Dismissed

P. Uma Maheswar, v. State, through Govt. of India

Telangana HC24 Feb 2012CRLRC/1473/2004

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

In this criminal revision, Justice N. Ravi Shankar rejected the petitioners contention that prior sanction was required under Section 75 of the Mines Act, 1952, upholding the validity of prosecution by authorized inspectors. The court upheld convictions for violations regarding safety precautions for a waterlogged mine area, finding existing barriers insufficient. The revision was dismissed accord

What did the court decide?

The criminal revision case was dismissed, affirming the conviction and sentence under Sections 73 and 72-C(1)(a) of the Mines Act, 1952.

P. Uma Maheswar, Vs State, through Govt. of India — Corruption | Telangana HC (2012)

¶1

THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE N. RAVI SHANKAR

¶2

CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No.1473 of 2004

¶3

ORDER:

¶4

The petitioner, hereinafterwards, referred to as accused, was tried in C.C.No.136 of 1999, which is a complaint case, on the file of the Special Judicial Magistrate of First Class (Mobile Court), Manthani (trial court), on two charges. According to the complaint, the first is under Section 73 of the Mines Act, 1952 (for short Act), read with Regulation 112(2) of the Coal Mines Regulations, 1957 (for short Regulations), and the second is under Section 72-C(1) (a) of the Act.

¶5

2. The trial court after considering the matter by its judgment dated 9^th August 2001 convicted the petitioner of both the charges and sentenced him to pay fine of Rs.500/- on the first count and Rs.3,500/- on the second count and imposed default clause prison sentences of various terms for non-payment of fine on both counts. Questioning that judgment, the accused filed Criminal Appeal No.108 of 2001 and that appeal was dismissed by the court of Principal Sessions Judge at Karimnagar (appellate court) by its judgment dated 2^nd July 2004. Aggrieved by the same, the accused has come up with this revision.

¶6

3. The admitted facts which led to the prosecution of the accused in the above case are these. At the relevant time, the accused i.e. P.Uma Maheswar was working as Manager of Singareni Collieries Company Limited (SCCL) and the complainant is one Sri B.P.Ahuja, Inspector of Mines and who is also designated as the Director of Mines Safety. On 2^nd March 1999 at

¶7

Ramagundam Open Cast Pit-I (OCP-I) mine of SCCL some outsiders entered into the water logged pit in the OCP-I mine of SCCL for bathing and in that transaction one boy by name Manoj Kumar aged about 14 years got drowned and died in that water logged pit of the mine.

¶8

4. The version of the complainant i.e. the Inspector of Mines is that the aforesaid incident occurred due to the failure of the accused as the manager of the Mine in not taking proper precautions to prevent the outsiders from entering the OCP-I i.e. the disused mine filled with water and violated Regulation 112(2) of the Regulations r/w Section 73 of the Act which is the first charge. The complainant further says that his enquiry into the matter revealed that the aforesaid incident resulting in death of the boy has occurred only due to the above violation of Regulation 112(2) and that is again punishable under Section 72-C(1)(a) of the Act which also deals with the offences. The details of the oral and documentary evidence let in by the complainant are mentioned in the judgments of the courts below.

¶9

5. Sri Nandigam Krishna Rao, the learned counsel appearing for the accused, arguing for an acquittal raised two contentions. The first is that a proper and valid sanction of the competent authority is necessary for launching prosecutions for offences under the Act as contemplated under Section 75 thereof and since there is no valid sanction of the concerned authority in this case the whole prosecution is bad. In support of this contention he also relied upon a decision of this court given in N.V.Subrahmanyam v. State (Government of India)^[1] . The second is that a perusal of the evidence on record would show that the accused can be said to have taken all care that is necessary to prevent accidents at the

¶10

waterlogged area. He says that since the above two aspects which relate to law have been ignored by both the courts below; this court should now interfere in the matter.

¶11

6. On the other hand, Sri Ponnam Ashok Goud, the Assistant Solicitor General, who argued for the complainant, answering the first contention, pointed out that Section 75 of the Act does not contemplate any sanction and what all that is required by the said provision is that prosecution should be instituted by the Chief Inspector of Mines or an Inspector who is authorized to do it and since in this case the Inspector who is authorized has filed the complaint after making an enquiry and satisfying himself about the violations of the Act, the prosecution can be said to be maintainable. He further argued that even the evidence on record would show that there is violation of Regulation 112(2) which by itself is sufficient for sustaining the convictions.

¶12

7. To appreciate the first contention of Sri Krishna Rao, it is necessary to look at Section 75 of the Act which reads as follows.

