Allowed¶15

Maharaja Pillai Lakshmi Ammal v. Maharaja Pillai Thillanayakom Pillai and Another

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – Sections 14(1) and 14(2)

Supreme Court3 Nov 19871987 INSC 311 · [1988] 1 S.C.R. 7801987 INSC 311

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Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Maharaja Pillai Lakshmi Ammal v Maharaja Pillai Trillana Yakom Pillai, Supreme Court, Nov 3 1987, Civil Appeal No. 266 of 1974 — Hindu Succession Act 1956 s.14(1) vs s.14(2); widow as full owner; property in lieu of maintenance; family partition deed Ex. D 1 (2.8.1950); Kerala High Court S.A. No. 763 of 1970 reversed, trial court restored; cites/follows Gulwant Kaur (CA 112/1980), explains Bai Vajia [1979] 3 SCR 291, relies on V. Tulsamma [1977] 3 SCR 261.

What did the court decide?

Appeal allowed and the judgment of the trial court restored (the judgments of the High Court and of the lower appellate court were set aside). ¶15

Maharaja Pillai Lakshmi Ammal versus Maharaja… — Succession and Inheritance | Supreme Court (1988)

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

Appeal allowed and the judgment of the trial court restored (the judgments of the High Court and of the lower appellate court were set aside).

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Issue for consideration

Whether, after the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, the widow got an absolute right or only a restricted right over the 'A' schedule properties (i.e., full ownership under Section 14(1) versus a restricted estate under Section 14(2)) on the terms of Ex. D 1.

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Court's answer

The properties possessed by the widow in the 'A' schedule fairly and squarely fall under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, i.e., she holds them as full owner.

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Ratio / Principle

Where a husband puts his wife in exclusive possession of property with the right to take the income for her maintenance, it must be presumed that the property is given to her in lieu of maintenance; the right to maintenance being a personal obligation of the husband, that right suffices for the ripening of possession into full ownership under Section 14(1).

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Key takeaways

The contention that Bai Vajia contradicts the Gulwant Kaur line of reasoning was rejected: Bai Vajia laid down no different principle and expressly accepted the view taken in V. Tulsamma.ratio¶99
The 'A' schedule property was allotted against the share of Maharaja Pillai and given to the widow's possession with a right to take the income for her maintenance, which is sufficient to call Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act into aid.ratio¶108

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 — Sections 14(1) and 14(2) — widow's right to 'A' schedule properties under family partition deed Ex. D 1 (August 2, 1950): properties allotted to Maharaja Pillai; after his death (August 31, 1955) the widow remained in exclusive possession taking the income for her maintenance. Trial court held she had an absolute right under s.14(1); the first appellate court held a restricted right under s.14(2); the Kerala High Court (S.A. No. 763 of 1970) upheld the appellate court but gave the widow a small share per the erstwhile Travancore law. The Supreme Court (Shetty, J.) held that where a wife is placed in exclusive possession with a right to take income for maintenance, the property must be presumed given in lieu of maintenance — maintenance being a personal obligation of the husband — and the properties therefore fall 'fairly and squarely' under s.14(1). Bai Vajia explained as laying down no different principle, expressly accepting V. Tulsamma; Gulwant Kaur followed. Appeal allowed; judgments of the High Court and lower appellate court set aside; trial court restored.

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MAHARAJA PILLAI LAKSHMI AMMAL

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MAHARAJ A PILLAI TRILLANA Y AKOM PILLAI AND ANOTHER

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NOVEMBER 3, 1987

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[B.C. RAY AND K. JAGANNATHA SHETTY, JJ.]

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Hindu Succession Act, 1956--Right of widow to property-Whether absolute right under section 14( 1) or restricted right under section 14(2) of the Act.

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Under.a family partition deed (Ex. D 1), the properties under 'A' \ schedule were allotted to Maharaja Pillai, and after his death, his __}-. widow was given the right to take the income from the properties.

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One of the sons of Maharaja Pillai filed a suit claiming his right to D l/3rd share in the properties above-said. The trial court held that the widow got absolute right over the properties in dispute under section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. On appeal, the appellate court 'held that the widow got only a restricted right under section 14(2) of the Act. On further appeal, the High Court mainly upheld the view of the first appellate court. Against the judgment of the High Court, appeal was E filed to this Court by special leave.

