preclude a second suit based on a distinct cause of action. It may not be out of place to clarify that the doctrine of res judicata differs from the rule embodied in Order 2 Rule 2, in that, the former places emphasis on the plaintiff's duty to exhaust all available grounds in support of his claim while the latter requires the plaintiff to claim all reliefs emanating from the same cause of action. The High Court is, therefore, clearly wrong in its view that the relief claimed is neither relevant nor material. Now, in the factsituation of the present case, as we have pointed out earlier, the first suit was for an injunction and not for possession of the demised property. The first suit was dismissed on the technical ground that since the plaintiff was not in de facto possession no injunction could be granted and a suit for a mere declaration of status without seeking the consequential relief for possession could not lie. Once it was found that the plaintiff was not in actual physical possession of the demised property, the suit had become infructuous. The cause of action for the former suit was not based on the allegation that the possession of the plaintiff was forcibly taken sometime in the second week of June 1968. The allegation in the former suit was that the plaintiff was a lessee and his possession was threatened and, therefore, he sought the court's assistance to protect his possession by a prohibitory injunction. When in the course of that suit it was found that the plaintiff had in fact been dispossessed, there was no question of granting an injunction and the only relief which the court could have granted was in regard to the declaration sought which the court held could not be granted in view of the provisions of Specific Relief Act. Therefore, the cause of action for the former suit was based on an apprehension that the defendants were likely to forcibly dispossess the plaintiff. The cause of action for that suit was not on the premise that he had in fact been illegally and forcibly dispossessed and needed the court's assistance to be restored to possession. Therefore, the subsequent suit was based on a distinct cause of action not found in the former suit and hence we do not think that the High
