speak of penalties imposed by s. 39 and acts punishable under it. In Public Prosecutor v. Abdul W ahab (1 ) it was stated that the language used in ss. 48 and 49 cannot be regarded as strictly accurate. Such an interpretation is not permitted for "the words of an Act of Parliament must be construed so as to give sensible meaning to them." The words ought to be construed ut res magis valeat quam pereat: Curtis v. Stovin('). And we find no difficulty in taking the view that s. 39 docs provide for a punishment. It says that the dishonest abstraction of energy shall be deemed to be theft within the meaning of the Indian Penal Code. The section, therefore, makes something which was not a tileft within that Code, a theft within it, for if the abstraction was a theft within the Code, the section would be unnecessary. It follows from this that the section also makes that theft punishable in the manner provided in it, for if the act is deemed to be a theft within the Code it must be so deemed for all purposes of it, including the purpose of incurring the punishment. In State v. Magan/a/ Chunilal Bogawat(8 ) it was also stated that the offence of abstraclion of energy is by s. 39 expressly made punishable under s. 379. We find no such express provision in s. 39. Even if there was such a provision in the Act, the liability to punishment woulc arise not under the Code but really because of s. 39. It will be impossible to hold that without s. 39 there is any liability to punishment under the Code for any abstraction of electrical energy. In Public Prosecutor v. Abdul Wahab(') it was observed that since s. 39 created a theft within the meaning of the Indian Penal Code by means of a fiction, it followed that as the fiction could not be departed from, the offence so fictionally created was one under the Code. We are unable to appreciate thi reasoning. If a provision says that something which is not an offence within the meaning of another statute is to be deemed to be such, the offence is, in our view, created by the statute which raises the fiction and not by the statute within which it is · to be deemed by that fiction to be included. If the other view was correct, it would have to be held that the offence was one within the last mentioned statute proprio vigore and this clearly it is not. At this stage we might point 0ut that in Abdul Wahab's(') case it was stated that "It can be accepted that s. 39 of the Act creates an offence." It seems to us that if so much is conceded, it is impossible to say that s. 50 would not apply to a prosecution in respect of it for it applies to every prosecution "for any offence against this Act".
