Dismissed

P.Venkataraju and Another v. Janardhanaswamivaru Agestheswaraswamyvar

Telangana HC27 Feb 2012AS/3109/1992

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

In this appeal, purchasers challenged a lower court decree declaring temple land as the absolute property of a deity. The land, originally given for service requisites under a 10-year agreement that expired in 1939, was allegedly converted to 'ryotwari padya' with pattas granted to the plaintiffs' predecessors in 1982-86 without notice to the temple authorities. The High Court upheld the trial court's decree, holding that the patta grants were null and void due to the absence of notice and opportunity of hearing to the interested plaintiff, violating principles of natural justice under the Inams Abolition Act rules.

What did the court decide?

The appeal was dismissed; the judgment and decree of the trial court declaring the plaintiff's title and right to the suit land and directing recovery of possession were upheld.

P.Venkataraju and Another Vs Janardhanaswamivaru… — Property and Title | Telangana HC (2012)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD

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MONDAY, THE TWENTY SEVENTH DAY OF FEBRUARY TWO THOUSAND AND TWELVE

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HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD

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A.S. No.3109 of 1992

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Between:

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Penumarthi Venkataraju and another .. Appellants (D-8 and 9)

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AND

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Sri Janardhana Swamy Varu and Sri Agastheswaraswamy Varu, the two Deities, installed in the two temples, in the same compound at Mandapeta, rep. by their Executive Officer, Mandapeta, East Godavari District .. Respondent (Plaintiff)

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JUDGMENT:

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The judgment and decree dated 29-10-1992 in O.S. No.81 of 1988 on the file of the Subordinate Judge’s Court, Ramachandrapuram led the unsuccessful defendants 8 and 9 to file the present appeal.

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2. The parties are referred to herein as they are arrayed in the suit.

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3. The plaintiff filed the suit for declaring its title and right to the plaint schedule land of Ac.2.76 cents in survey No.488 of Mandapeta and for possession after ejecting the defendants therefrom apart from future profits from the date of the suit till delivery of possession, costs and other appropriate reliefs. The plaintiff claimed that the deities are the absolute owners of the suit land, which is a specific endowment to meet the expenses to put decoration clothes of ‘Radham’ of the two deities specified in the Government records as ‘Radham Gudda Kuttu Inam’. The trustees were meeting the said expenses from the temple funds being in possession of the said land up to 1928. On 29-12-1928 Shaik Meera Saheb, paternal grand father of the 1^st defendant, and Medapati Veera Swamy, maternal grand father of defendants 2 to 7, made an application to the President of the plaintiff Devasthanam Committee to deliver the suit land as remuneration for ‘Dolu Sannayi Vayidyam’ services in the two temples to be performed every day in lieu of 510 kunchams of paddy per annum paid to them till then. The Trust Board passed a resolution on 0601-1929 agreeing to the request and to deliver the land for 10 years from 01-04-1929 to

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31-03-1939. The Managing Trustee of the plaintiff obtained a registered agreement dated 28-02-1929 from Shaik Meera Saheb and Medapati Veera Swamy to that effect and undertaking to redeliver the land to the trustees after personal cultivation during the period. Taxes were agreed to be paid by them and the land was delivered to Shaik Meera Saheb and Medapati Veera Swamy. Shaik Meera Saheb was playing ‘Sannayi Vayidyam’, while Medapati Veera Swamy was rendering ‘Dolu Vayidyam’ service and the land was divided between them with the Western Ac.1.84

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cents being taken by Shaik Meera Saheb, while the Eastern Ac.0.92 cents being taken by Medapati Veera Swamy. ‘Sannayi Vayidyam’ service must be rendered by a minimum of two people and ‘Dolu Vayidyam’ service has to be rendered by a minimum of one person. The two persons continuing to render service were allowed to continue in possession even after the originally agreed period and Lal Saheb, father of the 1^st defendant, after Shaik Meera Saheb and the 1^st defendant, after Lal Saheb came into possession of the Western Ac.1.84 cents while rendering service by themselves or by their deputies. Lanka Bulli Ammayi, daughter of Medapati Veera Swamy came into possession of the Eastern Ac.0.92 cents after Veera Swamy and she continued to render ‘Dolu’ service through her deputies. The 1^st defendant till 1984 and Lanka Bulli Ammayi till 1987 continued to render the services. Bulli Ammayi abandoned the service since 1987, while Sannayi service was being rendered by hired men at the request of the 1^st defendant till 1984. As the services were not resumed, the authorities of the plaintiff enquired into the status of the suit land and found that the 1^st defendant sold away the Western Ac.1.84 cents to the 9^th defendant under a registered sale deed dated 2604-1984 for Rs.29,500/- and delivered it to her. Lanka Bulli Ammayi sold away the Eastern Ac.0.92 cents for Rs.30,000/- to the 8^th defendant under a registered sale deed dated 30-04-1984 and delivered it to him. The 1^st defendant or Bulli Ammayi have no right to alienate the suit land except enjoying it towards remuneration for rendering the services and defendants 8 and 9 did not get any rights in the land. The plaintiff issued a registered notice dated 23-06-1988 to defendants 1, 8 and 9 and Lanka Bulli Ammayi and defendants 8 and 9 in their reply asserted their

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ownership. The 10^th defendant was claimed to be the tenant of the land under the vendors of defendants 8 and 9 and later defendants 8 and 9 also. The 10^th defendant was set up to create hurdles to the plaintiff and the ryotwari pattas allegedly issued in favour of the 1^st defendant and Lanka Bulli Ammayi were without notice to the temple and fraudulent. Section 76 of A.P. Act 30 of 1987 invalidates any such pattas and the permissive possession of the vendors of defendants 8 and 9 cannot be claimed to be adverse possession. Bulli Ammayi died on 11-07-1988 intestate leaving defendants 2 to 7 as her heirs and hence, the suit.

