Partly allowed
Commissioner of Gift Tax Kerala v. Gheevarghese. Travancore Timbers & Products, Kottayam
What the court decided
AI extract
Outcome
Partly allowed
Issue for consideration
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
817
A
COMMISSIONER OF GIFf TAX· KERALA
v.
GHEEVARGHESE. TRAVANCORE TIMBERS &
PRODUCTS, KOTTAYAM
B
September 20, 1971
[K. S. HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]
.Gift Tax Act 1958, s. 5(1) (xiv)-Proprietary business converted into partnership business-Proprietor's daughters taken as partners-AU assets of proprietary business transferred to partnership business-c-Daughters' contribution of capital effected by transfer of money from father"s account to c daughters' accounts-Whether share of goodwill of proprietary firm also thereby gifted-Gifted amounts whether exempt under s. 5(1) (xiv)-Tests for exemption-"In the course of business and "for the purpose of the Cusiness', meaning of.
The assessee wao the sole proprietor of a business in timber and timber products. He converted the proprietary business into a partnership business by means of a deed of partnership dated August 1, 1963. The part- D nership consisted of the assessee and his two daughters. The capital of the partnership was to be Rs. 4,00,000. The assessee contributed Rs. 3,50,000 and each· of his two daughters, one married and the other unmarried contributed Rs. 25,000. The contribution of the capital by the daughters was effected by transfer of Rs. 25,000 from the assessee's account to the account of each of the daughters. All the assets of the proprietary business were t{ansferred to the partnership. In these assets, the assessee and bis daughters were entitled to shares in the proportion E of their share capital i.e. the assessee was entitled to a 7/8 share and each of his daughters to 1/16 share. The profits and losses Of the partnership business were to be divided in equal shafes between all the three partners. The assessee was the managing partner of the firm. The assessee filed a return of gift tax for the assessment year 1964-65 in respect of the gift Of Rs. 50,000 in favour of his daughters representing the share capital contributed by his daughters. The Gift Tax Officer however took the view that in addition to the gift of the aforesaid amount the assessee had F gifted 113r<l portion of the goodwill of his proprietary business to each of his daughters. Accordingly he added a sum equal to 2/3rd df the i'Jodwill as estimated by him to the gift of &.. 50,000 admitted by the assessee. The Appellate Assistant Commissioner dismissed the assessee's appeal. The Appellate Tribunal held that only 1/8 of the goodwill was gifted to each of the daughters but the gift was exempt under s. 5(1)(xiv) of the Gift Tax Act. The High Court in reference held in favour of the G wessee. In appeal by special leave,
HELD : The goodwill was a part of the assets which had been transferred to the partnership. Under s. 14 of the Partnership Act, wbject to the contract between the partners the property of the firm includes all property and rights and interests in property originally brought into the stock of the firm or acquired by purchase or otherwise by or 'for the firm and includes also the goodwill of the business. The departmental authorities in the present case never treated as all the assets and property of the H assessee which were transferred to the partnership pertaining to his proprietary business as a gift nor was it suggested that the property and assets valued at Rs. 4,00,000 were the subject matter of the gift. The departrnentaf 11uthoritieo 'cmly picked up one of the assets of the assessee's l 8--L3Sup.C.I./72
818
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
(1972) 1 S.C.R.
proprietary business namely its goodwill and regarded that as the subject of giit having been made to the daughters. There was no justification for this approach. Accordingly no ~ft tax was payable by the assessee on the goodwill of the assessee's business. [823 A-DJ
(ii) To be exempt under s. 5 ( 1) (xiv) a gift should be proved to have been made not only in the course of carrying on the business, pro-fession or vocation but also1 for the purpose of such business, profession or vocation. The expression .'in the course of carrying on of business etc.' means that the gift should have some relationship with the carrying on of . the business. If a donor makes a gift only while he is running the business that may not be sufficient to bring the gift within the first part of cl. (xiv) of s. 5 ( 1) of the Act. It must further be established to bring the gift within that prMision, that there was some integral connection or relation between the making of the gift and the carrying on of the business. The meaning of the word 'purpose' is that which one sets before himself as an object to be obtained; the end or aim to be kept in view in any plan, measures, exertion or operation, design, intention. Therefore on the plain meaning of the word 'purpose' as employed in cl. (xiv) the object, plan or design must have connection or relationship with the business. [824 A-G]
Jn the present case, considering the terms of the partnership deed there was no cogent material to come to the conclusion that the gift of Rs. 25,000 to each of the daughters by the assessee was in the course of carrying on the business of the assessee and was for the purpose of the business. The real object of the assessee was to benefit the daughters for the natural reason that the father wanted to look to the advancement of his daughters. Accordingly the asscssee who bad himself shown the amount of Rs. 50.000 in his return of gift tax could not claim exemption for that amount under s. 5(7)(xiv). [826C-G]
State of Travancore Cochin & Ors. v. Chanmugha Vilas Cashew Nut Factory & Ors. [1954] S.C.R. 53, B. W. Noble Ltd. v. Mitchell 11 T.C. 372, Morgan v. Tate & Lyle Lid. 35 T.C. 367, 378, C.J.T., West Bengal v. Birla Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. dt. 17-8-71 and Commissioner of Gift Tax v. Dr. Grorge Kuruvilla, 77 l.T.R. 746, applied.
