Supreme Court held that s. 201 IPC punishment depends on the actual offence committed, not the one believed. Court reduced sentence from 3 years to one year nine months as max for grievous hurt (s. 325) evidence removal.
Sentence under s. 201 IPC reduced from three years to one year and nine months rigorous imprisonment.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
316
A
ROSHAN LAL & ORS.
v.
STATE OF PUNJAB
December 3, 1964
[A. K. SARKAR, N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR AND
B
R. S. BACHAWAT, JJ.]
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860), s. 201-Removal of evidence of crime to screen offender-Maximum punishment under 1ectlon whether tu be with reference to offence found to have been committed or offenc. 'believed' to have been committed.
•
Tue three appellants were prosecuted for various offences under the c Indian Penal Code and acquitted by the trial court, On appeal, the High Coun of Punjab convicted one of the appellants under ss: 330 and 148 of the Code and all the appellants under s. 201 of the Code while acquitting them in respect of the charge under s. 304. The sentence passed under s. 201 was three years rigorous imprisonment each, the coun holding ihat the apP"Jlants had removed evidence of the offence culpable homicide. In appeal to the Supreme Coun by special leave, the appellants contended that the only offences proved to have been committed were under ss. 330 D and 348 and therefore the fourth paragraph of s. 201 applied and under it the sentence could not exceed one-fourth of the longest term of imprisonment of the offences under ss. 330 and 348 which worked out at one year and nine months. The contention of the respondent State on the other hand was that the term of imprisonment that could be imposed under s. 201 did not depend on the actual offence committed the evidence of which had been destroyed but on what the accused belieYed that offence to have been and therefore the sentence imposed in the present case was E fully Within its terms. It was stressed that the words in the first paragraph of s. 201 were "knowing or having reason to believe that an offence had been committed," but in the second paragraph the words were "knows or believes to have been committed." HELD (Per Rajagopala Ayyangar and Bachawat, JJ.) (i) The expression "knowing or having reason to believe" in the fint paragraph and tho expression "knows or believes" in the second paragraph are used in the F same sense. If it be supposed that the word "believes" was used in a sense different from the expression "having reason to believe", it would be necessary for the purpose of inflicting punishment upon the accused to prove that he "believes" in addition to "having reason to believe". We cannot impute to the legislature an intention that an accused who is found guilty of the offence under the first paragraph would escape puni!hment under the succeeding paragraphs unless some additional fact or state of mind is proved. [324 A-DJ · G (ii) If the contention of the Stale were to be accepted, the erroneous belief or delusion of the •ccused would furnish the. measure of punishment and he would be punishable under the second paragraph with imprisonment extending to seven years. On this interpn;tation it is possible that a person who removes the evidence of an offence may be liable to a heavier punishment than the person who committed the main offence as when the actual offence committed is under s. 323 but the accused under s. 201 H removes the blood-marks caused by the offence in the belief that they were caused by murder. It does not stand to reason that s. 201 provides for punishing a minor offence more severely than tho principal offence. [325 ~:01
"
ROSHAN LAL v. STATE (Sarkar, /.)
317
A . Chinna Gangappa, In re: I.L.R. (1931) 54 Mad. 68, coosidered and mterpreted.
