantial nature of the evil involved or in the interest of justice required or any other relevant matter. The proviso thereunder envisages that the Special Court shall not take cognizance of any such case without hearing the petitioner. Under Rule (2), exclusive jurisdiction is given to the Special Court constituted for the area in which the land grabbed is situated to try any case in respect of an alleged act of land grabbing, or the determination of questions of title and ownership to, or lawful possession of, any land grabbed under this Act notwithstanding anything in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Central Act 5 of 1980) ( code for brevity) or in the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972, (Act 9 of 1972). This also provides that the decision of the Special Court shall be final. This provision makes it categorical that no appeal would lie against the decision of the Special Court. By virtue of Rule (2-A), if the Special Court is of the opinion that any case brought before it, is not a fit case to be taken cognizance of, it may return the same for presentation before the Special Tribunal. In addition to that the first proviso to that envisages that if, in the opinion of the Special Court, any application filed before it is prima facie frivolous or vexatious, it shall reject the same without any further enquiry. The second proviso thereunder is with regards to withdrawal of such cases. Rule (2-B) enjoins that it shall be lawful for the Special Court to try all offences punishable under this Act

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notwithstanding anything in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. So the Special Court is given empowerment not only to deal with the the question of land grabbing and the consequential measures to be taken, but also to deal with the question of punishing the person declared as land grabber of certain property. Rule 2(c) is about the mode of dealing with those two different issues. Rule 4 prescribes limitation of six months from the date of institution of the case before the Special Court to dispose of the matter. The proviso under this rule reiterates the principle of testimonial compulsion. Rule (6) mandates that every finding of the Special Court with regards to any alleged act of land grabbing shall be conclusive proof of the fact of land grabbing and of the persons who committed such land grabbing, and every judgment of the Special Court with regard to the determination of title and ownership to, or lawful possession of, any land grabbed shall be binding on all persons having interest in such land. The provisios thereunder are with regard to issuance of notification, evacuee property and issuance of notices to all those interested in such property. Rule 7 deals with the question of payment of compensation and Rule 8 deals with the question of territorial jurisdiction.

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By virtue of Section 9 of the Act, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Andhra Pradesh Civil Courts Act, 1972 and Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 shall apply to the proceedings before the Special Court to the extent they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act unless expressly provided in this Act. For the purposes of the provisions of those enactments, the Special Court shall be deemed to be a Civil Court or as the case may be a Court of Sessions and shall have all the powers of Civil Court and the Court of Sessions.

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In State of A.P v. P.V.Hanumantha Ra o^[2] the Supreme Court had

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occasion to consider the scope of the powers of Special Court with reference to the relevant provisions of the Act and also the scope of invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court. The Supreme Court held;

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“On examination of the relevant provisions of the Act of 1982 and in the light of its objects and reasons, it is apparent that in cases of alleged land-grabbing, exclusive jurisdiction is conferred on the Special Court. Jurisdiction of a civil court on such subjectmatter stands ousted. The Special Court has been conferred powers of a civil court to examine all questions of title and possession with respect to the land alleged to have been grabbed. The findings of the Special Court are binding and conclusive on the parties and all others having interest in the land which is alleged to have been grabbed. Against the decision of the Special Court, no appeal is provided. The only remedy of the aggrieved party is to approach the High Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. It is on the basis of the aforesaid provisions that we have to determine the scope of interference of the High Court in writ jurisdiction in the judgment and decision of the Special Court.

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True it is that remedy of the writ petition available in the High Court is not against the “decision” of the subordinate court, tribunal or authority but it is against the “decision-making process”. In the “decision-making process”, if the court, tribunal or authority deciding the case, has ignored vital evidence and thereby arrived at erroneous conclusion or has misconstrued the provisions of the relevant Act or misunderstood the scope of its jurisdiction, the constitutional power of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 can be invoked to set right such errors and prevent gross injustice to the party complaining.”

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The Supreme Court also considered the case of Surya Dev [(2003) 6 SCC 675] and the case of Sawarn Singh v. State of Punjab^[3] while examining the nature and ambit of the power of the High Court to issue writs under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution. I n Surya Dev, the

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Supreme Court held

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“39. Though we have tried to lay down broad principles and working rules, the fact remains that the parameters for exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution cannot be tied down in a straitjacket formula or rigid rules. … At the end, we may sum up by saying that the power is there but the exercise is discretionary which will be governed solely by the

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dictates of judicial conscience enriched by judicial experience and practical wisdom of the judge.”

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In Sawarn Singh v. State of Punjab, the Supreme Court held:

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“13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases the error amounts to an error of law.”

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These decisions clearly emphasize the scope of the jurisdiction of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution by mandating that the remedy under the writ petition available in the High Court is not against the decision of the Subordinate Court, Tribunal or Authority, but against the decision making process and in the decision making process, if the Court, Tribunal or Authority concerned with has ignored vital evidence and thereby arrived at erroneous conclusion or misconstrued the relevant provisions or misunderstood the scope of its jurisdiction, the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court can be invoked to set right such errors and prevent gross injustice to the complainant.

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Consequently, the question of interfering with the findings of the Special Court in this writ petition would arise only when there are erroneous conclusions by ignoring vital evidence or the provisions of the Act are misconstrued. On the overall analysis of the entire material available, when it is categorical that the Special Court properly examined the evidence recorded particularly the evidence of C.W.1 and arrived at the conclusion that the identification of the properties was clearly made out and declared the respondents as the land grabbers of the property, this writ petition is not tenable.

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In the result, the Writ Petition is dismissed being devoid of merits without costs.

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______________ (V.V.S.RAO, J) ______________________________ (G.KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY,J) Date 07.3.2012 NOTE: L.R. Copy be marked. (By order) DA

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THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE V.V.S.RAO AND THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G.KRISHNA MOHAN REDDY

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WRIT PETITION No.5174 of 2012

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7.3.2012

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD

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THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE V.V.S.RAO AND

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