Partly allowed

B. Venkatramana, (a 1) v. State of a.P., rep. by its Public Prosecutor

Telangana HC4 Nov 2011CRLA/34/2006

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The single-judge High Court allowed the criminal appeal for modification of the sentence under Section 304-B IPC. The court affirmed the conviction of the appellant for dowry death, interpreting 'soon before her death' based on proximity rather than a fixed timeline, and reduced the imprisonment from ten to seven years.

What did the court decide?

The criminal appeal was dismissed, but the period of rigorous imprisonment was reduced from ten years to seven years.

B. Venkatramana, (a 1) Vs State of a.P., rep. by its… — Dowry and Cruelty | Telangana HC (2011)

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*** THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SAMUDRALA** GOVINDARAJULU

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+ CRIMINAL APPEAL No.34 of 2006

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% Dated 04-11-2011

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# B.Venkatramana, S/o Sreenivasulu, Aged abut 28 years, Madivaripalle, H/o Ghattu, B.Kothakota Mandal …. Petitioner.

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Vs.

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$ The State of Andhra Pradesh, Rep. by Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P. …. Hyderabad. Respondent.

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! Counsel for the Petitioner: Sri T.Niranjan Reddy

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^ Counsel for the Respondent: The Public Prosecutor.

<GIST:

> HEAD NOTE:

? Cases referred

1) 2003 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 1049 2) (2001)8 Supreme Court Cases 633 3) (2003)8 Supreme Court Cases 80

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4) 2010(2) ALD (Crl.) 548 (SC)

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HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SAMUDRALA GOVINDARAJULU

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CRIMINAL APPEAL No.34 of 2006

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JUDGMENT:

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The appellant/A.1 was convicted by the lower Court under Section 304-B IPC and was sentenced to rigorous imprisonment of ten years and fine of Rs.200/-. Questioning the same, A.1 filed this appeal. It is informed that against acquittal of A.2 and A.3 recorded by the lower Court, the State filed appeal before this Court and the said appeal was dismissed by this Court previously.

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2. The deceased – Manjula is wife of A.1. Marriage of the deceased with A.1 took place about two years prior to her death. The parties belong to Barber community. The deceased committed suicide in the night of 28.02.2004 at the house of A.1 in Ghattu village, B.Kothakota Mandal of Chittoor District, by consuming pesticide poison. PWs 1 and 2, who are parents of the

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deceased belong to Kagathi village in Chinthamani Taluk of Kolar District of Karnataka State. The villages of A.1 and PW.1 are located proximately, they being nearer to Andhra Pradesh – Karnataka border. It is alleged by the prosecution that the accused subjected the deceased to cruelty, demanding money and gold from her parents and that because of the said harassment, the deceased committed suicide. Plea of A.1 is one of not guilty. After trial, the lower Court found A.1 guilty of the above charge.

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3. On behalf of the prosecution, apart from evidence of PWs 1 and 2 who are parents of the deceased, there is evidence of PW.4 who is brother of the deceased, PWs 3 and 6 who are cousins of PW.1, and PW.5 who is mother of friend of the deceased in support of the prosecution case. PWs 7 and 8 turned hostile to the prosecution. PW.9 is the person who conveyed information of death of the deceased to PWs 1 and 2. After coming to know about the information, PWs 1 and 2 along with others rushed to village of A.1 and saw dead body of the deceased. PW.1 got Ex.P.1 report prepared and gave the same to PW.12 who is the Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police, B.Kothakota Police Station. PW.12 registered Ex.P.1 as case in Crime No.22 of 2004 under Section 304-B IPC and issued Ex.P.8 F.I.R. PW.13 is the Sub-

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Divisional Police Officer, Madanapalle Sub-Division who conducted investigation of the case and filed charge sheet before the Magistrate. PW.10 who was the then Mandal Revenue Officer, B.Kothakota Mandal conducted inquest on dead body of the deceased under the cover of Ex.P.5 inquest report. The version of PWs. 1 and 2 and other witnesses is consistent from the stage of F.I.R. to the stage of inquest to the effect that the deceased was subjected to cruelty by the accused resulting in the deceased committing suicide by consuming poisonous substance. PW.11 is the Civil Assistant Surgeon in Government Area Hospital, Madanapalle who conducted autopsy on dead body of the deceased along with another doctor. They gave Ex.P.7 post-mortem certificate opining that the deceased died due to organ ophosphate poison. The said final opinion was given by the doctors after receiving Ex.P.6 report of the Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, Tirupati, after analysis. The cause for committing suicide by the deceased is spoken to by PWs 1 to 6.

