Income-tax Act, 1961, s. 291(2)(d) (ii)-lncome-tax Act, 1922, S. 34(1) (a)--Notice under latter Act held beyond time-··l/ proceedings pending within meaning of s. 297(2) (d)(ii). The Income-tax Officer issued a notice to the respondent on January 5, 1962 under s. 34(l)(a) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, seeking to reopen his assessment for the assessment year 1945-47. The respondent challenged the validity of that notice. The High Court quashed the c impugned notice by its order dated .March 6, 1963 on the ground that the notice was issued beyond the time prescribed by law. On April 1. 1962 the Indian Income-tax Act, 1961, came into force. Under s. 297(2) (d) (ii) of this Act if "any income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment \vithin the meaning of that expression in s. 147 and no proceedings under s. 34 of the ·repealed Act in respect of any such income are pending at the commencement of this Act, a notice under s. 148 may . . . . be issued D \Vith respect to that assessment year . ... " The Incon1e-tax Officer again issued a noticl! under s .. 148 of the New Act in respect of the assessn1ent which he earlier unsuccessfully sought to reopen by n1eatb of notice under s. 34(1) (a) of the 1922 Act. The respondent again challenged the validity of the notice. The High Court quashed that notice on the ground that the Income-tax Officer was not competent to issue that notice. In appeal to this Court it was contended that the notice under s. 34(l)(a) being an invalid ootice on the ground that it was barred by E limitation the proceedings initiated on the basis of the notice should be considered as not pending when the new Act came into force. Dismissing the appeal, HELD : What s. 297(2) (d) (ii) requires is the factual pendency of a proceeding under s. 34 of the repealed Act. Whether that proceeding was barred by limitation or not is irrelevant. The proceedings pending before a competent authority cannot be said to be not pending merely because F no relief can be granted in that proceedings because of the bar of limitation. The proceedings in the present case were initiated by a competent authority and those proceedings were quashed for the reason that the notice was issued beyond the time prescribed by law. Hence it cannot be said that no proceedings under s. 34 of the 1922 Act, either factually or legally, \vas pending at the time when the new Act came into force. [617 D] _ CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeals Nos. 1301 of G 1971 and 1981 of 1968.
