A widow who had gifted her husband's tenancy property away and later reoccupied it as trespasser did not acquire full ownership under section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. The daughter's son's suit based on reversionary rights was not barred by the C.P. Tenancy Act limitation provision. Appeal dismissed.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
298
DINDY AL & ANR.
v.
RAJARAM
April 17, 1970
[J, C. SHAH, K. S'.' HEGDE AND A. N. GROVER, JJ.]
Hindu Succession Act, 195C, s. 14-Widow who has made gift of husband's property to daughter and ther•after reoccupied it as trespa.1·ser whether acquires rights of full ownership under s. 14(2)-"Po.isessed" in s. 14( I) meani11·11 of.
C.P. Tenancy Act, 1920, s. 104( 1) read with Art. /, Second Sc/12duleArticle is Inapplicable when suit is filed not as dispossei·sed tenant but as reversioner vf last male. ho/d.,-Act does not enable trespassers on tenancy land to acquire right against third parties by adverse posses·sion.
The defendants were the grandsons of G's brother between whom and G there had been division of Hindll undivided family property. G died in 1920 and his widow L entered into possession of his property, _namely, land held in tenancy in the former Central Provinces. In !936 L made a gift of the property to her daughter N. Thereupon K, G's daughter by his pre-deceased wife, filed a suit seeking declaration that the gift-deed was not binding on her. The suit was decreed in '.937. N died in 1941 and thereafter N's children entered into possession of the property. K died in 1943. The possession of N's children continued till June I, 1951 when L wrongfully dispossessed them under the guise of enforcing the decree obtained by K. Thereafter L continued in exclusive possession of the suit property. Jn !952 she gifted some of those properties to one R and the remaining properties she gifted to the defendants in J 957. She died in 1960. Meanwhile in 1956 the Hindu succession Act had com<> into force. The plaintiff after the death of L filed a suit claiming the properties in question as daughter's son and reversioner of G. The suit was decreed and the decree was upheld by the High Court. The High Court .can1e to the conclusion that L's possession of the suit properties after June 1, 1951 was that of a trespasser, and as such she did not be- come an absolute o\:ner of those properties on tne coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, It also helc'. that the plaintiff became entitled to the suit properties on the death of L as the nearest reversioner of G. In appeal to this Court by special leave it was contended on behalf of the appellants : (i) that as soon as L took posse>Sion of the suit properties fron1 the children of N. her previous possession as widow of G sprang up again and thereafter she was holding the properties in her capacity as the widO\" of G and hence she became absolute owner of those properties when the Hindu Succession. Act came into force; (ii) that the suit for possession of a holding by a person cf3fming to be tenant fron1 which he had been dispossessed could be filed under s. 104(1) of the C.P. Tenancy Act, 1920 read with Art. I of the Second Schedule thereto onJy \vithin three years of the- date of dispossession., and the present suit not having been filed within that period. the result must be that L had acquired title to the suit pi'operties by adverse possession. HELD : (i) The gift made bv L and in 'avour N was a valid gift and N cam'~ into possession of the suit properties On the tren!?'th of that gift. L could have no interest in those properties thereafter. T'ierefore. when L 1.ook poc;.;;c:;sion of thoe properties in 1951, she did so as a tres~ passer. and she continued in poc;•ession thereafter only as a trespasser. As such, he cou!d not be held to have acquired any ri.e:ht under the Hindu Succcss:~ori A:.:t becau<;e before an.y property can be· said to be "possessed"
c·
D
E
F'
G
H
DEENDAYAL v. RAJARAM (Hegde, !.)
299
A by a Hindu woman as provided ins. 14(1) of the Hindu Sucoession Act. two things are necessary (a) she must have a right to 1he possession of that property and (b) she must have been in possession of that property either actually or constructively. (301 C-El
' S. S. Munnia Lal v. S.S. Rajkumar & Ors. [1962] Supp, 3 S.C.R. 41S and Kuldip Singh & Ors. v. Surain Singh & Ors. C.A. No. 138/64 dt. 1-5-67. rehed on.
B
(ii) Article 1 of the Second Schedule read with s. 104(1) of the C.P. Tenancy 'Act was not applicable to the· present suit as it had been filed n.ot on the basis of wro11gful dispossession of a tenant but o.n the basis of reversionary rights. There was nothing in the C.P. Tenancy Act to enable a trespasser to impose himself as a tenant on the landlord by means of adverse possession of the holding as against the tenant for a period of three years, Similarly, it was not possible to hold that the tenancy right could have been acquired in a holding so as to affect the c rights of third parties by being in wrongful possession of that holding for a period of three years. If it was otherwise, valuable rights of third parties could have been jeopardised for no fault of theirs. [303 A-El
In 1951 the plaintiff had two different rights over the suit properties one under the gift referred to earlier and the other as reversioner. One was an existing right, the other was a prospective one. His right under the gift must be held to have been extinguished. under Art. I, Secon.d D Schedule read with s. 104(1) of the Act, but his right to those properties as reversioner arose only after the death of L. That right could not have been barred even before it accrued. As against the prospective reversioners L was holding the suit properties as a trespasser. She had acquired no rights in those properties as against the'm, Till her death it was not possible under law to predicate who would have been her husband's nearest reversion.er on the date of her death. [303 E-G]
E CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 404 of 1967.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated September 28, 1966 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. In Second Appeal No. 938 of 1965.