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4. It is evidence of the prosecution witnesses that the deceased and A.1 lived happily for about one year after their marriage. It is evidence of PWs 1 and 2 that about 35 grams of gold ornaments and silver articles were

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given by them to the couple at the time of marriage. It is evidence of PW.1 that after one year of the marriage, the accused sent the deceased to his house demanding Rs.10,000/- cash, gold ring and a Watch and that he took his daughter to house of the accused and informed them about his incapacity to meet their demands and left the deceased at the house of the accused. He says that again after one month, the deceased was sent to his house with the same demand and that in that manner, the accused sent the deceased to his house with demands for about seven times and that every time he took his daughter to the house of the accused and left her at their house after informing them about his incapacity. PW.1 says that on the last occasion, his daughter came to his house 10 to 15 days prior to her death. It is version of PW.1 in Ex.P.1 report that the couple lived happily for one year and that misunderstandings arose between the couple and his daughter came back to his house and that when he enquired, they were informed that dowry given to them was not sufficient and he demanded more and that he asked for watch, gold ring and cash of Rs.10,000/- and that as he was facing some difficulties, he took back his daughter to her husband’s house and pacified the inlaws. It is further stated in Ex.P.1 that whenever his

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daughter came to his house, she wept and told that she was ill-treated in her in-laws’ house and that they consoled her, asking her to adjust with her family members and left her in in-law’s house.

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5. It is contended by the appellant’s counsel that evidence of PW.1 to the effect that on the last occasion, her daughter came to his house 10 to 15 days prior to her death, is an improvement in the prosecution evidence. This piece of evidence was not challenged in PW.1’s cross-examination and it was not elicited whether it was an improvement in PW.1’s evidence with reference to PW.1’s statement to the Investigating Officer during investigation under Section 161(3) Cr.P.C. By comparing this piece of evidence with Ex.P.1 - F.I.R., one cannot conclude that it is an improvement in PW.1’s evidence. F.I.R. is not expected to contain every piece of evidence to be spoken by maker of the same. Evidence of PW.1 is corroborated by PW.2 also. PW.2 deposed that after one year of the marriage, the accused were sending her daughter to their house for getting money, ring and watch and that the cash demanded was Rs.10,000/- and that they did not give that money, gold ring and watch as demanded by the accused and that the accused sent her daughter to their house for about ten times. She also

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says that 15 days prior to death of her daughter, her daughter came to their house on the last occasion. She further says that her daughter informed that the accused were demanding Rs.10,000/- cash, watch and gold ring and that PW.1 used to take her daughter to the house of the accused and was leaving her there. PW.3 deposed that he questioned PW.1 as to why she came to her parents’ house and that PW.1 informed her that her husband and parents-in-law were troubling her. It is PW.4’s evidence that 15 days prior to her death, the deceased came to their village and informed that her husband and in-laws were demanding watch, ring and cash. He says that due to that harassment, Manjula committed suicide by consuming poison. He further says that after one year of the marriage, the accused were sending his sister to their house for every 15 days by beating her. It is evidence of PW.6 that 1 ½ years after the marriage, he saw the deceased in the village for about 15 days and when questioned her, she informed him about the accused demanding Rs.10,000/- cash, gold ring and watch and that when he informed the same to PW.1, PW.1 informed him about his inability to satisfy the said demands and expressed that he would go and leave the deceased in the village of the accused. PW.6 says that

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the deceased came like that for about 4 or 5 times on the same demand and that on the last occasion, the deceased came to their village 15 days prior to her death as the accused demanded additional dowry and that PWs 1 and 2 took the deceased and left her at house of the accused.

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6. INDERPAL V STATE OF M.P .^[1] of the Supreme Court is relied upon by the appellant’s counsel and contended that prosecution evidence about what the deceased informed the witnesses about the alleged demands and the alleged harassment of the accused, is inadmissible in evidence as the said pieces of evidence do not fall within the purview of Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act. Though what the deceased informed them on her various visits to her parents’ house, may not fall within the purview of Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, evidence of the prosecution witnesses with regard to the visits of the deceased to her parents’ house on several occasions would be admissible piece of evidence. It is evidence of PW.1 that he was taking the deceased back to house of the accused and was leaving her there after convincing the accused that he has no capacity to meet their demands for cash of Rs.10,000/-, gold ring and watch. It is contended by the appellant’s

