Dismissed

Hitkarini Sabha, Jabalpur v. the Corporation of the City of Jabalpur & Others

Supreme Court3 May 19721972 INSC 139 · [1973] 1 S.C.R. 4931972 INSC 139

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Apportionment of land acquisition compensation between Hitkarini Sabha and Jabalpur Corporation under a disputed lease deed. The Supreme Court held no valid lease could be spelt out of the void deed, so tenancy was month-to-month and the renewal clause could not aid apportionment; compensation quantum was left undisturbed.

What did the court decide?

None; both civil appeals dismissed, no order as to costs.

What the court decided

Hitkarini Sabha, Jabalpur versus the Corporation of the… — Land Acquisition | Supreme Court (1973)

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493

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IUTKARINI SABB~, JABALPUR

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THE CORPORA.TION OF THE CITY OF JABALPUR & C>THERS

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May 3, 1972

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[K. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.J

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B ,.	.. ..,. LandAcqu@ionAct IS9A--Apportlonmen~of compensatiqn- Unauthorised'leasebyM uniclpal Corporation to localCol!eg<-'Ler.ire *_deedcontainrngrenewalclause-Sincelease_isineffectiµerenewalclause*** _cannothetaken into_consideratio~forpurposeofapportionment-Quan- tumofcompe>!Jation-This Court_will_not interferewhenlower couri• have taken allfactorsinto consideration.
c	The Municipal Corporation of Jabalpur pu'rporated to grant a leave of certain land to the appellant Sabha. Accordingtothe documentthe periodcfkascwas 30 years. Theappellant was entitled on theexpiry_ oftl>olt,,,;c to have the same renewedonsuch terms and conditions as mightbeagreed between the parties. The appellant made a cl)llege hostelonthe aforesaid land and had also used theattache<Igroomdas playground for students. A portion of the said lapd was sought to be acquired by the State Government under the Land Acquisition Act,1894
D	for constructing the Home Science College. The Collector of JabbQlpur by his award dated July18,1955dealt with the claimsfiledby the appellant and the Municipal Corporation and as"""""d the compen.;ation at As.-/8/- persq.ft. Apportionment wasmarebetween the appellant and the Corporation on the footing that the at)pellant was not merely a tenantatwillascontenc!ed by the Corporation but was a lessee for the terms mentionedinle.,e. The appellant and the Corporation made applica- tionsforreference unders.18(1)of the Act. The Additional District
E	Judge held that the price should _bo_As. -/10/- per sq ft. and that the app,ellant and the Municipal Corporation were entit!OO to equal compensation. The Corpora.lion and the appellant filed appeals to the High Court. The decision of the Addi. District Judge fixing the price of the landAs.-/!01- per sq, ftwas ·affirmed. Asregards the dispute regarding apportionment the High Court held that the lease deed having been exempted by the Administrator during
	the time wher. the Corporation stood supersededwasineffective to convey
F	the leasehold interest to the appellant. However, the appellant was pay- ing the rent "'hich had been accepted for a long time by the Corporation. The'rewasthus a tenancy by necessary implication. The High Court furt!ler held that the leasewasto continue for the periodof30 years mentionedinthe deed but there was no valid contract for renewal of lease because the clause relating to that was vague and uncertain. The "'tit d til bi bt th llt dth
	pporonrmn was mae on acura ass eween e appean ane Corporationinthe ratioof1038:962. In.appealbefore the C'?'"1Ifie
G	questions relating to quantum of compensation and the aworti<1nment betweenth<appellant and the Corporation fell for consideration. HELD :(1)Nolease couldbespelt out_of_~.deeddatedAugust 31,l940 for a period of 30 years containing the renewnl clause. Ifthe officer who executedthe leasedeed hadne power to lease out the propertyinquestion the grant of the lease was wholly null andv<>id.,Itistruethat by the acceptance . ofren~from
H	the appellant the relationship of }Mdlord11nc!tenant came mtoex1stell!"'• But that did not show that a lease deed for a periDd of 30 years with
	a renewal clause had come into existence.[497EJ
	_Since_the lease deedwasineffective the lease couldbeunder thepro- visions of section I06of the TransferofProperty. Act, only frommonth

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[1973] l S.C.R.

