Dismissed¶134

Jai Dutt v. State of U.P. & Ors.

Supreme Court26 Oct 19781978 INSC 216 · [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1751978 INSC 216

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Supreme Court certificate appeal (Civil Appeal No. 484 of 1969, decided 26-10-1978, Sarkaria J.) by Jai Dutt against eviction from 80 Bighas 19 Biswas of public land (Survey Nos. 230, 131A and 131B, village Guljarpur Purramsingh, Tehsil Kalachungi, Distt. Nainital) under s. 3(1) of the U.P. Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent and Damages) Act, 1959: long occupation of State land without grant, settlement or lease confers no hereditary tenancy under s. 180(2) of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939; s. 7 referral duty contingent; s. 3 notice presumed compliant; appeal dismissed with costs. Relied on Maganlal Chhagganlal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay; referred Shri Chandra v. State of U.P.

What did the court decide?

No substantive relief to the appellant; appeal dismissed with costs. ¶134

Jai Dutt versus State of U.P. & Ors. — Supreme Court (1979) — LawSathi Research

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

No substantive relief to the appellant; appeal dismissed with costs.

¶134

Issue for consideration

Whether the appellant acquired rights of a hereditary tenant under Section 180(2) of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 by reason of long cultivatory possession, no steps having been taken by the Government to evict him within two years of his entry into possession. +3 more

¶65

Court's answer

The appellant's case was never lawful entry into possession; by claiming acquisition of a hereditary tenancy under s. 180(2) he admitted that he had taken possession without any grant, settlement or lease, without title, and without the consent of the landowner.

¶20

Ratio / Principle

Section 180 of the Tenancy Act is subject to the restrictions in Section 30, which excludes hereditary rights on land acquired or held for a public purpose or work of public utility; even if the appellant was in occupation for more than twelve years, he would not acquire hereditary tenancy rights under Section 180(2).

¶78

Key takeaways

Omission of the State Government to institute a suit under Section 180(1) within the prescribed limitation would not bring into existence a landlord-tenant relationship; the appellant's possession remains, as at its inception, that of a trespasser or unauthorised occupant.ratio¶78
The documentary evidence from the revenue records, accepted by the courts below, discounted the appellant's claim of cultivatory possession for the 12 years preceding the impugned notice under Section 3(1).ratio¶101
The Khasra shows the land lying banjar (barren) in 1362, 1363, 1365 and 1367 Fasli (roughly 1955-56 to 1960-61), when the appellant was not in occupation and possession would be presumed of the lawful owner, the State Government; the appellant's possession appears for the first time in the Khasra of 1368 Fasli as 'bila tasfia', i.e., without settlement, allotment or grant.

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

JAI DUTT v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. (Supreme Court of India, Civil Appeal No. 484 of 1969, certificate under Art. 133(1)(a) and (c) from Division Bench judgment of Allahabad High Court dated 28-7-1967 in Special Appeal No. 352 of 1967; R. S. Sarkaria, V. D. Tulzapurkar and A. P. Sen, JJ.; judgment by Sarkaria, J., October 26, 1978) — U.P. Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent and Damages) Act, 1959, ss. 2(a)-(h), 3(1), 3(2), 4(1), 5, 7; U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, ss. 2(18), 29, 30, 180(1), 180(2). HELD, dismissing the appeal with costs: (1) Section 180 Tenancy Act is subject to Section 30 — no hereditary right accrues on land acquired or held for a public purpose; occupation beyond twelve years conferred no hereditary tenancy under s. 180(2), and the State's omission to sue under s. 180(1) left the possession, as at its inception, that of a trespasser/unauthorised occupant. (2) By claiming hereditary tenancy the appellant admitted entry without grant, settlement, lease or the owner's consent. (3) Khasra/Khatauni showed the land banjar in 1362-1367 Fasli (possession presumed with the State) and the appellant's possession from 1368 Fasli as 'bila tasfia' (without settlement), discounting the 12-year cultivatory-possession claim. (4) On harmonious construction of Tenancy Act ss. 2(18), 30, 180(2) with Eviction Act ss. 2(b), 2(e)(i), 2(h), a trespasser or holder-over is not 'a tenure-holder from the State Government under the U.P. Act, 1939'; the land was 'public land' and the occupation 'unauthorised'; the rent plea lacked factual foundation and was not entertained. (5) The s. 7 referral duty is contingent on the Public Authority's opinion that the objection is not prima facie baseless or frivolous; in substance such opinion was formed — no infraction of s. 7. (6) The s. 3 notice-compliance plea, raised for the first time in the Supreme Court and not a pure question of law, was declined; omnia praesumuntur rite essa acta attracted, compliance with s. 3(2) presumed. Cases: Maganlal Chhagganlal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay (relied on); Shri Chandra v. State of U.P. (referred).

