The question was as to whether the appellant, in that case, was a 'railway', to whom the said provision would apply. The appellant company had constructed and maintained a tramroad connecting two systems of tramways, under the local Acts of 1896 and 1898. Various provisions of the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, had been applied to the tramroad. The tramroad, in that case, was on r11ils laid on sleepers, fenced off from adjoining land, excepting at the level crossings of roads. The Divisional Court had rejected the claim of the appellant; but the Court of Appeal held that the tramroad was land 'used only as a railway constructed under the power of an Act of Parliament for public conveyance', ·within the meaning of s. 211(1)(b) of the Public Health Act, 1875, and that the company was, consequent· ly, entitled to be assessed, in respect of the said 'railway', at onefourth of its net annual value. The appellants contended that the tramroad was and could only be worked as a railway and was, in fact and in law, used· as a railway, and, in consequence, they urged that the tramroad, maintained by them, is 'land' used only as a ·railway. The Court of Appeal noted that the rails were raised ai;:td laid on sleepers, just as a railway is laid, and that was the main distinction between the appellant's system, and a tramway, which ran along public streets and in grooved rails. No doubt, it was pointed out for the Urban Council, that the appellant company had been incorporated under the Tramways Act and the very fact that certain provisioru of the bilway Clauses Consolidation Act were applied to the appellant's system showed that the appellant was not a railway. The Court of Appeal held that it was impossible to distinguish the piece of tramroad, owned by the