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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494

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to month because the immovable property had not been Jeas,,d out for agricultural or manufacturing purpose in which case it would have been from year to year. The;:efore the contention that the· renewal clause was effective and should have been taken. into consiooration. whue making the apportionment between the appellant and the Corporation could ,not be accepted. (The question wiYother the High Court was right in holding that the period of lease was 30 years was not gone into beoause the Corporation had fjled no appeal against ihat portion of the decision. . [497Hl Dagdu/al v. Municipal Committee, Burhar, (19'60) M.P.L.J. 627 and H. V. Ranan v. G. N. Gopai & Ors. A.l.R. 1961 Mys. 29, leferred to.' <il The value which was fixed by the Addi. District Judge and the High Court wa. fixed by re_ference to sales of plots of comparable nature. There was no doubt that the High Court had taken all the factors into consideration while a~essing the value '3.nd there was no reason. to inter- fere in this regard. [499A.Cl Raja Vyigheria Narayana Gajapatiraju v.. The Re.·enue Divisional Officer Vi.zagapatam, 66 I.A. 104, referred to. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 702 and 703 of 1967.

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Appeals from the judgment and order dated September 28, 1960 of. the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. First Appeals Nos. 12 and 16 of 1958.

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D Nos. 12 and 16 of 1958. M. C. Chag/,a, Rameshwar Nath Nath and Swaranjit Ahuja, for the appellant (in both the appeals) . S. T. Desai and D. N. Mukherjee, for respondent No. No. 1 (in both the appeals) . I. N. Shroff, for respondents Nos. 2 and 3 (in C.A. No. 703 of. E 1967) and respondent No. 2 (in C.A. No. 702 of 1967). The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Grover, J. These api)eals which have been brought by certificates from a cominon judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court arise out of certain acquisition proceedings. The facts may be stated. Plots Nos. 670, 671 and 735 situate F

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M. C. Chag/,a, Rameshwar Nath Nath and Swaranjit Ahuja, for the appellant (in both the appeals) .

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S. T. Desai and D. N. Mukherjee, for respondent No. No. 1 (in both the appeals) .

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Grover, J. These api)eals which have been brought by certificates from a cominon judgment of the Madhya Pradesh High Court arise out of certain acquisition proceedings.

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The facts may be stated. Plots Nos. 670, 671 and 735 situate in Madan Mahal Extension area, Jabalpur were acquired by the State Government under the Land Acquisition Act l 894, hereinafter called the 'Act', for constructing the Home Science C""ege. In the present appeals we are concerned mainly with Plot No. 670. On August 31, 1940, a deed of lease had been executed on behalt of the Municipal. Corporation granting a lease free of premium to the Hitkarini Sabha, Jabalpur, which is the appellant before us. The laese was in respect of 10 Acres of land comprising Plot No. 670 and another strip of land measuring 0.621 Acres as.described in the deed and delineated in the plan annexed thereto. The period of the lease was 30 years and the purpose for which the land was to be used was for locating and running the Hitkarini City College. Amongst other terms and conditions the appellant was to pay a yearly rent of Rs . .SI - for 10 acres and Re. 11 - for the other strip of land besides payine and discharging all rates and taites etc. The appellant, on the expiry of the lease, was entitled

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HITKARJNI SABHA v. JABALPUR CORPN. (Grover, 1.)

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495

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A to-have the same renewed on slich terms a!ld conditions as might be agreed between the parties. The appellant had built a college · hostel o.n the aforesaid land and had also wed the attached ground as playground for students.

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The Collector of Jabalpur, by his award dated July 18, 1955 dealt with the claims filed by the appellant and the Municipal C)r· B poration and after disposing of certain preliminary objections he assessed the compensation for the lands in all the three plots at As. 018/- per sq. ft. According to the CoUector the appellant was not merely a lessee or tenant-at-will as contended by the Corporation but was a lessee for the term mentioned in the lease-deed dated August 31, 1940, the lease having been made for a specific C purpose, i.e. for locating and. running a City College. As regards Plot No. 670 the apportionment was made between the appellant and the Corporation.