17 5

JAI DUTT

STATE OF U.P. & ORS.

•

•

. ....__.

October 26, 1978

[R. S. SARKARIA, V. D. TULZAPURKAR AND A. P. SEN, JJ.]

¶11

U.P. Land (Evictio,n and Recovery of Rent & Da1nages) Act, 1959, s. 3(1) and U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 s. 180(2)-Scope of-Appellant reniained in occupation of baniar (barren) land for twelve years-Claitned ow11ership of land -No documentary evidence or rent receipts produced-Failure to take proceedings to evict-If would confer title on trespasser-Land lying banjarLawful ownership lies with State.

¶12

A notice under s. 3(1) of the U.P. Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent and Damages) Act, 1959 was issued by the Public Authority to the appellant on the ground that he \'as in unauthorised occupation of public land. The Public Authority rejected the appellant's claim that since he was in possession of the land for 1nore than 12 years, he had acquired rights of a hereditary tenant under s. 180(2) of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939. The appellant failed in bis appeal to the District Judge and his writ petition under Art. 226 was rejected by the Hi.5b Court.

¶13

In appeal to this Court it was contended that the appellant had become a hereditary tenant under s. 180(2) of thei. Tenancy Ac~ by reason of the fact that he had been in cultivatory possession of the land for a number of years and no steps had been taken to evict him within two years of his entry into possession of the land, (2) that since he had been paying rent to the Government he was not in unauth~rised occupation of the land and (3) failure of the Public Authority to refer the dispute to a Civil Judge under Section 7 of the Act vitiated the order of eviction

Dismissing the appeal,

¶19

¶20

HELD: l(a) The appellant's claim was not that he la\vfully entered into possession of the land but that he took possession without any grant, settlement or leases from the owner. By claiming acquisition of a hereditary tenancy under s. 180(2) he admitted that he had taken possession without any title and \Vithout the consent of the land owner. [180 C]

¶21

(b) The provisions of Section 2(18), 30, 180(2) of the Tenancy Act are to be construed in harmony with each other. So construed, a person occupying land belonging to the State Government, as a trespasser or \vithout title or a person holding over after the revocation or cancellation of the lease, aJlotinent or a grant in accordance with the condition thereof, cannot be "a tenureholder ... from the State Governn1ent under the U.P. Act, 1939." within the meaning of Sec. 2(e)(i) of the Tenancy Act. There was thus no doubt that the land was "public land" within the meaning of the Eviction Act. [181 A-BJ

¶22

(2) The obligation to refer the question whether or not the land is public land, unde:~ Section 7, is not basic but contingent. Although the· Public Authority did not say in the phraseology of the statute that the objection raised by the

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

176

(1979] 2 S.C.R.

A appellant was pnina facie baseless, yet, in substance, it well-nigh can1c to the same conclusion. It was, therefore, not obligatory for the authority to refer the question to the Civil Court. [181 F]

¶31

(3) The plea that the notice did not comply with the requirements of s. 3 of the Eviction Act and for that reason illegal had not been raised in the Courts below. It is not a pure question of law. The appellant has not produced a copy B of the notice served on him. In the circumstances, the maxim omnia praesun1untur vitt~ essa acta V.'ill be attracted. It will be presun1cd that the purpose for ·which the appellant \Vas sought to be evicted was duly specified in the notice in complaincc '\Vith the requirements of s. 3(2). [182 A-8]

¶32

CIVIL APPELLATE JuRJSDICTlON : Civil Appeal No. 484 of 1969. c From the Judgment and Order dated 28-7-1967 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 352167.