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4. Defendants 3 to 7 and 10 remained ex parte in the suit, while defendants 1 and 2 had no written statement. Defendants 8 and 9 resisted the suit claiming that Shaik Meera Saheb and Medapati Veera Swamy were in continuous possession and enjoyment of the respective extents since long as absolute owners. Shaik Meera Saheb or Medapati Veera Swamy or their successors in interest never rendered ‘Sannayi Vayidyam’ service or ‘Dolu Vayidyam’ service in the two temples since April, 1939 and they are enjoying the respective extents of the suit land as absolute owners, adverse to the rights of the plaintiff. Ryotwari pattas were issued to the 1^st defendant and Lanka Bulli Ammayi under the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act 1956 (for short “the Inams Abolition Act”) and the land was converted into zeroyathi. Pattas were issued after due publication and fulfilment of all statutory formalities. Defendants 8 and 9 also undertook to discharge the encumbrances and debts owed by the respective vendors. No objection was raised on behalf of the plaintiff at any time in spite of the knowledge of the Managing Trustee of the plaintiff and the suit

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land was being cultivated by the 10^th defendant as a tenant under the vendors of defendants 8 and 9 and later under defendants 8 and 9. Prior to the 10^th defendant, the lands were under the cultivation of different tenants and never under the personal cultivation of the 1^st defendant or Lanka Bulli Ammayi or their predecessors. The alleged rights of the plaintiff were never made known to anybody by the authorities and the conduct of the authorities and the issuance of ryotwari pattas by the Government extinguish any rights of the plaintiff, which must be deemed to have been waived even in 1940. Defendants 8 and 9 gave a reply to the suit notice with facts. Defendants 8 and 9, who are bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration, acting on the ryotwari pattas and absolute possession and enjoyment of their vendors, made enquiries about the title before purchase. The provisions of A.P. Act 30 of 1987 are in question before the Supreme Court and Section 76, which is prospective, can be of no avail. The civil Court has no jurisdiction in view of Sections 84 and 85 of A.P. Act 30 of 1987 and the Deputy Commissioner, Endowments has to be moved for eviction. The pattas were issued after issuing notices and following the prescribed procedure after wide publicity. The pattas have become final in the absence of any challenge and the 10^th defendant is entitled to protection of the Tenancy Act and has a right to purchase under Section 82 of A.P. Act 30 of 1987. Hence, defendants 8 and 9 desired the suit to be dismissed with costs.

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5. On such pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues for trial:

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(1) Whether the plaintiff has title to the plaint schedule property?

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(2) Whether the defendants perfected their title by means of adverse possession ?

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(3) Whether the sale deeds executed by the defendants are binding on the plaintiff or not ?

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(4) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover possession of the property ?

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(5) Whether this Court has jurisdiction ?

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(6) Whether the suit is premature ?

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(7) Whether the defendants are bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration without notice ? (8) To what relief ?

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6. During trial, P.Ws.1 to 4 and D.W.1 were examined and Exs.A.1 to A.16 and B.1 to B.4 were marked.

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7. The trial Court rendered the impugned judgment firstly noting that the order dated 06-01-1986 of the Mandal Revenue Officer, Mandapeta converting the Inam land into Ryotwari and issuing ryotwari pattas to the vendors of defendants 8 and 9 was not communicated to the plaintiff, though Ex.A.13 adangal and Ex.A.12 RSR extract referred to the ownership of the plaintiff. As the Tahsildar did not decide the title to the land under the Inams Abolition Act, the civil Court has jurisdiction to try the suit. The trial Court further observed that the Executive Officer of the plaintiff as P.W.1 speaking in detail, referred to Ex.A.1 application of Shaik Meera Saheb and Medapati Veera Swamy, Ex.A.2 resolution of the Trust Board, Ex.A.3 registered agreement and performance of services till 1984 and 1987 respectively as alleged in the plaint. P.W.1 was noted to have asserted the absence of any notice before issuance of ryotwari pattas and his claims about Ex.A.10 in the register maintained under Section 38

