Partly allowed

Smt. Rasila S. Mehta v. Custodian, Nariman Bhavan, Mumbai

Supreme Court6 May 20112011 INSC 364 · [2011] 6 S.C.R. 2342011 INSC 364

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Appeals by relatives of late Harshad Mehta challenging their 2007 notification under the Special Court Act and Custodian's claims for society dues. The Supreme Court upheld automatic attachment of all notified persons' properties, held no pre-decisional hearing is required, construed 'involved' purposively, treated Canfina as a financial institution, but barred interest and penalty on maintenance

What did the court decide?

Civil Appeals Nos. 2924 and 2915 of 2008 dismissed; Appeals Nos. 3377 of 2009 and 4764 of 2010 disposed with Custodian's claim sustained minus interest and penalty charges.

Smt. Rasila S. Mehta versus Custodian, Nariman… — Banking and Recovery | Supreme Court (2011)

[2011] 6 S.C.R. 234

SMT. RASILA S. MEHTA

CUSTODIAN, NARIMAN BHAVAN, MUMBAI

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(Civil Appeal No. 2924 of 2008)

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MAY 6, 2011

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[P. SATHASIVAM AND DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, JJ.]

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Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992: c

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ss. 3(2) and 4(2) and 9-A - Notification of persons involved in Securities Scam - Notification dated 4. 1. 2007 notifying two more family members of the entities initially notified - HELD: When the earlier entities were notified, 0^{_complete details of their transactions_were}^{not known and the} appellants were not notified because their involvement and diversion of funds to them was not clear - On the complaint of Canbank Financial Services Ltd., the Custodian rightly notified the appellants and the Special Court was justified in E dismissing the petition of appellants for their de-notification uls 4(2) - Securities Scam.

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ss.3(2), 3(3), 3(4) and 9-A- Proceedings against persons not involved in offences in transactions in securities -- HELD: With the amendment carried out in the Act on 25.1.1994, by F virtue of s. 9-A, civil jurisdiction has been conferred on Special Court - The object of the Act is not merely to bring the offender to book but also to recover the public funds - Even if there is a nexus between third party, an offender and/or property of the third party can also be notified - The word G "involved" in s.3(2) has to be interpreted in such a manner as to achieve the purpose of the Act - Interpretation of Statutes - Purposive construction - Rule of construction, 'noscitur a sociis' - Applicability of - Maxim 'ut res magis vafeat quam pereat'

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234

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RASILA S. MEHTA v. CUSTODIAN, NARIMAN 235 BHAVAN, MUMBAI

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ss. 3(2), 3(3), 3(4), 9-A and 11 - Notified persons - Attachment of properties - HELD: From the date of notification u/s 3(2} all movable/immovable properties whether acquired by tainted fund of otherwise, belonging to notified persons shall stand attached simultaneously with the issue of the Notification and are available for distribution u/s 11.

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ss. 3(2), 3(4) and 11- Notification uls 3(2) -Attachment of property- Opportunity of hearing - HELD: s.3(2) does not give any right of personal hearing to the person being notified, as a pre-decisonal hearing would frustrate the entire purpose of the Act - Attachment of property is natural consequence of notification and not sale of property - Power to order sale of property lies with Special Court which is presided over by a High Court Judge - Notified person can file a petition uls 4(2) within 30 days of the issuance of notification - This amounts to post-decisional hearing satisfying the principles of natural justice.

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· ss. 3(2), 3(3), 3(4), 9-A and 11 - Notified persons - Property attached - Claim for maintenance, repair charges, interest and penalty for belated payment - HELD: The attached properties continue to remain with the Custodian - For their upkeep maintenance, repair etc., Custodian is liable to pay to the Housing Societies, and as such his claim as approved by the Special Court is sustained, except that he is not permitted to collect interest and penalty charges on the ·- arrears of maintenance and repair charges.

Special court (Trial of Offences relating to Transactions in Securities) Rules, 1992: ·

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r.2(b/ read with s.1.1(2) - !:Financial institution" - Complaint by and claim of Canbank Financial Services Ltd. (Canfina) - HELD: For the purp9se of the Special Cowt Act and the Rules, C6nfina is a ';inancia/ institution' - /ts claim /alls uis 11(2)(b) of the Act and complaint falls under r.2(b) -

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236 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 6 S.C.R.

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A Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 - s.11(2).

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Interpretation of Statutes:

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Purposive construction - Object and reasons of a statute B - Significance of - HELD: It is incumbent on courts to strive and interpret the statute as to protect and advance its object and purpose and to keep the legislative policy in mind while applying the provisions of the Act to the facts of the case - When rule of purposive construction is gaining momentum, C courts should be very reluctant to ignore the legislative intent when the language is tolerably plain what it seeks to achieve.

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Harmonious construction - HELD: In the event of any conflict, a har'!'onious construction should be given.

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D Words and Phrases:

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Expression "involved in the offence" and "accused of the offence" in the context of s.3(2) of Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 - E Connotation of.

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On 8.6.1992, the Custodian, under the provisions of the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992, notified late 'HSM' F and 28 entities of 'HSM' group including his family members, except the appellants in Civil Appeal Nos. 2924 and 2915 of 2008, namely, Smt. 'RSM', mother of 'HSM and Smt. 'RM', the sister-in-law of 'HSM'. The appellants were active investors and had built up a portfolio by investment which appreciated in the value during the last G three years. They owned flats at Madhuli Co-operative Housing Society Ltd., which are merged and amalgamated with other flats under the occupation of the Joint family. The Bank account of shareholdings of these appellants was held jointly wtiere the appellants were the

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RASILA S. MEHTA v. CUSTODIAN, NARIMAN 237 BHAVAN, MUMBAI

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first holders and their family members were joint/second holders. Due to the fact that joint/second holders were notified entities, the assets of the appellants were treated as attached on and from 8.6.1992 and the same were managed by the Custodian for the last 15 years. On 21.7.2006 the Custodian preferred a common miscellaneous Petition No. 20/2006 against the appellants seeking relief of a declaration that the said appellants were benamies and friends of late 'HSM' and other notified entities, and, therefore, their assets should be utilized In discharge of their liabilities. The appellants also filed M.A. No. 291 of 2006 on 11.9.1997, seeking relief of a declaration that all the assets belonged to them and they were the first holders and their bank accounts and fixed deposits of the shareholdings may be declared as free from attachment. On 4.1.2007, on the basis of the complaint made by Canbank Financial Services Ltd. (Canfina), the Custodian notified both the appellants u/s 3(2) of the 1992 Act, for which a public notice was published in the newspaper on 6.1.2007. On 19.1.2007, Smt. 'RSM', filed Miscellaneous Petition No. 1/2007 and on 18.6.2007, Smt. 'RM' filed Miscellaneous Petition No. 2/2007 for de-notification u/s 4(2) of the Act. The Special Court by its order dated 26.2.2008 dismissed both the petitions. It also approved Report No. 19/2008 filed by the Custodian in respect of outstanding dues towards flats No. 32-A, 32-8, 33, 34A, 34-B, 44-A, 44-B and 4ii in Madhull Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. belonging to 'HSM' as well as other related notified entities of 'HSM' group and Report No. 23/2009 of the Custodian on outstanding dues towards flats No. 31 in Madhuli Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. Aggrieved, Smt. 'RSM' filed Civil Appeal No. 2294/2008 and Smt. 'RM' filed Clvil Appeal No. 2915/2008 against the final order dated 26.2.2008. Smt. 'RSM' also filed Civil Appeal No. 4764 of 2010 challenging the order dated 7.5.2010 passed by the Special Court approving report No. 23/2009 of the Custodian. Smt. 'JSM' and

238 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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[2011) 6 S.C.R.

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A other family members of 'HSM' filed Civil Appeal No. 3377/ 2009 against the order of the Special Court approving of Report No. 19/2008 filed by the Custodian.

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Disposing of the appeals, the Court

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B HELD: 1.1. It is settled law that the objects and reasons of an the Act are to be taken into consideration in interpreting its provisions. It is incumbent on the court to strive and interpret the statute as to protect and advance its object and purpose. Any narrow or technical C interpretation of the provisions would defeat the legislative policy. The court must, therefore, keep the legislative policy in mind while applying the provisions of the Act to the facts of the case. [para 12] [256-C-D]

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0 1.2. It is a cardinal principle of construction of statute or the statutory rule that efforts should be made in construing the different provisions, so that each prov1s1on may have effective meaning and implementation and in the event of any conflict a E harmonious construction should be given. [para 12] [256D-E]

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1.3. The Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 provides for stringent measures. It was enacted for dealing with an F extraordinary situation in the sense that any person who was involved in any offence relating to transaction of any security could be notified, whereupon all his properties stood attached. The provision contained in the Act being stringent in nature, the purport and intent thereof must G be ascertained having regard to the purpose and object it seeks to achieve. [para 18] [261-D-F]

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Harshad Shanti/al Mehta vs. Custodian and Ors. (1998) 3 SCR 389=(1998) 5 SCC 1; Hitesh S. Mehta vs. Union of H India & Anr., 1992 (3) Bomb. C.R. 716; LS. Synthetics Ltd.

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RASILA S. MEHTA v. CUSTODIAN, NARIMAN 239 BHAVAN, MUMBAI

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vs. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd. & Anr. 2004 (4) Suppl. SCR 109 = (2004) 11 SCC 456; Jyoti Harshad Mehta & Ors. Vs. Custodian & Ors. 2009 (12) SCR 1229 = (2009) 10 SCC 564; Ashwin S. Mehta vs. Custodian & Ors. 2006 (1) SCR 56 = (2006) 2 sec 385 - relied on

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Provisions with· regard to Attachment:

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2.1. Sub-s. (3) of s. 3 of the Special Court Act contains a non-obstante clause providing that on and from the date of notification under sub-s.(2), any property, movable or immovable, or both, belonging to any person notified under that sub-section shall stand attached simultaneously with the issue of the notification and subs. (4) of s. 3 makes it clear that such attached property shall be dealt with by the Custodian in such manner as the Special Court may direct. There is nothing in the Act D which suggests that only such properties which belong to the notified party and which have been acquired by the use of tainted funds alone can be attached for the purposes of distribution u/s 11 of the Act. Attachment of all the properties in terms of s. 3(3) of the Act is automatic. The said section does not provide any qualification that the properties which are liable to be attached should relate to the illegal transactions in securities in respect of which the Act was brought in force. [para 17 and 25] [260-F-H; 267-A-C]

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2.2. A reading of s. 11 of the Act further provides that all the properties which stand attached to the Special Court u/s. 3(3) are available for distribution u/s 11 of the Act. There is again nothing which suggests that the distribution must be restricted only to sale of such G properties which have been acquired by use of tainted funds. The statutory period is irrelevant for the attachment of properties and sale of the same. All properties which are attached would be liabfe to be sold

240 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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[2011] 6 S.C.R.

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A for redemption of liabilities till the date of notification u/s 11 of the Act. [para 25) (266-H; 267-A-C]

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Whether there are sufficient provisions for pre and post decisional hearing thereby ensuring Rules of Natural^Justice?

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3.1. Section 3(2) of the Special Court Act confers power on Custodian to notify a person in the Official Gazette on being satisfied on information received that such person was involved in any offence relating to C transactions in securities during the statutory period 1.4.1991 to 6.6.1992. Section 3(2) does not give any right of personal hearing to the person being notified. In the absence of any such right there is no pre-decisional hearing The provisions of the Act do not provide for a D pre-decisional hearing before notification but contain an impeccable milieu for a fair and just post decisional hearing. The fact that it does not provide for a predecisional hearing is not contrary to the rules of natural justice because the decision of the Custodian to notify E does not ipso facto take away any right of the person thus notified nor does it impose any duty on him. Also a predecisional hearing would frustrate the entire purpose of the Act. If there is time given to show cause why a person should not be notified, that time could practically be F utilized to further divert the funds, if any, so that It becomes even more difficult to trace it. [para 30-31) [269F-G; 270-A-C; 271-F-G]

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Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, 1981 (2) SCR 533 = (1981) 1 sec 664 - relied on

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3.2. Attachment of property is a natural consequence of notification and not sale of the property. The power to order a sale of the property lies only with the Special Court u/s. 11 and at this instance where notified person H can be adversely affected, sub-s. (2) of s. 4, provides for

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RASILA S. MEHTA v. CUSTODIAN, NARIMAN 241 BHAVAN, MUMBAI

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a hearing as regards correctness or otherwise of the notification notifying a person in this behalf, in the event an appropriate application, therefor, is filed within 30 days of the issuance of such notification. The Special Court is presided over by a sitting Judge of the High Court. All material before the Custodian is placed before the Special Court which independently analyses all the material while deciding the application filed by the notified party challenging the notification. This amounts to post decisional hearing satisfying the principles of natural justice. [para 18 and 31] [260-8-D; 271-D-F]

4. Notification of the appellants:

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4.1. When 'HSM' and 28 members of his group including his family members/entities were notified under the Ordinance, the complete details of his transactions were not known. At that time the appellants were not notified because their involvement and diversion of funds to them was not clear. The Reserve Bank of India constituted the Janakiraman Committee to look into the diversion of funds. Inasmuch as the scam relates to accounts and money transactions by way of. transfer of shares through nationalized banks and financial institutions, various committees were appointed by the Union of India which collected relevant materials and unearthed the persons involved, therefore, the Custodian and the Special Court are fully justified in relying on those reports In order to ascertain the correctness or otherwise of the transactions. [para 32 and 34] [272-B-D; 276-D-F]

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Chi/dline India Foundation & Anr. Vs. Allan John Waters & Ors., JT 2011(3) SC 750 - relied on

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4.2. The accounts of the notified parties where significant diversion of funds had taken place were not completed due to non-cooperation of members of 'HSM' Group. The important aspect is that the appellants have

242 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011] 6 S.C.R.

