Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway versus S. Raghavendrachar

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DIVISIONAL PERSONNEL OFFICER, SOUTHERN A RAILWAY

v.

S. RAGHAVENDRACHAR

December 16, I 96S

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(P. B.GAJENDRAGADKAR,C.J.,K.N.WANCHOO, M.HmAYATULLAH,v.RAMASWAMI anQP.SATYANARAYANARAJU,IJ.]
ConstitutionofIndia, Art.311(2)-Rtversionfrom o[ficialU.1ponto su'11tan1ive postloJ/Jenjuniors officiating inhigherpost-Whetheramounts to reduction in rank.	C
Therespondentwasemployed intheSouthern Railway uTrain EuminerinthescaleofRs. 100-5-125-t>-185. Hewas promoted19 officiate in the next higher scaleofRs.150-225. Subsequentlyhewas rCTCnedtothe lower scale, andhisdepanmental representations and aj>pealshaving failed,hefiled a writpetiuonunderAn.226oftheCooa- Utution.TheHigh Court heldthatthe reversionofthe respondent amounted toareduction in ranl:. becausehew..revertedfromthehigh..- p<llttothe lower post notwithstanding the factthathisjuniorswerestill retained in the higher posts.Asthisreductionofranl:.wasin violation ofAn.311(2)the High Court granted the writ prayedfor.TheDivi- sional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway appealed to thisCourt by opecia1leave.	D	•
Itwas contendedonbehalfofthe appellantthattheHighCourthad milunderstood the ratioofthe judgment of this Courtin_VaJJ:untMs_ cueandthatthe respondent had not suffered any reduction inrank withinthemeaningofArt.311(2).	E
HELD : (i)1bereversionofaGovernment servant fromsoolli- ciatingpostto his substantive post, while his juniorisofficiatinginhlgbtt pail,doesnot,byitself, Constitute a reduction in ran: within the mean- ingofAn.311(IoftheCoru>!irution. [IIODJ (ii)Animportant aspectofthe decision in_Vaikunthe's_case was lost sightofby the High Court.Thereal groundonwhich_V aikunthe's_re- versiontohis origioalpostofmamlatdarwasheld tobeaviolationof hi"constitutional guaranteewasthathischancesofpromotion wereirr vocablybarredfora periodofthree years. Therewasno:1uchbaroo promotion in the present case. [1 I 4El _Madhav Lru:man Vaikunthe_v.StateofMysore,[19621 1S.C.R.886. <listinguishod.	F G	• 1-
{iii)Therespondent's complaintwasthat he had lost his 9Clliority hy reaaonofthe retentionofhis juniors in the officiating higherpool. But his rank in the substantivepost_i.e._inthelower grade, wasinno wayaffected by this. In the substantive grade the respondent retained hisnntand\'ac;not visited with any penal consequences.Therespon- dent hadnorighttothe post to which he was provisionally promoted. His reversion in these circumstances did not amounttoreduction in rant.(118G-119Al	II

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D. P. 0., s. RLY. V. RAGHAVENDRACHAR (Raju, J.) 107

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A Parshatam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India, [19581 S.C.R. 828, SMI• of Bombay v. F. A. Abraham, (19621 Supp. 2 S.C.R. 92 and The High Court, Calcu~ta v. Amal Kumar Roy, [19631 1 S.C.R. 437, relied on. P. C. Wadhwa v. Union of India, (19641 4 S.C.R. 598, distinguished. M. A. Waheed v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [19541 Nag. L. J. 31t5, referred to.

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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 975 of 1964.

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Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated December 12, 1962, of the Mysore High Court in W.P. No. 531 of 1961.

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Bishan Narain, Naunit Lal and B.R.G.K. Achar, for tAc appellant.

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S. K. Venkataranga Iyengar and R. Gopalakrishnan, for the respondent.

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D The judgment of the Court was delivered by

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Satyauarayana Raju, J. This appeal, by special leave, raises a somewhat important question of all, which is whether the teTersion of a Government servant from an officiating post to his substantive post, while his junior is officiating in the higher post, does 1!: 11ot, by itself, constitute a reduction in rank within the meaning of art. 311 (2) of the Constitution.