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of the Endowments Act, Ex.A.11 order for opening the register and other documents marked, were also referred to and though the absence of any renewal of the agreement after 1939 is admitted, any perfection of title by adverse possession is denied. The trial Court noted the evidence of the public servant deposing with reference to official records to be in consonance with the suit claim and the effective steps taken by P.W.1 to negative the sale of the temple lands by service holders were noted. The trial Court found corroboration to the claims of P.W.1 from the evidence of P.W.2, the archaka of the temple since 40 years and P.W.2 deposed in detail about Veera Swamy, his son-in-law Subba Rao and his son Satyam or his appointee performing ‘Dolu Vayidyam’ service and the deputy of the 1^st defendant performing ‘Sannayi Vayidyam’ service after the death of Shaik Meera Saheb. P.W.2 also stated about the discontinuance of services since 1984 and 1987 respectively and noting that the archakatvam of P.W.2 is not in dispute, the trial Court accepted his personal knowledge and independence. The trial Court also referred to P.W.3, who claimed to have been initially appointed by the 1^st defendant to perform ‘Sannayi Vayidyam’ service and the evidence of P.W.4, the trustee of the temple from 1981 to 1987 speaking about the resolutions Exs.A.14 to A.16 in respect of the plaint schedule land. The claims of D.W.1, the 8^th defendant, who is the husband of the 9^th defendant, that Shaik Meera Saheb and Medapati Veera Swamy were paying land revenue for the respective extents and that pattas were granted in 1982 under Exs.B.1 and B.3 to the 1^st defendant and Lanka Bulli Ammayi for Ac.1.84 cents and Ac.0.92 cents respectively, were referred to. Exs.B.2 and B.4 are the registered sale deeds in favour of 8^th and 9^th defendants

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respectively and the 10^th defendant was claimed to be cultivating the land since earlier and after purchase. While D.W.1 admitted that he did not see the title deeds of the 1^st defendant or Lanka Bulli Ammayi, he admitted that he came to know that the land belonged to the temple, which admissions were opined to be contrary to any enquiries made before purchases or any bona fide purchase. D.W.1 also admitted that no document was filed to show that the Mandal Revenue Officer issued any notice to the plaintiff before issue of pattas and no receipts were filed to show payment of rents by the 10^th defendant to the 1^st defendant and Bulli Ayyami. The admission of D.W.1 that the 10^th defendant delivered possession of the suit lands to him and his wife, is contrary to the pleading that the 10^th defendant continued to be the cultivating tenant and the 10^th defendant was noted to be the father of D.W.1. No document was filed showing the possession of the 10^th defendant as a tenant including any revenue records like adangal.

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8. The trial Court concluded from such evidence that the ownership of the plaintiff of the land, which was given to Shaik Meera Saheb and Medapati Veera Swamy, on Ex.A.1 application under Ex.A.3 registered agreement for performing ‘Sannayi and Dolu Vayidyam’ services, was proved. Ex.A.10 page 9 of Section 38 register was also accepted, as the same was approved by the President of H.R.A. Board of Composite Madras State on 17-05-1946 and was being inspected every year. Ex.A.11 order dated 17-05-1946 about approval of the list of properties, in pursuance of which Ex.A.10 was maintained, was noted as showing vesting of the property with the plaintiff, which was recorded even in 1945. Ex.A.12 re-survey register showing the

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ownership of the plaintiff, Ex.A.13 adangal showing defendants 8 and 9 as encroachers, the continued mention of the land as temple land in the revenue records coupled with the oral evidence were concluded as showing that there was no adverse possession which would have led to perfection of title of defendants 8 and 9. Exs.A.14 to A.16 resolutions of the Trust Board were also accepted and with reference to Section 76 of A.P. Act 30 of 1987, Exs.B.1 and B.3 ryotwari pattas and Exs.B.2 and B.4 registered sale deeds were held to be not valid and binding on the plaintiff and they were also considered hit by Section 23 of the Contract Act as opposed to public policy. Following the precedents from this Court, the trial Court also considered the issuance of pattas without notice to the plaintiff to be invalid being in violation of the procedure prescribed by the Inams Abolition Act. Defendants 8 and 9 were considered to be acquiring no title on their purchase and it was also noted that not even a single receipt was filed to show the payment of land revenue by 8^th and 9^th defendants or their vendors. Consequently, the trial Court decided all the issues in favour of the plaintiff and also considered any pendency of any challenge to Section 76 of A.P. Act 30 of 1987 to have no effect on the maintainability of the suit. Accordingly, the trial Court decreed the suit with costs declaring the plaintiff’s title and right to the suit land and for recovery of possession ejecting the defendants therefrom as well as future profits from the date of the suit till the date of delivery of possession to be determined on a separate application.

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9. Defendants 8 and 9 challenged the said judgment and decree in this appeal contending that the trial Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The pattas granted under the

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Inams Abolition Act are final and cannot be challenged before a civil Court. The official acts must have been presumed to have been performed regularly under Section 114 of the Evidence Act in the absence of any other evidence. Any aggrieved party has to pursue the remedies under that Act and the decisions relied on by the trial Court have, in fact, no application. Grant of pattas made the 1^st defendant and Lanka Bulli Ammayi absolute owners with a right of alienation and the documents relied on by the plaintiff become irrelevant. Exs.A.12 and A.13 are not binding on defendants 8 and 9 and the interested and untrustworthy evidence of P.Ws.1 to 4 could not have been relied on. The title acquired by the bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration under Exs.B.2 and B.4 should have been upheld and they are not hit by Section 76 of A.P. Act 30 of 1987. The Supreme Court is still seized of the validity of the provisions of A.P. Act 30 of 1987 and Section 23 of the Contract Act had no application. Hence, defendants 8 and 9 desired the impugned judgment and decree to be reversed.

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10. Sri T.S. Anand, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri N. Siva Reddy, learned counsel for the respondent are heard.

