It is trnc that mens rea in the ordinary or usual sense of this term is not required for proving an offence defined by Sedion 7 of 1he Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). It is enough if an article of adultcred food is ,either manufactured for sale, or stored, or sold or distributed in ,contravention of any provision of the Act or of any rule made there· :under. Nevertheless, the prosecution has to prove, beyond reasonable ,doubt, that what was stored or sold was 'food'. The charge was that the Til seed£ sold were unfit for human consumption. Tilis necessarily meant that it was part of the prosecution case that the Til seeds with which we arc concerned were meant for human consumption. Recently, this Omrt has held in Bhagwan Das v. Delhi Administra· rion,(') that, although mens rea, in the ordinarily understood sense, may not be needed lo be proved in such cases, yet, the purpose for which articles of food covered by the Act are manufactured, distributed or sold was that they '"should reach the consumer to be used as food". Thus, the use of the article sold was not entirely irrelevant. lt is more correct to say that it is presumed from the nature of the article itself or the circumstances and manner of offering it for sale. Where circumstances raise a genuine doubt on the question whether what was kept by a seller was "food" at all, this must be resolved
