upon whether the topic of that legislation has been assigned by the Constitution Act to that legislature. · Thus, a law of the State of an Entry in Lt I, Schedule VII of the Constitution would be wholly incompetent and void. But the law may be on a topic within its competence, as for example, an Entry in List II, but it might infringe restrictions imposed l:fy the Constitution on the character of the law to be passed as for example, lirnitatfons enacted in Part III of the Constitution. Here al_so; the-law to the extent of rthe repugnancy will be void. Thus, a legislation on a topic not within the competence of the legislature and a legislation within its competence but violative of constitutional limitations have l,oth the same reckoning in a court of law; they are both of them uneforceable. But does it follow from *his that both the laws are of the same quality and character, ar.d stand on the same footing for all purposes'? This question has been the subject of consideration in numerous de_cisions in the American Courts, and 1the preponderance of authority is in favour of the view that while a law on a matter not within the competence ;if the legislature is a nullity, a law on a itopic within its competence but repugnant to the constitutional prohibitions js only unenforceable. This distinction has a material bearing on the present discussion. If a_ Jaw is on a iield no'! within the domain of the legislature. it is absolut_ly null and void, and a subsequent cession of t)lat field to tl\e legislature will not have the effect of brealliing life into what was a still-born piece of legis\ation al)_d !} -fresh legislation on the subject would be re-quisit_e But if the law is in respect of a matter assigned to the legislature but its provisions disregarded constitutional prohibitions, though the law would be unenforceable by re_ason of those prohibitions, when once they are removed, the Jaw will bcorne effective without re-