¶33

M. S. Gupta for the Appellant.

¶34

G. N. Dikshit and 0. P. Rana. for the Respondents.

¶35

D The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

¶36

SARKARIA, J. This is an appeal by certificate against a judgment, dated July 28, 1967, pass,ed by ·the High Court of Allahabad in Special Appeal 352 of 1967. It arises out of these facts:

¶37

J ai Dutt, appellant, was in possession of public land bearing Survey E Nos. 230, 131A and 131B, with an aggregate area of 80 Bighas and 19 Biswas in the area of village Guljarpur Purramsingh, Tehsil Kalachungi, Dist!. Nainital. The Public Authority, Nair'~al served a showcause notice, dated August 26, 1963, under Section 3(1) of the U.P. Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent and Damage•) Act, 1959 (here- F inafter called the Eviction Act) on the appellant for bis eviction from this land on the ground that he was in its unauthorised occupation. The appellant contested the notice on the grO'llnd that he was in its possession for more than 12 ~ars and had acquired the rights of a hereditary tenant in the land under Section 180(2) of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 19"9 (for short, called the Tenancy Act). On these premises, G the appellant contended that the land was not 'public land', and as such, the Eviction Act has no application and the notice was illegal.

¶38

By its order dated October 31, 1963, the Public Authority dismissed the objections, holding that the appellant "has not filed any documentary evidenoc to show that the land in dispute was allotted to him by H a competent authority, while the documents filed on behalf of the State show that it is a public land and "the O.P. (appellant herein) is a trespa•ser thereon", and he is, therefore, liable to be evicted therefrom

¶39

• •

¶40

.TAI DUTT v. u. P. (Sarkaria, J.)

¶41

177

¶42

•

¶43

uuder Section 4(1) of the Eviction Act. The Public Authority further assessed Rs. 121- as damages payable by the appellant.

¶44

¶45

Against this order of the Public Authority, Jai Dutt carried an appeal under s>ectian 5 of the Eviction Act to the District Judge. The appeal was heard by the Additional District Judge, Kummaon-Nainital, before whom the appellant reiterated the contentian that he had bc'cn in possession of the land in question for the preceding 12 years, and as such, had acquired the rights of a hereditary tenant thereon. There, the appellant seems to have further contended that he had been • paying "rent" for his occupation of the land. He appears to have shown some receipts also to the Additional District Judge.

¶46

¶47

¶48

The Additional District Judge negatived all the contentions and dismissed the appeal.

¶49

¶50

• '

¶51

The appellant then filed a writ petition und,er Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court to impugn the orders of the Public Authority and of the Addi. District Judge, inter aJia, on the ground that since he had been paying rent for the land which ha·s been in his cultivating possession for a number of years preceding the eviction proceedings, he could not be said to be an 'unauthorised occupant', but a hereditmy tenant under Section 180(2) of the Tenancy Act. The learned Sir1gle Judge of the High Court, who heard the writ petition, rejected this contention with the observation that "the Khatauni of 1368 Fasli entered the petitioner's possession over the disputed plots as ranging from 1 to 6 years. The oral evidence led by the petitioner does not outweigh the force of the entries in the Khatauni. The petitioner, therefore, did not acquire any title und,er Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act before 1953." The learned Single Judge further observed that the decision of the Division Bench of that High Court in Shn Chandra v. State of U.P. & Ors. (W.P. No. 3277 of 1966 decided on 13-2-67) was applicable to the case and the land in dispute will be public land and the possession of the appellant unauthorised. In the result, the writ petition was dismissed with costs. The appellant's special Appeal was dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court on July 28, 1967. In the meantime, the Evictian Act was successfully challenged before the High Court in Writ Petitions 3755 and 3756 of 1962 which were decided on May 24, 1968 .