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A not explained the source of their income either to the Custodian or to the Income Tax authorities. The outstanding Income Tax from the appellants for the assessment year 1991-92 is Rs.2,65,38,345; for the assessment year 1992-93 it is Rs.11,55,28,951 and for the B assessment year 1993-94, it is Rs.4,46,40,586. On a complaint, filed by Canbank Financial Services Ltd. (Canfina), the Custodian notified the appellants on 04.01.2007. The appellants filed petitions u/s.4 (2) of the Act challenging the notification. The Special Court looked c into all the materials including the Audit Report and came to a conclusion that the appellants are only fronts of late 'HSM'. It further concluded that the appellants are only housewives, having no independent source of income, and were given loan by the brokerage firms for purchase 0^{of shares.TheSpecial Court, therefore, rightly held that} the money and assets were diverted to the appellants by the brokerage firms who were notified parties. The order of the Special Court does not suffer from any infirmity and there was sufficient material before the Custodian to E arrive at a satisfaction that monies had been diverted by late 'HSM' to the appellants. [para 37,38,44 and 46] [278A-B; D-G; 286-C-D; 291-F-G; 292-8-C]

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Whether the appellants being not involved in offences in transactions in securities could have been proceeded F against in terms of the provisions of the Act?

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5.1. On 25.1.1994, an amendment was carried out in the Act, wherein, s.9-A was inserted to confer civil jurisdiction on the Special Court. The appellants were G active investors and had built up a portfolio of investments which has appreciated in value over the years, more particularly, during the last three years. It cannot be said that since the appellant have not been I charged for any offence, they cannot be notified under H the Act. The plea that the phrase "involved in the offence"

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RASILA S. MEHTA v. CUSTODIAN, NARIMAN 243 BHAVAN, MUMBAI

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could only mean "accused of the offence" and since the appellants are not charged with any offence they could not be notified, cannot be accepted. In construing these words which are used in association with each other, the rule of construction noscitur a sociis may be applied. It is a legitimate rule of construction to construe words in an Act of Parliament with reference to words found in immediate connection with them. The actual order of these words in juxtaposition indicates that meaning of one takes colour from the other. The rule is explained differently: that meaning of doubtful words may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it. [para 5(e) and 47) [250-H; 251-A-B; 292D-G]

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Ahmedabad Teachers' Association vs. Administrative Officer, AIR 2004 SC 1426 - relied on.

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5.3. In the instant case the nature of "offence", in which the appellants are allegedly involved, is to be taken into consideration. The Act does not create an offence for which a particular person has to be charged or held guilty. Thus the phrase "involved in the offence" would not mean "accused of the offence". Also, the appellants could have been reasonably suspected to have been involved in the offence after consideration of the various reports of the Janakiraman Committee, Joint Parliamentary Committee and the Inter Disciplinary Group (IDG); and also the fact that 28 members of MIS 'HSM' group including his family members/entities were notified under the Special Act Ordinance itself. The said factual matrix was sufficient for the satisfaction of the Custodian to notify the appellants. [para 48) [292-G-H; 293-A-C]

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5.4. The object of the Act is not merely to bring the offender to book but also to recover what are ultimately public funds. Even if there is a nexus between a third party, an offender and/or property of the third party can

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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[2011) 6 S.C.R.

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244

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A also be notified. The word "involved" in s. 3(2) of the Special Court Act has to be interpreted in such a manner so as to achieve the purpose of the Act. (para 48) (293· C-D]

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Ashwin S. Mehta vs. Custodian & Ors., (2006) 2 SCC 8 386; and Jyoti H Mehta & Ors. vs. Custodian & Ors., (2009) 10 sec 564 - referred to.

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5.5. In construing the statute of this nature the court should not always adhere to a literal meaning but should C construe the same, keeping in view the larger public interest. For the said purpose, the court may also take recourse to the basic rules of interpretation, namely, ut res magis va/eat quam pereat to see that a machinery must be so construed as to effectuate the liability D imposed by the charging section and to make the machinery workable. The statutes must be construed in a manner which will suppress the mischief and advance the object the legislature had in view. A narrow construction which tends to stultify the law must not be E taken. Contextual reading is a well-known proposition of interpretation of statutes. The courts, when rule of purposive construction is gaining momentum, should be very reluctant to hold that Parliament has achieved nothing by the language it used when it is tolerably plain F what It seeks to achieve. [para 49] [293-H; 294-A-C, F]

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Whether Canfina is a Financial Institution and whether ' the complaint filed by Canfina is invalid?

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6.1. The complaint has been received from Canfina G which is a 100% subsidiary of Canara Bank, a nationalized bank. The term 'financial institution' has not : been defined under the Act. It became necessary to enact the Special Court Act because of the large scale Irregularities which came to light as a result of the ' H investigations by the Reserve B~nk of India into the

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RASILA S. MEHTA v. CUSTODIAN, NARIMAN 245 BHAVAN, MUMBAI

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affairs of various banks and financial institutions whose A monies were siphoned out. It has come to light that there were large scale siphoning out of monies from Canfina also as held by the Special Court In its order dated 25.06.1997. [para 50) [294-G·H; 295-A·D]

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6.2. The term "financial institution" for the purposes of the Special Court Act should be interpreted in accordance with the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act. Thus, at the very inception of this Act are the investigations by the Reserve Bank of India and these C investigations were carried on by the Janakiraman Committee. The Act was intended to be applied to the workings of the banks and financial institutions (though not covered by the strict definition of the term but involved in the securities scam of 1992) into whose affairs the Janakiraman Committee had investigated. Canfina, was one such non-banking financial institution that Janakiraman Committee had investigated and thus it was meant to be covered under the Act. The sources of information illustrated in r. 2 of the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Rules, 1992 also indicates Canfina as a financial institution. fhus, the claim of Canfina falls u/s 11(2)(b) of the Act and their complaint falls under r. (2)(b). The power to deal with the property ultimately lies with the Special Court. This Court is entirely in agreement with the conclusion arrived at by the Special Court. [para 51-55] [295-F-H; 296-A-C, H; 297-A-D]

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Claim for maintenance. repair charges. interest and penalty for belated payment (CA Nos. 3377 of 2009 4764 of 2010)

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7 .1. The appellants in C.A.No. 3377 of 2009 were notified under the Act. Upon enforcement of the Act, all the properties of late 'HSM' and his family members, h1cludlng the appellants apart from other corporate H

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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(2011] 6 S.C.R.

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246

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A entities stood attached by the Custodian. Consequently, all eight residential properties/flats of the appellants, namely, residential flat Nos. of 32A, 328, 33, 34A, 348, 44A, 448 and 45 in the Madhuli Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. at Dr. Anne Besant Road, Worli, Mumbai B continue to remain attached under the Act with the Custodian. Their upkeep/repair is essential so that their market value does not get depreciated. Further, all the owners of the residential properties/flats, as the members of the Housing Society, are liable to pay such amount as c may be determined by the Society towards the upkeep, maintenance and repairs of the flats as well as common areas and amenities in the housing complex, and the Cooperative Housing Societies are entitled to recover all the arrears and charges from the members who have not 0^{paid the society in time. The appellants have failed to pay} to the Madhuli Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. their contfibution towards the maintenance charges, interest thereon and the charges incurred towards the repair of the attached property by the Housing Society. The total dues demanded by said Housing Society by its letter E dated 12.03.2009 relating to the eight attached properties in question is Rs.1,87,97,011/-. In the same way, in Civil Appeal No. 4764 of 2010, the appellant, namely, 'RSM' a notified party who is the owner of the attached property failed to pay to the Housing Society her contribution F towards maintenance charges, interest thereon and also the charges incurred by the Housing Society towards repair of the attached property. The total dues demanded by the Housing Society, by its letter dated 21.06.2010 qua the attached property is Rs.21,06,230/-. The attached G properties are to be properly maiatained and as per the scheme, the repair and upkeep of the attached properties are to be followed by the Custodian and on the orders of the Special Court. [para 56-58, 60 and 61) [297-F; 298· 8-H; 299-A·B, F-H; 300-8)

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RASILA S. MEHTA v. CUSTODIAN, NARIMAN 247 BHAVAN, MUMBAI

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7.2. It is also brought to the notice of the Court that A · during the course of hearing, either before the Special Court or in this Court, certain amounts have been paid/ deposited by the appellants. Considering the fact that the appellants are agitating the matter at the hands of the Custodian, the Special Court and before this Court, the appellants need not be burdened with interest and penal charges for non-payment of maintenance and repair charges to the society. Accordingly, while sustaining the claim of the Custodian as approved by the Special Court, it is clarified that the Custodian is not permitted to collect interest and penal_ty charges on the arrears of maintenance and repair charges. The Custodian is free to adjust the amounts deposited by the appellants on the orders of this Court or the Special Court. The impugned order in both the appeals is accordingly modified. [para 62) [300-C-F]

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Case Law Reference: (1998) 3 SCR 389 relied on para 8 1992 (3) Bomb. C.R. 716 relied on para 19 2004 (4 ) Suppl. SCR 109 relied on para 20 2009 (12 ) SCR 1229 relied on para 21 2006 (1 ) SCR 56 relied on para 22 1981 ( 2) SCR 533 relied on para 33 JT 2011 (3) SC 750 relied on ·para 34

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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2924 of 2008.

G ·

From the Judgment & Order dated 26.2.2008 of the Special Court (Trial of offences relating to transactions in securities) at Bombay in Misc. Petition No. 2 of 2007.

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[2011] 6 S.C.R.

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248 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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WITH

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C.A.Nos. 2915 of 2008, 3377of 2009 & 4764 of 2010.

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K.K. Venugopal, l.H. Syed, Varinder Kumar Sharma, Kamini Jaiswal, Sham Mohan, B. Vijayalakshmi Menon, B Tushad Cooper, Sangeeta Mandal, Kayesh Begg, Taruna A. Prasad (for Fox Mandal & Co.), Arvind Kumar Tewari, Subramonium Prasad, S. Majumdar, Shyam Nanda for the appearing parties.

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c The Judgment of the Court was deliverd by

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P. SATHASIVAM, J.1. Civil Appeal No. 2924 of 2008 has been filed by Smt. Rasila S. Mehta, mother of late Harshad S. Mehta and Civil Appeal No. 2915 of 2008 has been filed by Smt. Rina S. Mehta, sister-in-law of late Harshad S. Mehta D against the final judgment and order dated 26.02.2008 passed by the Special Court under the provisions of the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") at Bombay in Misc. Petition Nos. 2 and 1 of 2007 respectively whereby the Special E Court dismissed their petitions challenging the notification dated 04.01.2007 issued by the Custodian exercising powers under Section 3(2) of the Act notifying the appellants.

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Civil Appeal No. 3377 of 2009 has been filed by Smt. F Jyothi H. Mehta, widow of late Shri Harshad S. Mehta and six others against the judgment and order dated 13.03.2009 passed by the Special Court in approving Report No. 19 of 2008 filed by the Custodian in respect of outstanding dues towards Flat Nos. 32A, 328, 33, 34A, and 348 on the Third G Floor and 44A, 448 and 45 on the Fourth Floor together with terrace area on the Third Floor and eight car parking space in Madhuli Cooperative Housing Society Limited, Worli belonging to late Harshad S. Mehta as well as other related notified entities of the Harshad Mehta Group.

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H 3. Civil Appeal No. 4764 of 2010 has been filed by Smt.

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RASILA S. MEHTA v. CUSTODIAN, NARIMAN . 249 BHAVAN, MUMBAI [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

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Rasila S. Mehta challenging the order dated 07 .05.201 O A passed by the Special Court in approving Report No. 23 of 2009 of the Custodian on outstanding dues of Madhuli Cooperative Housing Society Limited, Worli as on 31. 03. 2009 · towards Flat No. 31 on the Third Floor belonging to her being a notified party. · B

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Since all the parties in the above appeals are famiiy members of late Harshad S. Mehta and the orders challenged were of the Special Court, the same are being disposed of by the following common judgment.

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Brief Facts:

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(a) Sometime in 1992, it was noticed that frauds and irregularities involving colossal amounts of money were committed by certain stock brokers and other persons as a:so o by certain banks and financial institutions. The amounts involved in the said frauds and/or irregularities were estimated to run into several thousand crores. The Central Government, therefore, formed an opinion that it was necessary to take immediate steps to try offences relating to such transactions . E in securities and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The President of India thereupon promulgated an Ordinance on 6th June 1992 known as the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Ordinance 1992 and the said Ordinance came into force on the same day. The said Ordinance with certain modifications became the Act F when the assent of the President was given thereto on 18th August 1992 and the said Act was deemed to have come into force on 6th June 1992, namely, the date on which the said Ordinance had been promulgated.

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(b) On 6th June, 1992 the Central Government had also framed certain rules under the provisions of Section 14 of the said Ordinance known as the Special-Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Rules, 1992 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules'). The said rules came into force on · H

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250 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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[2011] 6 S.C.R.

¶161

A the 6th June 1992 and continue in force after the enactment of the Act under section 15(2) of the Act and/or Section 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.

¶162

(c) The object of the Act, as apparent from the provisions 8^{thereof,istoensurethat offencesrelatingtosecuritieswere} expeditiously tried and it, therefore, provides for the establishment of a Special Court. The Act also provides that an appeal lies from the judgment, sentence or order, not being interlocutory order, of the said Special Court to the Supreme C Court of India both on facts and on law. An important object of the said Act is to ensure speedy recovery of the huge amounts involved, to punish the guilty in such irregularities or fraud, to restore confidence in and maintain the basic integrity and credibility of the banks and financial institutions.

