Dismissed¶41

Gulam Mustafa & Ors. v. the State of Maharashtra & Ors.

Supreme Court18 Sept 19751975 INSC 223 · [1976] 1 S.C.R. 8751975 INSC 223

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Keywords: Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act; public purpose; mondha / country fair / village market; mala fide; colourable exercise of power; malus animus; ultra vires municipality; Hyderabad District Municipalities Act ss. 2(20), 72, 72(a); s. 5(3) declaration; excess land diverted to housing colony; Master Plan 15 acres vs 28 acres acquired; Bombay High Court S.C.A. No. 16 of 1967 dismissal in limine; Supreme Court of India Civil Appeal No. 675 of 1968; decided September 18, 1975; bench V. R. Krishna Iyer and S. Murtaza Fazal Ali; appeal dismissed without costs.

What did the court decide?

Providing a village market is an obvious public purpose and a municipal facility. ¶26

Gulam Mustafa & Ors. versus the State of Maharashtra… — Land Acquisition | Supreme Court (1976)

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

Dismissed

¶41

Issue for consideration

Whether there is a 'public purpose' supporting the compulsory acquisition under the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act, and whether providing a market (mondha) falls within the Municipality's powers (i.e., is not ultra vires). +2 more

¶26

Court's answer

Providing a village market is an obvious public purpose and a municipal facility.

¶26

Ratio / Principle

The absence of the words 'public purpose' in the notification (which referred to 'government purpose') and the claim that 'mondha' is a word unknown to law raise no objection; the purpose was set down as a 'mondha' or 'country fair', which is obviously a public purpose.

¶28

Key takeaways

Since 'market' is defined in wide terms in s. 2(20) of the Hyderabad District Municipalities Act and s. 72 enumerates vesting of markets among municipal purposes, a joint reading of ss. 2(20) and 72(a) shows that providing a market for the townsfolk falls within the powers of a municipality.ratio¶28
Seven years after the 1968 event the Court declined to consider sending the case back to the High Court even if there were justice in the grievance over the in limine dismissal, and instead heard counsel on the substantive grievances.ratio¶26

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Supreme Court (Krishna Iyer, J.; Fazal Ali, J.) — Civil Appeal No. 675 of 1968 (decision of September 18, 1975, dismissing without costs the appeal from the Bombay High Court's dismissal in limine of S.C.A. No. 16 of 1967, dated 19th January, 1967). Appellants' lands were compulsorily acquired under the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act for the stated purpose of running a country fair or market (mondha), declared in 1960 under s. 5(3) covering at least 28 acres. Held: (1) providing a village market is an obvious public purpose and a municipal facility; the notification's 'government purpose' label and the claim that 'mondha' is legally undefined raise no objection; (2) 'market' is defined in s. 2(20) of the Hyderabad District Municipalities Act in wide terms and s. 72 includes markets among purposes for which property may be vested in a municipality, so ss. 2(20) and 72(a) jointly place market-provision within municipal powers; (3) striking down an act for mala fide exercise of power is a judicial reserve power used rarely — such charges against public bodies are more easily made than made out; whether 28 acres were needed is not for the Court to investigate, and there is no scintilla of evidence of malus animus in the State Government, the acquiring authority; (4) once a valid acquisition vests title in the Municipality, its later sale of excess land as plots for a housing colony is no concern of the original owner — no principle voids a valid compulsory acquisition because the requiring authority later diverts the land to another public purpose.

875

GULAM MUSTAFA & ORS.

THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS.

¶6

September 18, 1975 ,

¶7

B [V. R. KRISHNA IYER AND S. MURTAZA FAZAL ALI, JJ.l

¶8

. flyder?bad Lcofld Acquisition Act-Acquisition of land for a village marketlf a public purpose-Excess land. sold to o hdusing colony-If acquisition ma/a fide.

¶9

Certain ·lands belonging to the appellants were compulsorily acquired underthe Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act for running a country fair or market (1nDndha). A·fter the acquisition, the municipality parcelled out the excess land c and sold it for a housing colony. The High Court dismissed the appellants' writ petition, in li111ine. On app-cal to this Court it wa9 contended that the acquisition was not for a public purpose and that it was 1nala fide.

¶10

Dismissing the appeal,

¶11

HELD: (l)(a) Providingi a village market.is an obvious .public purpose. D [876C-Dl

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¶13

¶14

( b) A ntondha is a country fair or village market. Market is defined in. s. 2(20) of the Hyderabad District Municipalities Act in wide terms and s. 72 of the said Act enumerate9 the purposes for which property may be vested in a municipality. This includes markets. It inexorably follows from a joint reading of Ss. 2(20) and 72(a) of the District Municipalities Act that the purpose of providing a mark_et for the townsfolk falls within the oowers of the municipality. [876G-H] (2)(a) Striking down. any Act for nwfa fide exercise of poWer is a judiciai reser..,.'ed power exercised lethally, but rarely. The charge of mala fides agaimt public bodies and authorities is more 'easily made than made out. It is the last refuge of a losing litigant. [876D] (b) What has to be established is nwla fide exercise of power by the State Govemment although the beneficiary is the municipality. There is no. evidence of 111afus ani1nus in Government. [877B]

¶15

(c) Apart from the fact that a horning colony is a public necessity, onoo the original acquisition is valid and title has vested in the municipality how it uses the excess land is no concern of the original owner and cannot be the basis for invalidting the acquisition. There is no principle of law by which a valid compulsory acquisition stands voided because long later the requiring authority diverts it to a public purpose other than the one stated in the dcclaralion. [877C]

¶16

¶17

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDIC'!'.ION : Civil Appeal No. 675 of 1968. From the judgmt\nt and order dated the 19th January, 1967 of the Bombay High Court in S.C.A. No. 16 of 1967.