(iii) The word "offence" wherever used in the first, second, third and founh paragraphs of s. 20 I means some real offence which in fai:t has been committed and not some offence which the accused imagines to have been committed. In the present caoe it had not been establisbed that the offence under s. 304 was committed by the appellants or by B anybody else. Only offences under ss. 330 and 348 I.P.C. has been proved t.o have been comn\jtted. [324 G-H]
(iv) By the same act, namely, burning of the dead body of Raja R31D, the appellants caused the evidence of two offences namely s. 330 and 348 to disappear. Taking a strict view of the matter it must be held that by the same act the appellants committed two offences under •. 201. But normally, no court should award two separate punishments for the same act constituting two offences under s. 201. Under s. 330 c the maximum punishment is seven years' imprisonment and therefore the accused are liable to a maximum of one-fourth of se-en years' imprison• ment I.e. one year and nine months. [327 A-CJ
Per Sarkar, J.-(i) There is no reason to dispute the proposition that there must first be an actual offence in order that there may be evidence of it which is destroyed. But this does not furnish an answer to the contention for the State. Suppose an offence is committed but is believed to D be of a graver nature than it actually is. There can be no objection in principle in such a case to a law which makes the punishment of the person who destroys the evidence of that offence to depend on what he belie\·ed it to have been. [320 C-F]
(ii) But even if the interpretation suggested for the state were accept· ed the sentence imposed in the present case could not be upheld. In order that that interpretation might assist the State it has to be shown E that the appellants believed that an offence under s. 304 had been committed so that the case could be brought under paragraph 3. The High Court had not come to a finding that an offence under s. 304 had been committOd by tbe appellants, in fact they were acquitted of that charge. The most that can on the facts be reasonably said against tbe appellants is that they knew or believed tbat an offence of grievous hurt bad been committed under s. 325. The longest term of imprisonment for that offence being seven years, the appellants could at the most be given under F the fourth paragraph of s. 201 one-fourth of that term, namely, one year and nine months. (321 G-H; 322 A-Bl
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Ctiminal Appeal No. 197 of 1964.
Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated May 21, 1964, of the Punjab High Court in Criminal Appeal No. G 598 of 1963.
N. S. Krishna Rao and Girish Chandra, for the appellants.
R. N. Sachthey, for the respondent.
SARKAR •. J. delivered a separate Opiition. The Judgment of Rajagopale Ayyangar and Bachawat JJ. was delivered by Bachawat H J.
Sarkar J. There are three appellants in this case. They had been prosecuted for various offences under the Indian Penal Code
[1965] 2 S.c.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
318
and acquitted by the trial Court. On appeal, the High Court of A Punjab convicted the appellant Roshan Lal, a Sub-Inspector of ' Police, under ss. 330 and 348 of the Code. The High Court also convicted all the three appellants under .s. 201 of the Code. This appeal is against the judgment of the High Court with special leave. That leave was however confined only to the question as to the .legality of the term of imprisonment imposed under s. 201. B
B
The High Court found that Roshan Lal, with a police party which included the two other appellants one of whom was an Assistant Sub-Inspector and the other a police constable, arrested a man called Raja Ram on a public street on suspicion that he was an opium smuggler, took him to his house and when no C · contraband opium was found there, the appellant Roshan Lal got very angry and hit him on the head with his baton which injured his eye. In respect of this injury the appellant Roshan Lal was convicted on one count under s. 330 of the Code. After this beating Raja Ram was taken by the police party to the police station and kept confined in a room there for the night and was I> there beaten by Roshan Lal assisted by some policemen. It was however not found that the other two appellants had taken any fart in administering this beating to Raja Ram. In respect of this beating the appellant Roshan Lal was convicted by the High Court on a second count under s. 330 read with s. 34 of the Code and also under s. 348 for wrongful confinement of Raja Ram with E · a view to extort· a confession. Next morning Raja Ram was found dead in the room in a pool of blood. The three appellants thereafter carried his dead body to a jungle, burnt it up and collected the bones and ground them in a pestle and mortar and threw the remnants in a canal. In respect of the disposal of the body l!Dd thereby destroying the evidence of the offences commitF ted upon Raja Ram the appellants were convicted under s. 201 of the Code. Each of the appellants was sentenced for the offence under s. 201 to rigorous imprisonment for three years.
E ·
The only question in this appeal is whether the· appellants could have been awarded a sentence of imprisonment for three years under s. 201. That section is in these terms :
G
. S. 201. Whoever, knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed, causes any evidence of the commission of that offence to disappear, with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment, or with that intention gives any information respecting the offence which he knows or believes to be false,
H
ROSHAN LAL v. STATE (Sarkar, /.)
319
shall, if the offence which he knows or believes to have been committed is punishable with death, be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine;
B
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and if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment which may extend to ten years, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, and shall also be liable to fine;
and if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for any term not extending to ten years, shall be punished with imprisonment of the description provided for the offence, for a term which may extend to one-fourth part of the longest term of the imprisonment provided for the offence, or with fine, or with both.