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For the purpose of deciding the point raised in the appeal, it would be necessary to state the material facts. 1k Southern Railway has two grades of Train Examiners, one in the scale of Rs. 100-5-125-6-185 and the other in the scale of Rs. 150-225. • F The respondent was employed in the lower scale as a Train Examiner. By an order dated April 7, 1959, the respondent was promoted to officiate in the higher scale with a starting salary ot Rs. 150 per month. That order read as follows : "2. Sq S. Raghavendrachar, TXR·YPR in scale • Rs. 100-185 is promoted to officiate as TXR in scale G Rs. 150-225 on Rs. 150 per month and retained YPR as TXR-IC.

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Sri James Blazey TXR-MYS in scale Rs. 100185 is promoted to officiate as TXR in scale Rs. 150225 on Rs. 150 per month and transferred to SBC-BG H vide item 1 above.

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Sanction endorsed by D.S. for promotion of items 2 and 3."

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108 SUPRBMI! COUJ.T REPORTS (1966]3 S.CR.

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Thereisa note appendedtothe order whichisimportant : "Note :1.Thepromotion of items 2 and 3 are purely provisional subjecttorevision when Divisional Seniority lists arc drawn up."	A
By an order dated November 27, 1959, the respondent was reverted. Thatorderwa~~follows : '"SriS.Raghavendrachar,TXR/YPR(officiating) in scaleRs.150-225isreverted to scale Rs. 100-185 onRs. 130 per monthandtransferredtoSBC/MG."	B	•
Oore~eiptofthis order, the respondent made representations to th:: appellant. The appellant sent to the respondent communica- tion dated May 25,1960: "Asper the existing instructions an officiating em- ployee with less than 18 monthsofservice in the higher grade may be revertedtolower scale w'thout assigning any reason for.such rever.;ion by a competent au:hority. Since the period of your officiatinginscale Rs. 150- 225 was less than 18 months and since your reversion from scale Rs. 150-225 to Rs. 100-185 has been order- edbya competent authority, no reasons need be assign- ed as requestedinyour representation dated8th/9th December 1959. Asregards the confirmation ofTXRsin scale Rs. 150-225, who were your juniors while you were officiating in scale Rs. 150-225, I havetoadvise you that consequent on your reversion to scale Rs. 100-185, all your junior.;, in scale Rs. 150-225, have become your seniors and their confirmation.' in preference to you are in order. Regarding your re-promotion to scale Rs. 150-225, it will be considered in the normal course according to your seniority and suitability to hold the post in scale Rs. 150-225."	c D F G	J • • • I. t
Therespondent made a further appeal to the Divisional Super- intendent, Mysore,onJuly 2,1960and sent him two reminders. Nothaving got any response,hefiledanappealonJanuary 31, 1961,tothe General Manager, Southern Railway. Therespon- dent sent a remindertothe latteronMarch31, 1961.Inreply,	H	'•

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109

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D. P. o., s. RLY. v. RAGHAVENDRACHAR (Ra;u, l.)

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A the Divisional Personnel Officer wrote to the respondent as follows by letter dated April 30, 1961 :

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"Your reversion from an officiating post on scale Rs. 150-225 (PS) was not a penalty as presumed by you, in your above representations. The vacancy thus released by you in scale Rs. 150-225 (PS) and ~e B vacancies which existed on the date of your reversion were filled uo on 14th February 1960. You are therefore eligible -to be considered for promotion against a ' vacancy which occurred after the date of your reversion and not against the vacancies which existed on the , date of your reversion and also the vacancy caused by c your reversion. No regular vacancy (other than short term leave vacancy) in scale Rs. 150-225 has occurred from the date of your reversion till date. You will therefore be considered for promotion against the next vacancy, subject to the condition of seniority-cum-suitability, on the basis of which only promotions to nonselection posts are to be ordered. 2. As regard§ seniority, all those hitherto promoted to scale Rs. 150-225 (PS) will automatically rank seniors to you and your seniority if promoted will be reckoned only from the date of your promotion in E future vacancy. · 3. Your contention that, when you were promoted to officiate for 2 months against the leave vacancy of Shri Venkataraman, as per this office order No. M. 542/PI of 14th November 1960, you should have been continued even after the expiry of the leave F vacancy, and that Shri Varghese should have been reverted, is not correct, for .the reasons stated in paragraph 2 above. · 4. Your representation of 30th January 1961 to • GM(P) Madras is therefore withheld." G Aggrieved by the order dated November 27, 1959, the respondent moved the Mysore High Court, on the failure of his representations to the hierarchy of Departmental Heads, for a writ of cert!'orari to quash the impugned order made by the appellant. By judgment dated December 12, 1962, ·a Division Bench H of the High Court quashed the order of reversion; The High Court observed that it was not necessary to express any opinion on the qu.~stion whether the reversion of the respondent on the ground that his work was unsatisfactory amounted to a reduction

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[1966) 3 S.C.R.