¶18

s. J. Deshpande and A. G. Ratnaparkhi, for the appellant.

¶19

H M. C. Bhandare and M. N. Shroff, for respondent nos. 1. 2 and 4. D. V. Patel, K. Laxmanrao and S. Gopalakrishnan, for respondent no. 3 ·

¶20

876

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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[1976] I s.c.R. ·

¶23

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

¶24

¶25

. }..

¶26

KR1sHNA IYER, J. Brevity will do no inequity in this appeal where three points were urged but only ()Ille survives for serious scanning. The subject matter is the validity of land acquisition proceedings whereby a Municipality compulsorily purchased the appellant's land for the stated public purpose of running a country lair or market (mondha) under the Hyderaba!d Land Acquisition Act (for short, the Act) which is closely similar to the Land Acquisition Act, 1923 (Central Act). The first charge is that the High Court dismissed the Writ Petition in limine. Seven years after the 1968 event, we cannot consider sending back the case even if there be justice in the submission. We have therefore heard counsel Shri Deshpande on his substantive grievances. The second contention is that there is no 'public purpose' to support the acquisition which is allegedly ultra vires the Municipality's powers. We disagree. Providing a village market is an obvious public purpose and a municipal facility. The fast plea which has been pressed strenuously is that the acquisition exercise is ba\l being ma/a fide-an uphill task to make out against a public body. Was this colourable exercise of power?

¶27

Striking down any act for mala fide exercise of power. is a judicial reserve pQwer exercised lethally, but rarely. The charge of malafides against public bodies and authorities is more easily made than made out. It is the last refuge of a! losing litigant. Even so, we will examine the merits oil' the contention here from the point of view of the serious factors placed for our consideration.

¶28

Was .this acquisition done colore ofjicii? The circumstances relied on may be examined from this standpoint. Section 5 ( 3) of the Act provides for declaration of the pnblic purpose, like s. 6 ( 3) of the Central Act. This declaration was made in 1960 and covered at least 28 acres of land belonging to the appeUant. His counsel contends that there in no public purpose mentioned in the notifica• tion because what is stated is 'g;overnment purpose'. There is no force in this terminological deviation. The purpose has been set down as for a 'mondha' or 'country fair' which is obviously a public purpose. So counsel shifted to another shade of the same argument and stateid that 'mondha' is not a wor'd known to law and has not been definen anywhere and so such a purpose cannot be· taken cognizance of by the law. We cannot agree to tli~ linguistic game masquerading as a legal point. It is plain that a 'mondha' is a countrv fair or village market. 'Market' is defined in s. 2(20) of the Hyderabad District Municipalities Act in Wide terms, and s. 72 of the said Act enumera•es the purposes for which property may be vested in a municipality. This includes 'markets'. It inexorably follows from a ioint reading of ss. 2(20) and 72(a) that the purpose of providing a market for the townsfolk falls within the powers of a municipality.

R •

•

Failing here, counsel finally stressed that in any case no market for a small municipal town requires. 28 acres of land, especially because the Master Plan prepared for the Municipality had allotted

¶38

GULAM MUSTAFA v. Mf\HARASHTRA (Krishna Iyer, !.) 877

¶39

A only 15 acre,s for this purpose. It is not for the Court to investigate into the are_a necessary for running a market. Moreover there is no mala [ides emerging from this circumstance. What has to be established is mala fide exercise of power by the State Governmentthe acquiring authority-although the beneficiary of the acquisitiolll is etventually the Municipality. There is no scintilla of evidence suggestive of ma/us animus in Government.

¶40

¶41

At this stage Shri Deshpande complained that actually the Municipal Committee had sold away the excess land marking them out intQ separate plots for a housing colony, apart from the fact that a housing colony is a public necessity, ouce the original acquisition is valid and title has vested in the Municipality, how it uses the excess lanU is no1 concern of the original owner and cannot be the c basis for invalidating the acquisition. There is no principle of law by which a valid compulsory acquisiton stands voided because long later the requiring authoritr diverts it to a public purpose other than the one stated in the s. 5(3) declaration. There is no merit in the appeal which is dismissed without costs.

P.B.R .

Appeal dismissed.

•

Gulam Mustafa & Ors. v. the State of Maharashtra & Ors.

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Gulam Mustafa & Ors. v. the State of Maharashtra & Ors.

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Statutes considered

Procedural history

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