A
B
c
D
E
Commissioner of Gift Tax, Kera/a v. Dr. George Kuruvilla, (1965) K.L.R. 721, referred to.
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2293 of 1968.
F
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated October 9, 1967 of the Kerala High Court in Income-tax Reference No. 64 of 1966.
0. P. Malhotra, R. N. Sachthey and B. D. Sharma, for the G appellant.
S. T. Desai, A. K. Verma and J. B. Dadachanji, for the respondent.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Grover, J. This is an appeal by special leave from a judgment of the Kera la High Court in a refere.nce made under s. 26 ( 1) of the Gift Tax Act, 1958, hereinafter referred to as the "Act", relating to the assessment year 1964-65. The assessee was the sole
H
C.G.T. V, GHEEVARGHESE (Grover, J.)
819
(1972] 1 S.C.R.
820
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
A
The High Court answered all the questions in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue.
It is essential to look at the deed of partnership closely because certain clauses which have a material bearil!lg do not appear to have received the attention either of the Appellate Tribunal or the High Court. It was recited, inter a/ia, that the assessee was desirous of introducing into the business of Travatncore Timbers and Products his major daughters and also his minor children as and whero. they attained majority. It was next stated that upon the treaty for the introduction of the said partners into the business and for the partnership it was agreed that the first partner (assessee) would gift a sum of Rs. 25,000/- to each of his two major daughters. The property of the busillless was next described. It was stated to consist of the land and buildings, plant, fixtures and machinery, book debts, benefits of existing cont~ acts etc. and stock-in-trade and other movable chattels and effects. The assessee as beneficial owner conveyed and assigned unto the partners including himself all these properties including the goodwill of the marks and all rights and privileges belonging thereto. Each of the partners covenanted that he or she will duly pay discharge or perform all the debts and liabilities, contracts and engagements of the individual business of the assessee subsisting in the shares and proportions in which they respectively became entitled under the business. It was expressly stated in the first schedule which contaillled the terms, conditions and stipulations that the partnership was to be at will. Clause (2) in the schedule is of particular importance. According to clause 2 (a) if the partners or partner who, for the first time, represented or possessed the major part in the value of the capital of the busiiness desired to continue the business with additional partners they, he or she would be at liberty to do so on giving 6 months' previous lllOtice to the other partner or partners paying to the partners or partner not desiring to continue the value of their his or her shares or share and interest in the business, property and the goodwill and giving a bond of "indemnity" with regard to the rriode of ascertaining such value and the payment thereof and the amount of the penalty of such bond and otherwise as i,f the partnership had under these presents been stipulated to continue after the 31st day of March
C
D
E
F
G
H
C.G.r. v. GHEEVARGHESE (Grover, J.)
821
[ 1972] 1 S.C.R.
szz
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
the representatives of such deceased partner from out of the properties and assets of the partnership as a1so its profits. The partnership deed also contained what were called special provisions as to the share of the first partner. Clause 18 provided that the assessee who was the first partner could nominate either one or all of the his minor children to be a partner or partners on their attaining majority. Such nomination or appointment could be made by a will or codicil.
It is somewhat surprising that the Gift Tax Officer picked up the assets of the business of the assessee, 111amely, the goodwill for treating that as a gift apart from the amount of Rs. 50,000/- which had' admittedly . been gifted to the daughters. It was mentioned in the assessment order that as the assessee had failed to disciose the gift relating to the same actiOlll under s. 17 ( 1) ( c) was being taken. Before the Appellate Assistant Commissioner it was contended inter a/ia, that the value o.f the goodwill should not be included as a part of the gift. Alteriuatively it was contended that the value had been calculated correctly. This was apart from the other contentions which were raised claiming exemption under s. S(l)(xiv) of. the Act. Without examiniiJig the contentions that the value of the goodwill should not be included as a part of the gift the Appellate Assistant Commissioner examined the other contentions a111d agreed with the view taken by the Gift Tax Officer.
A
B
c
D
E
The way the Tribunal examined the question relating to the goodwiJl was by treating it as an ·asset which had beein gifted by the assessee to his two daughters. This is what the Tribunal observed:
"By admitting his two daughters, as partners of the business, the assessee also admitted them to the benefit arising out of the goodwill of the business".
