Dismissed

Spl Dy Collector v. G.Lakshmamma (died)

Telangana HC15 Feb 2010CCCA/310/2003

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

In multiple compensation appeals and writ petitions concerning land acquisition, the High Court affirmed the Reference Court's market value determination based on specific sale transactions. The Court dismissed claims for enhancement and rejected writ petitions alleging fraud or procedural delays, holding that the beneficiary could not collaterally challenge earlier proceedings.

What did the court decide?

All appeals and writ petitions were dismissed; claimants entitled to statutory benefits including interest and solatium.

Spl Dy Collector Vs G.Lakshmamma (died) — Land Acquisition | Telangana HC (2010)

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THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B PRAKASH RAO

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AND

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THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE R KANTHA RAO

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C.C.C.A. No. 310 OF 2003, 53 OF 2004, 82 OF 2004 AND

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W P No. 9970 and 9972 of 2004

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COMMON JUDGMENT : (Per Sri Justice B Prakash Rao)

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Since the parties are common in respect of very same acquisition

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proceedings, hence, they are taken up together for disposal.

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The Special Deputy Collector is the appellant in CCCA No. 310 of 2003 and CCCA no. 53 of 2004 which were filed against the judgment and decrees passed in O P No.9 of 2003 and O P No. 111 of 1993 dated 17.4.2003 and 8.9.2003 on the file of the First Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad. Both these proceedings arise out of a reference made under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act (for short the Act) for the purpose of determination of market value in respect of the acquired lands. The claimants filed an appeal in CCCA 82 of 2004 seeking enhancement of the compensation. Whereas, writ petitions in W P Nos. 9970 and 9972 of 2004 are filed by the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad assailing the correctness of the award passed on 18.11.1992 and 25.9.1992 respectively, in the same acquisition.

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Briefly the facts giving raise to these proceedings are that in respect of

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the aforesaid references under Section 18 of the Act, initially reference was made which was numbered as O P No. 111 of 1993 where there were in all 15 claimants. Similarly another reference was also made in O P No. 9 of 2003. However, since an application was filed in I A No.110 of 2003, both the references were split up restricting the reference in O P No. 9 of 2003 to claimants 6 to 15 and whereas the other reference in respect of other claimants in O P No. 9 of 2003 , the extent of land is Ac.1.19 guntas in survey No. 822/1 of Malkajgiri village, Secunderabad out of the total land to an extent of Ac.2.06 guntas plus 27 square yards situate at Malkajgiri village, Secunderabad which was acquired for the purpose of providing a public facility of a park and a notification under section 4 (1) of the Act was issued on 26.12.1990 and the same was published under section 6 thereof on 7.11.1991. After the parties appearance, the Land Acquisition Officer passed two aforesaid awards on 25.9.1992. Meanwhile there was an errata published which was marked as

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Ex A.1 deleting 27 guntas out of Ac.2.06 guntas. Thereafter, as per the proceedings initiated in C C No. 526 of 1990 said errata was withdrawn on 11.11.1992 and ultimately award was passed on 25.11.1992 which was marked as Ex.A.3. In these awards the Land Acquisition Officer fixed the market rate at Rs.50/- per sq.yard, having not satisfied thereby the claimants sought for reference, hence aforesaid references are taken up in the Court below.

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During the course of enquiry in O P No. 111 of 1993, P.W.1 and P.W.2 were examined and documents in Ex A.1 to Ex.A.24 were marked on behalf of the Land Acquisition Officer and R.W.1 was examined and Ex.B1 to B.3 were marked. Similarly in O P No. 9 of 2003, the claimants examined P W 1 and marked documents in Ex.A1 to A.13 and on behalf of the Land Acquisition Officer, D.W.1 was examined and documents in Ex.B1 to Ex.B.6 were marked, apart from Ex.C1 and C.2.

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Considering the same, the Court below fixed the marked rate at Rs.400/- per sq yard, aggrieved thereby the present appeal in CCCA No. 310 of 2003 and CCCA 53 of 2003 are filed by the Land Acquisition Officer, whereas the appeal in CCCA No. 82 of 2004 is filed by the claimants for further enhancement.

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Since there was some dispute as stated above, the reference was also made under Section 31 of the Act, where the parties have compromised and it is the appellants in CCCA No. 82 of 2004 who are agreed to be entitled to the compensation on the terms as mentioned. Thus the appeals, one filed by the Land Acquisition Officer and another by the claimants, assailing the correctness of the marked rate as fixed. In other two writ petition in W P No. 9970 and 9972 of 2004, the petitioner is Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad, assailing the aforesaid two awards on various grounds, especially that of a fraud. It was submitted therein that the Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad has requisitioned the land for the purpose allotting it to a park in the year

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1952 for an extent of Ac.8.24 guntas and accordingly a notification was issued under sections 3 and 5 of the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act and possession was taken in the year 1960 and an award was passed on 1.8.1960, the said award was under challenge in a writ petition filed by a protected tenant in W P No. 1177 of 1962 and the same was allowed as per the orders dated 27.9.1996 remitting the matter for afresh consideration and to continue the proceedings from the stage it was left. Thereafter another writ petition in W P No. 6432 of 1981 was filed by one Mr A S Venkateswarlu and the same was dismissed for default on 21.3.1986 and again another writ petition was filed in the year 1989 but is of no avail and this Court directed for passing the award and pay compensation. It is only thereafter the present impugned notification was issued afresh under section 4 (1) of the Act, out of which only the above references and appeal arise.

