The equitable rule that the burden of a covenant runs with the land is to be found in s. 40 of the Act. This section reads : 40. "Where for the more beneficial enjoyment of his own immoveable property, a third person, has, indec pendently of any interest in the immoveable property of another or of any easement thereon, a right to restrain the enjoyment in a particular manner of the latter property, or where a third person is entitled to the benefit of an obligation arising out of contract, and annexed to the D ownership of immoveable property, but not amounting to an interest therein or easement thereon, such right or obligation may be enforced against a transferee with notice thereof or a gratuitous transferee of the property affected thereby, but not against a transferee for consideration and without notice of the right E or obligation nor against such property in his hands." As pointed out in Mulla's Transfer of Property Act, 5th Edn., at page 194, s. 40 expressly says that the right of the covenantee is not an interest in the land bound by the covenant nor an easement. It is not an interest because the Act does not recognise equitable estates and it cannot be said as Sir George Jessa! said F in London & South Western Rly. v. Gomm(') that if a covenant "binds the land it creates an equitable interest in the land." The expression "covenant runs with the land" has been taken from the English law of real property. It is an exception to the general rule that all covenants are personal. Even on the fcoting that the clauses relating to renewal in the lease, in the present case, contain covenants running with the land the rule against perG petuity contained in s. 14 of the Act would not be applicable as no interest in property has been created of the nature contemplated by that provision. For the above reasons the appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs .. H G.C. Appeal dismissed. (I) [1961] 3, A.E.L.R. 181, 188. (2) )1882] 20 Ch. D. 562, 580.