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11. The following points arise for consideration herein: (1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to declaration of its title and recovery of possession ? (2) Whether defendants 8 and 9 and their vendors perfected their title by adverse possession and the sales in favour of defendants 8 and 9 are valid and binding on the plaintiff ? (3) Whether the civil Court has no jurisdiction ? (4) To what relief ?

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12. As the questions in issue are closely interwoven, they

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are being dealt with together.

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13. Points 1 to 4:

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The then Executive Officer of the plaintiff as P.W.1 consistently repeated the suit claim and there is no reason to suspect the truth of Ex.A.1 application dated 29-12-1928, Ex.A.2 resolution, dated 06-01-1929 and Ex.A.3 registered agreement dated 28-02-1929 spoken to by P.W.1 and the 1^st defendant being the son of Lal Saheb, son of Shaik Meera Saheb and defendants 2 to 7 being the legal representatives of Bulli Ammayi, daughter of Medapati Veera Swamy, are also not in dispute. The sales under the originals of Exs.A.4 and A.5 (Exs.B.2 and B.4 respectively) in favour of defendants 9 and 8 respectively by the 1^st defendant and Bulli Ammayi of extents of Ac.1.84 cents and Ac.0.92 cents respectively, are also not in dispute. P.W.1’s claim about maintaining Section 38 register as per Ex.A.11 order and Ex.A.10 being the true extract of page 9 of the said register also cannot be doubted in the absence of any contrary material and though P.W.1 had no personal knowledge of Exs.A.1 to A.3, the old documents produced from proper custody cannot be even remotely suspected to be manipulated with a view to claim the land in 1988 after 60 years.

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14. Ex.A.1 specifically referred to Shaik Meera Saheb and Medapati Veera Swamy who signed it to be acknowledging the daily ‘Sannayi and Dolu Vayidyam’ service in the temple and receiving 510 kunchams of paddy each by three persons per annum. They complained against such salary in kind being too low and requested for being given the land in question of an extent of Ac.2.76 cents in survey No.472/1 towards salary. The Trust Board accepted the request under Ex.A.2 specifically stating the

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permission granted for cultivation of the land and enjoying the usufruct alone by the applicants towards ‘Sannayi Dolu’ service. The Managing Trustee appeared to have signed the resolution and communicated to the applicants. The registered document executed by Shaik Meera Saheb and Medapati Veera Swamy, dated 28-02-1929 was appropriately styled as a service employment agreement towards enjoying the land yielding income in order to perform the service. Under the agreement, the executants agreed to perform ‘Dolu Sannayi’ service without default for ten years from 01-04-1929 to

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31-03-1939 and to have taken possession of the land for cultivation and enjoying the yield. The executants specifically undertook not to give the land, in any manner, to anybody else and to perform the service. However, in Exs.A.4 and A.5 registered sale deeds by the 1^st defendant and Bulli Ammayi, the respective lands were claimed to have been delivered possession to the vendees with absolute rights, which the vendors had and the land was specifically described as even ancestral property in Ex.A.5. However, when Ex.A.6 suit notice was given with similar allegations as in the plaint, defendants 8 and 9 gave Ex.A.9 reply claiming absolute ownership respectively in themselves and their vendors, further stating the land to be always under tenants since 40 to 50 years and to be under the 10^th defendant since about 12 years earlier, who was claiming to be continuing as tenant even under defendants 8 and 9. Grant of ryotwari pattas by the revenue department to the vendors, mortgage of the lands for obtaining loans by the vendors, etc., were also referred to. The temple and its authorities were claimed to have never exercised any interest in the land and the possession since 40 to 45 years was claimed to be in their own right, resulting in extinguishment of any contrary

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rights.

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15. Exs.B.1 and B.3 are the pattas granted in favour of the 1^st defendant and Lanka Bulli Ammayi respectively and while granting pattas under the Inams Abolition Act, converting the land into ryotwari zeroyati, the proceedings were not marked to the temple and either the nature of the Inam or the nature of interest of the applicants in the land were not referred to. Significantly in Ex.A.12 certified copy of A-Register, the pattadar was mentioned to be the temple and similarly in Ex.A.13 certified copy of adangal for fasli 1400, the pattadar was mentioned to be ‘Devadayam’ with defendants 8 and 9 being mentioned as the encroachers. If the temple had nothing to do with the lands, Exs.A.12 and A.13 could not have been what they are and when Exs.B.1 and B.3 do not have any reference to the temple, the claim that the grant of pattas was without notice to the temple, gains credence.

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16. Ex.A.14 resolution of the Trust Board dated 22-101983 refers to the persons performing ‘Sannayi’ service being not paid salary by the Inamdar since 1983-84, while it was paid up to 1982-83. Ex.A.15 resolution dated 30-11-1985 is similarly about the discontinuance of service while enjoying the land of the temple and hence, taking steps for recovery of possession of the land. Ex.A.16 resolution dated 10-04-1987 is about the Inamdars selling away the land and stopping ‘Sannayi Dolu Vayidyam’ service. The resolutions of the Trust Board Exs.A.14 to A.16, consistent with the claims of the plaintiff, cannot, in the absence of any material, be presumed to be recording any false allegations.

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17. Exs.A.1 to A.16 and Exs.B.1 to B.4, on a close and careful consideration, do not seem to be unreliable or unacceptable or to be manipulated with an eye on the litigation.

