Dismissed
Mr. Ranvir Dewan v. Mrs. Rashmi Khanna & Anr.
What the court decided
AI extract
Outcome
Dismissed
Issue for consideration
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
[?Oi 7] Li S.C.R. 542
MR. RANV!R DEWAN
v.
MRS. RASHMI KHANNA & ANR.
(Civil Appeal No.21784 of2017)
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DECEMBER 12, 2017
[R. K. A<(;RAWAL AND ABHAY MAHOHAR SAPRE, JJ.]
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 - s.14(1) ands. 14 (2) r/w s.300ne BRD w<11s the owner of the house in question_ - _Appellant is the son of BRD. while respondent no.I is the daughter_ - _Through his_ c _Will, BRD gpve his wife (mother of appellant) a "life interest" to reside in the house till her death_ - _While, the ground floor and first floor of the house were given exclusively to appellant and respondent no. 1. respectively_ - _Di>putes arose between the parties - Joint suit filed by appellanr and his mother against the respondent no. 1. inter D alia praying/or declaration that appellant's mother Wa> the absolure owner of the said house as her "life interest" in the property had enlarged and ripened into an absolute interest by virtue of s.14(1), on the death of her husband - Suit dismissed by Single Judge of High Court ·- Division Bench upheld the judgment of Single E Judge - On appeal. held: Case of appellant's mother does not fall u/s.14 ( l) but it squarely falls uls.14 (2) - It is clear from the contents of the Tf!ill that BRD intended to give only "life interest" to his wife in the suit house - Such "life interest" neither enlarged nor ripened into an absolute interest in the suit house and remained "life interest", i.e. "restricted estate" uls.14(2). till her death - It was the F appellant and the respondent no. I who were given absolute ownership of the suil house while appellant:~ mother was given on~v "'life interest·· in the suit house - Such disposition was made by virtue of s.14 (2) rlw s. 30 of the Act - No error in the impugned judgment.
G Hindu Succession Act. 1956 - s.14(2) - Scope and ambit a/- Discussed.
Will - intention of testator - Interpretation of - Held: What the testator intended to bequeath to any person(s) in his Will. has to be gathered primarily by reading the recitals of the Will only.
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MR. RANVIR DEWAN v. MRS. RASHMI KHANNA & ANR.
Words & Phrases - "Life Interest" - Meaning of - Held: "Life interest" means an interest which determines on the termination of life - It is incapable of being tramferred to others being personal in nature.
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Dismissing the appeal, the Court
HELD: 1.1 It is not in dispute that the suit house was the self-acquired property of late Mr. BDR, appellant's father. It is also not in dispute as one can take it from reading the contents of Will that Mr. BDR had intended to give only "life interest" to his wife (appellant's mother) in the suit house, which he gave to her for the first time by way of disposition of his estate independent of her any right. It is also not in dispute that it was confined to a right of residence to live in the suit house during her lifetime and to use the income earned from the suit house to maintain herself and the suit house. It is also not in dispute that the testator gave to his son (appellant) ground floor of the suit house and first floor to his daughter (respondent no.I) with absolute right of ownership. The testator also permitted both of them to get their names mutated in the municipal records as absolute owners and also get them assessed as owners in the wealth tax assessment cases. [Para 34] [551-C-E]
1.2 It is a settled principle of law that what the testator intended to bequeath to any person(s) in his Will has to be gathered primarily. by reading the recitals of the Will only. On facts, reading of the Will would go to show that it does not leave any kind of ambiguity therein and one can easily find out as to how and in what manner and with what rights, the testator wished to give to three of his legal representatives his self acquired properties and how he wanted to make its disposition. [Paras 36, 37] . [551-G-H]
1.3 The ambit of Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 must be confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any preexisting right, under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a "restricted estate" in the property. Where, however, property is acquired by a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of right of maintenance, it is in virtue of a
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS
[2017] 13 S.C.R.
MR. RANVIR DEWAN v. MRS. RASHMI KHANNA & ANR.