¶13

“Prosecution of owner, agent or manager:-No prosecution shall be instituted against any owner, agent or manager for any offence under this Act except at the instance of the Chief Inspector or of the District Magistrate or of an Inspector authorised in this behalf by general or special order in writing by the Chief Inspector :

¶14

Provided that the Chief Inspector or the District Magistrate or the Inspector as so authorised shall, before instituting such prosecution, satisfy himself that the owner, agent or manager had failed to exercise all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence.

¶15

Provided further that in respect of an offence committed in the course of the technical direction and management of a mine, the District Magistrate shall not institute any prosecution against an owner, agent or manager without the previous approval of the Chief Inspector.”

¶16

8. A perusal of Section 75 would show that it does not contemplate any prior sanction of the Chief Inspector or the District Magistrate. What all the main Section 75 says is that a prosecution for the offences under the Act against any owner, agent or manager of the mine can be instituted only at the instance of the Chief Inspector or of the District Magistrate or of an Inspector i.e. Inspector of Mines authorized in that behalf by the general or special order in writing of the Chief Inspector. In other words it can be said that it is enough if the prosecution is instituted by the Chief Inspector or the other officers or authorities specified in the section.

¶17

9. The other aspect to be seen is whether the Inspector of Mines, Sri B.P.Ahuja, is competent to institute prosecution in the present case. On this aspect, the complainant in his evidence as P.W.1 filed Ex.P.2 xerox copy of the gazette notification dated 30^th January 1990 issued under Section 75 of the Act. That notification shows that it is a general order issued by the Chief Inspector of Mines authorizing all officers and who are appointed as Inspectors of mines to institute prosecutions. No dispute is raised by the defence about the validity of this notification and it is also not shown that it has subsequently been cancelled. Hence it follows that the complainant Sri B.P.Ahuja was competent under the above Ex.P.2 to institute the prosecution.

¶18

10. It may then be noted that the first proviso to Section 75 says that before instituting such prosecution the Chief Inspector or the Inspector authorized shall satisfy himself that the owner, agent or manager has failed to exercise all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence. In the case on hand, the complaint is filed by P.W.1 Sri B.P.Ahuja, the then Inspector of Mines. The

¶19

complaint reads that an enquiry was conducted into the incident of drowning and its cause by P.W.2 Sri S.Adhikari the Deputy Director of Mines and the said Officer held an enquiry and submitted his report which is marked as Ex.P.18 wherein he opined that the accused was responsible for the above incident inasmuch as he did not exercise due diligence in taking the precautions. The complaint reads that after being satisfied with the report and the statements recorded by the enquiry officer the complainant, who is the Inspector of Mines, has filed the complaint.

¶20

11. In my opinion, the above procedure followed by the complainant can be said to be substantial compliance with the first proviso to Section 75 of the Act with regard to his satisfaction for instituting the prosecution. It may be noted that the above safeguard in the first proviso is only intended to ensure that prosecutions are not instituted for the offences under the Act on frivolous grounds. It is not necessary that every complaint filed by the Inspector should end in conviction and what all the section requires is that the Inspector should satisfy himself about the responsibility of the accused for the commission of the offences and then launch prosecution. That requirement can be said to have been complied with in the present case. In this connection, it should be mentioned here that the complainant has filed Ex.P.4 sanction order for prosecution which he says was signed by a law officer which is not necessary at all and even otherwise law officer is not competent to accord such sanction. This is mentioned only as it has been marked in the evidence.

¶21

12. In N.V.Subrahmanyam case (1 supra) a learned single Judge of this Court observed that sanction by the Chief Inspector of

¶22

Mines for instituting a prosecution for an offence under Section 72C(1)(a) of the Act is necessary and that the Chief Inspector shall also record reasons in his order for concluding that due diligence by the officer concerned was not exercised. It may be noted that, as already mentioned, Section 75 does not contemplate any sanction and it does not also stipulate that the Chief Inspector should record reasons for concluding that the officer concerned did not exercise due diligence. It appears that this court on the facts and circumstances of that case held so. I am of the opinion that the said case/decision must be confined to the facts of that case and cannot be treated as a precedent. The above decision therefore cannot help the accused. Accordingly the first contention of Sri Krishna Rao is rejected.

¶23

13. Now coming to the second contention of Sri Krishna Rao it relates to the merits of the matter. The complainant’s case, which is already set out above, with regard to both the charges is based upon the violation of Regulation 112(2) of the Regulations and the substance of both the charges is that the accused being the manager did not take precautions or measures contemplated in the said Regulation 112(2) and if he had taken those precautions the incident would not have occurred resulting in the death of the deceased boy. This Regulation 112 speaks of providing fencing and gates to the places in a mine area where excavations are made to prevent accidents and loss of life or injuries. Regulation 112(2) reads as follows. “112. Fencings and gates –

¶24

(2) Every entrance to a shaft, staple pit, sump, goaf or other dangerous place shall be provided with an efficient fence, barrier or gate, so designed and constructed as to effectively prevent any person from entering or falling therein.”