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These documents clearly suggest that Shaik Meera Saheb and Medapati Veera Swamy were doing daily ‘Sannayi Dolu Vayidyam’ service in the temple and in lieu of the paddy being received as remuneration earlier, on their application and on the resolution of the Trust Board, the total land of Ac.2.76 cents was given to them for being cultivated and enjoyed towards performing ‘Dolu Sannayi Vayidyam’ service in the temple as earlier for a period of ten years initially under a registered agreement and even after the expiry of the said period, the land continued to be with them and their successors. While so, the Mandal Revenue Officer, Mandapeta granted pattas to the 1^st defendant and Lanka Bulli Ammayi in respect of the lands respectively in their possession out of Ac.2.76 cents without referring to the nature of their possession or the nature of their interest in the land and without any notice or information of any sort to the temple. The services were discontinued by the Inamdars from 1983-84 and 1986-87 respectively and notwithstanding the grant of pattas in favour of the 1^st defendant and Bulli Ammayi, the revenue records continued to mention the land to be ‘Devadayam’ belonging to the plaintiff temple. The Trust Board, therefore, resolved to take steps for resumption of the land and consequently, the suit.

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18. The claim that the land belonged to the temple is also evidenced by Ex.A.10 extract of Section 38 register of the temple, which was so maintained as per the orders under Ex.A.11 of the year 1946. It was specifically mentioned regarding this land in Ex.A.10 that it is called as ‘Radham gudda kuttu manyam’, which was in the possession of the Trustees who gave it on 28-02-1929 for daily performance of ‘Dolu Sannayi’ service. It was also specified that Medapati Veera Swamy and Shaik Silar Saheb, son

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of Meera Saheb were in possession by the time of the entry and that they were performing ‘Dolu Sannayi’ service daily. The possession of Shaik Meera Saheb and Medapati Veera Swamy of the respective extents was, therefore, permissive and any assertion of Shaik Meera Saheb and Medapati Veera Swamy or their successors of any independent or adverse rights in the land can only be since the undated applications of Shaik Meera Saheb (the 1^st defendant) and Lanka Bulli Ammayi leading to the grant of pattas in a reference of 1982 to Shaik Meera Saheb (the 1^st defendant) and on 06-01-1986 to Bulli Ammayi. Prior to the applications of the 1^st defendant and Lanka Bulli Ammayi for grant of pattas under the Inams Abolition Act, they were not shown by any document or any other evidence to have made any claim adverse to the interests of the temple to consider any change of their permissive possession into adverse possession. The documents on record clearly establish the original ownership of the land with the temple, the same being given for cultivation and enjoyment of the income in lieu of rendering services to the temple and the services being discontinued and pattas being granted in favour of the service holders sometime after 1982. Even if the possession of the 1^st defendant and Lanka Bulli Ammayi was to be considered adverse to the temple since their applying for grant of pattas to the Mandal Revenue Officer, the same could not have ripened into perfection of title by the time of the suit in 1988.

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19. Coming back to the evidence of P.W.1, there was nothing in his cross-examination which ran contrary to the suit claim, though he was the Executive Officer of the plaintiff only from 1988 and criticizing the absence of any personal knowledge for him of the transaction from Exs.A.1 to A.3 or the entries in

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Exs.A.10 and A.11 will be preposterous, as P.W.1 aged about 43 years by the time of his evidence in 1992 could not have been aware of the happenings more than 60 years before personally. The absence of knowledge of P.W.1 as to whether the land was cultivated personally or by tenants has no bearing on the title or right to possession of the plaintiff and defendants 9 and 8, who purchased the respective lands in 1984 and 1986 respectively, cannot acquire any better rights than their vendors against the plaintiff. If defendants 8 and 9 had bona fide verified the relevant records, the entries in the revenue records should have shown to them that the land has been stated as ‘Devadayam’ of the plaintiff temple in the revenue records.

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20. The evidence of the Archaka since 35 to 40 years as P.W.2 stated consistently about the services rendered by the deputies of the Inamdars and the division of the land between the Inamdars at Ac.1.84 cents and Ac.0.92 cents is in proportion to the manner of service rendered as stated by P.W.2. P.W.2 claimed to have commenced Archakatvam service since the age of 4 years and P.W.3 spoke about being deputed by the 1^st defendant to perform clarinet service and being paid salary by the 1^st defendant for about three years initially. The plaintiff was claimed by him to be paying 20 bags of paddy thereafter towards his annual salary. P.W.4, the then Trustee, spoke about Exs.A.14 to A.16 resolutions and his ignorance about the Inamdars or their successors performing any service, is explicable, as by the time of his office from 1981 to 1987, it is not even the claim of the plaintiff that the Inamdars or their successors were personally performing such services. Mere suggestion that Exs.A.14 to A.16 were passed to create a claim over the suit land, cannot be

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accepted in the absence of any such motives for the Trustees being probablised by the evidence. Significantly, none of defendants 1 to 7 entered the witness box and defendants 8 and 9 have not taken any steps to examine anybody connected with Shaik Meera Saheb or Medapati Veera Swamy or their families to probablise their claims, which may even have to lead to drawal of an adverse inference against their claims.

