Partly allowed

Bidi, Bidi Leaves' and Tobacco Merchants Association v. the State of Bombay

Supreme Court15 Nov 19611961 INSC 311 · [1962] SUPP. 1 S.C.R. 3811961 INSC 311

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Challenge to a minimum wage notification for the bidi industry in Vidarbha whose later clauses regulated rejection of 'chhat' bidis and payment for them. Held that the Act empowered only fixation of minimum wages, not variation of other contract terms; clauses 3 to 7 were ultra vires and severable.

What did the court decide?

Clauses 3 to 7 of the notification declared ultra vires; Civil Appeals Nos.415 and 417 allowed with costs against the respondent; Nos.416 and 418 dismissed.

What the court decided

Bidi, Bidi Leaves' and Tobacco Merchants… — Labour and Industrial Disputes | Supreme Court (1962)

¶1

(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 381

¶2

department. We are therefore of opinion that the workmen are entitled to an additional bonus for half a month for this year.

¶3

We therefore partly allow the appeal and reduce the additional bonus from one month to half a month. In the circumstances we order the parties to bear their own cost~.

¶4

1961

¶5

illysort Kir/oakar Ltd, •• lt"orkers of lhe 1~1.Jsore Kirloskar Ltd.

¶6

Appeal allowed.

¶7

BIDI, BIDI LEAVES' AND TOBACCO MERCHANTS ASSOCIATION

1961

THE STATE OF BOMBAY

(P. B. GAJENDRAGADKAR, A. K. SARKAR, K. N. WANCHOO, K. C. DAs GUPTA and N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR, JJ.)

¶12

Minimum Wages-Bidi industry-Nolificatlon fixing minimum wages, prescribi11g method for di.•carding of 'Chhat' bidis and payment therefore-If ultra vii-es-Doctrine of implied powers-Notification No. MIV A 1557 J dated June 11, 1948-Minimurn Wages Act, J.948(11 of 1948), ss. 2(k) 3, 5, 20 and 21.

¶13

By s. 3 of the Minimum W;iges Act, 1948, the appro- priate Government is authorised to fix minimum rates of wages for employees in the Scheduled employments and •· 5 lays down the procedure for fixing and revising such minimum wages. The State Government published a notification dated June 11, 1958, fixing minimum rates of wages in respect of employments in bidi making in the Vidarhha region. Clauses I and 2 of the notification prescribed the minimum rates district wise and provided for higher rates for making bidis known as •Hatl)akhun' in all the districts. Clauses 3 to 7 dealt with disputes between the employers and the employees as to how bad bidis were to be discarded and in what proportion and as to the payment for such discarded bidis. The appellant contended that els. 3 to 7 of the notification were 'ltltra virea:

¶14

llel.d, that els. 3 to 7 of the Notification were outside the purview of the p~wers conferred upon the State Government

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¶16

382 SUPR,EME CO"(fflT RE.PORTS [1962lSUPP.

¶17

1961 by s. 5 of. the Act and were ultra vires. TI.e pro- Ridi Bidi Leaves and i~~ns of ~~C Act empoered the Gov:i-ne? only to fi" Tob0acco Merchants' mm1mum Wages; they did not authorise it to make rules Association for resolving the disputes regarding the rejection of bad v. bidis an,d regarding the payments to be made for the rejected Thi State of Bomhrry· bi dis. ' ·

