Allowed

Vishwa Mitter v. O. P. Poddar and Others

Supreme Court30 Sept 19831983 INSC 137 · [1984] 1 S.C.R. 1761983 INSC 137

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The Supreme Court held that courts cannot decline to take cognizance of a criminal complaint merely because the complainant is not the registered owner of the trademark. Unless a statute specifies eligibility, any person can initiate criminal proceedings under Section 190 CrPC. The Court allowed the appeal, quashing the dismissal of the complaint filed by a dealer and attorney.

What did the court decide?

The appeal was allowed; orders of the Magistrate and High Court dismissing the complaint and rejecting the revision petition were set aside; matter remanded to the Magistrate.

Vishwa Mitter versus O. P. Poddar and Others — Writ and Judicial Review | Supreme Court (1984)

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176

·VISHWA MITTER

o: P. PODDAR AND OTHERS

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September 30, 1983

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[D. A. DESAI AND AMARENDRA NATH SEN, JJ.]-

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Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958-0jfences under ss. 78 Qnd 79Jndian Penal Code-Offence under s. 420-Code of Criminal Procedure 1973Sub-ss. (I) _and (2) of s. 4 r~ad with s. 190-Court cannot decline td take cogni· c zance of complaint on. the sole gtound that complainant was not competent to file the complaint.

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The appellant, in his capacity as a dealer. of beedies and as the consti~ tuted attorney of the firm_ manufaturing a particular brand of beedies, filed a con1plaint alleging comrnissio of offences by the respondents under ss. 78 and D 79 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 and s. 420, I.P.C. The Magistrate, after a preliminary inquiry, directed issue of process to the respon· dents but the s_an1e was quashed in revision by· the High Court on a technical ground and the Magistrate was directed to consider the question of issue of process afresh. The Magistrate re-heard the matter and dismissed the com. plaint on the ground that the appellant was not competent to file the coinplaint against the respondents as he was not the fegistered owner of the trade-mark E in question. The ·appellant approached this Court after the revision petition filed "by hi1n was dismissed in limine by the High Court ..

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Allowing the appeal,

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HELD : Ayone can set the criminal ·law in motion by filing a comF plaint of facts constituting an offence before a Magistrate entitled to take cogniz:iince tinders. 190 of the Coe of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and unless any statutory provision prescribes <iny special qualification or eligibility criteria -for putting the criminal law in motion, no court can decline to take cognizance on the !'iole ground that tho complainant was not competent to file the complaint.· Sectf-;,n 190 of the Code claJy indicates _that the qualification of the complainant to file a complaint ~s not relevant. (181 H; 182 A-BJ

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(b) Section 4, Cr. P.C. provides for trial of offences under the Penal Code and other laws. Sub-s. (1) of s. 4 deals with offences under the Penal -. Code. Sub-s. (2) of s. 4 provides that hll offences· under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried a.nd otherwise dealt with according to the H same pfovisions, but subject to any enactment for the t_ime being in force regulatirig the manner or place of investigating, inquiring illto, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences. From a combined reading of s. 4(2) withs. 190~ it transpires that upon a complaint. bein~ filed by a person, settin~-ou~

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177

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VJSHWA MITTER v. o.P. PODDAR (Desai, J.)

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facts therein which constitute the offence, before a Magistrate specified ins. 190, the Magistrate will be competent to take cognizance of the offence irrespective of the qualifications or eligibility of the complainant to file the complaint. [179 H; 180 A-B; H; 181 Al

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(c) Section 89 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 pro!ides that no court shall take cognizance of an offence under s .. 81, 82 or 83 eX.cept . on a complaint in writing made by the Registrar or any officer authorised by him in writing. This provision manifests the legislative intention that in respect of the three specified offences punishable under ss. 81, 82 and 83, the Registrar alone is competent to file the coinplaint. This would show that in respect of other offences under the Aci the provision contained in s. 190, Cr. P.C. read with sub-s. (2) of s. 4 thereof would permit anyone to file the complaint. Thi indication to the contrary as envisaged by sub-s. (2) of s. 4 is to be found in s. 89 of the Act and that section does not prescribe any particular eligibility criterion or qualification for filing a complaint for contravention of ss. 78 and 79 of the Act. [182 E·Gl