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\ >--

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Allowing the appeal and restoring the judgment of the trial court, the Court,

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HELD: The question to be decided is whether the widow got an F absolute right or a restricted right over the properties in the 'A' schedule after the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act. During the life time of Mabaraja Pillai, his wife (The widow in the case) was maintained by him. After his death, the widow was in exclusive possession of the 'A' schedule properties and was taking the income from those properties. She had a right to utilise that income for her G maintenance. That right was conferred on her under Ex. D. 1. The properties possessed by the widow fairly and squarely fall under Section 14(1) of the Act. Tile property mentioned in section 14(1) may be acquired by a female by inheritance or devise or at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, etc. The right to maintenance of a Hindu female is a personal obligation of the husband. If the H wife is put in exclusive possession of property with the right to take

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780

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781

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MAHARAJA PILLAI v. M.P. THILLANAYAKOM [SHETTY, J.)

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_,,. given to her in lieu of maintenance, The property under 'A' schedule income for her maintenance, it must be presumed that the property is A was allotted against the share of Maharaja Pillai, That property was given to the possession of the widow with a right to take income for her maintenance, and this is sufficient to get the protection of section 14( l) of the Act, [782B; 783D-E; 784C-D; 786G]

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Gu/want Kaur & Anr. v, Mohinder Singh & Ors., Civil Appeal No. 112 of 1980, date 20,7.87; Bai Vajia v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai & Ors., [1979] 3 SCR 291; V. Tulsamma v. Sesha Reddi, [1977] 3 SCR 261at310, referred to.

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of 1974. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 266 c

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From the Judgment and Order dated 7 .2. 1973 of the Kerala High Court in S.A. No. 763 of 1970.

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S. Padmanabhan and N. Sudhakaran for the Appellant.

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G. Vishwanatha Iyer and Miss Lily Thomas for the Respondent Nos. 2 and 5.

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-A

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D.M. Nargolkar for the Respondent No. 1.

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The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

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-.(,

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JAGANNATHA SHETTY, J. This appeal by special leave has been preferred against the judgment and decree dated February 7, 1983 passed by the High Court of Kerala in Second Appeal No. 763 of 1970.

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Under the family partition deed Ex. D 1 executed on August 2, 1950, the properties under 'A' schedule were allotted to Maharaja Pillai and after his death his widow was given the right to take the income therefrom. One of the sons of Maharaja Pillai filed a suit claiming his right to take 1/3rd share in those properties. The trial court G while construing the terms of Ex. D 1 held that the widow got absolute right over 'A' schedule under section 14( 1) of the Hindu Succession Act. The appellate court, however, took a different view. The appellate court held that: the widow could get only a restricted right under Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act. Upon further appeal, the High Court agreed with the view taken by the appellate court. The H

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782

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(1988] 1 S.C .. R.

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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A High Court, hoWever, granted a smill share to the widow stating that ~ according to law in force in the erstwhile Travancore State, the widow would have inherited the share which would have fallen to any.of the sons.

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The question for our consideration is whether the widow got B absolute right or only a restricted right over the 'A' schedule after the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act. The answer to the question turns upon the scope and meaning to be given to the terms of Ex. D 1, the relevant portion of which is extracted hereunder:

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-f-..

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" •.• 3. As it was decided by us to partition our family . porperties providing .to mamtain Kothamachiyar Ammal, . who is thew. ife of executant No. 1 and mother of others. and ·\ the aforesaid Lakshmi Ammal, this partition deed is written ·with the stipulation mentioned below and it is fully agreed· by us to abide by the provisions contained herein •

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.. . D
(

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xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx

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During the life time of the 1st executant as and when the marriage of the· said Lakshmi Ammal is decided to be conducted tlie first executant himself shall meet the expense in oonnection with that and conduct her marriage and if her marriage happened to be conducted after the death of 1st exeeutant;executants Nos. 2 and 3 shall have right to encumber the 'A' schedule property for an amount up to · Rs.2,000 to meet the expenses for marriage ceremonies and. for.dowry and gold ornaments and the A schedule proper- · ties shall be liable· for so much amount. 10. Kothamachikyar Ammal, ·the wife of first executant and mother of . · other executants may reside in the buildin. g included in the--Y

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A Schedule during her life time and take the income of the . ) · properties included in the A schedule after the death of the 1st executant; after the death of the 1st executant the

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·successor-in-interest of the 1st executant shall have no right to create any document, except in the manner stated in paragraphs 9 above encumbering A schedule properties so as not to affect the right of enjoyment of the ,said person

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· but this provision will not be binding on the 1st executant as regards his absolute right over. the A schedule properties.