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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in rank within the meaning of that expression occurring in art. 311 (2) of the Constitution. But the High Court held that the reversion of the respondent amounted to a reduction in rant because he was reverted from the higher post to the lower post notwithstanding the fact that his juniors were still retained in the higher posts. In reaching this conclusion the High Court purported to follow the decision of this Court in Madhav Laxman Vaikunthe v. Stare of Mysore(').

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Tue Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway, Mysore, obtained special leave from this Court against the order of the lligh Court.

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It is contended by Mr. Bishan Narain, learned counsel for the appellant, that the High Court misunderstood the ratio of the judgment of this Court in Vaikunthe's case('), that there is DO right in a Government servant to promotion as of right, that the mere reversion of a Government servant from an offic:ating post to his substantive post, notwithstanding that his juniors are retained in the higher posts, does not amount to a reduction in rank and tho provisions of art. 311 (2) are not attracted. On the other hand, it is contended by Mr. S. K. Venkataranga Iyengar, !cam. ed counsel for the respondent, that the circumstances of the CMe clearly indicated that the reversion of the respondent amounted to a reduction in rank and since the procedure prescribed by art. 311 (2) was not complied with, the order of reversion v;as bad in law.

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It may be taken to be settled by the decisions of this Court that since art. 311 makes no distinction between permanent and temporary posts, its protection must be held to extend to all govcrnment servants holding permanent or temporary posts or officiating in any of them, but that protection is limited to the imposition of three major penalties contemplated by the Service Rules. l'iz., dismissal, or removal or reduction in rank.

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The first of the cases which may be considered is the decis"on in Parshotam l.,al Dhingra v. Union of lndia(i), commonly known as Dhingra's case. In this case, Das C.J., who spoke for the majority, considered comprehensively the scope and effect of the relevant constitutional provisions, service rules and their impact on the question as to whether reversion of Dhingra offended against the provfaions of art. 311 (2). Dhingra was appointed as a Signaller in 1924 and promoted to the post of Chief Controller in 1950. Both these posts were in Class ill Service. In (I) (19621 I S.C.R. 886. (2) (t9S8] S.C.R. 828.

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(I) (19621 I S.C.R. 886.

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D. P. 0., s. RLY. v. RAGHAVENDRACHAR (Raju, J.) 111

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A 1951, he was appointed to officiate in Class II Service as Assistant Superintendent, Railway Telegraphs. On certain adverse remarks having been made against hinI, he was reverted as a subordinate till he made good bis short comings. Then, Dhingra

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·made a representation. Subsequently, the General Manager gave hinI notice reverting hinI to Class ID appointment. It was this

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B order which was challenged by Dhingra by a writ petition, in the ' High Court and, eventually, in this Court. The question for declSion was whetl!er tl!e order of the General Manager amounted to reduction in rank wi tlJin the meaning of art. 311 ( 2) of the . Constitution, and Dhingra was entitled to a reasonable opportunity to show cause against the order. This Court held that the

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C reversion of an officiating officer to his substantive post did not attract the provisions of art. 311 (2) and that Dhingra was not

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· entitled to tl!e protection of that article.

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It is however true tl!at even an officiating government servant

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may be reverted to his original rank by way of punishment. It was

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0 therefore observed in Dhin1?,ra's case(') at p. 863 :

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' "Thus if tl!e order entails or provides for the forfeiture of his pay or allowances or the loss of his seniority in his substantive rank or the stoppage or postponement of his future chances of promotion, then that cir-

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E cumstance may indicate that altl!ough in form tl!e Government had purported to exercise its right to terminate the employment or to reduce the servant to a lower rank under tl!e terms of the contract of employment or under tl!e i:ules, in truth and reality the Government has terminated tl!e employment as and by way of

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F penalty."

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One test for determining whether the termination of service was by way of punishment or otherwise is to ascertain whether under the Service Rules, but for such termination, the servant has the

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• right to hold the post. It was held in Dhinf(rds case(') that he G was holding an officiating post and had no right under the rules of

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'\ the Railway Code to continue in it, that under the general law such appointment was terminable at any time on reasonable notice and the reduction could not operate as a forfeiture of any right,

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,. that the order of the General Manager ,visited hinI with no evil H consequences and that the order therefore did not amount to a reduction in rank.