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(d) Even otherwise, in the absence of a specific qualification, if the person complaining has a subsisting interest in the protection of the registered. trademark, his complaint cannot be rejected on the ground that he had ,n,o cause of action or sufficient subsisting interest to file the complaint. In the instant case the appellant who was the complainant was not only a dealer in the beedies manufactured and sold by the registered owner of the trade-mark but also its constituted attorney. [182 H; 183 A-BJ

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(e) Even with regard to offences under the Penal Code, ordinarily, anyone can set the criffiinal law in motion but the various provisions in Chapter XIV, Cr. P.C. prescribes the qualification of the complainant which would enable him or her to file a complaint in respect of specified offences and no court can take cognizance of such Offence unless the complainant satisfies. the eligibility criterion; but, in the absence of any such specification no court can throw-out the complaint or decline to take cognizance on the sole ground that the complainant was not competent to file the Complaint.

[182 C-Dl

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, CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 516 of 1983.

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Appeal by Special leave from the iJudgment and Order dated ·· the 'Ith November, 1980 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Criminal Revision No. 652 of 1980.

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V.M. Tarkunde, P.H. Parekh a11d Ms. Pinki Mishra for the Appellant.

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Harbans Lal and N.D. Garg for the Respondent.

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The Judgment of the <;:011r\ was 4elivered by

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·178

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(1984] 1 s.c.11..

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SUPRBMI! COURT REPORTS

DESAI, J. : Appellant Shri Vishwa Mitter, a dealer in beedies and .cigarettes as also the constituted attorney of M/s., Mangalore Gaesh Beedies Works, Mysore filed a complaint i.n the Court of Sub Divisional Magistrate, 1st Class, Pathankot on December 6, 1977 complaining of commission of offences by the four respondents impleaded as accused under Sections 78 and. 79 of the. Trade· and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 ('Act' for short) and Sec. 420 IPC. It was alleged in the complaint that the principals of the complainant · M/s. Mangalore Ganesh Beedies Works, Mysore are the registered owners of four trade marks in respect of' beedies manufactured by ·them. The name under .which beedies manufactured by the principals of the complainant are sold in the market is 'Mangalore Ganesh .lleedies' having a registered trade mark in the wrapper being pink 'Colour wrapper coutaining the motif of Lord G anesha and the numeral '501'. One additional registered trade mark used by the manufacturers· of the beedies is the 'Ganesh Beedies' wrapped in a 'wrapper ·as mentioned above and bearing a multy-colour seal label containing the . numeral '501' at its centre. The owners ·of the registered. trade mark came to know that respondent.No. 4-M/s . S.hri Ganesh Beedi Works, Chakradhapur, Bihar were guilty of infringing the trade mark by using a wrapper and seal label identical with or deceptively similar to the registered trade mark and the ·principals of the complainant filed a suit complaining of infringment and passing off against the 4th respondent. There was a prayer for perpetual injunction in the suit. The suit ended in a decree in favour of the owners of the registered trade mark. Somewhere in August 1977, the complainant who is a dealer in the beedies manufactured by the owners of the registered trade mark came to know that the 4th respondent was selling be.edies of infenor quality -after ·wrapping ·them in a wrapper and using the trade mark deceptively similar to that of the registered trade mark. A complaint thereupon. was filed which led to the seizure of some goods. Subsequently, the complainant came to know that the 4th respondent in league with the · 2nd and 3rd respondents were storing for sale and selling beedies of inferior quality wrapped in deceptively similar wrapper and were thereby infringing the registered trade mark despite. the injunction of the Court. It was alleged that respondents Nos. l to 3. knowing of the registered trade mark in favour of the principals of the complainant were storing for sale and selling beedies · of inferior quality manufactured by the 4th respondent and wrapped in wrappers falsifying the registered trade mark and thereby it was alleged ".that. respondents committed ofJences under Sections 78 and 79 of the· Act and Sc. 420 of the l.P.C,

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VISHWA MITTER v. O.P. PODDAR (Desai, J.) 179

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On this co.mplaint being filed after a preliminary enquiry, the learned Magistrate directed process to be issued to the accused. The . accused moved r·evision petition in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh with a request to quash the proceedings. The learned Single Judge of the High Court accepted 'the revision petition on the narrow ground that the order issuing the process is not a speaking order and directej the learned Magistrate to consider the question of issuing process afresh, When the matter came back to the learned Magistrate, he after hearing the parties held that no case was made out for issuing the process and proceeded to dismiss tlie complaint. The reasons which impelled the learned Magistrate to reach the aforementioned conclusion may better be extracted in his own words : · '

