that an employer would be entitled to lay off his 1963 workmen for the reasons prescribed by s. 2(kkk), it might have been another matter. The only pro- Workmenof vision on which reliance has been placed is contained Dewan Tea in s. 25C and that, as we have already seen, merely Estate and Ors. takes in the definition of lay off inasmuch as it v. refers to the workmen as laid off and provides the The Management manner in which compensation would be paid to . - them. An alleged conflict between the definition Ga1end7gadkar of lay off and the substantive rule of the Standing · Orders would not, therefore, help the respondent to contend that the definition over-rides the statutory conditions as to lay off included in the certified Standing Order. Therefore, we do not think Mr. Banerjee would be entitled to contend that s. 2(kkk) of the Act is wider than the relevant Rule in the Standing Orders and should apply to the facts of this case. We ought to make it clear that in dealing with this argument, we have not thought it necessary to consider whether the broad and general construction of s. 2(kkk) for which Mr. Banerjee contends is justified. In fact, Mr. Agarwala for the appellants has very strongly urged that the words "for any reason" found ins. 2(kkk) will not take in the trading considerations. He contends and prima facie with some force that the said words must be construed ejusdem generis with the words that precede them. (vide Management of Kairbetta Estate, Kotagiri v. Rajamanickam & Ors.)<1 > According to him, the circumstances specified in s. 2(kkk) which justify a lay off must be integrally connected with production, and so, trading reasons cannot be included in that definition. According to this argument, the distinguishing features of the genus of which the several circumstances mentioned in the definition are different species, are: they are beyond the control of the employer, are expected to be of a short duration, and are of compulsive effect. As we have already indicated, we do not think it necessary to decide this interesting point in the present appeal because we are satisfied that the present dis(!) [1960] 3 S.C.R. 371.