¶52

Keeping in view the value of the subject matter Whlch exceeded Rs. 20,000¹ - and the ques'tion of the Constitutional validity of the Eviction Ac:t, the High Court granned a certificate under Article 133 (1) (a) and (c) of the Constitution, that the case was fit for appeal :to this Court. Hence, this appeal.

[1979] 2 S.C.R.

17 8

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶61

¶62

• •

¶63

A Mr. M. S. Gupta, appearing for the appellant, has now given up the challenge to the Constitutional validity of the Eviction Act on the ground of its being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, because this ground of attack no longer survives in view of this Court's judgmerrt in Magan/al Chhagganlal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & ors.(") He, however, sought to make out these points: B

¶64

¶65

(i) The appellant had been in cultivatory possession of the land for a number of years and no action for his eviction was taken for a long time and since no steps were taken by the Government to evict him within two years of his entry into possession, he became a hereditary tenant under Swtion 180(2) of the Tenancy Act.

¶66

• •

¶67

¶68

(ii) Even if the appellant did not acquire the rights of a hereditary tenant in the disputed land, he had by long possession acquired the rights of a tenant or ~enure-holder of any other kind under the Government. He has been paying rent in respect of the land to the Government, and, as such, was not in unauthorised occnpation of the· D land. Since the land was held by the appellant as a tenant, it did not fall within the definition of 'public land' given in Section 2 (a) of the Eviction Act.

¶69

(iii) Since the objections raised by the appellant in response to· the show-cause notice ismed under Section 3 ( 1) of the Eviction Act E were substantial, the Public Authority was bonnd to refer the dispute to the Civil Judge under Sec. 7 of the Eviction Act. Its failure to do so, vitiates the code of eviction passed by it.

¶70

(iv) One of the prerequisites of taking action· under Section 3(1) of the Eviction Act is that the Public land is required "for one or more public purposes of this Act". Sub-section (2) (a) of Section 3 requires. F that the notice shall "specify the grounds on which the order of eviction is proposed to be made". The impugned notice issued by the Public Authority did not comply with these requirements of Section: 3 and was therefore, illegal.

¶71

¶72

Points (i) and (ii) :

¶73

Mr. Gupta did not &eriously press the first point, obviously because· it was without substance. It may be noted that Section 180 of the Tenancy Act is subject to the restrictions contained in Section 30 of that Act, which provides :

¶74

"Notwithstanding anything in Section 29, hereditary rights shall> H not accrue on ..... .

¶75

(!) [19751 l S.C.R. l.

¶76

JAl DUTT v. u. P. (Sarkaria, !.) 17 9

¶77

•

¶78

(3) land acquired or held for a public JYW1l0Se or work of public utility. " Even if it is assumed that the appellant was at the material time in occupation of this land for more than Swo years, he would not acquire rights of a hereditary tenant under Section 180(2). Omission of th~ State Government, therefore, to institute a suit under Section 180(1) within the prescribed period of limitation would not bring into existence relationship of landlord and tenant between the Government and the appellant, and the latter's possession would remain, as it was at its inception, that of a trespasser or unauthorised occupant

¶79

This point is further highlighted by the definition of "unauthorised occupation" given in clause (h) of Section 2 of the Eviction Act, which states :

¶80

"Unauthorised occupation" means occupation of a public land bv any person without the authority of the owner for such occupation and includes its continued occupation after the expiry of the period of allotment, lease or grant. . . . . . anything contained in. . . . O.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 .... to the contrary notwithstanding."

In the context, the definition of "Public Land" given in Section 2(e) of the Eviction Act may also be seen. This definition, so far as material for our purpose, states :

¶86

"Public land means land belonging to or owned by the State Govermnent but does not include land-

¶87

¶88

( i) for the time being held by a tenure-holder for the State Government under the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939.

¶89

(ii) "

¶90

Section 2 (b) of this Act defines "Lease" to mean "a lease as defined in Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882".