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"That complainant who has filed the present complaint is not the holder of the Trade Marks which is said to have been impugned by the accused, in coJiaboration with each other. He,is only a sub-dealer of M/s Mangalore Ganesh Beedies Works, Vinoba Road Mysore, and there must be hundred and thousand dealers of this firm . like him. It is only M/s Mangalore Ganesh Beedies Works, who are holders of the Trade Mark and it is only they who are competent to file the complaint against the accused. The complainant has got no any cause of action, because the trade mark which is impugned by the accused does not belong to him, but belongs to M/s Ganesh Beedies Works, Mysore, Karnataka State. As no trade , mark of the complainant has been violated by the accused as he is only. a sub-dealer and not holding any trade mark. I find no reason absolutely to .issue the process . and the complaint is hereby dismissed."

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The complainant moved the High Court of Punjab and . Haryana in Revision Petition No. 652 of 1980, which was dismissed in limine. Hence this appeal by special leave.

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The reasons which appealed to the learned Magistrate to come to the ·conclusion that the complaint filed by the complainant cannot be entertained because he is not registered owner of the trade mark is clearly erroneous.

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Sec. 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, · 1973 · provides for trial of offences under t)Je lnc\i~n :Penal Co\le and other Jaws. Sub•

[1984) 1 s.c.1.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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Sec. (!) of Sec. 4 deals with offences under the Indian Penal Code. A Sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 4 provides that all offences under any other law (other than offences under the Indian Penal Code) shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being · in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring B into, trying or otherwise dealing with such offences. Fasciculus of aections included in Chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code aet out conditions requisite ·for initiation of proceedings. Sec. 190 provides for cognizance of offences by Magistrates which inter a/ia provides that subject to the provisions of Chapter XIV, an Magistrate of the first class, and any Magistrate of the second class c apecially empowered in this behalf under sub-section (2), may take cognizance of any offence-(a) upon receiving a complaint of facts which constitute such offence; ... Sec. 190 thus confers power on any Magistrate to'take cognizance of any offence upon receivi'?g a complaint of facts which constitute such offence. It does not speak of D any particular qualification for the complainant. Generally. speaking, anyone can put the criminal law in motion unless there is a specific provision to the contrary. This is specifically indicated by the provision of sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 4 which provides that all offences under any other law-meaning thereby/ Jaw other than the Indian Penal Code-'-shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise E dealt with according to the provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise .dealing with such offences. It would follow as 11 necessary corollary that unless in any. statute other than the Code of . Criminal Procedure which prescribes an offence and simultaneously specifies the manner or place of. ·investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with sue!(. offences, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall apply in' respect of. such offences and they shall be investigated, inquired into, tried and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. G One such provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure in Sec. 190 · which empowers any Magistrate of the. class specied therein to take cognizance of any offence upon receiving a comp lain! of facts which constitutes such offence. If after taking cognizance of an offence . it is permissible under Sec. 192, such Magistrate may make over the H case to other Magistrate therein specified. Therefore, from a com1,iried:radin(l of Se. 4(2) with Si;c. !90 9f the Cod~ of Criminal

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181

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VISliWA Ml'rl'Ell v. 6.P. PODDAR (Desai, J.)

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Procedure, it transpires that upon a complaint filed by a person • setting-out facts therein which constitutes the offence before a Magis· trate specified in Sec. 190, the Magistrate will be competent to take cognizance of the offence irrespective of the qualifications or eligibi· Iity of the complainant to file the complaint. It must, however, be conceded that where a provision to the contrary is made in any statute, which may indicate the qualification or eligibility of a com· plainant to file the complaint, the Magistrate before taking cogni· zance is entitled and has power to inquire whether the complainant satisfies the eligibility criteria. One .illustration would indicate what can be a provision to the contrary as contemplated by sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sec. 195(1) provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence set out therein except on the complaint in writing of the public servant concerned or of some other public servant to whom he is administratively sub· ordinate. Similarly sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 1.95 provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any of the offences specified therein except on the complaint in writing to that Court, or to some other Court · to which that Court is subordinate. Sec. 198 provides that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Chapter XX of the Indian Penal Code, except upon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence. Sec. 199 provides that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Chapter XXI of the Indian Penal Code, except u.pon a complaint made by some person aggrieved by the offence. Sec. 20 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 provides that no prosecution for an offence under the Act, not being an offence under Section 14 or Section 14-A, shall be instituted except by, or with the written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or a person autho· rised in this behalf, by general or special order, by the Central Government or the State Government. Section 621 of the Companies Act, 1956 provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence against the Act (other than an offence with respect to which proceedings are instituted under section 545), which is alleged to have been . committed by any company or any . officer thereof . except on the complaint in writing of the Registrar, or o'r a shareholder of the company, or of a person authorised by the Central Government in that behalf.· It is not necessary to multiply the illustration. •