D The appellants contended that the sentence imposed was not justified by the section, for the offences found to have been committed were under ss. 330 and 348 and, therefore, the fourth paragraph of the section applied and under it the sentence could not exceed one-fourth of the longest term of imprisonment for the offences under ss. 330 and 348. It was said that on this basis, the longest E term of imprisonment that could be imposed in the present case would be one year and nine months and not three years as was done.
The contention of the respondent State was that the term of imprisonment .that could be imposed under s. 201 did not depend on the actual offences committed the evidence of which had been F destroyed but on what the accused believed that offence to have been and therefore the sentence imposed in the present case was fully within its terms and the matter had to be governed by the third paragraph of the section. Learned advocate for the State contended that the words "the offence" in the third and fourth paragraphs meant the offence mentioned in the second paragraph. The G second paragraph speaks of "the offence which he knows or believes to have been committed" and therefore the word "offence" in the last two paragraphs must refer to the offence which the person accused under s. 201 either knew or believed to have been committed. It seems to me that so far the contention of the State is unassailable. It is not necessary to consider a case where it is H known what the offence committed is, for it is not disputed that the punishment has there to depend on that offence. The argument on behalf of the State was that if s. 201 did not intend that
[i965] 2 S.C.R.
320
' SUPRBMJ! COURT llBPORTS
punishment under it could be made to depend on the belief as to the offence committed, then the words "which he .... believes to have been committed" would be rendered completely otiose. It was said that an interpretation cannot be accepted which would result in a part of the language used being rendered ineffective. As at present advised, l am inclined to agree with this reasoning though for reasons later discussed, I find it unnecessary t.o express a final opinion on it on the present occasion.
On behalf of the appellants it was contended first, that in order that an offence under s. 201 might be committed there must be another offence actually committed. It was indeed so held by this Court in Palvinder Ku er v. State of Punjab (1 ) and by a full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Empress of India v. A hdul Kadir(') I find no reason to dispute that proposition. There must first be an actual offence in order that there may be evidenc<: of it which is destroyed. Further it cannot be the intention of a law creating criminal offences that a person may be guilty only beeause he believed that what he was doing constituted an offence though D it was not in fact so. Both these aspects of the question were mentioned in the judgment of the Allahabad High Court. But I am unable to see that the fact that an actual offence has to be committed furnishes an answer to tlie contention for the State. Suppose an offence is committed but is believed to be of a graver nature than it actually is. There can be no objection in principle in such a case to a law which makes the punishment of the person who destroys the evidence of that offence to depend on what he believed it to have been. The person is not being convicted under that law because he believed what he was doing was an offence while it was in fact not; he did commit an actual offence by destroying the evidence of another actual offence and all that the law does is to F permit the imposition of a term of imprisonment according to his belief.
Learned advocate for the appellants then said that in view of the words "having reason to believe that an offence bas been committed" in the first paragraph of the section the contention on behalf of the State could not be accepted. It was said that if the contention of the State was accepted, it would be necessary to prove two states of mind, namely, first that he bad reason to believe that an offence bad been committed and secondly, what his belief as to the kind of that offence was. It was said that that would be anomalous. But this argument is to my mind unavailing. for the acceptance of the State's interpretation of the section does not ----(!) (19S3] S.C.R. 94, 102. (2) (1880] I.L.R. 3 All. 279.
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B
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G
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ROSHAN LAL v. STATE (Sarkar, /.)
321
I have said that I am inclined to agree with learned advocate for the State but I think it right also to observe that I find it diflicult to imagine that it can ever be found that a person guilty of an F offence under s. 201, believed the offence of which he had destroyed the evidence, to have been of a higher degree than it actually was. That, however, is only a matter of proof. But even if we were to accept the interpretation suggested for the State, I think, we cannot in the present case uphold the sentence imposed. In order that that interpretation might assist the State, it has to be G shown that the appellants believed that an offence under s. 304 had been committed so that the case could be brought under paragraph 3. The High Court had not come to a finding that an offence under s. 304 had been committed by the appellants; in fact they were acquitted of the charge under that section for causing the death of Raja Ram. The High Court did not even find that the H appellants believed that an offence under s. 304 had been committed. All that the High Court said was that "Raja Ram met his death by violence", without indicating who had committed
322
[1965] 2 S.C.ll.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
that violence. It may be that the violence only caused a grievous A hurt. The most that can on the facts be reasonably said against the appellants is that they knew or believed that an offence of grievous hurt had been committed on Raja Ram under s. 3:Z5. The longest term of imprisonment that can !>e imposed under that section is seven years. The appellants could not most be given under the fourth paragraph of s. 201 one-fourth of that term, B namely, one year and nine months. A similar view was taken, it seems to me rightly, in In re Chinna Gangappa(').