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counsel that except there being evidence of the accused sending the deceased for demanding her father for cash of Rs.10,000/-, gold ring and watch, there is no further evidence on the part of the prosecution to the effect that A.1 harassed the deceased for meeting the said demands. Harassment need not necessarily be verbal or physical harassment. It includes mental harassment also. Simply because there is no evidence of abusing or beating the deceased by PW.1, it cannot be concluded that there was no harassment of the deceased by A.1. The prosecution evidence reveals that the deceased was sent by the accused to her parents’ house 7 to 10 times after one year of her marriage with A.1. The said visits by the deceased were at the instance of A.1 for making the above demands with her father. At no point of time, the accused accompanied the deceased to her parents house or went to her parents’ house to take her back. Evidence of PWs.1 and 2 is to the effect that always PW.1 was taking the deceased back to her in-law’s house and leaving her there after explaining to the accused about his incapacity to meet the said demands. This conduct of sending away the deceased by the accused to her parents’ house and making her father to bring her back to their house to convince the accused about his inability to

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meet the demands of the accused, certainly amounts to harassment of the deceased. The deceased was thrown like a football from house of the accused to house of PW.1 and back for no fault of her.

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7. PW.5 is Dhobi in Kagathi village and her daughter Sivamma is stated to be friend of the deceased. Her evidence of what was informed to her by the deceased Manjula, is not only omission from her previous statement to the police, but is also hit by INDERPAL (1 SUPRA) as it will not come within the purview of Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act.

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8. Evidence of PWs. 1 to 4 and 6 reveals that conduct of A.1 in sending the deceased to her parents’ house with demands for money, gold ring and watch continued till 10 to 15 days prior to her death. It is contended by the appellants’ counsel that it is not known what transpired in house of the accused subsequent to the deceased rejoining A.1 at his house about 10 to 15 days prior to her death and that it cannot be said that the alleged demand for money, gold ring and watch was the proximate cause for the deceased to commit suicide. It is also further contended that since the last sending of the deceased to PW.1’s house took place about 10 to 15

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days prior to her death, it cannot be said that there was cruelty or harassment on the part of A.1 ‘soon before’ her death. The Supreme Court had many a occasion to consider the phrase ‘soon before’ occurring in Section 304-B IPC. In SATVIR SINGH V STATE OF PUNJAB^[2] , the Supreme Court termed the said phrase as an elastic expression and no hard and fast rule limit can be laid down for the interval which elapsed between death of the deceased and cruelty or harassment meted out to her. The Supreme Court enunciated;

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“It is not enough that harassment or cruelty was caused to the woman with a demand for dowry at some time, if Section 304B is to be invoked. But it should have happened “soon before her death”. The said phrase, no doubt, is an elastic expression and can refer to a period either immediately before her death or within a few days or even a few weeks before it. But the proximity to her death is the pivot indicated by that expression. The legislative object in providing such a radius of time by employing the words “soon before her death” is to emphasise the idea that her death should, in all probabilities, have been the aftermath of such cruelty or harassment. In other words, there should be a perceptible nexus between her death and the dowryrelated harassment or cruelty inflicted on her.

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If the interval elapsed between the infliction of such harassment or cruelty and her death is wide the court would be in a position to guage that in all probabilities the harassment or cruelty would not have been the immediate cause of her death. It is hence for the court to decide, on the facts and circumstances of each case, whether the said interval in that particular case was sufficient to snuff its cord from the concept “soon before her death”.

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In HIRA LAL V STATE (GOVT.OF NCT), DELH I^[3] , the Supreme Court held that interpretation of the above phrase depends upon facts and circumstances of each case. It is observed therein:

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“Soon before” is a relative term and it would depend upon the circumstances of each case and no straitjacket formula can be laid down as to what would constitute a period of soon before the occurrence. It would be hazardous to indicate any fixed period, and that brings in the importance of a proximity test both for the proof of an offence or dowry death as well as for raising a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act. The expression “soon before her death” used in the substantive Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act is present with the idea of proximity test. No definite period has

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been indicated and the expression “soon before” is not defined. A reference to the expression “soon before” used in Section 114 Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act is relevant. It lays down that a court may presume that a man who is in the possession of goods “soon after the theft, is either the thief or has received the goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for their possession”. The determination of the period which can come within the term “soon before” is left to be determined by the courts, depending upon facts and circumstances of each case. Suffice, however, to indicate that the expression “soon before” would normally imply that the interval should not be much between the cruelty or harassment concerned and the death in question. There must be existence of a proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the death concerned. If the alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb the mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequence”.