¶91

Them is neither any factual nor legal basis for the appellant's contention that he had acquired some kind of tenure as a tenanr by remaining in twelve years' continuous possession of the land in dispute. As noticed by Additional District Judge and the learned Single Judge \ ' of the High Court, the Khasra tendered in evidence before the Public Authority, shows that in the years 1362, 1363, 1365 ·and 1367 Fasli (which we are told roughly corresponds to 1955-56, 1956-57, 1958-59 and 1960-61 A.D.) the land in dispute was lying banjar (barren). " • • That is to say, in the years 1955 to 1961, the appellant was not in occupation of this land. During these years, when the land was lying banjar, its possession would be presumed to be of the lawful owner, viz., the State Government. The appellant's possession over the land is shown for the first time in Khasra of the year 1368 Fasli (roughly

" • •

ff•

180

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[1979] 2 S.C.R.

• •

A corresponding to 1961-62) as "bi/a tas{ia, Ziman 10-Ka". Same is the position shown in the Khatauni 1368 Fasli "Bil Tasfia" obviously means "without settlement or allotment or grant". The docnmentary evidence from the revenue NCords, accepted by the courts below, had thus discounted the appella:nt's claim that he had been in cultivatory possession of the disputed land for 12 years preceding the issue of B the impugned notice under Section 3 ( 1).

¶102

It was never the case of the appellant that he had lawfully enbered into possession of the land. On the cantrary, his case was that he took possession of the land without any grant, settlement or lease from the land owner. Indeed, by claiming acquisition of a hereditary tenancy under Section 180(2), he admitted that he had taken poss•Jssion without any title and without th.; consent of the land-owner.

Mr. Gupta has been unable to show that the appellant's occupation of the land o:wen for one or two years preceding the notice under Section 3(1) was that of a "t.;nure holder" within the contemplation of the saving sub-clause (i) in the definition of "public land" in Section 2 ( e) of the Eviction Act.

¶109

The appellant's conten'tion that hoo has been paying rent !or this land does not appear to bo well-founded. No such plea appears to have been raised before the Public Authority, much ""ss was any evidence, such as a rent receipt produced there. The Public Authority has nobed in its Order dated October 3, 1963, that the O.P. (appellant herein) did not produce any documentary evidence to show that he was holding the land with the permission of or under allo!ment from any competent authority. Nor was this pica agitated or pressed before the learned Single Judge or the Division Bench of the High Court. Even now, before us, counsel has not referred to a:ny rent receipt or like document on record showing that the appellant had paid rent in respect of this la:nd to the Govermnent for the period of his possession precedrng the notice under Section 3 ( 1) of the Eviction Act. Even the Additional District Judge, to whom for the first time in appeal, some "rent receipts" appear to have been shown by the appellant, has not recorded any clear-cut finding that tho~o documents evidence the receipt of rent by the Government in respect of the disputed land for the relevant period proceding the issue of notice under Section 3 (1). This being tho situation, in this appeal arising out of writ proceedings under Article 226, we decline to embark upon a speculative examination of this argument for which there is no firm factual foundation and which was never raised before the Public Authority, nor pressed before the High Court.

¶110

¶111

¶112

JAI DUTT v. u. P. (Sarkarfo, !.)

181

•

•

Be that as it may, the provisions of Sections 2(18), 30, 180(2) of the Tenancy Act on the one hand and Sections 2(b), 2(e)(i) and 2(h) of the Eviction Act on the other, are to be c<Y11Strued in harmony with each other. So construed, a person occupying land belonging to the State Government, as a trespasser or without title or a person holding over aft>cr the revocation or cancellation of the lease, allotment or grant in accordance with the conditions thereof, cannot be considered "a tenure-holder from th.e State Governn"ent under ... the U.P . Tenancy Act, 1939" within the meaning of Section 2(e) (i) of the Tenancy Act. Ther•e was thus no doubt that the disputed land was "public land" and the appellant was in its "unauthorised occupation" within the meaning of the Eviction Act.

Poilll (iii) :

Section 7, (so far as material) reads thus :

¶123

"7 (I ) Where an objecticm ~' taken on the ground that the dispnbed land is not public land and the Public Authority is of the opinion that the objection is not prima facie baseless or frivolous, he shall refer the question to the Civil Judge, having jurisdiction, stating the facts of the case and the point in issue."