¶163

D (d) On 13.05.1992, the Central Bureau of Investigation (in short "the CBI") issued freeze orders under Section 102 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (in short 'the Code) on all the bank accounts of Smt. Rasila S. Mehta and Smt. Rina S. Mehta on the ground that the appellants are recipients of monies diverted E by M/s Harshad S. Mehta from banks and financial institutions. This was a preventive measure taken by the CBI which powers are normally invoked pending investigation to bring. within their fold, any property which is the subject-matter of an offence. Since then, all the charge-sheets came to tie filed by the CBI F after thorough investigation and trial has been completed in several cases. Based on the provisions of the Act, on 08.06.1992, the Custodian notified 29 entities except the appellants (Smt. Rasila S. Mehta and Smt. Rina S. Mehta) in the Mehta family comprising four brothers, the wives of three G brothers, their three HUFs, a partnership firm, three brokerage firms in the family and 15 corporate entities promoted by them. These persons were notified on the basis of information/ complaint received from the Ministry of Finance in which the Janakiraman Committee report was cited and relied upon.

¶164

H (e) On 25.01.1994, an amendment was carried out in the

¶165

RASILA S. MEHTA v. CUSTODIAN, NARIMAN 251 BHAVAN, MUMBAI [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

¶166

Act, wherein, Section 9-A was inserted to confer civil jurisdiction to the Special Court. Smt. Rasila S. Mehta and Smt. Rina S. Mehta were active investors and had built up a portfolio of investments which has appreciated in value over the years, more particularly, during the last three years. They own one each of the nine flats at Madhuli Cooperative Housing Society Limited which are merged/amalgamated with other flats under the occupation of the joint family. The bank accounts and shareholdings of these appellants are held jointly where the appellants are the first holders and their family members are joint/second holders. Due to the fact that joint/second holders are notified entities, the assets of the appellants have been treated as attached on and from 08.06.1992 and the same are being managed by the Custodian for the last 15 years. On 21.07 .2006, the Custodian preferred a common Misc. petition No. 20 of 2006 against Smt. Rasila S. Mehta and Smt. Rina S. Mehta seeking relief of a declaration that the said appellants are benamis and fronts of late Harshad S. Mehta and other notified entities and, therefore, their assets should be utilized . in discharge of their liabilities. The appellants also filed M.A. No. 291/2006 on 11.09.2007 seeking relief of a declaration that all the assets belonged to them and they were the first holders, namely, bank accounts and fixed deposits and the shareholdings may be declared as free from attachment.

¶167

(f) On 04.01.2007, the Custodian issued a notification notifying both the appellants under Section 3(2) of the Act for which a public notice was published in the newspapers on 06.01.2007.

¶168

(g) On 19.01.2007, Smt. Rina S. Mehta filed Misc. Petition No. 1 of 2007 and on 18.06.2007, Smt. Rasila S. Mehta filed Misc. Petition No. 2 of 2007 for the relief of de-notification under Section 4(2) of the Act. It transpired that the appellants were notified on the basis of the alleged complaint by Canbank Financial Services Ltd. (in short "Canfina"). On considering the materials, the Special Court, by impugned order dated

252 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶178

[2011) 6 S.C.R.

¶179

A 26.02.2008, dismissed the petitions filed by the appellants · Smt. Rasila S. Mehta and Smt. Rina S. Mehta.

¶180

(h) Inasmuch as the other two appeals relate to the order:passed on the report submitted by the Custodian, there is n<B need to traverse all the details as stated therein.

¶181

Heard Mr. LH. Syed, learned counsel for the appellants Mr. Subramonium Prasad, learned counsel for the Custodian Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned senior counsel for intervenor,.... Standard Chartered Bank and Mr. Tushad Cooper, learnet C counsel for intervenor/State Bank of India.

¶182

Mr. Syed, learned counsel for the appellants after taking• us through the relevant provisions of the Act, Rules and the materials available with the Custodian as well as the reasonings 0^{of theSpecialCourt raisedthe followingcontentions:}

¶183

(i) The impugned notification is non-reasoned and nonspeaking. The validity of a statutory order must be judged by a court of law by the reasons mentioned in the order itself and a statutory order cannot be explained and supplemented by fresh E reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise whereas in the present case the Special Court accepted the same which is contrary to settled law.

¶184

(ii) Delay of 15 years in passing the order of notification

¶185

F is unreasonable. The explanation offered for delay is also unacceptable.

¶186

(iii) Material relied upon in passing the order of notification i.e. Canfina's letter dated 28.12.2006 is not supported by an G affidavit which could not have been relied upon as it is contrary to proviso to Rule 2 of the Rules.

¶187

(iv) Reliance on the reports of Joint Parliamentary Committee, Jankiraman Committee, IDG and Chartered Accountants' by the Custodian is unacceptable.

¶188

¶189

RASILAS.MEHTA_v._CUSTODIAN.NARIMAN 253 BHAVAN,MUMBAI[P.SATHASIVAM,J.] (v)Pre-decisionalhearingbytheCustodianwasrequired .,begivenandinthecaseonhandsuchopportunitywasnot •fforded. (vi)Noeffectivepost-decisionalhearingasthematerials -elieduponwasnotsuppliedintime. (vii)TheSpecialCourterroneouslyheldthetransaction~o ->ebenamiingeneralonthebasisofCharteredAccountants' -eportswithoutexaminingindividualtransactions. (viii)Theonustoestablishthevalidity,correctness,legality, ->ropriety ofthenotification orderisontheCustodian but -Yronglyshiftedontheappellants. (ix)Satisfaction ofCustodianwhilepassinganorder of 1otificationshouldbeobjectiveandbasedonmaterialsas >rovidedintheRules. (x)TheSpecialCourterroneouslyheldthatthemeaning ::>fthephrase"involvedanoffence"hasattainedfinalitybythis 8ourt,thoughthesaidquestionwasleftopen.Inanyevent,the -caseoftheCustodianwasthatasumofRs.50croreswas ::livertedbyM/sHarshadS.Mehtatotheappellantsduringthe 1period01.04.1990to06.06.1992.Insuch event, monies ltransferred/divertedfromthebanks/financialinstitutionscanonly lberecoveredfromtheappellantsandnothingmore. (xi)ThejurisdictionoftheSpecialCourtislimitedtothe -statutoryperiodonly,i.e.01.04.1991to06.06.1992. (xii)Nointerestcanbeleviedonthenotifiedpartiesasper the judgment of this Courtin_Harshad Shanti/al Mehta_vs. _Custodian and_Ors.(1998)5SCC1.	A 8 c 0 E F G
8.Ontheotherhand,Mr.SubramoniumPrasad,learned counselfortheCustodianheavilyrelyingonthecircumstances forpassingtheAct,thestatementofObjectsandReasonsand thereleva!lt provisionssubmittedthat:	H

RASILAS.MEHTA_v._CUSTODIAN.NARIMAN
253
BHAVAN,MUMBAI[P.SATHASIVAM,J.]
(v)Pre-decisionalhearingbytheCustodianwasrequired
.,begivenandinthecaseonhandsuchopportunitywasnot
•fforded.
(vi)Noeffectivepost-decisionalhearingasthematerials
-elieduponwasnotsuppliedintime.
(vii)TheSpecialCourterroneouslyheldthetransaction~o
->ebenamiingeneralonthebasisofCharteredAccountants'
-eportswithoutexaminingindividualtransactions.
(viii)Theonustoestablishthevalidity,correctness,legality,
->ropriety ofthenotification orderisontheCustodian but
-Yronglyshiftedontheappellants.
(ix)Satisfaction ofCustodianwhilepassinganorder of
1otificationshouldbeobjectiveandbasedonmaterialsas
>rovidedintheRules.
(x)TheSpecialCourterroneouslyheldthatthemeaning
::>fthephrase"involvedanoffence"hasattainedfinalitybythis
8ourt,thoughthesaidquestionwasleftopen.Inanyevent,the
-caseoftheCustodianwasthatasumofRs.50croreswas
::livertedbyM/sHarshadS.Mehtatotheappellantsduringthe
1period01.04.1990to06.06.1992.Insuch event, monies
ltransferred/divertedfromthebanks/financialinstitutionscanonly
lberecoveredfromtheappellantsandnothingmore.
(xi)ThejurisdictionoftheSpecialCourtislimitedtothe
-statutoryperiodonly,i.e.01.04.1991to06.06.1992.
(xii)Nointerestcanbeleviedonthenotifiedpartiesasper
the judgment of this Courtin_Harshad Shanti/al Mehta_vs.
_Custodian and_Ors.(1998)5SCC1.

A
8

c
0
E
F
G

8.Ontheotherhand,Mr.SubramoniumPrasad,learned
counselfortheCustodianheavilyrelyingonthecircumstances
forpassingtheAct,thestatementofObjectsandReasonsand
thereleva!lt provisionssubmittedthat:

¶190

254 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 6 S.C.R.

¶191

A (i) The impugned order of the Special Court is valid and the appellants have not made out any case for interference by this Court.

¶192

(ii) As per Section 4(2) of the Act, it is for the appellants B to show to the Special Court that they are not involved in any offence in securities between 01.04.1991 to 06.06.1992.

¶193

· (iii) A perusal of various reports like the Auditor's report, Janakiraman Committee's report, report of Inter Disciplinary Group (IDG), report of Vinod K. Aggarwal and Company C coupled with materials placed and discussed, the impugned decision of the Special Court cannot be faulted with.

¶194

(iv) From the materials placed, it is clear that the appellants are nothing but front benamidars of Harshad S. Mehta and there 0^{isnoacceptablematerialtoshowthattheappellantswere} having sufficient funds in their hands due to the purchase and sale of shares by placing acceptable materials such as income-tax returns etc. Inasmuch as the Special Court is manned by or presided over by a sitting Judge of High Court, E sufficient safeguards are provided in the Act and, in any event, the appellants have no way prejudiced.

¶195

(v) As per the provisions of the Act and interpreted by this Court on various occasions, it is for the appellants to make out a case before the Special Court that they are not involved in F any offence or that they have no nexus.

¶196

Mr. K.K. Venugopal, learned senior counsel for intervenor/Standard Chartered Bank and Mr. Tushad Cooper, learned counsel for intervenor/State Bank of India assisted the G Court by highlighting the object and salient features of the Act as well as huge financial implications on the banks due to the act of Harshad S. Mehta in the sale and purchase of shares. They also highlighted that crores of public monies were lost due to the conduct of Harshad S. Mehta and his family members H which resulted in huge financial loss to the banks.

¶197

RASILA S. MEHTA v. CUSTODIAN, NARIMAN 255 BHAVAN, MUMBAI [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

¶198

¶199

Before going into the rival submissions, it is necessary to trace the history of enactment of the Act. The Special Courts Act, 1992 (27of1992) was legislated to meet the necessity of establishing Special Courts for trial of offences committed in relation to Transactions in Securities Act, 1992. Reserve Bank of India found that large scale irregularities and malpractices were found in Government and other securities through brokers in collusion with Bank employees. This legislation was enacted to meet this situation. It is a short Act containing only 15 sections. It deals with establishment of Courts, defines jurisdiction and powers of Special Court. It also defines civil jurisdiction of such Special Courts. Provision of arbitration was reserved and appeal could also be pref erred under the Act. Much protection was given for acts done in good faith and punishment for contempt was also provided so that the provisions of the Act would be more strictly implemented.

11. Objects & Reasons:

¶204

The Statement of Objects and Reasons is as follows:-

¶205

"(1) In the course of the investigations by the Reserve Bank of India, large scale irregularities and malpractices were noticed in transactions in both the Government and other securities, indulged in by some brokers in collusion with the employees of various banks and financial institutions. The said irregularities and malpractices led to tl1e diversion of funds from banks and financial institutions to the individual accounts of certain brokers.

¶206

(2) To deal with the situation and in particular to ensure speedy recovery of the huge amount involved, to punish the guilty and restore confidence in and maintain the basic integritv and credibility of the banks and financial institutions the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Ordinance, 1992, was promulgated on

256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 6 S.C.R.

¶212

¶213

¶214

the 6th June, 1992. The Ordinance provides for the establishment of a Special Court with a sitting Judge of a High Court for speedy trial of offences relating to transactions in securities and disposal of properties attached. It also provides for appointment of one or more custodians for attaching the property of the offenders with a view to prevent diversion of such properties by the offenders."

¶215

It is settled law that the objects and reasons of the Act C are to be taken into consideration in interpreting the provisions of the statute. It is incumbent on the court to strive and interpret the statute as to protect and advance the object and purpose of the enactment. Any narrow or technical interpretation of the provisions would defeat the legislative policy. The Court must, D therefore, keep the legislative policy in mind while applying the"· provisions of the Act to the facts of the case. It is a cardinal principle of construction of statute or the statutory rule that efforts should be made in construing the different provisions, so that each provision may have effective meaning and implementation E and in the event of any conflict a harmonious construction should be given. It is also settled law that literal meaning of the statute must be adhered to when there is no absurdity in ascertaining the legislative intendment and for that purpose the broad features of the Act can be looked into. The main function of the F Court is to merely interpret the section and in doing so it cannot re-write or re-design the section. Keeping all these principles in mind, let us consider the relevant provisions.