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(1) (1958] S.C.R. 828.

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SUPREME COURT REl'Olll'S [ 1966] 3 S.C.R.

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Vaikunthe's case(') was relied upon by the High Court in suppon of its conclusion that the reversion of the respondent amounted to a reduction in rank:. It is therefore necessary to scrutinize the facts of that case.

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The appellant V a.ikunthe, who held the rank: of a Mamlatdar in the first grade, and was officiating as Dist.-ict Deputy Collector, was alleged to have wrongly charged travelling allowance for 59 miles instead of 51 and was, as the result of a Departmental enquiry, reverted to his substantive rank for three years and directed to refund the excess he had charged. He made a representation to the Government which was of no avail although the Accountant General was of the opinion that the appellant had not over-charged and committed no fraud. Ultimately, the appellant was promoted to the Selection Grade but the order of reversion remained effective and affected his position in the Selection Grade. After retirement he brought a suit for a declaration that the order of reversion was void and for recovery of a certain sum a.~ arrears of salary and allowances. The trial Court held that there was no compliance with the provisions of s. 240(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935, granted the declaration but refused the arrears claimed. Vaikuntbe filed an appeal and the State a cross-objection. The High Coun dismissed the appeal and allowed the cross-objection, holding that the order of reversion was not a punishment within the meaning of s. 240(3) of the 1935 Act.

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This Court held that the matter was covered by the observations in Dhin[fra's ca<e(') and the tests of punishment laid down by this Court viz., ( I ) whether the servant had a right to the rank or ( 2) whether he had hcen visited with evil consequences of the kind specified therein, and that the second test certainly applied. This Court concluded that Vaikunthe might or might not have the right to hold the higher post, but there could be no doubt that he was vi~ited with evil consequences as a result of the order of revers'on. It was there held :

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"Mere deprivation of higher emoluments, however, in consequence of an order of reversion could not by itself 'atisfy that test which must include such other consequences as forfeiture of substantive pay and loss of seniority."

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Since the requirement of s. 240 ( 3) of the 1935 Act, which corresponds to art. 3 I I (2) of the Constitution, had not been found to have been fully complied with, the order of reversion was held to he void.

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(1) (1962) 1 S.C.R. 886

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f2) 11918) S.C.R. 828.

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D. P. 0., s. RLY. V. RAGHAVENDRACHAR (Raju, J.) !13

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A There was an important aspect of this decision which was lost sight of by the High Court. The impugned order there ran as follows: "After careful consideration Government have de-

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cided to revert you to Mapilatdar for a period of three years . ..... "

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B It was pointed out in Dhingra's case(') that if the order of reversion entailed or provided for the forfeiture of the pay or allowances of the Government servant or loss of his seniority in his substantive rank or the stoppag;~ or postponement of his future chances of promotion, then that circumstance might indicate that

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c although in form the Government had purported to exercise its right to terminate the employment or to reduce the servant to a lower rank under the terms of th\l contract of employment or under the rules, in truth and reality the Government had . ternlinated the employment as and by way of pem1lty. At p. 891, Sinha, C.J., who spoke for the Court, pointed out :

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• D " .... he would have continued as a Deputy Col-. lector but for the Order of the Government, dated August 11, 1948, impugned in this case, as a result of the enquiry held against him, and that his reversion was not as a matter of course or for administrative convenience. The Order, in terms, held him back tor

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E three years. (Italics ours). Thus his emoluments, present as well as future, were adversely affected by the Order aforesaid of the Government. In the ordinary cour'e, he would have continued as a Deputy Collector with all the emoluments of the post and would have been

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F entitled to further promotion but for the set back in his service as a result of the adverse finding against h·m, which finding was ultimately declared by the Accountant General to have been under a misapprehension of the true facts. It is true that he was promoted as a result of the Government Order dated March 26 1951 with

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• G effect from August 1, 1950. But that p;omotio'n did not entirely cover the ground lost by him as a result of the Government Order impugned in this case."

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Again, at p. 893, the learned Chief Justice pointed out :

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,. "If the loss of the emoluments attaching to the higher rank in wh;ch he was officiating was the only

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H consequence of his reversion as a result of the enquiry against him, the appellant would have no cause of

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(I) [1958] S.C.R. 828.

