Chittaranjan Das versus State of West Bengal — Supreme Court (1964) — LawSathi Research

Chittaranjan Das versus State of West Bengal — Supreme Court (1964) — LawSathi Research

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

Dismissed

Issue for consideration

Whether the charge framed on three counts, specifying only periods of dates (18.11.1958-21.11.1958; 1.12.1958-6.12.1958; 9.12.1958-15.12.1958) within which the rape was alleged, without the precise date and time, contravened s. 222(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and was invalid and illegal. +6 more

Court's answer

Where it is possible to specify precisely the necessary particulars required by s. 222(1), the prosecution ought to mention them in the charge; but where such particulars cannot be precisely specified having regard to the nature of the information available to the prosecution, failure to mention such particulars may not invalidate the charge.

Ratio / Principle

The basic requirement in every criminal trial is that the charge be so framed as to give the accused a fairly reasonable idea of the case he is to face; the validity of a charge must in each case be tested by whether the accused had reasonably sufficient notice of the matter with which he was charged.

Key takeaways

Where provisions of procedure are not of vital importance but are intended to be observed, their breach does not necessarily vitiate the trial unless the contravention caused prejudice to the accused, as made clear by sections 535 and 537 Cr. P. C.; a charge is not invalid solely because it does not specify the particular date and time of the offence.ratio¶83
The charge framed in the present case did not contravene the requirement of s. 222(1) and was therefore valid; in dealing with such questions the court examines all relevant facts and, if the charge could and ought to have been framed more precisely, then enquires whether the defect prejudiced the accused.ratio¶22

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Supreme Court of India (Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo and Das Gupta JJ.; judgment delivered by Gajendragadkar J.), Criminal Appeal No. 165 of 1960, decided April 22, 1963 - Jury trial for rape under s. 376 IPC (co-accused charged under s. 376 read with s. 109 IPC): (1) A charge specifying only periods of dates within which the offence was allegedly committed does not contravene s. 222(1), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, where the particulars cannot be precisely specified having regard to the information available to the prosecution; the test is whether the accused had reasonably sufficient notice, and breach of a non-vital procedural provision vitiates the trial only on shown prejudice (ss. 535, 537 Cr. P. C.). The charge in this case was valid; Ali Hyder v. Emperor (1939) 40 Cr. L.J. 280 does not support the contrary contention. (2) Under s. 421 Cr. P. C., a High Court satisfied that a criminal appeal has no substance may dismiss it summarily without recording reasons; summary dismissal involves application of mind to the merits, and the High Court was not right in granting a certificate on the ground that the appeal should not have been summarily dismissed - Mushtak Hussein v. State of Bombay, A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 282 and Shreekantiah Ramayya v. State of Bombay distinguished. (3) Alleged misdirections in the charge to the jury were rejected: deferring to the jury whether the charges were 'in order' (the High Court having already upheld the charge in revision, its finding binding the Sessions Judge); the corroboration requirement regarding the prosecutrix (adequately explained; charge fair and more favourable to the appellant); non-repetition of the onus on the prosecution to prove the girl was below 16; and the position that previous statements under s. 145 Indian Evidence Act serve to contradict and are not substantive evidence. (4) A unanimous jury verdict causing the judge disagreeable surprise is not for that reason perverse; the Sessions Judge rightly accepted it. Appeal dismissed; appellant to surrender to bail bond.

Issues for consideration

7 issues framed by the court

AI extract

1.
Whether the charge framed on three counts, specifying only periods of dates (18.11.1958-21.11.1958; 1.12.1958-6.12.1958; 9.12.1958-15.12.1958) within which the rape was alleged, without the precise date and time, contravened s. 222(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and was invalid and illegal.¶63
The court held
Where it is possible to specify precisely the necessary particulars required by s. 222(1), the prosecution ought to mention them in the charge; but where such particulars cannot be precisely specified having regard to the nature of the information available to the prosecution, failure to mention such particulars may not invalidate the charge.ratio¶88
2.
Whether the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court rightly summarily dismissed the appellant's appeal, and whether the certificate was rightly granted on the ground that the appeal should not have been summarily dismissed.¶98
The court held
The position under s. 421 is clear and unambiguous: when a High Court dealing with a criminal appeal takes the view that there is no substance in the appeal, it is not necessary that it record reasons for its conclusion in summarily dismissing it.ratio¶111
3.
Whether the Sessions Judge's statement to the jury that, in case they held the charges were in order, they should proceed to consider the evidence, amounted to a misdirection (the validity of the charge being a question of law for the judge).¶112
The court held
There was no misdirection in the judge leaving open to the jury the question whether the charges were in order: the High Court had already upheld the charge in revision, its finding was binding on the Sessions Judge, and if there was any grievance on this score it would be on the side of the prosecution, not the appellant.ratio¶116
4.
Whether the charge to the jury was materially defective in that the judge did not tell the jury that, in view of the contradictions brought out in her evidence and her past career and record, the prosecutrix's evidence should not be believed, and whether the requirement of corroboration was adequately explained.¶118
The court held
The requirement as to corroboration of the evidence of a prosecutrix was elaborately explained by the Sessions Judge to the jury; on the whole the charge was fair and more in favour of the appellant than of the prosecution, and was not materially defective on this matter.ratio¶122
5.
Whether the failure of the Sessions Judge, while dealing with the evidence on the girl's age, to tell the jury that the onus lay on the prosecution to prove she was below 16 (benefit of doubt going to the accused) constituted a misdirection.¶125
The court held
The failure of the learned Judge to mention again the point about the onus to prove the girl's age, when he dealt with the actual relevant evidence, was not a misdirection, much less a material one leading to prejudice, since in the first part of the charge he had made clear that the prosecution had to show the girl was below 16.ratio¶125
6.
Whether the Sessions Judge misdirected the jury by stating that the previous statements of the girl brought on the record under s. 145 of the Indian Evidence Act do not constitute substantive evidence but are intended only to contradict her evidence in court.¶128
The court held
When a previous statement is put to a witness in cross-examination under s. 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, its primary purpose is to contradict the witness by reference to the evidence given at the trial, and it cannot be treated as substantive evidence; the learned Judge was therefore right in law in his instruction to the jury, and the charge suffered no serious misdirection on this account.ratio¶134
7.
Whether the jury's verdict of guilty, practically based on the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix, was perverse, such that the Sessions Judge should have treated it as perverse and made a reference instead of accepting it.¶139
The court held
The jury's unanimous verdict of guilty, returned after considering the matter for an hour and a half, was not perverse; in a jury trial a verdict that causes the judge disagreeable surprise is not for that reason perverse, and the Sessions Judge was not required by law to treat the verdict as perverse.ratio¶139