¶124

From a plain reading of Section 7(1), extracted above, it is clear that the obligation to refer the question whether or not the land is public land, is not absolute, but contingent. It arises only if the Public Authority is of the opinion that objection is not prima facie basdess or frivolous. In the instant case, a perusal of the impugned order would show that although the Public Authority did not say in the phrm;eology of the Statute th'at the objection raised ·by the appellant was prima facie "basekss", yet in substance, h·e unhesitatingly came well-nigh to the same conclusion when he observed :

"The O.P. has not filed any documentary evidence to show that the land in dispu'.•e was allotted to him by a competent authority. The documents filed on behalf of the State show that the land in dispute is a public land and th·o O.P. is a trespasser thereon."

¶129

¶130

We are therefor:\ of opinion that there was no infraction of Section 7.

¶131

•,. Point (iv) :

¶132

This point was not raised before the Public Authority, nor in any H of the Courts below. It is sought to be raised for the first time in this Court, now. We decline to entertain it at this stage. It is not

¶133

(1979] 2 S.C.R.

¶134

	182 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1979] 2S.C.R.
A B	a pure questionoflawwhichcould be decidedonthebasisofmaterial already on record. Tue appellant has not produced even the copy of the notice under Section 3 ( 1) whichwasserved uponhimand issupposedtobeinhis possession.Inthe circumstances of the case, the maxim_omnia praesumuntur rite essa acta_willbeattracted.Itwill be presumed that the public purpose oftheActforwhichtheappllant wassought to be evicted from the public land,wasonly specified in the notice in compliance with therquirementof sub-section ( 2)of Section 3 of the Act. Thus, all the contentions advanced by the appellant are devoid of merit.	., •
c	Inthe result, the appealfailsandisdismissedwithcosts.
	P.B.R. Appeal dismissed.

¶135

¶136

•

Issues for consideration

4 issues framed by the court

AI extract

1.
Whether the appellant acquired rights of a hereditary tenant under Section 180(2) of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939 by reason of long cultivatory possession, no steps having been taken by the Government to evict him within two years of his entry into possession.¶65
The court held
The appellant's case was never lawful entry into possession; by claiming acquisition of a hereditary tenancy under s. 180(2) he admitted that he had taken possession without any grant, settlement or lease, without title, and without the consent of the landowner.ratio¶20
2.
Whether the appellant, claiming to have paid rent to the Government and to hold as a tenant/tenure-holder, was not in unauthorised occupation and the land did not fall within the definition of 'public land' under the Eviction Act.¶68
The court held
There was no doubt that the disputed land was 'public land' and the appellant was in its 'unauthorised occupation' within the meaning of the Eviction Act.ratio¶117
3.
Whether the Public Authority was bound under Section 7 of the Eviction Act to refer the dispute to the Civil Judge, and whether its failure to do so vitiated the order of eviction.¶69
The court held
From a plain reading of Section 7(1), the obligation to refer the question whether or not the land is public land is not absolute but contingent — it arises only if the Public Authority is of the opinion that the objection is not prima facie baseless or frivolous.ratio¶124
4.
Whether the impugned notice complied with the requirements of Section 3 of the Eviction Act — the land being required for one or more public purposes of the Act and the grounds of the proposed eviction being specified under sub-section (2).¶70
The court held
The plea of non-compliance with Section 3 of the Eviction Act was raised for the first time in this Court; it is not a pure question of law decidable on the material already on record, and the Court declined to entertain it at that stage.ratio¶132