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21. The 8^th defendant admitted that he did not peruse the title deeds of the 1^st defendant or Bulli Ammayi. He also admitted that he came to know that the suit lands are in the name of the plaintiff temple. The admissions belie the claim of D.W.1 seeing the title deeds of the 1^st defendant and Bulli Ammayi in respect of the self-acquired properties or that defendants 8 and 9 bona fide made enquiries about the title to the property. He also admitted that he did not file any document to show that the Mandal Revenue Officer issued notice to the plaintiff before issuing the pattas. Defendants 8 and 9 did not file any receipts or any other documents to show that the 10^th defendant was ever in possession and enjoyment of the land as a tenant. No revenue records were produced to show any cultivation of the land and D.W.1 admitted that Exs.B2 and B.4 did not recite the delivery of possession of the lands to be by the 10^th defendant. Unlike the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2, the Executive Officer and Archaka, who are interested in the plaintiff only in the performance of their duties, D.W.1’s evidence is self-serving and interested. Looking for satisfactory independent corroboration for such interested evidence is an accepted rule of prudence, which is totally lacking herein and the claims of D.W.1 that the lands are the absolute properties of Meera Saheb and Veera Swamy are, hence,

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unacceptable. While no document is produced to show that Meera Saheb or Veera Swamy or their successors were paying land revenue in their own right, the claim of D.W.1 about any perfection of title by adverse possession, as already stated, is unsustainable. The written statement and the evidence of defendants 8 and 9 while admitting grant of ryotwari pattas under the Inams Abolition Act, did not specify the connection between the 1^st defendant and Lanka Bulli Ammayi and the suit land, which was an admitted Inam land and under what provision of the statute they became entitled to the grant of pattas in what capacity.

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22. The appellants relied on Peddinti Venkata Murali

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Ranganatha Desika Iyengar v. Govt. of A.P.^[1] , wherein the Apex Court considered the impact of Section 76 of the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, A.P. Act 30 of 1987 on the Inams Abolition Act (A.P. Act 37 of 1956) and concluded that without amending the law under the Inams Abolition Act, Section 76 and Explanation II to Section 2(22) of A.P. Act 30 of 1987 were enacted without removing the foundation of the judgments to the contrary rendered by the High Court. Hence, Section 76 and Explanation II to Section 2(22) of A.P. Act 30 of 1987 were invalid and unconstitutional. The Apex Court pointed out that the provisions of the Inams Abolition Act are a complete code in itself and the Inam ceases to have effect from the date of grant of ryotwari patta, which creates a vested right to the property and the liability to render service ceases since the grant of patta. However, irrespective of the provisions of A.P. Act 30 of 1987, the question herein is whether the grant of Exs.B.1 and B.3 pattas to the 1^st defendant and Bulli Ammayi was in compliance with the mandatory

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procedure prescribed by the Inams Abolition Act.

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23. Sri T.S. Anand, learned counsel for the appellants also relied on Pushpagiri Math v. Kopparaju Veerabhadra Ra o^[2] , in which the above cited decision was also referred to. The Apex Court held that grant of ryotwari patta under Section 7 of the Inams Abolition Act becomes conclusive and the holder of the land became entitled to free-hold ryotwari patta extinguishing the pre-existing right, title and interest of the Inamdar or the institution. Consequently, the Apex Court concluded that the jurisdiction of Civil Court to declare title to the Inam land stood excluded by necessary implication. If the conferment of ryotwari patta became conclusive between the parties, the ouster of jurisdiction of the civil Court to declare title to the Inam land was, thus, held excluded. But the plea of the plaintiff herein is that the grant of ryotwari patta itself cannot be considered conclusive being in violation of the mandatory provisions of the Inams Abolition Act and in blatant violation of the principles of natural justice, which are an integral and inseparable component of fundamental judicial procedure governing judicial and quasi judicial proceedings.

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24. The appellants also referred to Sri Rama Swamy and Sri Prasanna Visweswaraswami temple v. D. Rajaia h^[3] , wherein the learned Judge was referring to Section 14 of the Inams Abolition Act, which barred the jurisdiction of civil Courts and noted the exception to be where the decision of the revenue official or Court was obtained by misrepresentation or fraud or collusion. The learned Judge noted that if a party alleged that there is no notice or there is no proper notice or there is no adequate opportunity to represent the case before the Tahsildar

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while decision is rendered, it is not an exception to the express bar to the civil Court’s jurisdiction and the remedy of the aggrieved in such an event is to prefer an appeal. The learned Judge also observed that the civil Courts are ousted from jurisdiction to consider whether a particular land situated in a particular village comes within the purview of the Inams Abolition Act. Such an issue was held to be not entertainable even collaterally and it is true that mere absence of notice to the plaintiff appears from the said decision to be susceptible to being interpreted as insufficient to confer jurisdiction on a civil Court in view of Section 14 of the Inams Abolition Act.

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25. However, Sri N. Siva Reddy, learned counsel for the temple brought to notice the decision rendered by the same learned Judge in A.S. No.558 of 1990 and batch on 24-07-200 8^[4] subsequently, wherein also one of the questions involved is ouster of jurisdiction of civil Court under Section 14 of the Inams Abolition Act. The learned Judge noted the admitted fact that the plaintiff or his mother were not parties to the proceedings before the Inams Tahsildar and therefore, prima facie, the submission of the learned counsel for the plaintiff was accepted, as the 2^nd defendant therein obtained the ryotwari patta without disclosing pendency of the suit or without disclosing the names of the rival claimants entitled to patta or those who have legitimate claim to patta. On the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, the learned Judge held the civil Court’s jurisdiction to be not barred. The principles laid down by the learned Judge in both the decisions have to be, therefore, appreciated with reference to the facts and circumstances of this particular case.

