High Court inanalysisquashed an order suspending a fair price shop dealer's authorization for unspecified duration without determining it to be interim orfinalpenalty.
Impugned order suspended from indefinite period was quashed; liberty granted to pass fresh order.
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THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY
Writ Petition No.833 of 2011 DT.24.01.2011
Between:
Smt.Chada Ramulamma
… Petitioner
And
The Revenue Divisional Officer, Nalgonda Division at Nalgonda
… Respondent
Counsel for the Petitioner: Sri Bollam Lingaiah Yadav
Counsel for respondent: AGP for Civil Supplies
The Court made the following ORDER:
ORDER:
This writ petition is filed for a mandamus to set aside order No.C/3399/2010, dated 04.01.2011, issued by the respondent.
I have heard Sri Bollam Lingaiah Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioner, and the learned Assistant Government Pleader for Civil Supplies.
The petitioner is a fair price shop dealer. On the allegation that weighment stones being used by her weighed 60 gms less than the prescribed weight, the Legal Metrology Department has initiated proceedings. On the same allegation, the respondent has issued show-cause notice No.C/3399/2010, dated 14.10.2010, calling upon the petitioner to show cause as to why action shall not be taken against her. In reply to the said show-cause notice, the petitioner has
submitted her explanation on 03.11.2010. Purporting to consider the said explanation, the respondent has passed the impugned order, whereby while holding that the allegations made against the petitioner stand proved and that she has violated clauses 17 and 22 of the A.P.State Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2008, her authorization is temporarily suspended.
However, it is not indicated therein as to whether the said suspension was substantive in nature or pending further enquiry, if any. If the suspension is by way of a substantive penalty, the same should be for a limited period. No such period is indicated. Conversely, if further enquiry is envisaged, the respondent should have indicated therein the said fact and taken steps for completion of enquiry. Nothing is discernable from the order of the respondent.
While dealing with a similar situation, this Court in Palle
Peeraiah v. The District Collector at Warangal and others[1] , held as under:
“…Under the provisions of the A.P.State Public Distribution System (Control) Order, 2008, respondent No.3 is empowered to initiate disciplinary proceedings and impose appropriate penalties. Though the said Order does not specifically provide for passing an order of suspension as interim measure, pending enquiry, the provisions of this Order and those of preceding Control Orders are interpreted by this Court to the effect that the order of suspension, pending enquiry, is concomitant to the power of the disciplinary authority and that therefore, even in the absence of an express provision, such a power is vested in the authority.
In the counter affidavit, respondent No.3 has stated that having regard to the bad history of the petitioner, he has suspended the authorization after giving a show-cause notice and opportunity to the petitioner to submit his objections. It is axiomatic that an order of suspension can be either interim or final in nature. In contrast to an order of cancellation, an order
of suspension can be for a limited period irrespective of whether such an order is interim or final in nature. In the light of the stand taken by respondent No.3, the impugned order passed by him can be construed as final in nature. However, curiously respondent No.3 failed to indicate the period for which the petitioner’s authorization is suspended, even if the same was intended to be as a measure of penalty. The impugned order thus suffers from a serious flaw rendering itself illegal and unenforceable.
If respondent No.3 felt that suspension is the appropriate substantive penalty, he could have limited the same for a limited period. Conversely, if he felt that cancellation is the appropriate penalty, he should have imposed such a penalty.”
In my opinion, the reasoning of this Court in the abovementioned judgment squarely applies to this case.
Therefore, the impugned order, which is styled as suspension, cannot be sustained and the same is quashed. The respondent is however given liberty to pass a fresh order in accordance with law and in the light of the findings rendered hereinabove.
Subject to the above, the writ petition is allowed.
As a sequel to disposal of the writ petition, W.P.M.P.No.1024 of 2011 filed by the petitioner for interim relief is disposed of as infructuous.
(C.V.NAGARJUNA REDDY, J)
Date:24.01.2011 VGB
[1] W.P.No.28833 of 2010, dated 18.01.2011
3 issues framed by the court
Whether a withdrawal order failing to specify the period of suspension constitutes a substantive penalty or interim measure rendering it illegal.
Whether the respondent authority lawfully suspended the petitioner's authorization without indicating the duration of suspension.
Whether the impugned order can be sustained when it fails to specify if suspension is substantive or pending further enquiry.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Palle Peeraiah v. The District Collector at Warangal and others [1]Applied¶18
1 provisions across 1 enactments
Smt.Chada Ramulamma
The Revenue Divisional Officer, Nalgonda Division at Nalgonda
C.V. Nagarjuna Reddy
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