¶216

Relevant Provisions:

¶217

G As per Section 2(b), 'Custodian' means "the Custodian appointed under sub-section (1) of Section 3." Section 2(c) 'securities' includes.-

¶218

¶219

"(i) shares, scrips, stocks, bonds, debentures, debenture stock, units of the Unit Trust of India or

¶220

RASILAS.MEHTA_v._CUSTODIAN,NARIMAN 257 BHAVAN,MUMBAI[P..SATHASIVAM,J.]
anyothermutualfundorothermarketablesecurities ofa likenatureinorofanyincorporatedcompany orotherbodycorporate;	A
(ii) Governmentsecurities;and
(iii) Rightsorinterestsinsecurities;"	B
11mdasperSection2(d)'SpecialCourt'means"theSpecial :ourtestablishedundersub-section(1)ofSection5."Among 11111theprovisionsSections3and4arerelevantwhichreadas ~ollows:	c
_"3.Appointment and functions of Custodian.--(1)_The CentralGovernmentmayappointoneormoreCustodian asitmaydeemfit forthepurposesofthisAct.
(2)TheCustodianmay,onbeingsatisfiedoninformation receivedthatanypersonhasbeeninvolvedinanyoffence relatingtotransactionsinsecuritiesafterthe1stdayof April,1991andonandbefore6thJune,1992,notifythe nameofsuchpersonintheOfficialGazette. (3)NotwithstandinganythingcontainedintheCodeandany otherlawforthetimebeinginforce,onandfromthedate ofnotificationundersub-section(2),anyproperty,movable orimmovable,orboth,belongingtoanypersonnotified underthatsub-sectionshallstandattachedsimultaneously withtheissueofthenotification.	D E F
(4)Thepropertyattachedundersub-section(3)shallbe dealtwithbytheCustodianinsuchmannerastheSpecial Courtmaydirect. (5)TheCustodianmaytakeassistance ofanyperson whileexercisinghispowersorfordischarginghisduties underthissectionandsection4.	G
4.Contracts entered into fraudulently may be	H

¶221

258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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[2011) 6 S.C.R.

¶223

A cancelled.-(1) If the Custodian is satisfied, after such inquiry as he may think fit, that any contract or agreement entered into at any time after the 1st day of April, 1991 and on and before the 6th June, 1992 in relation to any property of the person notified under sub-section (2) of B section 3 has been entered into fraudulently or to defeat the provisions of this Act, he may cancel such contract or agreement and on such cancellation such property shall stand attached under this Act:

¶224

Provided that no contract or agreement shall be cancelled c except after giving to the parties to the contract or agreement a reasonable opportunity of being heard.

¶225

(2) Any person aggrieved by a notification issued under sub-section (2) of section 3 or any cancellation made under D sub-section (1) of section 4 or any other order made by the Custodian in exercise of the powers conferred on him under section 3 or 4 may file a petition objecting to the same within thirty days of the assent to the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) E Bill, 1992 by the President before the Special Court where such notification, cancellation or order has been issued before the date of assent to the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Bill, 1992 by the President and where such notification, cancellation F or order has been issued on or after that date, within thirty days of the issuance of such notification, cancellation or order, as the case may be; and the Special Court after hearing the parties, may make such order as it deems fit."

¶226

Section 9 speaks about procedure and powers of Special G Court and by way of an amendment with effect from 25th January, 1994, Section 9-A was inserted to confer jurisdiction, powers, authority and procedure of Special Court in respect of civil matters. As per Section 10, against any judgment, sentence or order, not being interlocutory in nature of the H Special Court, an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court both

¶227

RASILA S. MEHTA v. CUSTODIAN, NARIMAN 259 BHAVAN, MUMBAI [P. SATHASIVAM, J.)

¶228

on facts and on law. Like Sections 3 and 4, another important A section is Section 11 which reads as under:

¶229

"11. Discharge of liabilities.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code and any other law for the time being in force, the Special Court may make such order as it may 8 deem fit directing the Custodian for the disposal of the property under attachment.

¶230

(2) The following liabilities shall be paid or discharged in full, as far as may be, in the order as under :-

¶231

¶232

(a) all revenues, taxes, cesses and rates due from the persons notified by the Custodian under subsection(2) of Sec. 3 to the Central Government or any State Government or any local authority.

¶233

(b)	allamountsduefromthepersonsonotifiedbythe D
	Custodiantoanybankorfinancial institutionor
	mutualfund;and

¶234

¶235

¶236

Section 13 makes it clear that the provisions of the Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any law, other than this Act, or in any decree or order of any Court, Tribunal or other authority. Section 14 empowers the Central Government to make rules for carrying out the provisions of the Act.

¶237

¶238

Based on the above statutory provisions, let us consider the claim of the appellants, stand taken by the G Custodian and the reasonings of the Special Court in passing the impugned orders.

¶239

Discussion:

¶240

¶241

260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2011) 6 S.C.R.

¶242

A The objects of the Act are two fold:

¶243

(a) to punish the guilty, and

¶244

(b) to ensure speedy recovery of the huge amount involved.

¶245

¶246

"Amount involved" means the amount of the banks and financial institutions alleged to have been diverted to the accounts of the offenders during the statutory period from 01.04.1991 to 06.06.1992.

¶247

¶248

The attached properties can be dealt with by the Special Court under sub-Sections (3) and (4) of Section 3, subsection (2) of Section 4, Sections 9-A and 11 of the Act. Section 3(3) of the Act provides for an automatic attachment of all properties as a consequence of Notification. The object D provides the attachment of all properties of the offender with a view to prevent diversion of such properties. The said provision is a preventive provision.

¶249

Section 11 provides for disposal and sale of attached E properties extinguishing the rights and title of a notified party, which is a punitive provision. Section 3 of the Act provides for appointment and functions of the Custodian. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 postulates that the Custodian may, on being satisfied on information received that any person has been involved in F any offence relating to transactions in securities after the 1st day of April, 1991 and on and before 06.06.1992 (the statutory period), notify the name of such person in the Official Gazette. Sub-section (3) of Section 3 contains a non obstante clause providing that on and from the date of notification under subG section (2), any property, movable or immovable, or both, belonging to any person notified under that sub-section s' stand attached simultaneously with the issue of the notific< and sub-section (4) of Section 3 makes it clear that SL.~.1 attached property shall be dealt with by the Custodian in such H manner as the Special Court may direct.

¶250

RASILA S. MEHTA v. CUSTODIAN, NARIMAN 261 BHAVAN, MUMBAI [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

¶251

In the Ordinance which preceded the Act, there was no provision for giving post facto hearing to a notified person for cancellation of notification, but such a provision has been made in the Act, as would appear from Section 4(2) thereof. Sub-section (2) of Section 4, however, provides for a hearing as regards correctness or otherwise of the notification notifying a person in this behalf, in the event an appropriate application therefor is filed within 30 days of the issuance of such notification. Section 5 provides for establishment of the Special Court. Section 7 confers exclusive jurisdiction of Special Court. A perusal of the Act makes it clear that any prosecution in respect of any offence referred to in sub-section (2) of Section 3 pending in any court is required to be transferred to the Special Court. Section 9 provides for the procedure and powers of the Special Court. Section 9-A, which was inserted by Act 24 of 1994 with effect from 25.01.1994, confers all such jurisdiction, powers and authority as were exercisable, immediately before such commencement by any civil court in relation to the matter specified therein. The Act provides for stringent measures. It was enacted for dealing with an extraordinary situation in the sense that any person who was involved in any offence relating to transaction of any security could be notified, whereupon all his properties stood attached. The provision contained in the Act being stringent in nature, the purport and intent thereof must be ascertained having regard to the purpose and object it seeks to achieve.

Provisions with regard to Attachment

¶259

The vires of Sections 3(2), 3(3) and 3(4) of the Ordinance was challenged before the High Court of Bombay in Writ Petition No. 1547 of 1992 Hitesh S. Mehta vs. Union of India & Anr., 1992 (3) Bomb. C.R. 716. It was argued before · G the Bombay High Court that there is no provision for hearing at the stage of notification i.e. Section 3(2) and also at the stage of attachment of all properties i.e., Section 3(3). Therefore, the provisions are contrary to the principles of natural justice and

¶260

¶261

262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶262

[2011] 6 S.C.R.

¶263

A be struck down. The Division Bench of the High Court in paragraph 8 of the said judgment observed as follows:

¶264

"Had the provision been confined to Section 3, subsections (2) and (3), the argument which is advanced before us would have had considerable force. It is B undoubtedly true that neither in sub-Section (2) nor in (3) is there any provision for any hearing being given to the person who may be notified; nor is there any provision for any reasoned order being passed by the Custodian at the time when he notifies such a person. There is, however, a c further sub-Section, namely, sub-Section (4) of Section 3 which provides as follows:

¶265

Section 3 (4) : The property attached under sub-Section (3) shall be dealt with by the Custodian in such manner as D the Special Court may direct.

¶266

This sub-section clearly contemplates that the power of the Custodian to deal with the property of a person who has been notified is subject to the orders and directions of the Special Court. Now, in the first place, the Special Court E under the Ordinance is a Court presided over by a sitting Judge of a High Court. This itself is a check on any arbitrary exercise of powers by the Custodian. Secondly, the power of the Special Court to give directions to the Custodian in respect of any attached property must F necessarily bring within its ambit, the power to order the release of such property or any part of its from attachment. If the person who is aggrieved by his name being notified under sub-section (2) approaches the Special Court and makes out, for example, a case that the property which is G attached or a portion of its has no nexus of any sort with the illegal dealings in securities belonging to banks and financial institutions during the relevant period and/or that there are no claims or liabilities which have to be satisfied by attachment and sale of such property, in our view, the H Special Court would have the power to direct the custodian

¶267

RASILA S. MEHTA v. CUSTODIAN, NARIMAN 263 BHAVAN, MUMBAI [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

¶268

to release such property from attachment. In the same way, if ultimately, the Special Court, after looking at all the relevant circumstances, comes to the conclusion that the entire property should be released from attachment, we do not see any reason why such a direction also cannot be given by the Special Court under Section 3, sub-section (4). In such a situation, if the entire property is required to be released from attachment, the Special Court, in our view, can also direct the Custodian that the name of the notified person should be de-notified. This would be a necessary consequence of the power of the Special Court to give proper directions in connection with the property which the Custodian seeks to attach. If sub-section (4) is read in this light, the grievance of the petitioner relating to the validity of powers granted to the Custodian under Section 3 would not survive.

The above-said paragraph of Hitesh S. Mehta's judgment was relied upon by this Court in Harshad S. Mehta vs. Custodian (supra).

¶274

This Court in LS. Synthetics Ltd. vs. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd. & Anr. (2004) 11 SCC 456 considered the judgment of Harshad S. Mehta (supra) and in paragraphs 27 to 29 observed as under:

¶275

"27. This Court in para 14 was merely recording the submissions of one of the notified parties. Even a question as to whether all properties of notified persons would be subject to the statutory attachment under sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the said Act or not did not arise for consideration therein.

28. Therein indisputably this Court was referring to a judgment of the Bombay High Court but did not prono,unce finally on the correctness or otherwise thereof.

¶280

29. In Hitesh Shanti/al Mehta the Bombay High Court

¶281

¶282

264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶283

[2011] 6 S.C.R.

¶284

A appears to have merely held that in appropriate cases theS pecial Court would have the power to direct the Custodian to release such property from attachment, in the event, it is found that the property which is attached has no nexus with the illegal dealings in securities belonging B to banks and financial institutions during the relevant period and/or there are no claims or liabilities which have to be satisfied by attachment and sale of such property. Once it is held that a debt can be the subject-matter of attachment, the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the said Act would squarely be applicable in view of the c fact that the same was the property belonging to a notified person. This position in law is not disputed. Such attached property, thus, if necessary, for the purpose of discharging the claims and liabilities of the notified person indisputably would stand attached and can be applied for discharge of D his liabilities in terms of Section 11 of the said Act."

¶285

In paragraphs 45, 46 and 47 of Jyoti Harshad Mehta & Ors. vs. Custodian & Ors. (2009) 10 SCC 564 this Court held as under:

¶286

¶287

¶288

"45. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellants Mr Syed that if any of the properties or assets of the notified parties have no nexus with the illegal securities transactions, the same can be released from attachment or at least need not be sold.

¶289

It has further been argued that no evidence has been adduced that loans given by M/s Harshad S. Mehta to his family members or monies used by Shri Harshad Mehta for purchase of his flat were acquired from the tainted G funds. It is submitted by the appellants that unless it can be shown that the properties in question were acquired from the tainted funds they would be liable to be released from attachment. It is argued that the fact that the properties had been purchased much before the securities scam

¶290

¶291

RASILA S. MEHTA v. CUSTODIAN, NARIMAN 265 BHAVAN, MUMBAI [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

¶292

would go on to show that they had no nexus with the funds diverted therefrom.

¶293

In our opinion the arguments advanced on behalf of the appellants need to be rejected at the outset because a plain reading of the sections of the Special Act would dearly point otherwise. In our opinion the attachment of all the properties in terms of sub-section (3) of Section 3 of the Special Act is automatic. The attachment restricts sale of the properties which have been acquired from illegal securities transaction. The sub-section specifically mentions that on and from the date of the notification, "any property, movable or immovable, or both", belonging to any person notified under the Act shall stand attached. "

¶294

In Ashwin S. Mehta vs. Custodian & Ors. (2006) 2 D SCC 385 in paragraph 15, this Court observed as under:

¶295

"15. The Act provides for stringent measures. It was enacted for dealing with an extraordinary situation in the sense that any person who was involved in any offence relating to transaction of any security may be notified, whereupon all his properties stand attached. The provision contained in the Act being stringent in nature, the purport and intent thereof must be ascertained having regard to the purpose and object it seeks to achieve. The right of a person notified to file an application or to raise a defence ' that he is not liable in terms of the provisions of the Act or, in any event, the properties attached should not be sold in discharge of the liabilities can be taken at the initial stage by filing an application in terms of sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the Act. But, at the stage when liabilities are required to be discharged, the notified persons may raise a contention inter a/ia for the purpose of establishing that the properties held and possessed by them are sufficient to meet their liabilities. In terms of the provisions

266 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶304

[2011] 6 S.C.R.