545
given his other properties absolutely to his wife which enabled A her to maintain herself. Sixth, it is a settled principle of law that the "life interest" means an interest which determines on the termination of life. It is incapable of being transferred by such person to others being personal in nature. Such person, therefore, could enjoy the "life interest" only during his/her lifetime which B is extinguished on his/her death. Such is the case here. Her "life interest" in the suit house was extinguished on her death on 12.09.2016. [Paras 44-49] [557-A-C, D]
Sadhu Singh v. Gurudwara Sahib Narike & Ors. (2006) 8 SCC 75 : [2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 799- held applicable.
Gullapalli Krishna Das v. Vishnumolakayya Venkayya & Am: (1978) l SCC 67; Bai Vajia (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai & Ors. (1979) 3 SCC 300 : (1979] 3 SCR 291; Thota Sesharathamma & Am: v. Thota Manikyamma (Dead) by L.Rs. & Ors. (1991) 4 SCC 312 : [1991] 3 SCR 717 - referred to.
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Case Law Reference
| (1978) 1sec67 | referred to | Para38 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| (1979] 3SCR291 | referred to | Para38 | E |
| [1991] 3 SCR 717 | referred to | Para38 | |
| [1977] 3SCR261 | reliedon | Para41 | |
| [2006] 5 Suppl.SCR799 | held applicable | Para50 | F |
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 21784 of2017
From the Judgment and Order dated 13.07.2016 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in RFA (OS) No. 147 of 2013.
Guru Krishan Kumar, Sr. Adv., Krishna Kumar, Sharad Cahndra G Nanda, Nirdj Kumar Mishra, Vinodh Kanna B., Siba Prasad, Ms. Srujuna Suman Mund. Bipin Bihari Singh, Advs. for the Appellant.
Anil Mittal, Vibhuti Sushant Gupta, Dr. Kailash Chand, S. S. Jauhar, Advs. for the Respondents.
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[2017) 13 S.C.R.
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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J. I. Leave granted.
and order dated 13.07.2016 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in R.F.A.(OS) No.147 of2013 whereby
B the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by PlaintiffNo.2 (since dead) and the appellant (plaintiff No. I) herein and confirmed the judgment and order dated 11.10.2013 of the Single Judge of the High Court in C.S.(O.S.) No.1502 of2010.
C is necessary to set out the facts of the case.
D brother(son) and the sister(daughter). It relates to a residential house consists ofbasement and two floors situated at D- 246, Defense Colony, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the "suit house").
two wives-Mrs. Katnla Devi and second- Mrs. Pritam. Out of wedlock
E with first wife - Mrs. Katnla Devi, a son -Ashok was born whereas out of wedlock with second wife-Mrs. Pritam, a son- Ranvir-appellant and a daughter-Rashmi- respondent No.I were born. Mr. Dewan owned moveable and immovable properties,
F (movables and immoveable). So far as the suit house with which we are concerned in this appeal, Mr. Dewan gave its ground floor to his son-Ranvir Dewan exclusively whereas the first floor, he gave exclusively to his daughter-Rashmi Khanna.
G interest" to reside in the suit house till her death and also to recover the rent and utilize the income earned by way of rent to maintain herself and the suit house. He also gave her a right to evict the tenants and induct the new ones.
H given "life interest" in the suit house and she will act as a trustee of its
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MR. RANVIR DEWAN v. MRS. RASHMI KHANNA & ANR. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]
(:~
legal owners (son and d~ughter) and utilize the income earned out of it A and on her death, by his son and daughter to whom the suit house was given exclusively.
I 0. The Will also recited that Ranvir and Rashmi would be free to get themselves assessed as owners of their respective shares in the suit house in their wealth tax assessment cases on the death of Mr. Dewan. B
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A 16. Mrs. Pritam-mothcr and Ranvir-son then jointly filed a suit being O.S. No.1502/2010 against the daughter/sister -Rashmi and the developer on the original side of the High Court at New Delhi out of which this appeal arises and claimed following reliefs:
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five reliefs but, in substance, the controversy centered around lo relief
G No.(v) only.
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MR. RANVIR DEWAN v. MRS. RASHMI KHANNA & ANR. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, .J.]
ripened into an absolute interest by virtue of Section 14 (1) of the Hindu Succession Act (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") on the death of her husband. Though the plaint contains several other avennents but they need not be stated herein being unnecessary to examine the issue relating to grant of relief No. (v).