¶25

14. Regulation 112(2) says that every other dangerous place in a

¶26

mine which includes a waterlogged area shall be provided with an efficient fence, barrier or gate, so designed and constructed as to effectively prevent any person from entering or falling therein. In the said clause the words “to effectively prevent any person” assume importance.

¶27

15. The evidence of the complainant i.e. P.W.1, the Deputy Director of Mines Safety who gave evidence as P.W.2, and the evidence of other officials who gave evidence as P.Ws.3 to 5 have been discussed by the trial court. It will be found from the evidence of P.W.2 and his enquiry report which is marked as Ex.P.18 that the waterlogged area had a length of six meters, width of 150 meters and a maximum depth of 4.5 meters. The evidence of P.Ws.2 to 5 would no doubt show that on the northern and western sides of the above waterlogged area there were dump heaps to a height of 25 meters with thorny bushes. Further their evidence would also show that on the southern side a pumping station was provided with gate and warning board and on the eastern side there was a dump yard progressing over a height of 20 meters from the water level. In fact, these aspects are mentioned in Ex.P.6 explanation of the accused given by him to the complainant.

¶28

16. It should however be noted that in Ex.P.6 explanation the accused himself admitted that he did not provide fencing as he considered it to be unnecessary because of the above dump heaps surrounding the waterlogged area and that he would provide it in future. Sri Krishna Rao’s contention is that the above dump heaps or sand heaps and the other barriers surrounding the waterlogged area are sufficient enough to prevent an inadvertent entry into the waterlogged area and as the enquiry report of P.W.2

¶29

itself would show that the deceased and the other boys entered the water for a bath after playing holy festival on that day i.e. 2^nd March 1999 deliberately, the accused cannot be held responsible. In this connection he also pointed out about the pumping house and the warning board also. It is true that the above circumstances may show that the accused has taken some precautions. The question is whether they are sufficient to exonerate him from both the charges. I am of the opinion that having regard to the language of Regulation 112(2) the answer to the above question should be in the negative.

¶30

17. A perusal of Regulation 112(2), which is already extracted, would show that it contemplates raising of a fence, barrier or gate so designed and constructed as to effectively prevent any person from entering or falling in a dangerous place. Thus it cannot be said that if the accused takes an ordinary care by relying upon dump heaps or sand barriers and a gate on one side of the waterlogged area, he has taken the care contemplated under Regulation 112(2). It is clear that the very fact that the deceased boy of aged 14 years who is a minor and three others entered the waterlogged area shows that the accused did not take precautions by raising fence or other barriers so as to effectively prevent the above deceased boy and the three others from entering the waterlogged area. It is clear that Regulation 112(2) imposes a very strict and absolute liability or duty upon the manager or owner of a mine to effectively prevent any person from entering the waterlogged area which is a dangerous place and that is intended to prevent both inadvertent entry as well as advertent entry.

¶31

18. Both the courts below proceeded on the above premise in upholding the case of the complainant. Thus it cannot be said that

¶32

their findings on the merits of the matter can be said to be against evidence having regard to the language of Regulation 112(2). The learned counsel for the accused could not point out any irregularity in the charges under Sections 73 and 72-C(1)(a) of the Act brought against the accused. Thus this being a revision there is very little scope for this court to interfere in the matter.

¶33

19. Even with regard to sentences, it may be noted that the petitioner has been let off with fines. Therefore, they cannot be said to be harsh. Accordingly, this criminal revision case is dismissed.

¶34

________________________ N. RAVI SHANKAR, J 24^th February, 2012 CVRK

¶35

[1] 2002 (2) ALD (Crl.) 165 (AP)

P. Uma Maheswar, v. State, through Govt. of India

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

P. Uma Maheswar, v. State, through Govt. of India

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

A compact analysis

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Gorantla Bhaskara Rao, Vs The State of a.P., through Si of Police, P.S. Narsaraopet

Bathala Venkata Sivudu, Vs Gunireddy Srinivasulu Reddy

Rasheed Ahmed Junaid Vs Bombay Mercantile Co.Op Bank Ltd.

V.Marthand Goud Vs The State of Andhra Pradesh Rep.by Public Prosecutor

Kotipalli Mallikarjuna Rao Vs The State Rep.by its Public Prosecutor

Mandala Balraj, Vs The State of a.P., through Sho.