The observations of one of us (Beg J.) in Rishikesh Singh's case (supra) on which Mr. Garg relies should not be torn out of the context to deduce a cast-iron rule of law out of a matter which is essentially one of fact. A reading of the whole opinion of Beg J. in Rishi Kesh Singh's case will show that the real question under consideration in that case was whether the evidence present in a case which may support the existence of a right of private defence must be excluded altogether from consideration where the accused fails to establish his defence by a ''preponderence of probabilities", or, it must be taken into account to determine whether the prosecution has established its case beyond reasonable doubt. It was held there that evidence as a whole must be considered, whether it comes from the side of the prosecution or the defence, to determine whether the inlfliction of injuries for which an accused is prosecuted were either proved by a "balance of probabilities" to have been inflicted in the course of exercise of a right of private defence, or, even if the accused fails to do that, it is sufficient to make the prosecution case doubtful on an ingredient of the offence. It is only in one of these two possible situations that the accused could get an 'acquittal. If circumstances which se•em to support the plea of private defence are satisfactorily explained .away by the prosecution on the evidence in the case, so as to be consistent with the prosecution version, the case may still result in a conviction. In every case, !he question is rea!ly one of appraisal of total evidence and its effect. This was pointed out by Beg J. in Rishi Kesh Singh's case (supra in para 1.11, p. 85) where two cases Emperqr v. U. Damapala(') and Thein v. The Kin1:r(') were referred to as illustrations of kinds of situations on facts in which the prosecution case would become doubtful on an ingredient of the offence. The meaning of "reasonable doubt" and the manner in which the evidence has to be sifted were also indicated (para 112, p. 85 and paras 128 to 130, p. 89-90). It was also pointed out that mere removal of the obligatory presumption at the end of s. 105 of the Evidence Act, by showing that some circumstances did exist to sur-port a plea of private defence, may not be enough to secure an ocquittal (para 161, pp. 97-98). The view taken there was that the obli_gatorv presumption at the end of s. 105 merely imposes a duty upon the accused of showing that certain circumstances exist which remove this presumption. It was held there that, despi!e the removal of this special presumption at the end of s. 105, Evidence Act, by showing that some circumstances of th~ kin~ mentioned there did exist in the case, the accused may fail to discharge the burden of proving his plea of private defence by balance of nrobab!lities. Nevertheless, despite the failure of the accused to prove his plea of private defence, the effect of the totality of the evidence may