¶305

A of the Act, the Special Court had been conferred a very wide power."

¶306

Section 9-A was inserted by an amendment dated 25.01.1994 conferring jurisdiction, powers, authority and 8^{procedureof Special Courtincivil matters.Inviewof this} amendment, this Court in paragraph 41 of Harshad Mehta's case (supra) observed as under:

¶307

"41 .......... If, according to any of the banks or financial institutions, any of the properties attached belongs to the C bank or financial institution concerned, it is open to that bank or financial institution to file a claim before the Special Court in that connection and establish its right to the property attached or any part thereof in accordance with law. Obviously, until such a claim is determined, the D property attached cannot be sold or distributed under Section 11 ....... ."

¶308

This Court in Ashwin S. Mehta's case (supra), in paragraphs 51 and 52 observed as under:

¶309

¶310

"51 ......... It was, thus, necessary for the learned Special Court to arrive at a firm conclusion as regards the involvement of the individuals with Harshad Mehta, if any, and the extent of his liability as such.

¶311

F 52. Furthermore, the question as regards liability of the parties should have been determined at the stage of Section 9-A of the Act. . . . . . . . . . It does not appear that claims inter se between the entities within the so-called group had ever been taken into consideration. The G Custodian does not appear to have preferred claims before the Special Court on behalf of the largest lender on the socalled group against those he had to recover loans. Such claims may also be preferred."

¶312

As regards Section 11, the properties which stand H attached by the Custodian are used to discharge the liabilities

¶313

•

¶314

RASILA S. MEHTA v. CUSTODIAN, NARIMAN 267 BHAVAN, MUMBAI [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

¶315

in full as far as may be in the order prescribed under Section 11 (2) of the Special Court Act. There is nothing in the Act which suggests that only such properties which belong to the notified party and which have been acquired by the use of tainted funds alone can be attached for the purposes of distribution under Section 11 of the Act. Section 3(3) postulates that on and from the date of notification all properties movable, immovable or both, belonging to the notified party on and from the date of the notification stand attached. Attachment of all the properties in terms of Section 3(3) of the Act is automatic. The said section does not provide any qualification that the properties which are liable to be attached should relate to the illegal transactions in securities in respect of which the Act was brought in force. Had the Parliament intended otherwise it would have specifically provided for the same as was done under the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976. A reading of Section 11 of the Act further provides that all the properties which stand attached to the Special Court under Section 3(3) are available for distribution under Section 11 of the Act. There is again nothing which suggests that the distribution must be restricted only to sale of such properties which have been acquired by use of tainted funds. The statutory period is irrelevant for the attachment of properties and sale of the same. All properties which are attached woule be liable~ to be sold for redemption of liabilities till the date of notification • under Section 11 of the Act.

¶316

The Custodian filed Misc. Petition No. 20 of 2006 on 21.07.2006 against the appellants for the recovery of the money alleged to have been advanced by the three brokerage firms i.e., Mis Harshad S. Mehta; Mis Ashwin Mehta and M/s J.H. Mehta to the appellants and prayed that the appellants be declared benami/front of late Harshad S. Mehta and/or his group, and the assets be utilized for discharging the liabilities of late Harsahd S. Mehta and/or his group. On 04.01.2007, the Custodian notified the appellants and subsequently on 23.01.2007 withdrew the said M.P. No. 20 of 2006 after the notification.

268 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 12011) 6 S.C.R.

¶326

A 27. The appellants filed Misc. Petition Nos. 1 & 2 of 2007 challenging the validity of the Notification dated 04.01.2007 before the Special Court. The Special Court dismissed the said petitions and granted the prayer In Misc. Petition No.20 of 2006 filed by the Custodian.

¶327

B 28. This Court in L.S. Synthetics (supra) in paragraphs 35, 36 and 42 held as under:

¶328

"35. S.N. Variava, J. in A.K. Menon, Custodian whereupon the learned Special Court has placed reliance, c observed:

¶329

"19. It is thus that the said Act lays down a responsibility on the Court to recover the properties. So far as monies are concerned, undoubtedly the particular coin or particular currency note given to a debtor would no longer be D available. That however does not mean that the lender . does not have any right to monies. What is payable is the loan i.e. the amount which has been lent. The right which the creditor has is not a 'right to recover' the money. The creditor has the title/right in the money itself. An equivalent E amount is recoverable by him and the title in any equivalent amount remains with the lender. Thus the property which a notified party would have is not the right to recover but the 'title in the money itself. Thus under Section 3(3) what would stand attached would be the title/right in the money F itself. Of course what would be recoverable would be an equivalent of that money. Once the money stands attached then no application is required to be made by any parties for recovery of that money. It is then the duty of the court to recover the money. No period of limitation can apply to G any act to be done by a court. Therefore in all such applications the only question which remains is whether on the date of the notification the right in the property existed. If the right in the property existed then irrespective of the fact that the right to recover may be barred by limitation H there would be a statutory attachment of that property.

¶330

RASILA S. MEHTA v. CUSTODIAN, NARIMAN 269 BHAVAN, MUMBAI [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

¶331

Once there is a statutory attachment of that property the court is duty-bound to recover it for the purposes of distribution. There can be no period of limitation for acts which a court is bound to perform. In this case since the court is compulsorily bound to recover the money there can be no limitation to such recovery proceedings. To be· remembered that Section 3(3) as well as Section 13 provide that provisions of the said Act would prevail over any other law. This would include the Limitation Act.

¶332

We respectfully agree with the said view.

Only in the event, all the claims as provided for under Section 11 of the said Act are fully satisfied, the amount belonging to the notified person can be directed to be released in his favour or in favour of any other person."

¶337

¶338

The same position is reiterated in para 56 of the judgment in Jyoti Harshad Mehta's case (supra) wherein this Court held that,

¶339

" ...... It is true that to such an extent all properties would be liable to be sold which are needed for redemption and not beyond the same. What should be kept uppermost in the mind of the Court is to see that the liabilities are discharged and not beyond the same. It is with that end in view that the powers of the Special Court contained in Sections 9A and 11 must be construed."

¶340

¶341

¶342

Whether there are sufficient provisions for pre and post decisional hearing thereby ensuring Rules of Natural Justice?

¶343

Section 3(2) of the Special Courts Act confer power to Custodian to notify a person in the Official Gazette on being satisfied on information received that such person was involved in any offence relating to transactions in securities during the statutory period 01.04.1991 to 06.06.1992. Though Mr. Syed

¶344

¶345

¶346

270 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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[2011] 6 S.C.R.

¶348

A contended that the appellants are entitled to hearing even at the stage of Section 3(2), we are unable to accept his claim. Section 3(2) does not give any right of personal hearing to the person being notified. In the absence of any such right there is no pre-decisional hearing The provisions of the Act do not B provide for a pre-decisional hearing before n:>tification but contains an impeccable milieu for a fair and just post decisional hearing. The fact that it does not provide for a pre-decisional hearing is not contrary to the rules of Natural Justice because the decision of the Custodian to notify does not ipso facto takes c away any right of the person thus notified or imposes any duty on him. This also has to be read in the light of the judgment of Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 664 which reads as under:

¶349

"Rules of natural justice are not embodied rules. Being D means to an end and not an end in themselves, it is not possible to make an exhaustive catalogue of such rules. But there are two fundamental maxims of natural justice viz. (i) audi alteram partem and (ii) nemo judex in re sua. The audi alteram partem rule has many facets, two of them E being (a) notice of the.case to be met; and (b) opportunity to explain. This rule cannot be sacrificed at the altar of administrative convenience or celerity. The general principle-as distinguished from an absolute rule of uniform application-seems to be that where a statute F does not, in terms, exclude this rule of prior hearing but contemplates a post-decisional hearing amounting to a full review of the original order on merits, then such a statute would be construed as excluding the audi alteram partem rule at the pre-decisional stage. Conversely if the statute G conferring the power is silent with regard to the giving of a pre-decisional hearing to the person affected and the administrative decision taken by the authority involves civil consequences of a grave nature, and no full review or appeal on merits against that decision is provided, H courts will be extremely reluctant to construe such a

¶350

RASILA S. MEHTA v. CUSTODIAN. NARIMAN . 271 BHAVAN, MUMBAI [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

¶351

statute as excluding the duty of affording even a minimal hearing, shorn of all its formal trappings and dilatory features at the pre-decisional stage, unless, viewed pragmatically, it would paralyse the administrative process or frustrate the need for utmost promptitude. In short, this rule of fair play must not be jettisoned save in very exceptional circumstances where compulsive necessity so demands. The court must make every effort to salvage this cardinal rule to the maximum extent possible, with situational modifications. But, the core of it must, however, remain, namely, that the person affected must have reasonable opportunity of being heard and the hearing must be a genuine hearing and not an empty public relations exercise."

¶352

(Emphasis supplied)

¶353

Attachment of property is a natural consequence of notification and not sale of the property. The power to order a sale of the property lies only with the Special Court under Section 11 and at this instance where the notified person can be adversely affected, Section 4(2) provides that any person aggrieved by the notification can file a petition objecting the same within 30 days of the date of the issuance of the notification. The Special Court is presided over by a sitting Judge of the High Court. All material before the Custodian is placed before the Special Court which independently analyses all the material while dec:ding the application filed by the notified party challenging the notification. This amounts to post decisional hearing satisfying the principles of natural justice. Also a pre-decisional hearing would frustrate the entire purpose of the Act. If there is time given to Show Cause why a person should not be notified, that time could practically be utilized to further divert the funds, if any, so that it becomes even more difficult to trace it.

Notif; ~ation of the appellants:

¶362

¶363

272 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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[2011) 6 S.C.R.

¶365

A As stated earlier that some time in 1992, it was noticed that frauds and irregularities involving huge amounts of money running into several thousand crores were commited by certain financial brokers and financial institutions. The Central Government, to combat with the situation, promulgated an B ordinance on 6.6.1992 known as the Special Court (Trial of Offences relating to Transactions in Securities) Ordinance, 1992. On 08.06.1992. Mr. Harshad S. Mehta (since deceased) and 28 members of his group including his family members/ entities were notified under the Ordinance. It is pertinent to C mention here that the complete details of the transactions of Harshad Mehta were not known. At that time the appellants - Mrs. Rasila Mehta (mother of Harshad Mehta) and Mrs. Rina Mehta (sister-in law of Harshad Mehta and wife of Sudhir Mehta) were not notified because their involvement and diversion of funds to them was not clear. The Reserve Bank of D India constituted the Janakiraman Committee to look into the diversion of funds. The Janakiraman Committee in March 1993 brought out the 4th Interim Report. Para 2.3 of the said report reads as under:

¶366

E "2.3 In the names of HSM and his family members, the bank's Adayar branch, Madras granted 19 individual overdrafts against shares. Significantly, all the current accounts, which were opened between April and June, 1991 were introduced by the same person viz. Branch F Manager Shri Bakshi Varunkumar, Adayar branch, Madras and a cheque book was issued only in the name of one account holder, Smt. Jyoti H. Mehta. All the overdrafts limits were sanctioned between 20 April. 1991 and 24th July, 1991 and on the very day of sanction, the overdrafts amounts were transferred to Smt. Jyoti H. G Mehta's current account for operational convenience. This facility also appears to have been extended, as HSM was a 'significant customer'."

¶367

Similarly, the Joint Parliamentary Committee established · H to enquire into the irregularities in securities and bank

¶368

RASILA S. MEHTA v. CUSTODIAN, NARIMAN 273 BHAVAN, MUMBAI [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

¶369

transactions also found out the involvement of the family members of Harshad Mehta. Para 17.21 of the Report reads as under:

¶370

"17.21 In January, 1992 Smt. Rasila Mehta, mother of HSM and Shri Hitesh Mehta, brother of HSM received US $ 5 lakhs each from Popular Espanol Las Palmas, Spain on the advice of Giorgia Pvt. Ltd., New York under the Immunity Scheme, 1991. Smt. Rasila Mehta also received US$ 96, 331 as per advice of Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. New York also under the Immunity Scheme, 1991. As Shri Niranjan J Shah had narcotic and hawala business links, it was suspected that the said remittances were arranged through him."

¶371

In accordance with the recommendations of the Joint Parliamentary Committee a group known as Inter Disciplinary Group (IDG) for tracing the end use of funds was set up by the Reserve Bank of India. The findings of the IDG read as under:

¶372

"3.5.2 On the basis of reliable and specific information, action under Section 132 of the Income Tax Act was taken on 23.07 .1993, during which shares valued at Rs. 22.69 crores were seized. Records of Income Tax investigations indicated that investment in these shares had been made in the names of dummy companies and individuals at the behest of the HMG. About 30 defunct Private Limited Companies appear to have been 'purchased' and the shares transferred in their names. Further enquiries led to identification of further 50 dummy companies and over 40 individuals. Enquiries have revealed that they were apparently fronts, since they were located in chawls, shops, etc. and prima facie could not have been made such huge investments. Considerable assistance was made available by CBI in identifying employees and associates ofHMG.

¶373

3.5.3 Action under Section 132 was thereafter conducted

274 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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[2011) 6 S.C.R.