F
R. L. Kohli and J. C. Ta/war, for the appellants.
S. N. Prasad for B. P. Singh, for the respondent
The Judgment of the Court was delivered b}
Hegd.e, J. This appeal by special leave arises trom the decision of Madhya Pradesh High Court in second appeal No .. 938 of 1965 0n its file.
G The facts found which are no more in dispute, and relevant for the purpose of deciding the questions of law arising for decision in this appeal may now be briefly stated. One Gulli Gotamia had two sons by name Girdharilal and Nandoo. From the material on record, it is not possible to find out the date of death of Gulli Gotamia but admittedly he died leaving behind him his aforementioned two sons. Girdharilal and Nandoo were divided. H Girdharilal died on May 17, 1920. His first wife had pre-deceased him But at the time of his death, his second wife Ladli Babu was alive. On his death his widow t<lok possession of his pro-
[1971] l S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
300
A
perties. Girdharilal's brother Nandoo had two children. Gajadhar and Lachpi, Lachhi died issueless. Gajadhar also is dead. He has two·\children Dindayal (!st defendant) and Prameshwar Dayal (second defendant). Girdharilal had a daughter from his pre-dedeased wife by name Konsa Bai. She died in 1943. Ladli Bahu had a daughter by name Nanni Bai who died in 1941. The children of Nanni Bai, Narbada Bai, Raja Ram, Ram Narain and Gaya Prasad are the plaintifis in the ~.uit.
Ever since the death of Girdharilal,!Ladli Bahu was in posses.sion of th' suit properties. She gifted those properties to her daughterNanni Bai on July 30, 1936 and put the donee in possession of e .same. Thereupon Konsa Bai filed a suit in 1937 seeking a dclaration that the gift deed in question is not binding on her and that it cannot come in her way in inheriting the suit proparties on the death of Ladli Babu. That suit was decreed on May 3, 1937. As mentioned earlier, Nanni B'ai died in 1941. On her death, the pl&intiffs clime into possessiol) qf the suit properties. Ladli Bahu took wrongful possession of the suit properties from ·the plaintiffs en. June 1, 1951 under the guise of i:nforcing the decree in the suit filed by Konsa Bai. Thereafter she -continued to be in exClusive possession of the suit properties. On May 27, 1952, she gifted some of those properties to one Rameshwar Prasad and the remaining properties she gifted to the appellants on March 21, 1957. She died on April 9, 1960. The Hindu Succession Act came into force on June 17, 1956.
B
c
D
E
Two questions namely ( f) What is the effect of the possession taken by Ladli Babu on June 1, 1951 and (2) Did Ladli Bahu become1 he full owner of those properties in view of s. 14 ( 2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, were presented to the High Court as well as to the courts below for decision.
The High Court came to the conclusion that Ladli Bahu's possession of the suit proi;erties after June 1, 1951, was that of a 1respasser and as such she did not become an absolute owner of those properties on the coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act. It also held that the plaintiffs became entitled to the suit properties on the death of Ladli Bahu as the nearest reversioner of Girdharilal.
It was urged on behalf of the appellants that as soon as Ladli Bahu took possession of the suit properties from the plaintiffs, her previous 11ossession as the widow of Girdharilal sprang up again and thereafter she was holding the properties in her capacity as the widow of Girdharilal and hence she became the absolute owner of those properties when the Hindu Succession Act came into force. On the other hand. it was urged on behalf of the respondents, 1hat as soon as Ladli Bah11 parted with the possession of the suit properties, in favoLlr cf her daughter under a gift deed, she lost
F
G
H
DEENOAYAL v. RAJARAM (Hegde, J.)
301
all rights in th_ose properties. Therefore when she acquired possession in 1951, she did so as a trespasser. As she had no right to possess those properties when the Hindu Succession Act came into force, she acquired no rights under s. 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act.
The next question is whether in view of s. 104 (1) read with Art. 1 of the Second Sch. of the C.C. Tenancy Act, 1920 (to be E hereinafter referred to as the Act) it can be held that Ladli Bahu had acquired a title to possess the suit properties.
Section 104 (1) of the Act provides that the suits and applications specified in the Second Schedule therein shall be instituted or made within the time prescribed in that Schedule for them respectively; and every such suit instituted and application made F after the period of limitation so prescribed shall be dismissed. Art. 1 of the Second Schedule is as follows :
G
| Description.ofsuitorapplication. | Periodoflimita· tion |
Tin1efromwhich periodbeginstorun. |
|---|---|---|
| F'orpossessionof aholdingbya person clain1ingtobea tenantfromwhichhe hasbeendispossessedorexcluded fron1possessionbyanyperson. |
Threeyears | Thedate ofdis- possession_or_ex· clusion. |
[1971] 1 $.C.R.