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[1966] 3 S.C.R.

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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action. But it is clear that as a result of the Order dated August 11, 1948 (Ex. 35), the appellant lost his seniority as a Mamlatdar, which was his substantive post. That being so, it was not a simple case of reversion with no evil consequences; it had such consequences as would come within the test of punishment as laid down in Dhingra's case."

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Finally, it was pointed out:

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"Jf the reversion had not been for a period of three years, it could not be said that the appellant had bee\n punished within the meaning of the rule laid down in Dhingra's Case. It cannot be asserted that his reversion to a substantive post for a period of three years was not by way of punishment. From the facts of this case it is clear that the appellant was on the upward move in the cadre of his service and but for this aberration in his progress to a higher post, he would have, in ordinary course, been promoted as he actually was some time later when the authorities realised perhaps that he had not been justly treated ...... "

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The real ground on which Vaikunthe's reversion to his original post of Mamlatdar was heid to be a violation of his Constitutional guarantee was that his chances of promotion were irrevocably barred for a period of three years. Jf this aspect of Vaikunthe's case(¹ ) is borne in mind, it will be found that there is no basic inconsistency between the decisions which have a bearing on the question as to in what cases reversion would amount to a reduction in rank.

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Even so, it is contended by learned counsel for the respondent that the real reason which operated on the mind of tile appellant was that the respondent's work in his officiating capacity was unsatisfactory. Assuming that to be so, the questioD is whether his reversion to his original post, because he was found unsuitable for the higher rank to which he had been given the officiating chance, is valid. In State of Bombay v. F. A. Abraham(') the respondent held the substantive post of Inspector of Police and had been officiating as Deputy Superintendent of Police. He was reverted to his original rank without being given an opponunity of being heard in respect of the reversion. His request to furnish him with reasons for his reversion was refused. Later, a depanmental ------(!) lt %2] I S.C.R. --886. - (2) [1%2] Supp. 2 S.C.R. 92.

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D. P. o., s. RLY. v. RAGHAVENDRACHAR (Raju, J.)

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A enquiry was held behind his back in regard to .certain allegati?ns of misconduct made against him in a confidential commurucatlon from the District Superintendent of Police to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, but these allegations were not proved at the enquir¥. The Inspector-General of Police, however, thereafter wrote to the Government that the respondent's previous record

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B was not satisfactory and that he had been promoted to officiate as Deputy Superintendent of Police in the expectation that he would turn a new leaf. The High Court held, following its earlier decision in M.A. Waheed v. State of Madhya Pradesh(') that if a person officiating in a higher post is reverted to his original post in the normal course, that is, on account of cessasion

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C of the vacancy or his failure to acquire the required qualification, the reversion did not amount to a reduction in rank but if he is reverted for unsatisfactory work, then the reversion would amount to a reduction in rank. This Court did not agree with the observations in Waheed's case(') that when a person officiating in a post is reverted for unsatisfactory work, that reversion would

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0 amount to a reduction in rank. This Court took the view that the Government had a right to consider the suitability of the respondent to hold the position to which he had been appointed to officiate and that it was entitled for that purpose to make inquiries about his suitability and that that was all what the Government

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E had done in that case.

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Two more cases cited at the Bar now require to be considered. In The High Court, Calcutta v. Amal Kumar Roy(² ) this Court held that the word 'rank' in art. 311 (2) referred to cl'assification and not to a particular place in the same cadre in the F hierarchy of service. The facts of the case were as follows. The respondent was a Munsif in the West Bengal Civil Service (Judicial). When the cases of several Munsifs came up for considera- • tion before the High Court for inclusion in the panel of officers to officiate as Subordinate Judges, the respondent's name was excluded. On a rnpresentation made by· him, the respondent was G told by the Registrar of the High Court that the Court had decided to consider his case after a year. As a result of such exclusion, the respondent, who was then the seniormost in the list of Munsifs, lost eight places in the cadre of Subordinate Judges before he was actually appointed to act as an Additional Subordinate Judge. His case mainly was that this exclusion by the High H Court amounted in law to the penalty of 'withholding of prom<>tion' without giving him an opportunity to show cause. He pray-

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(!) [1954] Nag. L.J. 305.

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(2) [1963] 1 S.C.R. 437

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[ 1966] 3 S.C.R.