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The appellant and the Corporation were dissatisfied with the

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award of the Collector. Applications for reference were made under s. 18 ( 1) of the Act. The Additional District Judge held

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D that the price should be 10 As. per sq. ft. and that the appellant and the Municipal Corporation were entitled to equal compensation for plot No. 670. The Corporation and the appellant filed appeals to the High Court. The decision of the Additional District Judge fixing the price of the land at As. 0/81 - per sq. ft. was affirmed. As regards the dispute regarding apportionment the High Court

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E held, following a decision of a Division Bench 0f the same court in Dagdulal v. Municipal Committee, Burhdr('), that the lease deed having been executed by the Administrator during the time when the Corporation stood superseded was ineffective to convey the lease hold interest to the appellant. However, the appellant had been paying rent at the stipulated rate which had been ac-

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F cepted for a long time by the Corporation. It amounted, therefore, to the creation of a tenancy by necessary implication and the relationship of landlord ~nd tenant came into existence. On the character of tenancy, whether it should be deemed to be from year to year or whether it should be on terms contained in the leasedeed, the High Court held that the tenancy cQntinued on the terms contained in the lease deed. The High Court then proceeded to

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G say:"The lease deed in this case was executed on

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31-8-1940 and was for a period of thirty years. It was, therefore to remain in force for 15 yearo mere after the date of acquisition. There is a renewal clause which has been already quoted above. The lessee is entitled for

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H renewal "on such terms and conditions as may \JP. agreed lo between the parties". It appears to us that the clause

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(!) 1960 M. P. L. J. 627

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[1973] I 8.C.R.

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496

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IUPkEM.I OOUllT llEl"61lTS

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D •

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is uncertain and vague and does not fonn a valid contract for renewal of the lease. Nonnally in a covenant for renewal tmre is an expn!SS agreement that the lease would be continued on the same terms and conditions subject to a reservation that the rent may be enhanced under certain circumstances. In the instant case, all the terms and cortditiorts have been left to the agreement of parties which may not take place at all. Although a renewal is contemplated, no terms on which it can be granted have been fixed between the parties. Under section 29 of the Indian Contract Act such a contract cannot be enforced. It has been held in Ramaswami v. Rajagopala (I.L.R. 11 Mad. 200) that a lease whereby a tenant agreed to pay whatever rent the Landlord might fix was void for uncertainty".

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The apportionment was made on acturial basis between the appellant and the Corporation in the ratio of 1038 : 962.

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Before us two matters have been sought to be raised. One one relates to the quantum of compensation awarded by the learned Additional District Judge and the other to the apportionment between the appellant and the Corporation. We shall first deal with apportionment. It has been argued that since the High Court had held that the tenancy continued on the terms contained in the lease deed benefit should have been given of the renewal clause also. The High Court had taken the view that that clause was uncertain and vague and did not form a valid contract for the r11newal of the lease. Our attention has been invited to a judgment of the Mysore High Court in H. V. R«jan v. C. N.Gopal & Others.(!) There the relevant portion of the renewal clause was "lessee shall have the option of five years but subject only to such terms and conditions as may be mutually agreed upon". It was observed that ordinarily the renewal clause in a lease deed was an important term of the agreement and the courts would be reluctant to ignore that clause on the ground that it was vague unless on a reasonable construction no meaning could be attached to it. An agreement to renew the· lease, wihout more, must be deemed to be an agreement to renew as per the original terms. Even if the renewal provided was dependent on the agreement between the parties the clause merely provided for an agreement on reasonable terms. If the parties could not agree as to those terms the courts could step in.

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In our judgment it is altogether unnecessary to decide the true scope and effect of the renewal clause contained in the deed executed on August 31, 1940. At the titne the lease was executed

(1) A.I.R. 1961 Mys. 29.

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HITKUINI SABHA v. JAJM.LPUA (:(J,APN, (Grover,/.) 4W7

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A there used to be a Municipal Committee in Jabalpur. Apparently it became a Corporation later. The Committee was supe11Cded S0111Ctimes prior to August 31, 1940 and T. Chhatra Singh Officer· in-Charge of the Committee, Jabalpur as also Secretary of the Municipal Committee had signed the lease on behalf of that Com· mittee. In the decision of the i\1adhya Pradesh High Court in B Dagdulal's(1) case the view had been expressed that so long as M unicpal Committee Wlll\ not recocstituted the ownership of the property stood transferred by operation of law to the State Government and therefore the Admnistrator had no power whatsoever to sell the property which had vested in the Government. The Additional District Judge had observed that the lease deed had been c executed in pursuance of a resolution which had already been passed by the Municipal Committee. The High Court, however, found on the evidence produced before the Additional District Judge that the final resolution passed by the Municipal Committee was only for the grant of a license and not a 1ease to the appellant. The deed of lease, therefore, was held to be ineffective for conveying any lease-hold interest to it. But still the High Court held D that the tenancy was to last for a period of thirty years.

