Act was repealed, and that section itself, under the proviso, laid down that such repeal shall not affect the previous operation of the said Act or .any right, title, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or incurred thereunder. There was also the further addition that subject thereto, anything done or any· action taken (including any appointment, notification, notice, order, rule, form, regulation, certificate or licence) in the exercise of any power conferred by or under the said Ac\ shall, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, be deemed to have been done or taken in exercise of the powers conferred by or under this Act, as if this Act were in force on the date on which such thing was done or action was taken. In view· of this proviso it has to be held that when this new Act came into force on !st April, 1959, all rights, title, obligation or liability already acquired, accrued or incurred under the repealed Act by the respondent remained unaffected and intact. The rights and liabilities, which had been acquired or incurred under the repealed Act, included the right or liability to be assessed in accordance with the provisions of the repealed Act in respect of turnover of sales effected during the time when that Act was in force. The repealed Act laid down that turnover was taxable, how it was to be computed, and at what rate the tax was to be charged. These provisions clearly created rights as well as liabilities of dealers. Those rights and liabilities were thus preserved by s. 52 of the new Act. The assessment which was completed in the case of the respondent on 23rd May, 1959, was, therefore, an assessment in accordance with the rights and liabilitiC5 of the respondent under the repealed Act ; and this being so, it has to be held that the proviso to s. 19(1) of the new Act was aj>'plicable to the case of the respondent. As a result of this proviso, the period of re-assessment on the ground of under-assessment, escapement or wrong deduction in the case of the respondent had to be as provided in s. 11-A(I) of the repealed Act, so that the period was three years and not five years as laid down by s. 19(1) of the new Act. The notice dated 23rd October, 1962, was clearly issued beyond the period of limitation prescribed bys. 11-A(I) of the repealed Act, and the proceedings in pursuance of it were timebarred.