an equitable remedy. But nonetheless it is found that a statement that has been extrapolated from an equity judgement, and is then construed out its context, give rise to use of the maxim, he who comes to equity must approach the court with clean hands. This is doubtless a maxim which is both striking and succinct and which may be found to be of value for many explanatory or justificatory purposes. But when its content is examined it is seen specific performance is sought, relief should in the particular circumstances be refused. So it has been established that even a plaintiff who has been guilty of fraud, which is hardly consistent with clean hands, may under some circumstances obtain equitable relief, such as where, for example, the fraud has been waived by the other party and there is no additional consideration that renders the grant of that relief unjust. Again, it has been laid down that the absence of clean hands is of no account “unless the depravity, the dirt in question sued for”. When such exceptions or qualifications are examined it becomes clear that the maxim that predicates a requirement of clean hands does not set out a rule that is either precise or capable of satisfactory operation. Rather in order to establish whether equitable relief should be refused through dishonesty or on a cognate ground it is necessary to examine precisely the rules and practices which have been established and followed by courts or equity and which are generally referable to such established considerations as fraud, misrepresentation, illegality or unfairness. “