302
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
G
s. 28 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, which principle is not confined to suits and applications for which limitation is prescribed under that Act but is of general application, the plaintiffs' right to the suit properties must be held to have been extinguished. In other words, the contention was in view of the aforementioned provisions, the plaintiffs had not merely lost their right to sue for possession of the suit properties, their right in the properties itself had been extinguished. It is well settled that the principle underlying s. 28 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (same as s. 27 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963) is of general application. It is not confined to suits and applications for which a period of limitation is prescribed under the Limitation Act.
A
B·
c
Art. 1 of the second schedule to the Act applies only to suits brought by a person claiming to be a tenant for possession of a holding from which he has been dispossessed or excluded from possession by any person. In other words before this Art. can apply. the following conditions must be fulfilled.
Though the plaintiffs in this suit w~re at one time the tenants in the suit holding in view of the gift in favour of their mother, they have not brought the present suit as tenants of that holding. They have brought it on the strength of their title as the nearest reversioners to Girdharilal. Nor is their dispossession in 195 l a part of the cause of action for the present suit. This is not a suit for possession on the ground that the plaintiffs had been earlier dispossessed. This is a suit for possession on the strength of the new title acquired by the plaintiffs after the death of Ladli Bahu. Therefore Art. 1 of the second schedule does not apply to the present suit. The limitation for this suit is governed by the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1908.
Further it is one thing to say that a tenant who was in possession of the tenancy holding at the time of dispossession had lost his rights in the holding but it is another thing to say that a trespasser had become the tenant of that holding at the en_d of the prescribed period. It must be remembered that C. P. Tenancy Act is a special Act. It only governs those matters for which provision is made therein. In other respects the general law continues to apply. The Act does say that a tenant's right in respect of any propert·: can be acquired by adverse possession. We do not think
F
H
DEENDAYAL v. RAJARAM (Hegde, !.)
303"
that the provisions of the Act enabled (The Act has been since" repealed) a trespasser to impose himself as a tenant on the land· lord by means of adverse possession of the holding as against the tenant for a period of three years. Similarly, it is not possible to hold that a tenancy right could have been acquired in a holding. so as to affect the rights of third parties by being in wrongful B possession of that holding for a period of three years.. If jt is· otherwise, valuable rights of third parties could have been jeopardised for no fault of th.irs. Take the case of a widow who was in possession of a tenancy holding. The ;>rospective reversioner to· her husband's estate would have had no right in that holding dur· ing her life time. Is it reasonable to hold that the reversioner c would have lost his rights in the holding even before he acquired them because someone was in possession of that holding adversely to the widow for a period of three years ? That would not have been the position even under Art. 144 of the Limitation Act, 19tl8. It could not be different under the Act. A right cannot be barred even before it accrues. The fact that the tenant dispossessed happened to become the rev.~rsioner on the death of the widow D cannot make any differeni in law.
In 1951, the plaintiffs had two different rights over the suit properties--0ne under the gift referred to earlier and the other as reversioner. One was an existing right, the other was a prospective· one. Their right under the gift must be held to have been extinguished under Art. 1 Sch. II read with s. 104 of the Act. But E their right to tho'e properties as reversioner arose only after the death of Ladli Bahu. That right could not have been barred even before it accrued. As against the prospective reversioners Ladli Bahu was holding the suit properties as a trespasser. She had acquired no_right in those properties as against them. Till her death, it was not possible under law to predicate who could have been her F husband's nearest reversioner on the date of her death.
In the result this appeal fails ond it is dismissed with costs.
G.C Appeal dismissed.
[The above judgment dated April 17, 1970 was reviewed by the Court on Review Petition No. 38 of 1970. The following. G order was passed on October, n, 1970 :]
ORDER
L'orrection to be made at appropriate places in the Judgment · by showing the name of Rajaram as plaintiff instead of the names referred to as of "plaintiffs", and also substitution to be made of H the word "plaintiff" for the word "plaintiffs" wherever it occurs in the Judgment. No order as to costs. The security will be refunded. Mesne profits deposited by the appellants to be paid. over to the respondent Rajaram.
2 issues framed by the court
Did the widow who reoccupied the property as a trespasser become full owner under s. 14 of the Hindu Succession Act?
Was Art. 1, Second Schedule read with s. 104(1) of the C.P. Tenancy Act applicable to a suit filed on reversionary rights rather than as dispossessed tenant?
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
S. S. Munna Lal v. S. S. Rajkumar & Ors.Relied on
[1962] Supp, 3 S.C.R. 418 · Who else cites this
Kuldip Singh & Ors. v. Surain Singh & Ors.Relied on
C.A. No. 138/64 dt. 1-5-67
6 provisions across 3 enactments
Deendayal
Prameshwar Dayal
Rajaram
C. SHAH
K. S. HEGDE
A. N. GROVER
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