I would, therefore, reduce the sentence passed under s. 201 to one year, nine months. ·
Bacbawat, J. Appellants, Roshan Lal, Lachhman Singh and Kulwant Rai were police officers attached to the police station, Jaito in District Bhatinda. Roshan Lal was the Sub-Inspector and Station House Officer, Lachhman Singh was the Assistant Suli-Inspector and Kulwant Rai was a foot constable. The appellants were charged with diverse offences under ss. 330, 348, 330/ 34, 304, 342, 201 and 342/34 of the Indian Penal Code. The Trial Judge acquitted all the appellants. On appeal, the High Court found that on December 24, 1961 al Raja Ram's house, Roshan Lal for the purpose of extorting information from Raja Ram as to the illegal possession of opium, gave a danda blow to Raja Ram and injured his eye, and had thereby committed an E offence under s. 330, and that Roshan Lal was responsible for the illegal confinement of Raja Ram at the Jaito police station, and together with other police officers for the belabouring of Raja Ram during the night between the 24th and 25th December, 196 l, and thereby committed offences under ss. 348 and 330/34. Accordingly, the High Court convicted Rosban Lal of the offences under ss. 330, 330/34 and 348 and passed appropriate sentences on him for those offences. The High. Court also found that all the appellants "knowing or having reason to believe that an offence has been committed and with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment caused the evidence of an offence of culpable homicide and of offences under ss. 330 and 348 of the Indian Penal Code to disappear by burning clandestinely Raja Ram's dead body." On this finding, the High Court convicted all the appellants pf the offence under s. 201 and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for thre1~ years. The High Court directed that the substantive sentences of Roshan Lal under ss. 340, 348 and 201 would run consecutively. All the appellants H
D
F
G
(I) (1931) I.L.ll 54 Mad. 68.
ROSHAN LAL v. STATE (Bachawat, J.)
323
[1965] 2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT RBPOR'ICS
324
Section 201 is somewhat clumsily drafted, but we think that the expression "knowing or having reason to believe" in the first paragraph and the expression "knows or believes" in the second paragraph are used in the same sense. Take the case of an accused who has reason to believe that an offence has been committed. If the other conditions of the . ..first paragraph are satisfied, he is guilty of an offence under s. 201. If it be supposed B that the word "believes" was used in a sense different from the expression "having reason to believe", it would be necessary for the purpose of inflicting punishment upon the accused to prove that he "believes" in addition to "having reason to believe". We cannot impute to the legislature an intention that an accused who is found guilty of the offence under the first paragraph would escape punishment under the succeeding paragraphs unless some additional fact or state of mind if proved. Jn' the instant case, the High Court recorded the finding that the appellants knew or had reason to believe that an offence had been committed. It did not record a separate finding that the appellants knew or believed that D an offence was committed. If Mr. Sachthey's argument were accepted, the appellants would escape punishment altogether. But, iii our opinion, it was not necessary to record such a separate finding.
The first paragraph of s. 201 lays down the essential ingredients of the offence under s. 201. It must be proved first that an offence has been committed. See Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab(') and Empress of India v. Abdul Kadir(2 ). Secondly, the accused must know or have reason to believe that the offence has been committed. Thirdly, the accused must either cause any evidence of the commission of that offence to disappear or give any information respecting the o~nce which he knows or believes to be false. Fourthly the accusedmust have acted with the intention of screening the offender from legal punishment. By the second, third and fourth paragraphs, the measure of the punishment is made to depend upon the gravity of the offence. The word "offence" wherever used in the first, second, third and fourth paragraphs means some real offence, which, in. fact, has been committed and not some offence which the accused imagines has been committed. The punishment depends upon the gravity of the offence which was committed and which the accused knew or had reason to believe to have been committed. If an accused on seeing blood marks on the ground-made as a result of an offence punishable under s. 323, erases the blood marks with the intention
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(I) (1953] S.C.R. 94, 102.