¶384

A on 27.08.1993 at more than 30 premises. The search confirmed that the shares had been transferred in the names of these companies and individuals by the HMG. Documents seized indicated the possibility of investments of market value of over Rs. 50 crores in the names of Smt. B Rasila Mehta, mother of Harshad Mehta and Smt. Reena Mehta, wife of Sudhir Mehta. Statements recorded of various persons confirmed that they had merely allowed their names as benamidars of HMG. In addition, persons found in premises given as addresses of various c companies stated that they had allowed their premises to be used as mailing addresses, and no companies existed there. They also stated that the shares received at these addresses were handed over mainly to one Shri Vinod Mehta, an uncle of HSM, who died in February, 1993. Subsequent to his death, these were handed over to his D wife, Smt. Vanita Mehta who confirmed that her husband was receiving these shares, and that after his death she had, on instructions from HSM, handed them over to his representative. The involvement of the HMG in the matter of transfer of shares in benami names was corroborated E by recorded statements of HSM and Sudhir Mehta. The total shareholding of HMG in benami shares identified so far comes to 81.65 lakh shares in 131 companies of market value (as in June, 1995) of Rs. 453 crores.

¶385

F 4.7 Problems in tracing:

¶386

¶387

7 .1. The identification of end use of funds was a laborious process involving examination and correlation of every investment transaction of the brokers and banks. The following were among the more important constraints:

¶388

Entries in the books of one counterparty bank did not correspond with that of the other counterparty.

¶389

¶390

There was mismatch between seller and

¶391

RASILA S. MEHTA v. CUSTODIAN, NARIMAN 275 BHAVAN, MUMBAI [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

¶392

payee or buyer and payer. A

¶393

The investment records did not depict the true character of the deals. Actual recipient and issuer of cheque were not known.

¶394

Often, and more particularly in the case of B HMG, entries in broker's current account at SBI, Bombay only revealed the net effect of all bankers cheques received and issued on his behalf on a particular day. On days when the value of cheques issued equaled the C value of cheques received there was no entry in his current account.

¶395

Transactions with banks/financial institutions whose investment account was maintained by the same routing bank was difficult to analyze as the payments and receipts were netted and only the net effect reflected in the bank accounts. One to one correspondence between security transactions and payments was difficult to establish as entries did not reflect true details of the transactions.

¶396

¶397

¶398

Accounts of the brokers had not been prepared."

¶399

¶400

Mr. Syed heavily contended that the Custodian and the Special Court ought not to have based reliance on these reports since the appellants were not afforded opportunity to · go through the contents of the same. This objection is liable to be rejected. First of all, there is no criminal prosecution against G these appellants and in the event of prosecution, all documents relied on by them could be furnished. These are all materials from various bodies constituted by the Reserve Bank of India/ Government of India about the scam created at the instance of Harshad Mehta. These bodies consist of experts in various

¶401

¶402

276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 6 S.C.R.

¶403

A fields, particularly, from the financial side. The Special Court is fully justified in relying on these Reports.

¶404

This Court in Childline India Foundation & Anr. Vs. Allan John Waters & Ors., JT 2011 (3) SC 750, while B considering the plight of street children in Bombay, heavily relied on the evidence of PW-2 & PW-3, who were the members of NGOs, who highlighted the plight of street children in a shelter home at Bombay. Similar objection was raised in that case about the admissibility and reliability of those witnesses. Rejecting the said objection, this Court held that C though based on the statements of PWs 2 & 3, members of NGOs the accused persons cannot be convicted but taking into account their initiation, work done, interview with the children, interaction with the children at the shelter homes which laid the foundation for the investigation and to that extent their D statements and actions are reliable and acceptable. By applying the same analogy, inasmuch as the scam relates to accounts and money transactions by way of transfer of shares through nationalized banks and financial institutions, various committees were appointed by the Union of India which E collected relevant materials and unearthed the persons involved, hence the Custodian and the Special Court are justified in relying on those reports in order to ascertain the correctness or otherwise of the transactions. Accordingly, we reject the objection of the counsel for the appellants relating to F the report of various Committees mentioned above.

¶405

The Special Court, vide its order dated 03.08.1993 allowed the application of the Custodian for appointing Auditor. The Minutes of the Order read as under:

¶406

G "1. Order in terms of prayer (a)

¶407

Order in terms of prayer (b) & (c), Respondents 2 and 3 to furnish the information within 6 weeks.

¶408

¶409

To enable the 1st Respondent to furnish the said

¶410

RASILA S. MEHTA v. CUSTODIAN, NARIMAN 277 BHAVAN, MUMBAI [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

¶411

information one or more of the following persons, viz., Mr. Harshad Mehta, Mr. Ashwin Mehta, Mr. Pankaj Shah and · Mr. Atul Parekh and a computer specialist will be entitled to attend the offices of the 1st Respondent between 1 O a.m. to 6 p.m. A representative of the Custodian and the C.B.I. will be present for which prior intimation will be given. The said persons will be entitled to operate the computers in the presence of the officers of Respondent Nos. 2 and 3 and if necessary hire a personal computer to compile the requisite information.

¶412

The Custodian will appoint one or more auditors to C prepare and audit the accounts of the 1st Respondent from 1st April, 1990. The auditors will be entitled to obtain all requisite information and documents from the Respondents or any other person in possession of the same. They will be entitled to use the computers of D Respondent no.1 and the requisite hard discs and floppy discs will be made available to the auditors by Respondents No. 2 and/or 3. The remuneration of the auditors will be determined by the Custodian. The persons named in Clause 2 will assist the auditors. The auditors will complete the work and submit a report to court as expeditiously as possible and preferably within 3 months. The auditors will be entitled to furnish reports from time to time as the work is completed.

The remuneration payable to the auditor to be released from the bank account of the Respondent No.1.

¶418

Liberty to apply."

¶419

The Special Court vide its order dated 03.02.1994 appointed M/s Kalyaniwalla & Mistry, M/s Kapadia Damania & Co. and M/s Natwarlal Vepari & Co., Chartered Accountants firms for the purposes of preparing Statements of Accounts and liabilities of the notified parties i.e. the Harshad Mehta Group for the period 01.04.1990 to 08.06.1992.

¶420

¶421

¶422

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[2011) 6 S.C.R.

¶424

A 37. It was the grievance of the Custodian that the notified parties were not at all cooperating in the process of auditing. The accounts of the notified parties where significant diversion of funds had taken place were not completed due to noncooperation of members of M/s Harshad Mehta Group. When B their non-cooperation was brought to the notice of the Special Court, the members of the Harshad Mehta Group had given an undertaking to fully cooperate with the Auditors. Rasila S. Mehta, the appellant herein had filed an application being M.A. No. 467/1999 for lifting the attachment over assets which she c was owning jointly with the other members of the family. In the said application, the Custodian filed a reply highlighting the complete non-cooperation of the group in completing the accounts.

¶425

The important aspect is that the appellants have not D explained the source of their income. The outstanding Income tax from the appellants for the Assessment Years 1988-89 to 1993-94 is as under:

¶426

1988-89 Rs.2,005 E 1989-90 Rs. 0 1990-91 Rs.2,54,595 1991-92 Rs.2,65,38,345 F 1992-93 Rs.11,55,28,951 1993-94 Rs.4,46,40,586

¶427

The appellants are house-wives having no independent source

¶428

G of income. It is impossible for such persons to have such huge amounts of money unless they were the beneficiaries of monies diverted by late Harshad Mehta and his other family members who were notified and firms belonging to the Harshad Mehta Group. The appellants have not been able to reveal their source

¶429

H of income either to the Custodian or to the Income Tax

¶430

279

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RASILA S. MEHTA v. CUSTODIAN, NARIMAN BHAVAN, MUMBAI [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

authorities.

1 39. It is relevant to point out that in a letter dated^.. 22.03.1996 addressed to the Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax the appellant - Rasila P. Mehta has stated as under:

¶436

¶437

"3) Please be.informed that as far as my source of funds ·is concerned for making investments or taking trading positions to the extent the funds are required the same are from the following:

¶438

¶439

(a) Capital plus profits

(b) Borrowings

As far as borrowings are concerned, the same is resorted in two ways. I have obtained loans from my family members, particularly, Shri Harshad S. Mehta which is as and by way of monies advanced to me through cheques or payments made on my behalf. The other way of borrowing is through enjoying a running current account with the brokerage firms in my family of Mis Harshad S. Mehta, Mis Ashwin S. Mehta and M/s Jyoti Mehta which are partly paid-unpaid. Under this arrangement for transactions undertaken by me at these respective brokerage firms my account is debited and credited for each and every transaction, i.e. for every purchase made by me my account gets debited and for every sale effected by me my account with these brokerage firms gets credited. I state that barring a few exceptions payments for these transactions have not been exchanged on a trapsaction to transaction basis and the account is in the nature of a running account. I state that for the borrowings effected under both the methods. I have agreed tci pay interest to the lender. I state that the same is computed on the basis of deliveries performed for purchase and sale

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(2011) 6 S.C.R.

A of shares. I state that in cases where I have purchased the shares for delivery and the delivery has not been tendered to me, for the purposes of computation of interest the debit will not be reckoned. I say that thus on the net outstanding balance after giving credit to each party on account of nonB delivery of share the amount payable at the end of month is arrived at which is mentioned for the computation of interest (not on compounded basis). I state that as such interest is payable on the amounts borrowed by me and the same constitutes my expense. I humbly submit that this expense is allowable as a deduction from my taxable c income. In support of my above and other related contentions I am also pleased to enclose confirmation letters of the three brokerage firms of Mis Harshad S. Mehta, Mis Ashwin S. Mehta and Mis J.H. Mehta. I further submit that due to course of events and multiple raids and D our groups accounting system having gone haywire and the delivery status of all the transa~tions remaining unascertained we have not been able to precisely compute my interest liability for the earlier as well as the present year.

¶453

¶454

I state that I follow an accrual method of accounting for all my income as well as expenses which system of accounting is being followed by me for a number of years. I state that pending finalization of my payable figure for F which effort is being made to arrive at the figure and on the basis of the minimum amount due by me I have made the provision of interest payable by me in my books of accounts and the extract of my account in this regard is being forwarded separately to your kindself. I submit that G since my books of accounts are in the process of being drawn I am not in a position to make a provision of the precise figures of interest amo.unt much as I would like to do. I submit that in this regard the respective brokerage firms have to assist and furnish substantial particulars. I H further state that the provision made by me is in fact on a

¶455

¶456

RASILA S. MEHTA v. CUSTODIAN, NARIMAN 281 BHAVAN, MUMBAI [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

¶457

conservative basis though the interest payable by me would be higher that the provision. I humbly request your kindself to take note of above and grant me a deduction of the same from the income that your kindself is arriving for the present year. In case your kindself is not inclined to accept my submissions or allow me the deduction of above expenses then kindly give me an opportunity to make further representation in this regard more so as it vitally affects determination of my taxable income".

¶458

A perusal of the above letter shows that there was no proper maintenance of accounts and there was no cooperation at all. Even, late Harshad Mehta in his letter and declarations to the Income Tax Authorities in which the appellant Rasila Mehta is a signatory had admitted that the family is a joint Hindu family where all are living together and that the business is such that it requires very c1ose control at the operational level.

¶459

It is relevant to note that in a letter dated 21.01.1991 late Harshad S. Mehta informed the following particulars about source of payments for acquisition of flats in Madhuli, Worli by the entities of his family to the Deputy Director of Income Tax (Investigation), Mumbai. ·

¶460

"My transactions in the Capital and Money markets, especially the latter, result in a continuous stream of funds and securities moving in and out. These transactions result in large but transient positive balances in my bank accounts on any given day. Running up of such current liabilities constitutes payables to my clients/constituents which include, inter alia, corporates and banks. Such funds, though transient in nature, tend to acquire semipermanency in view of the daily operations in the Money Market and result in a pool of funds float. This float of funds has been utilized for acquisition of flats as well as for making investments in shares, pending accrual of income, in future, when such liabilities are automatically washed off. In point of fact, deferred and future incomes have been

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[2011] 6 S.C.R.

financed in advance by the float. I now enclose, on behalf of my family and myself details of payments made to Mis 1 Crest Hotels Pvt. Ltd. the owners of the 9 (nine) flats, at "Madhuli", Worli in the firsthalf of 1990 and extracts of the relevant Bank Accounts of the concerned members of my family, reflecting the payments and corresponding receipts in the bank. Details of transactions which resulted in credit balances in my accounts on those particular dates on which the payments for these flats were effected are also enclosed. You will appreciate that all my family members have been financed through my business operations."

¶475

Another important aspect relates to final declaration made by Harshad S. Mehta and all his family members including Rasila S. Mehta under Section 132(4) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The following material from his statement dated D 24.01.1991 is relevant:

¶476

, "

¶477

"First of all, I would like to put on record a few things about my family members. I take justifiable pride in asserting that it is the combination of the efforts of all the members of E my family that has been responsible for our expansion and growth in terms of volume since 1988. Each and every member of the family is taking charge of some or the other vital functions in the organization creating controls and checks which are so very essential for generating, F maintaining and reaping the fruits of any business activity. Almost all of them are very well attained and qualified and do business in their individual capacities and possess a sound and thorough knowledge of Investments, Finance and are authorized agents of the Unit Trust of India or members of the recognized Stock Exchange in Bombay. G All of them take active interest in Investments in the Stock Market. Ours is an investor family committed to growth through capital appreciation and holds a mix of both short term and long term portfolio of shares. In brief, we owe our success to our coordinated endeavours and investment

¶478

¶479

¶480

RASILA S. MEHTA v. CUSTODIAN, NARIMAN 283 BHAVAN, MUMBAI [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

¶481

philosophy. The sharp growth in income in·the last two years from 1988 is only after entering the Money Market.