Now it is quite clear that according tQ the deed of partnership and even otherwise on admitted facts goodwill was a part of the properties and assets of the business which the assessee was running under the style of Travancore Timber & Products at Kottayam. All these were valued at Rs. 4,00,000/-. The entire property of the assessee's proprietary business was transferred to the new partnership. According to clause 7 in the schedule to the partnership deed the parties were to be entitled to the capital 'and property of the partnership i.n the following shares :
F
G
H
Asses see
~ach daughter
: 7 /8th share.
: 1/16 share
C.G.T. 1'. GHEEVARGHESE (Grover, J.)
823
E "Whether on the facts amd in the circumstances any gift tax was payable on the goodwill Otf the assessee's business. If the answer be in the affirmative how much share in the goodwill was liable to such tax" ?
We reframe the question in the above terms. It is quite obvious F that the answer to the first part of the questionhas to be in the negative and therefore there is no necessity of answering the second part of the question. Question No. I also does not arise and need not be 'answered.
We may next deal with the third question. Section 5 of the G Act gives the exemption in respect of certain gifts. Sub-clause (xiv) of sub-s. ( 1) is as follows :
[1972] l s.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
824
.
The critical words are "in the course of" and "for the purpose". Therefore the gift should be proved to have been made not oniy "in the course of carrying on the business, profession or vocation" but also bona fide for the purpose of such business, profession or vocation. The words "in the course of" were considered by this Court in State of Travancore Cochin & Others v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashew Nut Facrory & Others(') in connection with the language employed in Art. 286 of the Constitution. It was pointed out that the word "course" etymologically denotes movement from one point to another and the expression "in the course of" not only implies a period of time duril!lg which the movement is in progress but also postulates a connected relation. There clause l ( b) of the Article was under consideration iind what was exempted under the clause was the sale or purchase of the goods taking place in the course of the import of the goods into or export of the goods out of the territory of India. The only assistaillce which can be derived in the present case is the emphasis on there being connected relation between the activities for which these words are used. Thus the expression "in the course of carrying o°r of business etc." means that the gift should have some relationship with the carrying on of the business. If a donor makes a gift only while he is runni[lg the business that may not be sufficient to bring the gift within the first part of clause (xiv) of s. 5(1) of the Act. It must further be established, to bring the gift within that provision, that there was some integral connectiM or relation between the making of the gift and the carrying on of the business.
Under clause (xiv) of s. 5 (!) the second requirement is that the gift should have been made bona fide for the purpose of such business etc. According to the meaning cf the word "purpose" in Webster's New Internatio1nal Dictionary, it is that which one sets before himself as an object to be attained; the end or aim to be kept in view in any plan, measure, exertio.n or operation; design intention. Therefore on the plain meaning of the word "purpose" as employed in clause (xiv) the object, plan or design must have connection or relationship with the business. To put it differently the object in making the gift or the design or intention behind it should be related to the business. Some assista.nce may be derived from the language used in s. 19(2) (xv) of the Income tax Act 1922. According to that provision any expenditure laid out or expended wholly and exclusi·:e!y for the purpose of business, pro· fession or vocation is a permissible deduction in the computation of profits. In B. W. Noble Ltd. v. Mitchell(') a snm had been paid to a retiring Director in very peculiar circumstances. The object of making the payment was that of preserving the status and reputation of the company which the Directors felt would be
(2) II T.C. 372.
(I) [1954] S.C.R. 53.
n
c
I>
E
J[1
G
H
"' • ) ...
C.G.T. v. GHEEVARGHESE (Grover, J.)
825
A imperilled either by the other Director remaining in the business. or by a dismissal of him against his will involving proceedings ry way of action i,n which the good name of the company might suffer. Sargant L.J. was of the view that preservation of the status aind dividend earning power of the company was well within the ordinary purpose of the·trade, profession or vocation of the company. B Indeed the English courts have refrained from adopting any dogmatic or set line for discovering the meaining of the expression "for the purpose of" when used in connection with trade or business because it is essentially a matter which depends on the various sets of circumstances and facts of a particular case {or determining whether certain expenditure has been i1ncurred for the purpose of c the trade or business: (See Morgan v. Tate & Lyle, Ltd.('). According to a recent decision of this court in Civil Appeals Nos. 1351-1353, 1897 & 1241 o.f 1968 (The Commisswner of Income tax, West Bengal v. Bir/a Cotion Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd. etc.(') the expression "for the purpose of the business" is essentially wider than the expression "for the purpose of earning profits". It covers not only the running of the business or its administration D but also measures for the preservation of the business, protection of its assets and property. It may Jegiti.mately comprehend many other acts incidental to the carrying on of the busines>. Another test that has often been take1n into consideration is whether the expenditure was necessitated or justified by commercial expediency.
