in aocordaoce with, and shall be governed by, the other provisions of the Act so far as they can be made applicable. Further we find that the same discretion has been given to the court in the matter of arbitration in suits provided under Chap. IV, was s. 25 provides that "the provisions of the others Chapters shall, so far as they can be ma.de applicable, apply to arbitration under this Chapter." The proviso to s. 2fi gives discretion to the court in any of the circumsta.nCJ3s mentioned in ss. 8, IO, 11 and 12, instead of filling up the vacancies or making the appointments, to make an order super· sedinl.( the arbitration and proceed with the suit, and when' the court sursedes the arbitration under A. HJ it i;hall proceed with the suit. The sc·beme of the Act therefore is whether the a.rbit1 ation is unc.ier Chap. JI, Chap. HI or Chap. IV, to give discretion to the court to decide whether to · supersede the r!'fcrence or not. Where it deides to supersede the refer!'nce it hll.l' to order that the arbitration agreement shall cease to h'lve effect with respect to the difference rt•fcrr!'d ; but where it decides not to supersede the reference and the reference and the arbitration agreement subsist and if there is machinery provided in the arbitration agreement for making a further reference or for continuing the same reference, further arbitration oa.n take place. The contention therefore urged on behalf of the appellant that once the l\ward is ee\ aside the arbitrator becomes functu.~ officio and consequently there can be no further reference with respeot to ihe dispute decide'1 by the nward which is set asirle, must fail in view of the specific provisions of e. 19 of the Act.