¶482

Our family is run as a Joint Hindu Family. We, all live together. Our joint effort is one of the most important factors . that has contributed to the growth of our business. Our business is such that it requires very close control at the operational level. The different members of the family have taken charge of various areas of crucial importan~e in OlJr business e.g. Research, On-the-floor, trading, dealing in Money Market, Share Handling, Accounts, Finance, etc. My wife Mrs. Jyoti Mehta and Ashwin's wife Mrs. Deepika Mehta while handling other functions in the office, also work as authorized clerks and hold the necessary badge for entry into the trading floor of the Stock Exchange, Bombay ...... •

¶483

It is also useful to refer the letter of Smt. Rasila S. Mehta dated 25.06.2007 addressed to Mukund M. Chitale & Co., Chartered Accountants, Mumbai wherein she admitted that during the relevant period i.e. in 1990s she and all her family members actively associating in the brokerage firms and companies promoted by them jointly. She also admitted that she had a running account with brokerage firms ofM/s Harshad S. Mehta, Mis Ashwin Mehta and Mis J.H. Mehta. ·

¶484

All the above details clearly show their ass.ociation with brokerage firms being handled by Harshad S. Mehta and also their interest and entitlement in the transactions of their joint family business. . 1

¶485

The firms of M/s Kalyaniwalla & Mistry; M/s Kapadia Damania & Co. and Mis Natwarlal Vepari & Co. did not complete the audit and as permitted by the Special Court, vide Order dated 16.10.2003, the Custodian was permitted to appoint another Auditor. The Custodian, vide its Order dated 05.11.2003, appointed Mis Vyas & Vyas Chartered

284

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶496

[2011] 6 S.C.R.

¶497

A Accountants to audit the accounts and also to investigate fraudulent and illegal transactions entered into by Mis Harshad S. Mehta Group and his notified entities as referred to in Janakiraman Committee Report, IDG Report and reports based on the audit of the banks conducted by the RBI and the B charge-sheet filed in the Special Court. Mis Vyas & Vyas submitted their report in respect of Harshad S. Mehta Group. Even in the said report, Vyas & Vyas pointed out the complete non-cooperation on the part of the appellants and the group while auditing the accounts. In the report, on review of un-audited c accounts of M/s Harshad S. Mehta regarding the diversion of funds it was observed as under:

¶498

"12 Diversion of fund&

¶499

•

¶500

12.1 HSM diverted his funds to his family members as and D when he received funds generated form PSU banks and financial institutions. We have drawn a statement of funds diverted to family members and his associate companies in Annexure No. 7. We have also checked these figures from the audited reports of his family members and E associate companies and comparative chart is enclosed In Annexure No. 6A.

¶501

12.2 Further we studied the end use of funds diverted to family members and associate companies of HSM group and found that either funds were used for purchase of F immovable properties or for purchase of shares and securities. HSM has not charged interest fror.i his family members and his associate companies. The details of end use (broadly) by HSM group are also enclosed.

¶502

G 12.3 It is a case of one man show i.e. Mr. H.S. Mehta, who generated funds from PSU banks and financial institutions and diverted funds to his group entities. There is no ban on payment/receipt of funds from one family member to another member of the family. But then all prudential norms H should have been followed. In this case no interest was

¶503

RASILA S. MEHTA v. CUSTODIAN, NARIMAN 285 BHAVAN, MUMBAI [P. SATHASIVAM, J.)

¶504

charged/paid and there are huge differences in the A balances of both the books.

¶505

12.4 The concept of corporate entity was evolved to encourage and promote trade and commerce but not to commit illegalities or to defraud people where therefore the corporate character is employed for the purpose of committing illegality or for defrauding other the corporate character should be ignored and will look at the reality behind the corporate veil.

¶506

i:]

¶507

12.5 We have found that these corporate bodies are merely cloaks behind which lurks HSM and/or member of his family are involved and the device of incorporation was really a ploy adopted for committing illegalities and/or to defraud revenue and other people. Finally to get protection by law, in case HSM gets exposed the property belonging to his family members may be protected.

¶508

¶509

¶510

12.6 Further we have studied the accounts of Smt. Rasila Mehta and Reena Mehta who is not notified parties and their accounts were not subject to audit. The total balances outstanding in the books of M/s HSM of both the entities are as under as on 8/6/92:

¶511

¶512

Smt. Rasila Mehta 10,82,65,860.74 Dr

¶513

Smt. Reena Mehta 6,33,35,834.69

¶514

¶515

We are enclosing the copies of accounts of Smt. Rasila Mehta and Reena Mehta appearing in the books of M/s HSM. From the accounts we observed that M/s HSM paid a sum of Rs. 30 Lacs on 16th April 1990 and a sum of Rs. 1259000/- on 18th April 1990 to Rasila Mehta. These are the dates when other members of the family purchased flat in 'Madhuli'. Therefore in our opinion these funds were diverted by Mis HSM to Smt. Rasila Mehta (mother) for purchase of flat in 'Madhuli'. Further we have also observed that Mis HSM debited the account of Smt. Rasila on

¶516

¶517

¶518

286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶519

(2011) 6 S.C.R.

¶520

A account of purchases of shares in different companies. Similarly in r.ase of Smt. Reena Mehta huge quantity of share were purchased by her, which were funded by Mis HSM. Copy of accounts of Mrs Rasila & Mrs Reena Mehta is enclosed in annexure No.SE

¶521

¶522

12.7 The above funds diverted by HSM to his family members were certainly for purchase of immovable properties and shares. Therefore all assets so called belonging to above persons should go back to HSM only."

¶523

C 46. On a complaint, filed by Canbank Financial Services Ltd. (wholly owned subsidiary of Canara Bank), the Custodian notified the Appellants on 04.01.2007. The appellants filed petitions challenging the order of notification under Section 4(2) of the Act. The Special Court looked into all the materials D including the Audit Report submitted by Mis Vyas & Vyas. A summary of the accounts produced by M/s Vyas & Vyas is as under:

¶524

Ledger Account of Mrs. Rasila S. Mehta for the period E 1.4.1991 to 8.6.1992 in the books of accounts of various entities of Harshad Mehta Group.

¶525

SUMMARY

¶526

Mis Harshad S. Mehta

¶527

F Opening Balance as on 01.04.1990

ADD:

3227047.30

(i) Shares purchased

275393709.50

G (ii) Funds transferred

110184616.44

Total debits

388805373.24

LESS CREDITS:

1990-91 H

71135919.00

RASILAS.MEHTA_v._CUSTODIAN, BHAVAN,MUMBAI[P.SATHASIV	NARIMAN 287 AM,J.]
1991-92 195090538.5	0 A
8THJune1992 16948055.00	283174512.50
Debit balanceason08.06.1992	105630860. 7 4
ADD:	B
Loans&AdvancesduetoMis	2635000.00
HarshadS.MehtaasperBalance Sheetason08.06.1992. Total Debits	108265860. 7 4 c
Mr. HarshadS.Mehta
Opening Balanceason01.04.1991 ADD:	NIL D
(i) Sharespurchased	NIL
(ii) Fundstransferred	5000000.00
Debit balanceason08.06.1992	5000000.00 E-
LESSCREDITS:
1991-92	NIL
8THJune1992	NIL F
Total Debits	5000000.00
M/sJ~otiH.Mehta
Opening Balanceason08.06.1992 As per client control - ARsummary ADD:	117899544.00 G
(i)Interestreceivable(asper	H

¶541

288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶542

(2011) 6 S.C.R.

¶543

A	Annexure E of Balance Sheet)	2500000.00
	Total Debits Mrs. JyotiH.Mehta	120399544.00
B	Opening Balanceason 01.04.1990 ADD:	179550.00
	(i)Shares purchased	NIL
c	(ii)Fundstransferred	18000.00
	TotalDebits	197550.00
	LESSCREDIT:
D	Debit balanceason31st March 1991. The balanceisasperTrialbalanceas on8thJune,1992.	NIL 197550.00
	M/s AshwinS.Mehta
E	Opening Balance as on 01.04.1990 ADD:	117756.00
F	(i) Shares purchased	149166082.25
	(ii) Funds transferred	300.00
	Total debits	149048626.25
G	LESSCREDITS:
	1990-91	88034149.00
	1991-92	47414656.84
H	8THJune1992649373.00	136098178.84

¶544

RASILA S. MEHTA v. CUSTODIAN, NARIMAN 289
BHAVAN, MUMBAI [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]
Debit balance as on 08.06.1992 12950447.41 A
Mr. Ashwin S. Mehta
Opening Balance as on 01.04.1991 NIL
ADD: B
(i} Shares purchased 204085.50
(ii} Funds transferred NIL
Total Debits 204085.50 c
Less Credits NIL
Total Debits 204085.50
Mrs. Deepika A. Mehta
D
Opening Balance as on 08.06.1992 20500.00
(As per Trial Balance of
Mrs. Deepika A. Mehta)
Ledger Account of Mrs. Rina S. Mehta for the period from E
1st April, 1990 to 8th June, 1992 in the books of accounts
of various entities of Harshad Mehta Group:
SUMMARY:
F
Mis Harshad S. Mehta
Opening balance as on 01.04.1990 NIL
ADD:
G
(i) Shares purchased 72918112.75
(ii) Funds transferred 32239980.94
Total Debits 105158093.69
H
LESS CREDITS:

¶545

290

¶546

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶547

[2011) 6 S.C.R.

¶548

¶549

1990-91 NIL 1991-92 41822259.00 41822259.00

¶550

Debit Balance as on 08.06.1992.

¶551

The balance is the same as on 31.03.1992 B (as per the copy of client control accounts as on 08.06.1992.)

¶552

63335834.69

¶553

Mr. Harshad S Mehta

¶554

Opening balance as on 01.04.1991 NIL

¶555

c ADD:

¶556

¶557

(i) Shares purchased NIL (ii) Funds transferred 3500000.00 Total Debits 3500000.00

LESS CREDITS:

NIL

Total Debits 3500000.00

¶562

Balance as on 08.06.1992 is the same as on 31.03.1992

¶563

(As per trial balance as on 08.06.1992)

¶564

F Mis Jvoti H. Mehta

¶565

Opening balance as on 08.06.1992 50757937.00 As per client control - AR Summary G (extracts of report of M/s Jyoti H. Mehta)

¶566

Add: Interest receivable 3000000.00 Total Debits 53757937.00

¶567

Mrs. Jyoti H. Mehta

¶568

¶569

RASILAS.MEHTA_v._CUSTODIAN, NARIMAN 291 BHAVAN,MUMBAI[P.SATHASIVAM, J.] ·
Opening balance ason08.06.1992 131000.00 (as pretrial balance as on 8th June 1992)	A
MisAshwinS.Mehta
Opening balance ason01.04.1990 NIL	B
ADD:
(i) Shares purchased 102293155.00
(ii) Funds transferred 4929687.50	c
TotalDebits 107222842.50
LESS CREDITS:
1990-91 NIL	D
1991-92 50936485.00
TotalDebits 56286357.50
Mrs. DeepikaA.Mehta	E
Opening Balance ason08.06.1992 8300:00 (As per Trial Balanceof Mrs. Deepika A. Mehta)
After perusing the Report of M/s Vyas&·Vyas, the Special Court came to a conclusion that the appellants are only fronts of late HarshadS.Mehta.It further concluded that the appellants are only housewives and were givenloanbythe brokerage firms for purchase of shares. The SpecialCourt,therefore, rightly held that the money and assets were diverted to the appellants by the brokerage firms who were notified parties. Mr. Syed objected to the order of the Special Court for fully relyingonthe Auditor's report. We reject his objection for the following reasons. First of all, the issue relates to accountingofseveral persons. Several volumesofaccounts relating to various members of late Harshad Mehta's family have tobescrutinized.	F G H

¶570

292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶571

[2011) 6 S.C.R.

¶572

A The Court and members of the bar are not conversant with the accounting procedures and in such event assistance from an established Chartered Accountant Firm is needed. In fact, even during the course of arguments in respect of questions by the Court, Mr. Syed himself sought the assistance of persons who

¶573

B are conversant with accountancy. In view of complicity in the matter, there is nothing wrong on the part of the Special Court getting report from M/s Vyas and Vyas who are recognized Chartered Accountants. The order of the Special Court does not suffer from any infirmity and there was sufficient material

¶574

c before the Custodian to arrive at a satisfaction that monies had been diverted by late Harshad S. Mehta to the appellants.

¶575

Whether the appellants being not involved in offences in transactions in securities could have been proceeded against in terms of the provisions of the Act? D

¶576

The contention of the appellants that since they have not been charged for any offence, they cannot be notified under the Act. According to the appellants, the phrase "involved in the offence" could only mean "accused of the offence" and since E they are not charged with any offence they can not be notified. In construing the above mentioned words which are used in association with each other, the rule of construction noscitur a sociis may be applied. It is a legitimate rule of construction to construe words in an Act of Parliament with reference to words F found in immediate connection with them. The actual order of these three words in juxtaposition indicates that meaning of one takes colour from the other. The rule is explained differently: 'that meaning of doubtful words may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it. (vide G Ahmadabad Teachers' Association vs. Administrative Officer, AIR 2004 SC 1426).