Procedural history

How this case reached the court

AI extract

Order under challenge
Division Bench judgment and order dated 28-7-1967 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 352 of 1967, dismissing the appellant's special appeal against rejection of his writ petition; the decision under challenge in this certificate appeal.¶36
Allahabad High Court · 28-7-1967
Prior proceeding
Show-cause notice dated August 26, 1963 issued by the Public Authority, Nainital, under Section 3(1) of the U.P. Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent and Damages) Act, 1959 for the appellant's eviction from public land (Survey Nos. 230, 131A and 131B; aggregate 80 Bighas 19 Biswas, village Guljarpur Purramsingh, Tehsil Kalachungi, Distt. Nainital) on the ground of unauthorised occupation; the appellant contested, claiming over 12 years' possession and hereditary tenancy rights under Section 180(2) of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939.¶37
Prior proceeding
Public Authority, by order dated October 31, 1963, dismissed the objections, observing that the appellant had filed no documentary evidence of allotment by a competent authority and that State documents showed the land to be public land with the appellant a trespasser; held him liable to eviction under Section 4(1) of the Eviction Act and assessed Rs. 121/- as damages.¶38
Prior proceeding
Appeal under Section 5 of the Eviction Act to the District Judge, heard by the Additional District Judge, Kumaon-Nainital; the appellant reiterated the 12-year possession/hereditary-tenancy contention and, for the first time, showed some 'rent receipts'.¶45
Prior proceeding
Additional District Judge negatived all the contentions and dismissed the appeal.¶48
Prior proceeding
Writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution to the Allahabad High Court impugning the orders of the Public Authority and the Additional District Judge; the learned Single Judge rejected the hereditary-tenancy contention (Khatauni 1368 Fasli showing possession of 1 to 6 years), held the Division Bench decision in Shri Chandra applicable, and dismissed the writ petition with costs.¶51
Prior proceeding
Special Appeal No. 352 of 1967 dismissed by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court on July 28, 1967.¶51
Prior proceeding
During the pendency, the Eviction Act was successfully challenged before the High Court in Writ Petitions 3755 and 3756 of 1962, decided May 24, 1968.¶51
Prior proceeding
High Court granted a certificate under Article 133(1)(a) and (c) of the Constitution, the value of the subject matter exceeding Rs. 20,000/- and the case involving the constitutional validity of the Eviction Act; hence this appeal.¶52

Cite this judgement

Jai Dutt v. State of U.P. & Ors., 1978 INSC 216, [1979] 2 S.C.R. 175 (SC).

Neutral and reporter citations as published by the Supreme Court of India.

Cases cited2

Shri Chandra v. State of U.P. & Ors.Referred¶51
Maganlal Chhagganlal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & Ors.Relied on¶63

Open Authorities

Statutes20

U.P. Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent and Damages) Act, 19593(1) · 3(2) · 3(2)(a) · 4(1) · 5 · 7 · 2(a) · 2(b) · 2(e) · 2(e)(i) · 2(h)
U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939180(2) · 180(1) · 30 · 29 · 2(18)
Constitution of IndiaArticle 226 · Article 133(1)(a) and (c) · Article 14
Transfer of Property Act, 1882105

View all statutes

Procedural history9

Division Bench judgment and order dated 28-7-1967 of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 352 of 1967, dismissing the appellant's special appeal against rejection of his writ petition; the decision under challenge in this certificate appeal.Allahabad High Court · 28-7-1967
Show-cause notice dated August 26, 1963 issued by the Public Authority, Nainital, under Section 3(1) of the U.P. Land (Eviction and Recovery of Rent and Damages) Act, 1959 for the appellant's eviction from public land (Survey Nos. 230, 131A and 131B; aggregate 80 Bighas 19 Biswas, village Guljarpur Purramsingh, Tehsil Kalachungi, Distt. Nainital) on the ground of unauthorised occupation; the appellant contested, claiming over 12 years' possession and hereditary tenancy rights under Section 180(2) of the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939.
Public Authority, by order dated October 31, 1963, dismissed the objections, observing that the appellant had filed no documentary evidence of allotment by a competent authority and that State documents showed the land to be public land with the appellant a trespasser; held him liable to eviction under Section 4(1) of the Eviction Act and assessed Rs. 121/- as damages.

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Bench / Coram

R. S. Sarkaria and V. D. Tulzapurkar and A. P. Sen

Parties & counsel

Jai Dutt v. State of U.P. & Ors.

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What is this about?

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Jai Dutt v. State of U.P. & Ors.

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

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What the court decided

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Coram

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