(2) [1880] I.L.R. 3 All. 281.
ROSHAN LAL v. STATE (Bachawat, J.)
325
We do not think that the passage supports the contention of Mr. Sachthey. It is clear that in this passage the Judges had in their mind the first paragraph of s. 20 l and not the second paraH graph, as suggested by Mr. Sachthey, for they refer to the offence which the accused "knew or had reason to believe had been com-
(I) (19311 I.L.R. S4 Mad. 68.
l·
[1965] 2 S.C.R.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS
326
.mitted". Literally read, the passage may suggest that the guilt under s. 201 does not depend on what offence the accused knew or believed to have been committed and only the measure of punishment depends on that fact. We cannot agree with this construction of the passage. But we think that in the. context of the entire judgment the passage really means that both the conviction and punislupent under s. 201 depend not so much on what offence was, in fact, committed but on what the accused knew or had reason to believe to have been committed, and where a major offence was committed but the accused knew or believed that only a minor offence had been committed, it would be the minor offence that would furnish the measure of punishment; for :the Judges went on to say :
"From that point of view we cannot on the evidence say that more is proved than that the accused knew that some one had hit his wife and th at she had died in consequence. We arc unable to conclude that he knew that the person who struck her had the criminal intention of killing her. It must have been clear however to the accused that his wife bad died as a result of the blows given and that she at least suffered grievous hurt, and "that is punishable under section 325, Indian Penal Code, with imprisonment for seven years. Under section 201 the accused is then liable to be sentenced to a maximum of one-fourth of that seven years. The learned Sessions Judge has sentenced the accused to rigorous imprisonment for five years. At the most he can be sentenced to one year and three-fourths. We think that it will be sufficient if he undergoes imprisonment for one year and we reduce the sentence accordingly."
It is reasonable to think, though the judgment is not explicit on this point, that the High Court found that the offence of grievous 1mrt under s. 325 had been committed in the presence of the accused, and the accused knew that the offence had been committed and was, therefore, punishable with one-fourth of the maximum imprisonment of seven years provided for the offence under s. 325. In this view of the matter, the ultimate conclusion of the Madras High Court may well be supported, though we cannot agree with the entirety of .the observations.
Mr. Sachthey next contended that the appellants having caused the evidence of the two offences under ss. 330 and 348 to disappear, committed two separate offences' under s .. 201 and are punishable accordingly. Now, by the same act, namely, burning
A
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D
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G
H
LAL v. STATE (Bachawat, !.)
ROSHAN
327
E
. In the result, the appeal is allowed in part, and the sentences passed on the appellants for the offence under s. 201 of the Indian Penal Code are reduced to rigorous imprisonment for one year and nine months. In other respects, the judgment under appeal is I~ affirmed.
Appeal partly allowed.
L3 Sup./65-5
3 issues framed by the court
Whether the punishment for removing evidence under s. 201 IPC depends on the actual offence committed or the offence believed to have been committed by the accused.
Whether the acquittal on the charge of culpable homicide (s. 304 IPC) precludes conviction under s. 201 IPC based on that believed offence.
Whether the appellants could be punished for two separate offences under s. 201 for destroying evidence of multiple crimes by a single act.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Palvinder Kaur v. State of PunjabReferred¶51
Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab (1953) S.C.R. 94, 102 · Who else cites this
Empress of India v. Abdul KadirReferred¶61
Empress of India v. Abdul Kadir (1880) I.L.R. 3 All. 279 · Who else cites this
Chinna Gangappa, In reDistinguished¶111
Chinna Gangappa, In re: (1931) I.L.R. 54 Mad. 68 · Who else cites this
3 provisions across 1 enactments
Roshan Lal & Ors.
State of Punjab
Bachawat
Rajagopala Ayyangar
Sarkar
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