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11 6

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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ed that a declaration might be made that he occupied the same position in respect of seniority in the cadre of Subordinate Judges as he would have done if no supersession had taken place and claimed arrears of salary, in a suit filed by him. The trial Court decreed the suit. On behalf of the appellants a preliminary objection was taken in this Coun that the controversy raised was not justiciable. This Court held that there was no cause of action for the suit and the appeal must succeed.

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It was there contended on behalf of the respondent that even though there might not hav.~ been any d'sciplinary proceedings taken against him, the effect of the H:gh Court's order was that he was reduced by eight places in the !ht of Suoordinate Judges and that in law amounted to a reduction in rank within the meaning of art. 31 l (2) of the Constitution. At p. 453 it W1IS pointed out as follows :

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"Jn our opinion, there is no substance in this contention because losing places in the same cadre, namely, of Subordinate Judges docs not amount to a reduction in rank within the meaning of an. 311 (2). The plaintiff sought to argue that 'rank', in accordance with dictionary meaning, signifies 'relative position or ;talus or place', according to Oxford English Dictionary. The word 'rank' can be and has been used in different senses in different contexts. The exore.'5ion 'rank' in art. · 311 (2) has reference to a person's classification and not his particular place in the same cadre in the heirarchy of the service to which he belongs. Hence. in the context of the Jud'cial Service of West Bengal. 'reduction in rank' would imply that a person who is already holding the post of a Subordinate Judge has been reduced to the posilion of a Munsif, the rank of a Subordinate Judge being higher than that of a Munsif. But Subordinate Judges in the same cadre hold the same rank though they have to be listed in order of <cniority in the Cvil Li<t. Therefore .. los"ng some places in the seniority list is nnt tantamount to reduction in rank. Hence, it must be held that the provi,ions of art. 3 I I (2) of the Constitution are not a1tracte<l to this cai;;c."

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This decision therefore is authority for the position that losing some places in the seniority list is not tantamount to reduction in rank.

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D, P. 0., s. RLY, v. RAGHAVENDRACHAR (Raju, J.) 11 T

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A The respondent relied upon the decision of this Court in P. C. Wadhwa v. Union of India('). There, the appellant, a member of the Indian Police Service and holding the substantive rank of Assistant Superintendent of Police (a post in the junior time scale of pay) in the State of Punjab, was promoted to officiate as Superintendent of Police, which was a post carrying a B higher salary in the senior time-scale, and posted as Additional Superintendent of Police. After he had earned one increment in that post, he was served with a charge-sheet and before the enquiry, which had been ordered, had started, he was reverted to ' his substantive rank of Assistant Superintendent of Police, the ground suggested for reversion being unsatisfactory conduct. No C details of the unsatisfactory conduct were specified and the appellant was not asked for any explanation. At the time when the appellant was reverted, officers junior to him in the I.P.S. Cadre of the State were officiating in the senior scale. The order entailed loss of pay as well as loss of seniority and postponement D of future chances of promotion,

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It was held that the order of reversion made against the appellant was in effect a 'reduction in rank' within the meaning of art. 311 (2) of the Constituifon and inasmuch as he was given no opportunity of showing cause against the said order of reverE sion, there was violation of art. 311. On a consideration of the circumstances of the case, this Court reached the conclusion that the action of the Government reverting the appellant was ma/a fide. But that was not the sole ground on which the order of reversion was held to be bad.

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After an examination of the legal position from the large body of rules to which reference was made, it was held that in so far as the Indian Police Service is concerned there was only one cadre, that appointment to posts borne on that cadre were to be made by direct recruitment except to the extent of 25 per cent of the senior posts which may be filled by promotion from the State Police Service. A special feature of the All India Services like the Indian Police Service and the Indian Civil Service is that promotion is a matter of right. It was for this reason that this Court, by a majority pointed out at p. 622 that in the case of those services there was no rule which, specifically provided that an officer had to be freshly appointed to a post carrying a salary in the senior scale of pay.

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(I) (1964] 4 S.C.R. 598.

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J.