¶577

Therefore, in the present case the nature of "offence~ in which the appellants are allegedly involved, is to be taken into consideration. The Act does not create an offence for which H a particular person has to be charged or held guilty. Thus the

¶578

RASILA S. MEHTA v. CUSTODIAN, NARIMAN 293 BHAVAN, MUMBAI [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

¶579

phrase "involved in the offence" would not mean "accused of the offence". Also, the appellants could have been reasonably suspected to have been involved in the offence after consideration of the various reports of the Janakiraman Committee, Joint Parliamentary Committee and the Inter Disciplinary Group (IDG); and also the fact that 28 members of the M/s Harshad S. Mehta group including his family members/entities were notified under the Special Act Ordinance itself. The above factual matrix was sufficient for the satisfaction of the Custodian to notify the. Appellants. The object of the Act is not merely to bring the offender to book but also to recover what are ultimately public funds. Even if there i~ a nexus between a third party, an offender and/or property the third party can also be notified. The word "involved" in Section 3(2) of the Special Court Act has to be interpreted in such a manner so as to achieve the purpose of the Act. This Court in Ashwin S. Mehta vs. Custodian & Ors., (2006) 2 SCC 386 has observed as under:

¶580

"Although, we do not intend to enter into the correctness or otherwise of the said contention of the appellants at this stage, however, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that they being notified persons, all their properties would be deemed to be automatically attached as a consequence thereto. For the said purpose, it is not necessary that they should be accused of commission of an offence as such."

¶581

In Jyoti H Mehta & Ors. vs. Custodian & Ors., (2009) 10 SCC 564, this Court from para 33 to 38 has hel~ that the Special Court Act is a special statute and is a complete code in itself. The purpose and object for which it was creted was to punish the persons who were involved in the act for criminal misconduct in respect of defrauding banks and financial institutions and its object was to see that the properties of those who were involved shall be appropriatd for the discharge of liabilities of not only banks and financial institutions but also e>ther governmental agencies. In construing the statute of this nature the court should not always adhere to a literal meaning

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶591

[2011) 6 S.C.R.

¶592

294

¶593

A but should construe the same, keeping in view in the larger public interest. For the said purpose, the court may also take recourse to the basic rules of interpretation, namely, ut res magis va/eat quam pereat to see that a machinery must be so construed as to effectuate the liability imposed by the B charging section and to make the machinery workable. The statutes must be construed in a manner which will suppress the mischief and advance the object the legislature had in view. A , narrow construction which tends to stultify the law must not be taken. Contextual reading is a well-known proposition of c interpretation of statute. The clauses of a statute should be construed with reference to the context vis-a-vis the other provisions so as to make a consistent enactment of the whole statute relating to the subject-matter. Furthermore, even in relation to a penal statute any narrow and pedantic, literal and 0^{lexical construction may not always be given effect to. The law} would have to be interpreted having regard to the subject-matter of the offence and the object of the law it seeks to achieve. The purpose of the law is not to allow the offender to sneak out the meshes of law. The courts will reject the construction which will E defeat the plain intention of the legislature even though there may be some inexactitude in the language used. Reducing the legislation futility shall be avoided and in a case where the intention of the legislature cannot be given effect to, the courts would accept the bolder construction for the purpose of bringing about an effective result. The courts, when rule of purposive F construction is gaining momentum, should be very reluctant to hold that Parliament has achieved nothing by the language it used when it is tolerably plain what it seeks to achieve.

¶594

Whether Canfina is a Financial Institution and

¶595

G whether the complaint filed by Canfina is invalid?

¶596

The complaint has been received from Canfina which is a 100% subsidiary of Canara Bank, a nationalized bank. The term financial institution has not been defined under the Act. It became necessary to enact the Special Court Act because of H

¶597

RASILA S. MEHTA v. CUSTODIAN, NARIMAN 295 BHAVAN, MUMBAI [P. SATHASIVAM, J.)

¶598

the large scale irregularities which came to light as a result of A the investigations by the Reserve Bank of India into the affairs of various banks and financial institutions whose monies were siphoned out. Thus the Statement of Objects and Reasons makes it clear that the purpose and the object of the Act was to recover and return monies to those banks and financial B institutions from whom the monies were siphoned out. It is thus clear that the bodies which were sought to be covered were the banks and financial institutions whose affairs were investigated into by the Reserve Bank of India. The investigation was conducted by the Reserve BMk of India c through Janakiraman Committee; the Joint Parliamentary Committee, and the Inter Disciplinary Group. The affairs of Canfina were also investigated by the various committees as a financial institution. It has come to light that there were large scale siphoning out of monies from Canfina also as held by the 0 Special Court in its order dated 25.06.1997 in the matter of Fairgrowth Financial Services Vs. Andhra Bank in Misc. Petition No. 222 of 1996.

¶599

It is the argument of learned counsel for the appellants that Canfina should not be tre~ted as a Financial Institution after the rejection of the Reserve Bank of India to consider Canfina as a Financial Institution. But this straight jacket definition should be applied to the provisions of other Acts like the Debt Recovery Act, the Companies Act, the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 etc. The term "Financial Institution" for the purposes of this Act should be interpreted in accordance with the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act.

¶600

¶601

¶602

Thus, at the very inception of this Act are the investigations by the Re_serve Bank of India and these investigations were carried on by the Janakiraman Committee. The Act was intended to be applied to the workings of the banks and financial institutions (though not covered by the strict definition of the term but involved in the securities scam of 1992) into whose affairs the Janakiraman Committee had

¶603

¶604

¶605

296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2011) 6 S.C.R.

¶606

A investigated. Canfina, was one such non-banking financial institution that Janakiraman Committee had investigated and thus it was meant to be covered under the Act.

¶607

These sources of information have been illustrated in

¶608

B Rule 2 of the Rules, which reads as under:

¶609

"2. Sources of information: The Custodian appointed under sub-section (1) of section 3 of the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) may entertain for

¶610

C consideration any information or complaint in writing submitted personally or sent by post to him by -

¶611

(a) the Reserve Bank of India;

¶612

¶613

(b) any bank or financial institution

¶614

¶615

(d) any officer or authority of the Government;

¶616

E (e) any person who is engaged in transactions of securities as a dealer, agent or broker;

¶617

(f) any other person whose rights or interests in securities are affected:

¶618

F (g) any other source including reports and proceedings before the Special Court established under the Act or any Court or Tribunal for the time being in force as the Custodian may deem fit at any point of time.

¶619

G Provided that the information or complaint sent by any person referred to in clauses (e) and (f) shall not be entertained by the Custodian if it is not accompanied by an affidavit signed by that person and duly verified by a Magistrate or a Notary Public."

¶620

H Thus the claim of Canfina falls under Section 11 (2)(b) of the

¶621

297

¶622

RASILA S. MEHTA v. CUSTODIAN, NARIMAN BHAVAN, MUMBAI [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

¶623

Act and their complaint falls under Rule (2)(b). Thus the fact that it was not accompanied by an affidavit signed by that person and duly verified 1>y a Magistrate or a Notary Public, does not make it an inapprop'riate complaint for consideration by the Custodian.

¶624

Further, Rule 3 illustrates situations whereby the Custodian may reject a certain complaint which is not accompanied by copies of documents referred to in the information or complaint, or is vague or does not contain the name and address of the sender. This rule also does not make it mandatory on the Custodian to reject a complaint if it does not accompany the above details. If the material information or the documents received by the Custodian are sufficient in his opinion, to reveal that a person is involved in an offence referred to in sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Act, he may proceed to notify the name of the person under that sub-section. Thus the satisfaction of the Custodian is of a subjective nature and is not violative of Natural Justice. The power to deal with the property ultimately lies with the Special Court.

¶625

In view of the same, we are in entire agreement with the conclusion arrived at by the Special Court and unable to accept any of the contentions raised by counsel for the appellants.

¶626

Claims for maintenance, repair charges, interest and penalty for belated payment (Civil Appeal Nos. 3377 of 2009 and 4764 of 2010)

¶627

With regard to the above appeals filed against the orders of the Special Court approving their report of the Custodian for realization of certain amounts payable to the Society towards repairs and maintenance charges, interest and penalty for belated payment, learned counsel for the appellants again raised various objections, inasmuch as the claim of· the Custodian depends upon the outcome of the other appeals i.e. Civil Appeal Nos. 2924 of 2008 and 2915 of 2008 and in view

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2011] 6 S.C.R.

298

' ,

A of our conclusion on these appeals, we are not inclined to go into all those details once again. Since we agree with the claim of the Custodian and various steps taken by him and the ultimate order of the Special Court in the normal circumstance, present appeals are also to be dismissed. We have already B noted that Smt. Jyoti H. Mehta and six other family members of late Harshad S. Mehta were notified under the Act. Upon enforcement of the aforesaid Act, all the properties of late Harshad S. Mehta and his family members, including the six appellants in Civil Appeal No. 3377 of 2009 apart from other c corporate entities stood attached by the Custodian. As a consequence thereof, all eight residential properties/flats of the \ appellants, namely, residential flat Nos. of 32A, 328, 33, 34A, · 348, 44A, 448 and 45 in the Madhuli Cooperative Housing Society Limited at Or. Anne Besant Road, Worli, Mumbai 0^{continuetoremainattachedundertheActbytheCustodian.} Since the aforesaid eight residential properties remain attached with the Custodian their upkeep/repair is essential so that the market value of the said attached properties does not get depreciated and that they may fetch best market value as and when the same are permitted to be sold by the Special Court E so as to pay the liabilities of the Government, Banks, Financial Institutions as well as other decree holders under the provisions of Section 11 (2) of the Act.

¶641

It was highlighted by the Custodian that as per the rules F and bye-laws of the Cooperative Housing Societies in Mumbai, which are incorporated under the provisions of the Maharashtra Cooperative Societies Act, all the owners of the residential properties/flats, as the members of the Housing Society are liable to pay such amount as may be determined by the Society G towards the upkeep, maintenance and repairs of the flats as well as common areas and amenities in the housing complex. In view of the same, the Cooperative Housing Societies are entitled to recover all the arrears and charges from the members who have not paid the society in time.

¶642

H 58. The appellants herein are notified parties who are the

¶643

RASILA S. MEHTA v. CUSTODIAN, NARIMAN 299 BHAVAN, MUMBAI [P. SATHASIVAM, J.]

¶644

owners of the attached properties and have failed to pay to the Madhuli Cooperative Housing Society Limited their contribution towards the maintenance charges, interest thereon and the charges incurred towards the repair of the attached property by the Society. The total dues demanded by Madhuli Cooperative Housing Society Limited vide its letter dated 12.03.2009 relating to the eight attached properties in question is Rs.1,87,97,011/-. The Custodian has furnished break-up of the same as follows:

¶645

¶646

¶647

"i. Maintenance Charges & Rs. 1,62,80,811-00 Rs. Interest thereon. ii. Repairs of Flats. Rs. 25, 16,200-00"

¶648

¶649

Learned counsel for the Custodian submitted that as per the scheme of the repair and upkeep of the attached properties, the maintenance charges· including the interest for the delayed payment is to be borne by the notified parties/ · entities occupying the attached property, whereas the charges incurred by the society towards the repair of the attached properties is to be paid by the Custodian from the attached . account of the notified parties. Regarding payment of maintenance and repair charges, there cannot be any doubt that the Custodian is liable to pay the same to the society. However, the Custodian has claimed interest for arrears of maintenance charges as claimed by the Housing Society.

In the same way, in Civil Appeal No. 4764 of 2010, the appellant, namely, Rasila S. Mehta, a notified party who is the owner of the attached property failed to pay to the Madhuli Cooperative Housing Society Limited her contribution towards maintenance charges, interest thereon and also the charges incurred by the Society towards repair of the attached property. The total dues demanded by the Madhuli Cooperative Housing Society Limited, vide its letter dated 21.06.2010 qua the attached property is Rs.21,06,230/- and breakup of the same is as follows:

¶654

¶655

¶656

300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ·· (2011) 6 S.C.R.

¶657

A Rs. 2,59,759-00 Rs. 9,57,501-00

¶658

Rs. 8,88,970-00"

¶659

s 61. As discussed earlier, unless the attached properties are properly maintained and as per the scheme, the repair and upkeep of the attached properties are to be followed by the Custodian and on the orders of the Special Court.

¶660

It is also brought to our notice that during the course C of hearing, either before the Special Court or in this Court, certain amounts have been paid/deposited by the appellant. Considering the fact that the appellants are agitating the matter at the hands of the Custodian, the Special Court and before this Court, we feel that the appellants need not be burdened D with interest and penal charges for non-payment of maintenance and repair charges to the society. Accordingly, while sustaining the claim of the Custodian as approved by the Special Court in view of the reasons mentioned above, we clarify that the Custodian is not permitted to collect interest and E penalty charges from the arrears of maintenance and repair charges. This position is also clear from the decision of this Court in Harshad Shanti/a/ Mehta vs. Custodian & Ors, (1998) 5 SCC 1. The Custodian is free to adjust the amounts deposited by the appellants on the orders of this Court or the F Special Court. With the above direction, the impugned order in both the appeals is modified to the limited extent.

¶661

In the light of the above discussion, we do not find any merit in Civil Appeal Nos. 2924 of 2008 and 2915 of 2008 and accordingly they are dismissed. Civil Appeal Nos. 3377 of G 2009 and 4764 of 2010 are disposed of granting the relief to the extent mentioned in para 62. No order as to costs in all the appeals. ·

¶662

R.P.

¶663

Appeals disposed of.

¶664

Smt. Rasila S. Mehta v. Custodian, Nariman Bhavan, Mumbai

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Smt. Rasila S. Mehta v. Custodian, Nariman Bhavan, Mumbai

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

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Cases cited

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