It is thus crystal clear that anyone can set the criminal law in motion by filing a complaint of facts constituting an offence before

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i19$4) i S.C.R.

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SUPREME COURT RBPORTs

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a Magistrate entitled to take cognizance under Sec. -190 and unless A any statutory provision prescribes any special qualification or eligibility criteria for putting the criminal law in motion, no Court can decline to take cognizance on the sole ground that the complainant was not competent to.file the complaint. Sec. 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure clearly indicates that the qualification of the complainant to file a complaint is not relevant. But where any B ~pecial statute prescribes offences and makes any special provision for. taking cognizance of such offences under the statute, the complainant requesting the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence must satisfy the eligibility criterion prescribed by the statute. Even with regard to offences under the Indian -Penal Code, ordinarily, c anyone can set the .criminal law in motion but the various provisions in Chapter XIV prescrib_e the qualification of the complainant which would enable him or her to file a complaint in respect of specified -offences and no Court can take cogni,ance of such offence unless the complainant satisfies the eligibility criterion, but in the absence of any such specification, no Court can throw-out· the complaint or decline to take the cognizance on the sole ground that the complainant was not competent to file the complaint.

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Section 89 of the Act provides that no Court shall take cognizance of an offence under Section 81, Section 82 or Section 83 except on a complaint in writing inade ·by the_ Registrar or any officer authorised by him in writing. This provision manifests the legislative intention that in respect of the three specified offences punishable under Sections 81, 82 and 83, the Registrar alone is competent to file the complaint. This would simultaneously show that in respect of o,ther offences under the Act, the provision contained in Sec. 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with sub· sec. (2) of Sec. 4 would permit anyone to file the complaint. The indication to the contrary as envisaged ·by sub-sec.-- 2 of Sec. 4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to be_ found in Sec. 89 and that section does not prescribe any particular eligibility criterion or qualification for filing a complaint for contravention of Sections 78 . and 79 of the Act. Therefore, the learned Magistrate was in error' '·in. rejecting the complaint on the _sole ground that the complainant was not entitled to file the complaint .

•

Even otherwise in the absence of a specific qualification, if the person complaining has a subsisting interest in the protection of the ergistered trade mar)<, his .complaint cannot be rejected on the

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. 1$3

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VISIIWA MITTER v. 0 P. PODDAR (l>esai, J.)

ground that he had no cause of action nor sufficient subsisting interest to file the complaint. M/s Mangalore Ganesh Beedies Works, a partnership firm is the registered owner of trade marks, falsification and infringment of which is complained by the present complainant, who is not only a dealer in these beedies manufactured and sold by the registered owner of the trade marks, but he is also · the constituted attorney of the .owners of the registered trade mark. To say that the owner of the registered trade mark can alone file the complaint is contrary to the provisions of the statute and commonsense and reasdn. Therefore, the order of the learned , Magistrate dismissing the complaint at the threshold on the ground that the present appellant has ·no cause of action to file the complaint is utterly unsustainable and inust be quashed· and set aside. Surprisingly, the High Court dismissed the revision petition of the complainant in /imine which order is equally unsustainable and must be set aside .

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. This appeal is accordingly allowed and order of the learned Magistrate dismissing the complaint and refusing to iss:.ie' process dated February 20, 1980 and the order of the High Court rejecting the revision petition· in limine dated November 4, 1980 are set aside and the matter is remanded to the learned Magistrate to proceed further according to law in the light of the observations made in t_his judgment.

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H.L.C.

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\ Appeal allowed .

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Vishwa Mitter v. O. P. Poddar and Others

Case brief

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Vishwa Mitter v. O. P. Poddar and Others

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