During the pendency of an industrial· dispute between the appellant and its workmen, the services of the respondent, who was an employee, were terminated without giving any reasons. He filed a petition before the Industrial Tribunal, under s. 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act. 1947, complaining that the approval of. the Tribunal for termmatiog his services as required by the proviso to s. 33(2)(b) was not obtained. The appellant justified the. termination by contending that cl. 17(a) of the Slanding Orders enabled the management to terminate the services of an employee by fourteen days' notice, that though the respondent was deliberately going slow in his work the termination was not for misconduct, and that therefore s. 33(2) (b) and its proviso did not apply. The Tribunal held, that as the termination was under cl. 17 (a) of the Standing Orderw, s. 33(2) (a) applied. The Tribunal however held that the proviso applied to s. 33(2) (a) also, and that, since the approval of the Tribunal was not obtained, . the application under s. 33-A was maintainable. The Tribunal then considered the evidence adduced on merits, held that the allegation that the respondent had been deliberately going slow was not made out, and ordered the reinstatement of the respondent The appe. Dant filed a writ petition in the High Court, which held, that the proviso applies only to cl. (b) and not to cl. (a), that action was taken against the respondent by way of punishment and therefore was covered by cl. (b) to which the proviso applies, and that therefore the Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain the application and pass order on merits. In appeal to the Supreme Court, it was contended that since the Tribunal took the \iew that the case was covered by s. 33(2) (a), it had no jurisdiction to entertain the application because, the proviso is not applicable to that sub-section.