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The main grievance of the writ petitioner, which is a corporation is to the effect that having regard to the fact that the land sought to be acquired as long back as in the year 1952 as per the due notification issued under the above referred Act and possession having been taken in the year 1960 itself, the question of payment of any compensation by the petitioner who is a beneficiary and it is it which is liable to pay ultimate compensation as determined, could not possibly taken into consideration as on the present date of notification i.e., 26.12.1990. Hence, the award determining the market value as on the date of the present notification i.e., 26.12.1990 is bad and liable to be set aside, that apart, several other grounds were taken

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alleging certain fraud, however, on reading of the material except bald assertions , the petitioner corporation could not have made out anything in support thereof.

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Of the evidence which has been produced from both sides, certain sale transactions were marked and it is these sale transactions which have been relied on by the Court below. The claimants on their behalf through its witness P.W.1 asserted for the claim as made at the rate of Rs.16,000/- per sq.yard, though, of course, the same has been restricted to Rs.1200/- per sq.yard in the appeal filed in CCCA No. 82 of 2004. Be that as it may, the fact which emerge from the afore said checkered events, is that even though the acquisition was sought to be made as long back as in the year 1950, till today, which is more than half a century, there is no serious attempt on the part of the authorities to make payment of due market value to the parties. There is no explanation on the part of the authorities as to why such delay is caused, more so, when the properties are to be denied for the public purpose, any denial thereof should not have any justification since even the record would amply disclose that there was no serious attempt on the part of the authorities to determine the same at the earliest. No doubt, the earliest acquisition made in the year 1955 was

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set at naught by this Court in the writ petition filed earlier, however, that itself could not be a ground to stall the whole proceedings for determination of the market value. In fact, even on a reading of the aforesaid proceedings and

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the orders passed by this Court, there is no such total quashing of the acquisition proceedings. In fact, the direction given as long back as in 1966 is only to continue the proceedings from the stage it was left and subsequent writ petition was dismissed. Apparently, in view of the bar to proceed beyond a period as provided for under the Act, the authorities choose to issue a fresh notification on 26.12.1990. Admittedly, the beneficiary viz., Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad is not a party in any of those earlier proceedings at any stage, no doubt at this stage, it cannot be said that the beneficiary has no locus to assail the proceedings. However, the ground of attack as sought to be made by the petitioner in writ petitions as against the awards passed after conducting due enquires both at the level of the Land Acquisition Officer and reference Court, where there was no similar such attempt on the part of the beneficiary, it is not open for them to seek any indulgence, more so, in its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

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Coming back to the material on record, apart from the oral assertion

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from the petitioners and P W 1 and D W 1 respectively, the entire matter boils down for consideration on material on record. It is now well established for determination of the market value as existing as on the date of notification, the basic search is only for the similar sale transaction as exists on that day. It is seen from the evidence as produced by the Land Acquisition Officer in Ex.B3 to Ex.B.5 which are dated 11.7.1988, where under lands therein were sold at Rs.100/- per sq yard and all these sale transactions were of the same

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date, there is no explanation as to why other sale transactions could not be produced except the one which are of the same date, therefore, the reference Court has not placed reliance thereon. In Ex.A-8, sale transaction dated 2.9.1988, land to an extent of 216 sq yards was sold at Rs.400/- per sq yard, which is much earlier to the present date of notification and the same was relied on, though discarded the other two sale transactions in Ex A.9 and Ex.A10 and ultimately by following the method of calculation fixed the same at Rs.400/- per sq yard. The Reference Court has taken into consideration the enhancement during the period of sale deed and present notification by adding 25 % and giving out deduction of 20% and therefore we do not find any error in regard to such method as adopted by the Reference Court. That apart, the Court below has also awarded rate of interest at 9% per annum for one year and thereafter at 15% per annum on the aggregate amount and 12 % additional amount and 30% solatium as per the statute.

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For the aforesaid reasons an especially taking into consideration the fact that the land was acquired as long as in the 1950s and for no fault the claimants are deprived of their due and legitimate entitlement, we do not find any error nor any justification to interdict or come to a different conclusion in regard to the method followed by the Reference Court. Though an attempt is also made on behalf of the claimants for enhancement of the market value as fixed by the Reference Court, having perused the entire reasoning of the Reference Court and giving due credence as rightly done to Ex.A-8 and without taking into consideration the other sale transactions on sound basis,

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we also do not find any reason to hold that the market value could be fixed at an higher rate than the one fixed by the Reference Court. Even otherwise, it is seen that there is no other material to support the claim as made by the claimants except the one which is already produced in the Court below. The reasons as given by the Court below in regard to other sale transactions is not seriously attacked or anyway shown to be on erroneous foundation. Therefore, we do not find any merits in either of the appeals i.e., the appeals filed by the Land Acquisition Officer in CCCA Nos. 310 of 2003 and CCCA No. 53 of 2004 and the appeal filed by the claimants in CCCA No. 82 of 2004 accordingly the same are dismissed. No costs. However, it is made clear that the claimants should be entitled to all the statutory benefits as provided under the law.

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Coming to the writ petitions, in view of the checkered events and long wait by the claimants for their due share of the amount and several circumstances, we do not find any justification or any warrant to interfere with the awards passed, especially at this length of time. Therefore, we do not find any merits in any of the contentions urged on behalf of the petitioners in the writ petition. They have not made any case in support of their plea of fraud. Hence, the writ petitions fails and accordingly dismissed. No costs.

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_______________

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B.PRAKASH RAO,J

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DATE: 15-2-2010 tvk

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R KANTHA RAO,J

Spl Dy Collector v. G.Lakshmamma (died)

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Spl Dy Collector v. G.Lakshmamma (died)

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

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