condition-precedent to a valid termination of service by way of teterncbment. In the Letters Patent Appeal at the inst.ance of the respondnt, the Division Bench set aside tlie judgment of the .learned Single Judge holding that it was not open to the learned Single Judge to bold that it was a case of closure covered by Sec. 25FFF because it was implicit in the reference that the .case was one of retrenchment and the only question with the Industrial Tribunal was called upon to .. deci.de. was whether the retrenchment was unjustified · or illegal. It is not necessary to examine the view expressed·. by the · Divison Bench of tlie High Court whether the assumption underlying ·an order of reference is unquestionable at the hearing of the reference. The question, however, is whethr the learned Single Judge, who .interfered with the award of the Tribunal was justified in coming to the conclusion that the case was one of closure covered by Sec. 25FFF or the Industrial Tribunal was right in holding that ·it i~ a case of retrenchment covered by Sec. 25F of Industrial ·Disputes Act. This point can be answered by mere refrrence to the notice ser~ed by the appe!lant·company on the respondent intimating to him that his services will no more be required effective from October 14, 1967. The.notice as a whole ltas been extracted hereinbefore. The notice recites that as a result of recession in the volume of work oi'the company, services of the respondent would nO" more be required by the company after October 14, 1967 and this notice n\ay be treated as a statutory notice as contemplated by Sec. 25F(a). There is not even a whisper in the notice that as the Delhi office is being closed down, the services of the respondent would not be required. An attempt was made while.leading evidence before. the Industrial Tribunal to show that the Zonal office at Delhi was closed on January 31, 1968 whil.e the Central Zone' office was closed somewhere in October, 1967. If by September, 1967, the appellantcompany had resolved to close the office at Delhi to which the respondent was attached, it is unthinkable that ·that aspect would noi be recited in the notice. The necessity for termination of service of the respondent recited in the notice was recession in the work handled by the company. 'Not even one word is stated in the notice that the office to which the respondent was attached was in the process of being closed down, so his services would no more be required. On a true construction of the notice, it would appear that the respondent .had become surplus on account of reduction in volume of work and that constitutes retrenchment even in the traditional sense of the term as interpreted in Pipraich Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pipraich Sugar Mills
