their jurisdiction, or abuse their powers vested in them by the Court. On the other hand, as already indicated, a right of appeal is a statutory right which has got to be recognized by the Courts, and the right to appeal, where one exists, cannot be denied in exercise of the discretionary power even of the High Court. The legislature has, therefore, specifically provided, by Section 43111 of the Code, the rules governing the right of substitution in case of death of an appellant, but there is no corresponding provision in Chapter XXXII, dealing with the question of abatement and the right of substitution in a criminal revision. We may assume that the Legislature was aware of the decision of the Bombay High Court, referred to above, when it enacted Section 431 for the first time in the Code of 1882. If the Legislature intended that all application in revision pending in a High Court, should be dealt with on the same footing as a pending appeal, it would have enacted accordingly. But in the absence of any such enactment, we may infer that the power of revision vested in the High Court under Chapter XXXII of the Code, was left untouched -- to be exercised according to the exigencies of each case. The High Court is not bound to entertain an application in revision, or having entertained one, to order substitution in every case. It is not bound the other way, namely, to treat a pending application in revision as having abated by reason of the fact that there was a composite sentence of imprisonment and fine, as some of the single Judge decisions placed before us, would seem to indicate. The High Court has been left complete