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26. The learned Judge referred to Vatticherukuru Village Panchayath v. Nori Venkataramana Deekshithul u^[5] in the first of the two decisions cited above and the Apex Court in the said decision was considering the various provisions of the Inams Abolition Act and held that the decision of the Revenue Tribunal is finally conclusive between the parties or the persons claiming right, title or interest through them. The Apex Court made it clear that the trick of pleadings and the camouflage of the reliefs are not decisive but the substance or the effect on the order of the Tribunal under the Inams Act are decisive and the civil suit except on grounds of fraud, misrepresentation or collusion of the parties, is not maintainable. However, on the facts of the present case, it may be noted that the plaintiff was not shown to be a party to the grant of patta under Exs.B.1 and B.3.

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27. The respondent temple in support of its contentions firstly referred to Juttiga Somanna v. Revenue Divisional Officer^[6] , wherein His Lordship Sri Justice Chinnappa Reddy (as His Lordship then was) was dealing with the absence of any notice of the enquiry conducted by the Tahsildar to the persons or institutions interested and the absence of individual notice to the persons known to be interested in the lands as per sub-rule (5) of Rule 3 of the A.P. (A.A.) Inams (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Rules, 1957 (for short “the Rules”) was held to be violation of the principles of natural justice. His Lordship concluded that such an order passed in violation of the principles of natural justice is a nullity and the party affected by it is entitled to treat it as non-est and not preferring any appeal against such an order was held not to affect the right of the aggrieved to maintain that the order is a nullity.

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28. I n G. Naganna v. Satya Sri Sri Sri Pramoda

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Theertha Swamy Var u^[7] also, another learned Judge of this Court held that the petitioners, who had no notice of the enquiry under Section 3 of the Inams Abolition Act, are not bound by the order of the Revenue Court. The act of the authorities was held to be a misuse of power and mala fide.

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29. Similar was the decision of a Division Bench in Sri Anjaneya Swami Temple v. Baddula Lakshmia h^[8] , wherein also it was concluded that where parties interested in the property were not given the notice contemplated under the Inams Abolition Act and the enquiry was held behind their back, the decision arrived at by the Revenue Court cannot bind the parties against whom any such decision has been arrived at. The Division Bench also held the finality contemplated under Sub-section (7) of Section 3 of the Inams Abolition Act arises only where the decision had been arrived at after giving notice to the parties in accordance with Section 3(3) of the said Act and not otherwise.

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30. In a decision of another Division Bench in Sri Varaha Laxmi Narasimha Swamyvari Devasthanam v. S.V. Narasimham^[9] also, in a similar situation the violation of sub-rule (5) of Rule 3 of the Rules was considered and the absence of compliance of mandatory requirement of issuance of notice was held to vitiate any action taken by the respondent.

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31. It may be incidentally noted that even in A.S. No.558 of 1990 and batch (4 supra), the learned Judge was referring to Babu Ram v. Gram Sabha, Buhavi^[10] , wherein it was laid down

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that even in cases where the jurisdiction of a civil Court is barred expressly or impliedly, the Court would nonetheless retain its jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate the suit, provided the order complained of is a nullity.

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32. The above decisions apart, Sri N. Siva Reddy, learned counsel for the temple also referred to the precedents laying down similar principles commencing from Secretary of State v. Mask & Co.^[11] , wherein the Privy Council held that exclusion of the jurisdiction of civil Courts is not to be readily inferred, but such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied and it is also well settled that even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the civil Courts have jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with, or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.

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33. I n The Public Prosecutor (A.P.) v. Mukh Singh

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Chand a^[12] also, it was stated that even in cases where a statute specifically excludes the jurisdiction of the civil Courts, the civil Courts will have jurisdiction to examine cases where the provisions of the Act have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure.

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34. In A. Jithendernath v. Jubilee Hills Coop. House

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Building Society and another^[13] , the person to whom the subject plot was claimed to have been allotted by the Co-operative Housing Society was not made a party in the application before the Registrar of Co-operative Societies and the Apex Court held that

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the above order being in violation of the principles of natural justice was a nullity. The Apex Court observed that the allottee was a necessary party and no award could have been passed in his absence and the Registrar acted illegally and without jurisdiction in passing the award without him. The Supreme Court consequently held that in case of such an award, which is a nullity, neither the principles of res judicata have any application nor there is any need to have the award passed without jurisdiction set aside.

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35. In Rajasthan State Board Transport Corporation

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and another v. Bal Mukund Bairw a^[14] dealing with the jurisdiction of civil Court vis-à-vis Labour Court in an employeremployee dispute, the Supreme Court held that any order passed in violation of the principles of natural justice save and except in certain contingencies of cases, would be a nullity and if the suit is based on the violation of the principles of common law or constitutional provisions or on other grounds, the civil Court’s jurisdiction may not be held to be barred. It was also held that if no right is claimed under a special statute in terms whereof the jurisdiction of the civil Court is barred, the civil Court will have jurisdiction. It was positively held that if no procedure has been followed as laid down by the statutory regulation or is otherwise imperative even under the common law or the principles of natural justice, which right having arisen under the existing law, the plenary jurisdiction of the civil Court cannot be held to have been taken away.