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A 25. Elaborating the submission, learned counsel urged that since the wife is entitled in law to claim maintenance from her husband even prior to and also after coming into force of the Act, it is in recognition of this pre-recognized right when the husband gave a "life interest" through Will, the same got enlarged and ripened into an absolute right by virtue of Section 14 (I) of the Act. It is essentially this submission, which was B elaborated by the learned counsel with reference to decided cases.
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MR. RANVIR DEWAN v. MRS. RASHMI KHANNA & ANR. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]
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A 38. Law relating to interpretation of Section 14 (J) and (2) of the Act is fairly well settled by series of decisions of this Court. However, the discussion on the interpretation of Section 14 (I) and (2) of the Act can never be complete without mentioning the first leading decision of this Court in V. Tulasamma & Ors. vs. Sesha Reddy(Dead) by L.Rs. ( 1977) 3 SCC 99. In this decision, Their Lordships (Three Judge Bench) B interpreted succinctly sub-sections ( l) and (2) of Section 14 of the Act and then on facts involved in that case held that the case falls under Section 14( l) of the Act. This decision is referred by this Court in every subsequent case dealing with the issue relating to Section 14 of the Act and then after explaining its ratio has applied the same to the facts of c each case to find out as to whether the case on hand attracts Section 14(1) or 14(2) of the Act. Indeed, we find that attempts were made in past for reconsideration of the law laid down in V. Tulasamma (supra), but this Court consistently turned down the request. (see-Gullapalli Krishna Das vs. Vishnumolakayya Venkayya & Anr. (1978) I SCC 67, Bai Vajia (Dead) by L.Rs. vs. Thakorbhai Chelabhai & Ors., D (1979) 3 SCC 300 and Thota Sesharathamma & Anr. vs. Thota Manikyamma (Dead) by L.Rs. & Ors., (1991) 4 SCC 312 ).
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"Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto of the Hindu Succe~'Sion Act, I 956 provide that any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of the 1956 Act, shall he held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner; and that 'property' includes both movable and immovable property acquired by her by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by 1,>ift from any person, whether from a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of the 1956 Act. The language is in the widest possible terms and must be liberally construed in favour of the females
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so as to advance the object of the Act and promote the A socio-economic ends, nameiy, to cnlai-ge her limited interest to absolute ownership in consonance with the changing temper of the times sought to be achieved by such a long legislation.
Section 14(2) provides that nothing contained in B Section 14(1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or decree, order or award prescribes a restricted estate in such c property. It is in the nature of a proviso and has a field of its own without interfering with the operation of Section 14(1) materially. The proviso should not be construed in a manner so as to destroy the effect of the main provision or the protection granted by Section 14(1) or in a way so as to become totally inconsistent with the main provision. D
Section 14(2) applies only to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts, etc. which create independent and new titles in favour of the females for the first time and has no application where the instrument concerned merely seeks to confirm, endorse declare or recognize pre-existing E rights. In such cases, a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and section 14(1) will not operate in that sphere. Where, however, an instrument merely declares or recognizes a pre-existing right such as a claim to maintenance or partition or share to which F the female is entitled, Section 14(2) has absolutely no application and the female's limited interest would automatically be enlarged into an absolute one by force of Section 14(1) and the restrictions placed, if any, under the document would have to be ignored. Thus, where a property is allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of G maintenance or a share at a partition, the instrument is taken out of the ambit of sub-section (2) and would be governed by Section 14(1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of the transferee.
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The use of terms like 'property acquired by a female Hindu at a partition', 'or in lieu of maintenance', or 'arrear~ of maintenance' etc. in the Explanation to Section 14(1) clearly makes sub-section (2) inapplicable to these categories which have been expressly excepted from the operation of sub-section (2).