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G ! ';

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MAHARAJA PILLAI v. M.P. THILLANAYAKOM (SHETTY, J.] 783

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-f"

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The first executant referred to above was Maharaja Pillai. The widow we are concerned was his wife. On August 31, 1955 Maharaja Pillai died. There-a.fter 'A' schedule items in the partition deed were being en joyed by the widow. While she was in possession of those properties the Hindu Succession Act of...1956 came into force. Subsequently, the widow had gifted those properties in favour of her daughter. The case of the plaintiff was that after the death of Majaraja Pillai, the said properties would devolve upon his heirs and he would be entitled to !/3rd share. It has been urged by Mr. Vishwanath Iyer, learned counsel for the respondents that the properties in A schedule . would remain in possession of the widow with the right to utilise the income therefrom for her maintenance but the properties were not ( given to her in lieu of maintenance. It was also urged that Maharaja ~ Pillai had abwlute power of disposal over the properties durii\g his life ·- time, and it would be therefore not proper to hold that the widow got the properties in lieu of her maintenance.

We are unable to agree with these contentions. It is not necessary for us to examine what would have happened to the rights of the wife if Maharaja Pillai had disposed of the 'A' schedule. The fact remains that he did not. During the life time of Maharaja Pillai, the wife was residing in the house allotted to her husband. She was being maintained by her husband. After the death of husband, she was in exclusive possession of the 'A' schedule. She was taking the income from those properties. She had a right to utilise that income for her maintenance. That right was conferred on her under Ex. D 1. The children alw were allotted separate properties under Ex. D 1. They had taken their respective shares from the family properties. In our opinion the properties possessed by the widow fairly and squarely fall under Section 14( 1) of the Hindu Succession Act. Section 14 provides:

"1. Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.

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Explanation-In this sub-section, "Property" includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or device or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription or any other manner what so

(1988] 1 S.C.R.

784

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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\ ,A

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ever, and also any such property held by her as stridhan immediately before the commencement of this Act. ·

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(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired.by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a degree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument Or the, decree, order or award prescribe "a .restricted state in such property."

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The property possessed by a female referred to under Section 14(1f includes property both movable and immovable, property. It C may be acquired by a female Hindu by iJlheritance or devise or at a partition or in lieu of maintenance or ears of maitence etc. The deed or any other arrangement by which the husband gives the pro- · · · perty to his wife for maintenance need not specifically state that it is given in lieu of maintenance. It is not an act of charity the husband does. It is out of his personal obligation to maintain her. The right to D maintenance of a Hindu woman is a personal obligation of the husband. If, therefore, the wife is put in exclusive possession·of the property with the right to take the income for her maintenanc. it must be presumed that the property is given to her in lieu of maintenance. The very right to receive maintenance which is inher~nt in her; is itself sufficient to enable the ripening of possession of any property into full E ownership under Section 14( 1) of the Hindu Succession Act.

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..._

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It was, however, urged for the respondents that Section 14( 1) does not take within its fold every property that comes into possessio:: of the widow. It must be a limited estate in the sense of ownership . without the right of disposal. It should be a specific property given to F her in lieu of her rightto maintenance.

