Then we come to the contention that the procurement which was made after December 29, 1957, when the price was reduced by the notification of December 30, 1957, as compared with the price fixed in the notification dated September 14, 1957, should have been in accordance with the notification of September 14, 1957 at any rate insofar as the rice purchased by the appellants between September 14 and December 29, 1957 was concerned. The argument is that in view of the maximum prices fixed in the notification of September 14, the appellants had to pay those prices which in such circumstances really became minimum prices for paddy and rice purchased by them during that period. The result of the notification of December 30 was that even though the appellants had purchased rice and paddy between September 14 and December 29 at higher prices in terms of the notification of September 14, they had to sell it to the Government at lower rates. That may in certain cases be so. But unless it can be shown that the reduction of price on December 30, 1957, was not fair, it cannot be said that procurement after December 30 based on the prices fixed in the notification of that date was in any manner against the provisions of the Act or was hit by Art. 19(1) (f). Now the reason for reduction of prices on December 30 was that the new crop came into the market from November 1957. It is a well-known economic fact that prices fall whenever the new crop comes into the market. There can also be no doubt that when prices fall, traders who had made purchases at higher prices have to sell at the reduced rates which are prevalent after the fall of the prices. Therefore, what would have happened if there had been a frne market is all that happened whn prices were reduced by the notificatio:i of December 30. It cannot therefore be said that there was any such loss to the appellants as would not have happened even in the normal course of business. Further if the argument for the appellants were to lie accepted, it would mean that it would not be possible for Central Government to reduce prices once it ha fixed them and that would in our opinion be against the very purpose for which s. 3 (1) of the Act was enacted, namely, fixation of fair prices. Again the result of tcceptance of this argument would be that there would be two sets of maximum prices prevalent whenever there is a reduction in the price by a subsequent notification, even though the higher price may not be a fair price. This is in our opinion against the very purpose to be found in s. 3 ( 1) of the Act. Lastly we may refer to the converse case where prices are raised by a subsequent notification. We have· no doubt that if that is so, the appellants would not come forward and say that the earlier stocks purchased by them should be sold at old prices. The present is a case completely analogous to the case of rise and fall of prices due to economic factors in a· free market. As the appellants could not possibly complain against rise and fall of prices due to economic factors in an open market they cannot complain of the increase or reduction of prices by notification under s. 3 ( 1), because that increase or reduction