E
The High Court, in the present case relied on Commissioner of Gift Tax, Kera/av. Dr. George Kuruvilla('). There the asscssee was a doctor by profession at the time of the gift which he made in favour of his son who also joined his father's profession. The Kerala High Court took the view that the gift had been made in the course of carrying on of the business, profession or vocation F within the meaning of s. 5 ( 1 )(xiv) of the Act and also for the purpose of such business, profession or vocation. That decision w;is reversed by This court in Commissioner of Gift Tax v. Dr. George Kuruvilla('). It has been observed thats. 5(l)(xiv) of the Act does not indicate that a gift made by a person carrying on any business is exempt from tax nor does it provide that a gift is G exempt from tax merely because the property is used for the purpose for which it was used by the donor. Without deciding whetl1er the test of "commercial expedie;ncy" was strictly appropriate to 1 l;c claim for exemption under the aforesaid provision this court held that there was no evidence to prove that the gift to the donee in that case was "in the course of carrying on the business" of the H donor and "for the purpose of the business". ·
(!) 35 T.C. 367, 378.
(2) Decided on 17-8·1971. (4), 77 LT.R. 746.
(3) (1965) K.L.T. 721.
[1972] 1 S.C.R.
826
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
We are satisfied that in the vresent case also it has not been established tlrat the requirements of s. 5(l)(xiv) of the Act were satisfied. The assessee was certainly carrying on his business at the point of time when he admitted his two daughters into the firm. But from that fact alone it did not follow that the gift had been made in the course of the assessee's business nor cou!d it be held that the gift was made for the purpose of carrying on the assessee's business. The Tribunal came to the conclusion that the partnership did provide for the continuance of the partnership business in spite of the death of the partner a1nd that the main intention of the assessee was to ensure the continuity of the business and to prevent its extinction oin his death. A true and correct reading of the deed of partnership indicates that the partners could go <>ut from the partnership in terms of clause 2 of the schedule in the deed of partnership. Moreover the partnership was expressly stated to .be at will. The real intention of the assessee aparently was to take his daughters into the firm with the object of conferring benefit on them for 1h~ natural reason that ithe father wanted to look to the advancement of his daughters. It was further provided in the deed that even the minor children would, in due course, be admitted to partnership. Clause 18 of the schedule already referred to laid down that the assessee could nominate either one or aII of his minor children to be partner or partners on their attaining majority and such nomination or appointment could be made even by a will or codicil. The assessee retained complete control over the running of the partnership business and it can hardly be said that he jlleeded any help from his daughters particularly when there is no evidence that he was in a weak state of health, his age bei)l.g below 50 years. Moreover there is nothing to show that the daughters had any specialised knowledge or business experience· so as to be able to assist in the development or mainagement of the business. We are wholly unable in these circumstances to accept tlidt the present case is different from Dr. George Kuruvilla's(1). In our judgment there was no cogent material to come to the conclusive that the gift of Rs. 25,000/- to each of the daughters by the assessee was "in the course of carrying on the business" of the assesese and was "for the purpose of the business".
A
B
C
D
E
F
.\
G
It may be recalled that the assessee had himseif made a return in the matter of assessment of Gift tax payable under the Act in respect of the amount of Rs. 50,QOO/- which had been gifted by him to his two daughters. The answer to question No. 3. consequently, would be in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee. so far as that amount is concerned.
H
For the reasons given above the answers returned by the High Court'are discharged aind in their place the question shall stand
C.G.T. v. GHEEVARGHESE (Grover, J.)
827
A answered in accordance with this judgment in the foliowing manner:
Question No. 1 : does mot arise.
Question No. 2 as reframed : The first part is answered in the negative and in favour oi the assessee. The B second part does not arise.
Questioo. No. 3 : The answer is in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee so far as the gift of Rs. 50,000/- is concerned.
The appe"al shall stand disposed of accordingly. In the circumC stances of the case we make mo· order as to costs.
G.C.
Appeal dismissed.
1 issue framed by the court
Was gift tax payable on goodwill of the proprietary business transferred to a partnership with the assessee's daughters?
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
State of Travancore Cochin v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashew Nut FactoryRelied on
[1954] S.C.R. 53 · Who else cites this
B. W. Noble Ltd. v. MitchellApplied
11 T.C. 372
Morgan v. Tate & Lyle Ltd.Referred
35 T.C. 367, 378
CIT West Bengal v. Birla Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Ltd.Relied on
Decided on 17-8-1971
Commissioner of Gift Tax v. Dr. George KuruvillaApplied
77 I.T.R. 746
Commissioner of Gift Tax, Kerala v. Dr. George KuruvillaDistinguished
(1965) K.L.T. 721
5 provisions across 4 enactments
Commissioner of Gift Tax, Kerala
Gheevarghese (Travancore Timbers & Products)
K. S. Hegde
A. N. Grover
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court