1963 elusive and non-justiciable would not make the pro--. vision unreasonable with respect to carrying on any Corporatwn of trade etc. In that case, s. 38 (I) of the Banking Com- Calcutta panies Act, provided that notwithstanding anything v. contained in the Companies Act, 1956, the High Court Calcutta Tram- shall order the winding up of a banking company, if ways Co., Ltd. an application for its winding up has been made by the Reserve Bank under s. 37, or this section. It Wanchoo J. was urged in that case that the provision amounted to an unreasonable restriction on the right to carry on banking as the whole procedure was a denial of the principles of natural justice, chiefly as it denied access to courts, for ordinarily it was for the court to be satisfied after a fair trial that an order of winding up a company was called for and the court was free to reach a decision after the company had shown cause and there was also a right of appeal against such decision. This Court held by a majority that in view of the history of the establishment of the Reserve Bank as a central bank for India, its position as a banker's bank, its control over banking companies and banking in India, its position as the issuing bank, its power to license banking companies and cancel their licences and numerous other powers, the provision could not be challenged as unreasonable as the Res~rve Bank makes an application for winding up only where it is satisfied that it was necessary to wind up a tottering or unsafe banking company in the interest of the depositors. We are of opinion that the decision in that case must be confined to the very special circumstances of the trade of banking, which is a very sensitive credit organisation and to the very special position the Reserve Bank occupies in the banking world in this country. That decision cannot be extended as a matter of course to other cases where substantially similar provisions are made in other laws relating to exclusion of the jurisdiction of courts. · In other cases of this kind, the question has to be examined on the merits in each case to see whether the restriction created by conclusiveness and nonjusticiability is a reasonable restriction in the circumstances of the particular case.