Tl1e words 'restricted estate' in Section 14(2) are wider than limited interest as indicated in Section 14(1) and they include not only limited interest but also any other kind of limitation that may be placed on the transferee."
c 40. Similarly, while explaining the ratio ofV. Tulasamma (supra) and how one has to read the ratio for being applied to the facts of a particular case, this Court in the case of Sadhu Singh vs. Gurudwara Sahib Narike & Ors., (2006) 8 SCC 75 again succinctly discussed the applicability of Section 14 (I) and (2) of the Act and on facts involved therein held that the facts involved would attract Section 14(2) of the D Act. Justice Balasubramanyan speaking for two Judge Bench held in paras 13 and 14 and 15 as under:
"13. An owner of property has normally the right to deal with that property including the right to devise or bequeath the property. He could thus dispose it of by a testament. E Section 30 of the Act, not only does not curtail or affect this right, it actually reaffirms that right. Thus, a Hindu male could testamentarily dispose of his property. When he does that, a succession under the Act stands excluded and the property passes to the testamentary heirs. Hence, F when a male Hindu executes a will bequeathing the properties, the legatees take it subject to the terms of the will unless of course, any stipulation therein is found invalid. Therefore, there is nothing in the Act which affects the right of a male Hindu to dispose of his property by providing only a life estate or limited estate for his widow. G The Act docs not stand in the way of his separate properties being dealt with by him as he deems fit. His will hence could not be challenged as being hit by the Act.
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MR. RANVIR DEWAN v. MRS. RASHMI KHANNA & ANR. [ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE, J.]
or widow has to take it as the estate falls. This restriction A on her right so provided, is really respected by the Act. It provides in Section 14(2) of the Act, that in such a case, the widow is bound hy the limitation on her right and she cannot claim any higher right by invoking Section 14(1) of the Act. In other words; conferment of a limited estate B which is otherwise valid in law is reinforced by this Act by the introduction of Section 14(2) of the Act and excluding the operation of Section 14(1) of the Act, even if that provision is held to he attracted in the case of a succession under the Act. Invocation of Section 14(1) of the Act in the case of a testamentary disposition taking effect after c the Act, would make Sections 30 and 14(2) redundant or otiose. It will also make redundant, the expression "property possessed by a female Hindu" occurring in Section 14(1) of the Act. An interpretation that leads to such a result cannot certainly be accepted. Surely, there D is nothing in the Act compelling such an interpretation. Sections 14 and 30 both have play. Section 14(1) applies in a case where the female had received the property prior to the Act being entitled to it as a matter of right, even if the right be to a limited estate under the Mitakshara law or the right to maintenance. E
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"Sub-section (2) of Section 14 applies to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts, etc., which create independent and new title in favour of females for the first time and has no application where the instruments concerned merely seek to confirm, endorse, declare or recognise pre-existing rights. The creation of a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and Section 14(1) will not operate in such a case. Where property is allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of maintenance or a share at partition the instrument is taken out of the
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ambit of sub-section (2) and would be governed by Section 14(1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of the transferee."(See p.1172 of the 15th Edn.)"
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estate" till her death and did not ripen into an "absolute interest" under Section 14( I) of the Act. In other words, once the case falls under Section 14(2) of the Act, it comes out of Section 14(1 ). It is pcnnissible in law because Section 14(2) is held as proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act.
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[2017] 13 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Divya Pandey
Appeal dismissed.
1 issue framed by the court
Whether the life interest bequeathed to the testator's widow under his Will fell under Section 14(1) and enlarged into absolute ownership, or under Section 14(2) as a restricted estate.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
V. Tulasamma & Ors. v. Sesha Reddy (Dead) by L.Rs.Relied on¶41
(1977) 3 SCC 99 : [1977] 3 SCR 261 · Who else cites this
Sadhu Singh v. Gurudwara Sahib Narike & Ors.Applied¶50
(2006) 8 SCC 75 : [2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 799 · Who else cites this
Gullapalli Krishna Das v. Vishnumolakayya Venkayya & Anr.Referred¶38
(1978) 1 SCC 67 · Who else cites this
Bai Vajia (Dead) by L.Rs. v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai & Ors.Referred¶38
(1979) 3 SCC 300 : [1979] 3 SCR 291 · Who else cites this
Thota Sesharathamma & Anr. v. Thota Manikyamma (Dead) by L.Rs. & Ors.Referred¶38
(1991) 4 SCC 312 : [1991] 3 SCR 717 · Who else cites this
3 provisions across 1 enactments
Mr. Ranvir Dewan
Mrs. Rashmi Khanna
R. K. Agrawal
Abhay Manohar Sapre
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court