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We are wholly unable to comprehend how any lease could be spelt out of the deed dated August 31, 1940 for a period of 30 years containing the renewal clause which has already been men· E tioned. If the officer who executed the lease deed had no power to lease out the property in question the grant of the lease was wholly null and void. It is true that by acceptance of the rent from the appellant the relationship of landlord and tenant came into existence between the parties but Mr. Chagla for the appellant has not been able to show how a lease for a period of 30 years together with a renewal clause could be held to have been created F or to have come into existence. It may be mentioned that we are not concerned with the period of 30 years which has already been taken into consideration by the High Court because no appeal has been filed on that point by the Corporation. The only matter which requires determination is whether the .High Court, while deciding the question of apportionment, should have given due G affect to the renewal clause. In our opinion the High Court .could not have done so. If .the so called deed of lease dated August 31, 1940 was wholly ineffective and void for the purpose of demising the land for a period of 30 years one could only look at the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act for determining the tem1 for which the tenW'.ij;y cami< into existence. Under s. 106 of that H Act the tenancy, in the present case, could be only from month to month because the immovable property had not been leased out

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(1) (1960) M.P.L,J. 627.

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[l 973] l S.C.R.

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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498

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fot !lgricuhural or manufacturing purpose in w~ch case the lease would have been from year to year. We are titerefo: c unable to accede to the contention that the renewal clause in the lease deed dated August 31, 1940 was effective and should ha\ e been taken into consideration while making the apportionment between the appellant and the Corporation.

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The next question relating to quantum can · be disposed of shortly. The sole criticism of Mr. Chagla is that the potential value of the plot in question was not taken into consideration. It is true, as pointed out in Raja Vyrigherla Marayana Gajapatiraju v. The Revenue Divisional Officer Vizagapatam(¹ ) that where the land to be valued possesses some unusual or unique features as regards its position or its potentialities the court determining the market value will have to ascertain as best as it can from the materials before it what a willing vendor n'i,ght reasonably expect to obtain from a willing purchaser for the land in that particular position and with those particular potentialities. It has been urged that Plot No. 670 had a special situation or position in view of its size, locality, nearness to business centre and the Madan Mahal Station. But the value which was fixed by the Additional District Judge and the High Court was fixed by reference to sales of plots of comparable nature. The following portion of the judgment of the High Court shows how the matter was dealt with :

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"We may observe that the two witnesses relied upon by the appellants purchased small plots at the rate 1>f Re. 1/- per sq. ft. As the map of the Wright Town Madan Mahal Extension area produced by the Corpor.1tion before us shows, these plots are in a fully developed lay out having roads and drains round about. We had asked the Corporation to calculate how much area out of the acquired sites would be required to be left open for roads and drains and they have calculated that about 70,000 sq. ft. would have to be left open for this purpose. Obviously, therefore, it is only the remaining plot which would have value as building sites. Besides leaving so much area open, costs will have to be incurred in developing the roads and drains for which the Corporation has estimated the cost to be Rs. 8,5001-. Considering all these factors and also calculating the built up area in the lay outs surroundings the acquired land, we find that it is only eighty per cent of the land which can be sold as building site.

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On these calculations if the average price of the plots sold in the locality is taken to be -/12/- per sq. ft. the

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o: 66 I.A. 104.

HITKARINI SABHA v. JABALPUR CORPN. (Grover, J.) 499

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A. overall price of the acquired land without roads and drains would work out to a li.ttleless than -19/-per sq. ft. To put the matter in a dilj'erent way, the value of -110/- per sq. ft. found by the' Additional Judge worild work out to a little over -/ 121- per sq. ft., if only the area which could be built upon is considered saleable as B building site. We, therefore, find that the price at -/10/per sq. ft. allowed by the Additional District judge is not unreasonable; if anything it errs on the generous side''.

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We have ;:o manner of doubt that the, High C-:>urt had taken all the factors into consideration while assessing the value.

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c In the result the appeals fail and are dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.

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G.C.

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Appeals dismissed.

Hitkarini Sabha, Jabalpur v. the Corporation of the City of Jabalpur & Others

Case brief

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What did the court decide?

What the court decided

Hitkarini Sabha, Jabalpur v. the Corporation of the City of Jabalpur & Others

Case brief

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What the court decided

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