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36. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannat h^[15] also,

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the Supreme Court reiterated that any order passed in violation of

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the principles of natural justice would be a nullity, save and except in certain contingencies of cases. If no procedure has been followed as laid down by the statutory regulation or is otherwise imperative even under the common law or the principles of natural justice, which right having arisen under the existing law, a civil Court has jurisdiction.

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37. In A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of A.P.^[16] , the Apex Court reiterated the well settled principle that any judgment or order obtained by fraud is a nullity and non-est.

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38. In Rani Aloka Dudhoria v. Goutam Dudhori a^[17] , the Supreme Court considered fraud to be vitiating all solemn acts. If there is an element of suppression or manipulation or fraud in the plaintiff being kept in the dark about the grant of pattas under Exs.B.1 and B.3, the above two decisions make the pattas vitiated, null and void.

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39. Apart from these general principles laid down in the above cited precedents, it was laid down in binding precedents under the Inams Abolition Act itself as referred to above that noncompliance with the mandatory provisions relating to notice to persons or institutions interested will vitiate the proceedings and being in violation of the principles of natural justice and fundamental principles of judicial procedure, any adverse order can be treated by the aggrieved as a nullity. Even in Vatticherukuru Village Panchayath v. Nori Venkataramana Deekshithulu (5 supra), the finality and conclusive nature attached to the decision of the Revenue Tribunal were stated by the Apex Court to be between the parties or persons claiming

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right, title or interest through them and if the plaintiff was not proved to be a party to the grant of Exs.B.1 and B.3, the ouster of jurisdiction of civil Court in this suit cannot be inferred.

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40. The objection of defendants 8 and 9 against the entitlement of the plaintiff to the suit reliefs on the ground of the 10^th defendant, who is the father of 8^th defendant and father-in-law of the 9^th defendant, being a cultivating tenant before and after their purchases, has no factual basis in the absence of any oral or documentary evidence to probablise the cultivation or tenancy of the 10^th defendant in respect of the subject land at any point of time and more so, when the 10^th defendant has not entered the witness box without any explanation for the same. Therefore, the question of any entitlement of the 10^th defendant to any protection or rights under the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Tenancy Act does not arise.

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41. In so far as the applicability of the provisions of A.P. Act 30 of 1987 against the sustainability of the suit is concerned, the validity and vires of Section 76 have been answered in the negative by the Supreme Court but the invalidity of Exs.B.1 and B.3 is not with reference to the said provision, but for the absence of any notice to or any opportunity of hearing for the plaintiff before the grant of pattas in spite of the subject land being originally a ‘Devadayam’ admittedly. Section 76 prohibiting transfer of lands granted for rendering service to a religious or charitable institution or endowment and making any ryotwari patta in respect of any inam land to a service holder deemed to have never been granted, of course, makes Sections 84 and 85 of A.P. Act 30 of 1987 apply in such an event, but when Section 76 was held to be invalid and unconstitutional by the Apex Court, it is non-est even in respect of

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the applicability of Sections 84 and 85 to any ryotwari patta in respect of any inam land given to a service holder. While Sections 84 and 85 of A.P. Act 30 of 1987, in any view, are restricted to removal of encroachments, the maintainability of a comprehensive suit before the civil Court for the reliefs not within the jurisdiction and scope of the Deputy Commissioner is well recognized and consequently, the provisions of A.P. Act 30 of 1987 cannot be considered to stand in the way of maintainability of the present comprehensive suit for declaration of the plaintiff’s title and possession apart from future profits, costs and other consequential reliefs.

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42. While, as already dealt with in detail, the grant of Exs.B.1 and B.3 pattas to the 1^st defendant and Bulli Ammayi was not shown to be after fulfillment of all the statutory formalities under the Inams Abolition Act and the Rules, the various assertions made in the written statement of defendants 8 and 9 did not find their echo in the interested and self-serving evidence of D.W.1 as already stated. When any adverse act by the persons in permissive possession of the land patently belonging to the plaintiff was only in 1982 and the grant of pattas was subsequent thereto and the purchases by defendants 8 and 9 were in 1984 and 1986, how any adverse possession can lead to perfection of title by prescription by the time of the suit in 1988, is incomprehensible.

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43. If so, on the admitted facts and the broad human probabilities arising out of the oral and documentary evidence on record, it is clear that the plaintiff has every right to ignore Exs.B.1 and B.3 pattas granted without any notice or information or an opportunity of hearing to it and claim the reliefs claimed in the suit

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in its own right, to deny which, there is no justification on the material on record, more so, when defendants 8 and 9 are not probablised to be bona fide purchasers for valuable consideration after every possible reasonable enquiries about the title of their vendors without the possibility of any notice of the claim of the plaintiff over the subject land.

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44. Under the circumstances, all the points have to be answered in favour of the plaintiff and the judgment and decree under appeal have to be upheld negativing the appeal, however in the circumstances of the case, without costs.

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45. In the result, the appeal is dismissed without costs.

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G. BHAVANI PRASAD, J

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Date: 27-02-2012

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Svv

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