¶170

I 18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS 11966] 3 S.C.R. At p. 627 it was said : A "In our opinion, the whole scheme of 1he rules indicates that a person borne on the junior scale of pay • has a right to hold a post on the senior scale of • pay depending upon the availability of a post and his seniority in the junior scale of pay. . . If a person holdB ing a post in the senior scale, though in an officiating ' capacity, is found to be unfit to hold that post, action will have to be taken against him as required by r. 5 of Discipline and Appeal Rules because his reversion • to a post in the lower scale would amount to reduction ' in rank within the meaning of art. 311 of the Constituc tion.'' On a consideration of the circumstances of thal case. it is • clear that the decision itself proceeded on the basic fact that for members of All India Services like the Indian Police Service. pr<>motion was a matter of right and special considerations would D have to be applil',,d to them. • Now, in the light of the principles established by the above decisions, we may consider the respondent's case. The Southern · Railway has two grades of Train Examiners. The respondent and one James Blazey were promoted from the lower grade to officiate in the higher grade. The respondent was shown at item f. no. 2 and James Blazey at item no. 3 in the promotion list. A note waq appended to the order that the promotion of the respondent and Wazey were 'purely provisional subject to revision when >eniority lists were drawn up for the Division'. By reason of the order ; dated November 27, 1959, the respondent was reverted to the F lower grade while Blazcy was retained in the higher grade. The • case of the respondent is that Blazey was junior to him and that since he was reverted while Blazey was not. it would amount to a reduction in rank so far as he was concerned. It is plain that what he complairn of is that he lost his seniority by reason of the the .. retention of Blazey in the officiating higher post. G The respondent's rank in the substantive post i.e., m the lower grade, was in no way affected by this. In the substantive grade, the respondent retained his rank. It may also be added that he was visited with no penal consequences. It is no doubt . • true that it is not the form but the substance that matters. but II

¶171

Now, in the light of the principles established by the above decisions, we may consider the respondent's case. The Southern · Railway has two grades of Train Examiners. The respondent and one James Blazey were promoted from the lower grade to officiate in the higher grade. The respondent was shown at item no. 2 and James Blazey at item no. 3 in the promotion list. A note waq appended to the order that the promotion of the respondent and Wazey were 'purely provisional subject to revision when >eniority lists were drawn up for the Division'. By reason of the order dated November 27, 1959, the respondent was reverted to the lower grade while Blazcy was retained in the higher grade. The case of the respondent is that Blazey was junior to him and that since he was reverted while Blazey was not. it would amount to a reduction in rank so far as he was concerned. It is plain that what he complairn of is that he lost his seniority by reason of the the retention of Blazey in the officiating higher post.

¶172

The respondent's rank in the substantive post i.e., m the lower grade, was in no way affected by this. In the substantive grade, the respondent retained his rank. It may also be added that he was visited with no penal consequences. It is no doubt true that it is not the form but the substance that matters. but once it is accepted that the respondent has no right to the post to which he was provisionally promoted, there can be no doubt that his reversion does not amount to a reduction in rnnk.

¶173

D. P. o., s. RLY. v. RAGHAVENDRACHAR (Raju, I.) 119

¶174

A None of the decisions considered above lends support to the contention for the respondent.

¶175

It was finally argued that the procedure prescribed by rr. 1609 to 1619 of the rules coFJ.tained in the Indian Railway Establishment Code, Vol. I., were contrayened. Rule 1609 reads :

¶176

B

¶177

c

¶178

"As a general rule, in no circumstances, should a gazetted railway servant be kept in ignorance for any length of time that his superiors, after sufficient experience of his work, are dissatisfied with him; where a warning might eradicate a particular fault, the advantages of prompt communication are obvious. On the other hand, the communication of any adverse remarks removed from their context is likely to give a misleading impression to the gazetted railway servant concerned. The procedure detailed in rule 1610 should therefore be followed."

¶179

D Rulec 1609 to 1618 apply only to gazetted railway servants. The respondent is not a gazetted railway servant and there is no quection of his claiming that he is entitled to the right given under the above rules.

¶180

Rule 1619 refers to non-gazetted railway servants. That rule E providec that in general conformity with the principles laid down in the preceding rules applicable to Gazetted Railway Servants, a General Manager may frame detai1-.,d rules for the preparation, submission and disposal of confidential reports on non-gazetted railway servants. Learned courn;el for the respondent could not place before us those rules, if any.

¶181

..

¶182

F

¶183

The contentions raised by the respondent having been negatived, this appeal must succeed, and it is accordingly allowed, but, in the circumstanc.a.,s of the case, there will be no order as to costs.

¶184

G .. . \

¶185

Appeal allowed .

¶186

< A

Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway v. S. Raghavendrachar

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Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway v. S. Raghavendrachar

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