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In ASHOK KUMAR V STATE OF HARYANA^[4] , the Supreme Court again refused to give restricted or narrow meaning to the above phrase; and observed

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“In our view, the expressions ‘soon before

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her death’ cannot be given a restricted or a narrower meaning. They must be understood in their plain language and with reference to their meaning in common parlance. These are the provisions relating to human behaviours and, therefore, cannot be given such a narrower meaning, which would defeat the very purpose of the provisions of the Act. Of course, these are penal provisions and must receive strict construction. But, even the rule of strict construction requires that the provisions have to be read in conjunction with other relevant provisions and scheme of the Act. Further, the interpretation given should be one which would avoid absurd results on the one hand and would further the object and cause of the law so enacted on the other. We are of the considered view that the concept of reasonable time is the best criteria to be applied for appreciation and examination of such cases.

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However, there must be existence of proximate link between the acts of cruelty along with the demand of dowry and the death of the victim. For want of any specific period, the concept of reasonable period would be applicable. Thus, the cruelty, harassment and demand of dowry should not be so ancient whereafter, the couple and the family members have lived happily and that it would result in

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abuse of the said protection.” Ultimately, it is for the Court to find out whether after the last incident of harassment or cruelty there was any happy and amicable living between A.1 and the deceased. There is no contra evidence on record to the effect that after the last sending of the deceased to PW.1’s house and PW.1 taking back the deceased to the house of the accused, A.1 and A.2 lived happily.

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9. It is contended by the appellant’s counsel that the deceased was suffering from stomach-ache as well as nervous weakness and that she might have committed suicide because of the said ailments. PW.1 in crossexamination deposed that his daughter was informing that she was getting stomach pain at times. In my opinion, this piece of evidence of PW.1 becomes irrelevant in view of INDERPAL (1 SUPRA). P.W.1 deposed that by the date of death of her daughter, she was carrying 5^th or 6^th month pregnancy. He further says that he got his daughter treated in Karnataka at Chintamani and that he does not know whether his daughter was treated for nervous weakness and that he took his daughter to a doctor who gave medicines and that Dr.Venkata Reddy, who gave treatment to his daughter is not alive. He denied the suggestion that his daughter was having

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nervous weakness and that at times she used to fall down unconscious. PW.1’s evidence of taking his daughter to doctor for treatment, cannot be taken that the deceased was taken to a doctor for the purpose of stomach pain. It may be because she was carrying pregnancy. Inspite of the deceased carrying pregnancy of 5^th or 6^th month by the date of her death, she preferred to commit suicide by consuming poison in order to kill herself together with foetus she was carrying. This drastic step was taken by the deceased because of the continuous harassment of A.1 by demanding her to go to her parents’ house to get cash of Rs.10,000/-, gold ring and watch, inspite of PW.1 going to A.1’s house and convincing him about his inability to meet the said demand. Simply because there is no evidence of A.1 beating the deceased physically or abusing her verbally, it cannot be said that there was no harassment of the deceased in this case. The evidence on record reveals that the deceased was harassed mentally and it drove the deceased to take the decision of ending her life by consuming pesticide poison.

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10. It is contended by the appellant’s counsel that in case there was harassment of the deceased by the accused, PW.1 would not have convened panchayat in the presence of elders. This is not a case where the

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deceased was harassed either physically by beating or verbally by abusing her. But, it is the case of A.1 harassing the deceased mentally by shunting her to her father frequently with a demand for money, gold and watch. Therefore, there was no occasion for PW.1 to raise dispute in any panchayat before village elders or caste elders.

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11. On total scrutiny and assessment of evidence on record by this Court, I am satisfied that the lower Court came to the correct conclusion in favour of the prosecution and against A.1 for the offence under Section 304-B IPC. There are no circumstances to come to a different conclusion in this appeal.

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12. It is contended by the appellant’s counsel that in any event, sentence of imprisonment of ten years is on higher side.

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13. In the result, the appeal is dismissed, but in the circumstances of the case, altering period of imprisonment from ten years to seven years.

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____________________________ SAMUDRALA GOVINDARAJULU,J

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Dt. 4^th November, 2011.

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PNV

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[1] 2003 Supreme Court Cases (Cri) 1049 [2] (2001) 8 Supreme Court Cases 633 [3] (2003) 8 Supreme Court Cases 80 [4] 2010(2) ALD (Crl.) 548 (SC)

B. Venkatramana, (a 1) v. State of a.P., rep. by its Public Prosecutor

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

B. Venkatramana, (a 1) v. State of a.P., rep. by its Public Prosecutor

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

A compact analysis

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

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