discriminatory and abuse of power cannot be easily assumed where the discretion is vested in high officials. According .to the Court there is a presumption that public officials will discharge their duties honestly and in accordance· with tbe rules of law, that unless the cone trary were shown·, the administration of a particular law would be done not "with an evil eye and unequal hand." The Court was of the· view that there might b,. cas·O< where improper exeieution of power will result in discriminatory treatment and injustice to the parties, but, the possibility of such discriminatory treatment cannot necessarily in· validate the legislation and where there is an abuse of such power, the ·parties aggrieved are not without ample remedies under the law and what will be struck down in such cases will not be the provision which invests the authorities with such power but the abuse of the power itself. The Court said that there is a distinction between a discretion which has to be exercised with regard to fundamental rights guaranteed by the Omstitution and ordinary rights given by statutes and .that discretion vested in a functionary has to be looked at from two points of view, namely, "( 1) Does it admit of the possibility of any real and substantial discrimination, and (2) Does it impinge cin a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution and that article 14 could be invoked only if both these conditions were satiSfied". Article 14 confers a fundal)lenta[ right, namely, the right to equality before the law. It is difficult to see why it is necessary for a person asserting that right .to prove that another fundamental right has been violated. The concept of equaliiy before the law does not vary with the nature of the right in issue. In other words, whether the right at stake is fundamental or not, is quite immaterial when we are considering the question· of equality before the law..
