The only other question that remains to be dealt with is the one that arises out of the statement of the Chief Minister of Punjab in the Legislative Assembly on 7-3-1973. The argument is that the Chief Minister's reply shows that the appellant has been detained and is, oontinued to be detained, not for the reasons which were intimated to him in the form of grounds of detention but really for the reasons mentioned in the Assembly and the detenticrn is therefore, bad. It is pertinent to remember in this context firstly that the order for the detention of the appellant was made by the District Magistrate of Amritsar. He could not have known of the activities of the appellant which the Chief Minister mentioned in the Assembly. Secondly, the approval by the Government of Punjab of the appellant's detention was made on 16·1·1973. There is nothing to show that on that day the Government of Punjab knew of the matters which the Chief Minister brought up in the Legislative Assembly on 7-3-1973, and the deten· tion was approved by the Government onJy for those reasons. We are not prepared to assume, as was urged on behalf of the appellant, that the_ three matters mentioned in the Chief Minister's speech should have come to the notice of the Indian High Commission as soon as they took place and that they should have alerted the Punjab Govern· ment at once. There is no warrant for such an assumption. Except that one of the activities is said to be in 1971, we do not even know about the dates of the others. Moreover, the Chief Minister's reply was in answer to the demand of the Akali Dal Party for the appellant's release. The grounds of appellant's detention must have been known to them. The Chief Minister should, therefore, have been giving them additional information which came to his knowledge subsequently. We are not, therefore, prepared to asswnc that the grounds for approval of the appellant's detention were not the same grounds on which he was detained but some others, and therefore malice in law has been established. Furthermore, by a Presidential order Articles 14, 19 and 22 of the Constitution have been suspended during the subsistence of the Proclamation of Emergency. This oontention is based on decisions of this Court interpreting Article 22. They . are, therefore, irrelevant in considering a petition under section 491 Cr. P.C.