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Similar contentions have been considered and rejected in a recent decision of this Court in Gu/want Kaur & Anr. v. Mohinder Singh & Ors., Civil Appeal No. lU of 1980 date 20.7.87 (to which one of us was a party, K. Jagannatha Shetty, J. ). There it was observed:

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"It is obvious that Section 14 is aimed at removing restriction no limitation on the right of a female Hindu to enjoy, as a full owner property possessed by her so long as her

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·possession is traceable to a lawful origin, that is to say, if .~he has a vestige of a title. It makes no difference whether the property is acquired by inheritance or device or at a

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)t: I •

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1-i

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MAHARAJA PILLAI v. M.P. THILLANAYAKOM [SHETIY, J.] 785

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partition or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of mainteA nance or by gift or by her own skill or exertion or by pruchase or by prescription or in any other manner whatsoever. The explanation expressly refers to property acquired in lieu of maintenance and we do not see what further title the widow is required to establish before she can claim full ownership under Section 14( 1) in respect of property given B to her and possessed by her in lieu of maintenance. The very right to receive maintenance is sufficient title to enable the ripening of possession into full ownership if she is in possession of the property in lieu of m:lintenance. Subsection (2) of Section 14 is in the nature of an exception to Section 14(1) and provides for a situation where property is c acquired by a female Hindu under a written instrument or a decree of court and not where such acquisition is traceable to any antecedents right."

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It was urged that the view taken in above case was contrary to the D decision in Bai Vajia v. Thakorbhai Chelabhai & Ors., [1979) 3 SCR 291. We do not agree with this contention also. Indeed a similar contention was urged in Gu/want Kaur's case and it was rejected by observing:

"We do not understand that court as laying down that what E was enlarged by sub-section 1 of Section 14 into a full estate was the Hindu women's estate known to Hindu law. When the Court uses the word limited estate, the words are used to connote a right in the property to which the possession of the female Hindu may be ligitimately traced, but which is not a full right of ownership. If a female Hindu is put in F pmsession of property pursuant to or in recognition of a right to maintenance, it cannot be denied that she has acquired a limited right or interest in .the property and once that position is accepted it follows that the right gets enlarged to full ownership under Sec. 14( 1) of the Act. That seems to us to follow clearly from the language of Sec. G 14(1) of the Act."

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Bai Vijia's case, has not laid down any different principle. It has expressly accepted the view taken in V. Tulsamma v. Sesha Reddi, [ 1977) 3 SCR 261 at 310 this Court summarised the scope of Section 14 as follows:

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [ 1988] 1 S.C.R.

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786

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"(l) The Hindu female's right to maintenance is not an A empty formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a matter of grace and generosity, but is a tangible right against property which flows from the spiritual r~•·•ionship between the husband and the. wife and is recognised and enjoined by pure Shastric Hindu Law and has been strongly B stressed even by the earlier Hindu jurist starting from Yajnavalkya to Manu. Such a right may not be a right to +_ property but it is a right against property and the husband has a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he or the family has property the female h2.s the legal right to be maintained therefrom. If a charge is created for the mainte· nance of a female the said right becomes a legally enforce· -\ c able one. At any rate, even without a charge the claim for maintenance is doubtless a pre-existing right so that any transfer declaring or recognising such a right does not con· fer any new title but merely endorses or confirms the pre· 1^{•existing rights.}

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f (2) Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto have been couched in the widest possible term and must be liberally construed in favour of the female so as to advance the object of 1956 Act and promote the socio economic ends sought to be achieved by this long need legislation .

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E . (3) Sub-section (2) of S. 14 is in the nature of a proviso and has a field of its own without interfering with the operation of S. 14( 1) materially. The proviso should not be construed in a manner so as to destroy the effect of the main provision or the protection granted by S. 14( 1) or in a way so as to become totally inconsistent with the main provision.

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xxx xxx . . . . xxx . xxx· xxxT

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In the ins~ant s; the propey under A Schedule was allotted against the share of Maharaja Pillai. The same property was given to the possession of the widow with a right to tllke the income for her maintenance. This is sufficient to call into aid Section 14(1} of the G · Hindu Succession Act.

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In the result, we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment of ·• .· . High Court and also the lower appellate court and restore that c . · "'t:: trial court. ·· ~ · '.?"'?

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S.L.

Maharaja Pillai Lakshmi Ammal v. Maharaja Pillai Thillanayakom Pillai and Another

Case brief

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Maharaja Pillai Lakshmi Ammal v. Maharaja Pillai Thillanayakom Pillai and Another

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