date and that therefore they must be deemed to be agricultural lands. Reliance was sought to be placed upon the decision of the Madras High Court in Sarojini Devi v. Shri Krishna (AIR 1944 Madras p. 401) in which it was held that the expression 'agricultural lands' must be taken to include lands which are used or are capable of being used for raising any valuable plants or trees or for any other purpose of husbandry. The Tribunal was, however, of the view that in the said decision their Lordships did not intend to lay down a definition of the expression 'agricultural lands' for all purposes, and that, on the other hand, they clearly indicated that the expression admits of different interpretations and that it was only from the context of the particular enactment in which this expression is used that its meaning has to be inferred. The Tribunal observed that the very wide definition of the expression 'agricultural lands' laid down in the above cited decision was not applicable to cases under the Estate Duty Act. The Tribunal, therefore, negatived the contention of the accountable person that the forest lands had to be excluded from the value of the assessable estate of the deceased". Thus, it is clear that the assessee, after having been given due opportunity to lead evidence to show that what was prima facie nonagricultural land, in the sense that it was covered by the spontaneous or natural growth of forests, was really agricultural land, had led no such evidence. It was not shown that the assessee or his predecessor in interest did anything to develop the forest in the sense that any particular trees were planted deliberately. It appears that the nature of exploitation of the forest lands was simply to give contracts for cutting of the trees. The assessee not having led any evidence of any intention to prepare or appropriate or ear-mark the land for any agricultural use or purpose, but, on the other hand, having contended that mere possibility of using such land for agricultural purposes in future was enough, could not be said to have discl;iarged his onus of proof. After the assessee's admission that it was "forest land", which presumably prevented cultivation, no evidence was led, as we have already observed, to indicate any change of character of this land or its conversion into agricultural land. We, therefore, think that the Appellate Tribunal was correct in expressing the view it had taken and the conclusions it had recorded. And, no case is made out for sending the case back to the Tribunal for any fresh decision. . ·