¶18

The Act empowered the Government to fix the re. muneration pavable to an employee if the other terms.of the c;ontracl were.observed; it did not authorise the Government to vary the other terms. Under the contract the employer was entitled to decide which bidis to discard, and to retain such bidi~ and to pay onlv for such bidis as were accepted by him. Clauses 3 to 7 of the notification purported to modifv these tert{ls in mterial particµlars and this was not within tJie po_wer conferred by 't]ie Act upon the 'GovrrnIl)ent. Nor could these'clauses• be justified. on the basis of implied powers. The doctrine of implied powers could only b invoked whn it was found that a duty was imposed or a power conferred qq an authqritv by a statute and it was furtl1cr found 'that the duty could not be discharged or the *p0wci:,s ,could n?t be, excrcisef* t ,all unless some auxiliary or inCjidrontal po\•er was assumed· to exist. ven 'if cIS. J and 2 would l'i'ecome 'ineffective without els. 3 fo 7 being there that viould not be a proper basis for invoking the doc.trJnc of implied power;c::. The definition of !wages' in •· 2(h) of the Act postulated, the binding character of the othP.1" tenTJS of the contract and brought Within the-pur"iew of the Act only th term.relating to wages. By impliqltio!l the very haic concept ot wae-es could not be ignored. By ss: 20 and 21 the Act makes specific provision for the settle- ment of claims in re12;ard to payment of minimum wages ;:i.nd a !llnch no :po,vers could be implied in the Governmf"nt to set up a separa1c machinery to settle such cjisputr.s. Fur. ther, no power could be. implied to make els. I and ·7 of the notification effective : such power could only be implied if it \vas neces5ary to make:is. 5 of the Act itself effective.

¶19

Michael Fent-On and JameA Fraser v. Jhon Sleplien Hom:eton, (1957-59) 117 R.. R. 21, referred to.

¶20

r C:rvn. APPELLATE .'T 1j-RISDIOTION ': Civil Appeals Nos. 415-Al8 of 1960.

¶21

Appeals from the judgments. and orders da.te9- September 23, 1958,' of tlie Bombay High Court in Specfal Civil Applications Nos. 205 and 214 of 1958.

•

383

(1) S.C.R. SUPREME OOURT REPORTS

¶27

A. V. Viswcinatha Sa8tri, S. P. Verma, S. N. Andley, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the appellants (in C. A. No. 415 of 1960).

¶28

A. S. Bobde and Ganpat Rai, for the appellants (in C. A. No. 417of1960) and respondents (in C. A. No. 418/60).

¶29

1961

¶30

Bidi, Bidi LeaVlfS and 'l'obacco lU1rclionfs' Association I Y. Th, Stole of Rombay

¶31

H. R. Khanna and R.H. Dhebar, for the appellants (in C. A~. Nos. 416 and 418 of 1960) and respondent No. l (in C. As. Nos. 415 and 417 of 1960).

¶32

A. G. R'1tnriparkhi, for respondent No. 3 (in C. A. No. 415 of 1960).

¶33

1961November15. The Judgment of the Court wa1 delivered by

¶34

GAJENDRAGADKAR, J.-These four appeals consist of two sets of cross appeals each and they arise from two petitions filed in the High Court of Bombay at Nagpur challenging the validity of the notification dated June 11, 1958, issued by the State of Bombay, now represented by the State of Maharashtra, under s. 5 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, ( 11 of 19_48) (hereafter called the Act.) The petitioners in Special Civil Applicati.m No. 20,; of 1958 are the Bidi, Bidi Leaves and Tobacco Merchants' Association. Gondia and two others, whereas the petitiones in Special Ciyil Application No. 214 of 1958 a.re Haji Latif Ghani Kachhi and five others. The impugned notification consists of seven clauaes. Bv the majority decision of the High Court els. 1 t 5 and th<i first p'lrt of cl. 6 are held to be inti-a vire.'I, whereas the latter part of cl. 6 a.nd cl. 7 as well as the explanation added to it are held to be ultra vires. The first part of the finding is challenged by the petitioners in the two writ petitions by their Civil Appeals Nos. 415 and 417 respectively, while the latter part of the finding is challenged by the State of Maharashtra in its Civil Appeals Nos. 416 and 418 respectively. Thus, Civil Appeals Nos. 415 and 4lll are cross

¶35

Gnjend1agadX:ar J.

¶36

38' SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.

¶37

11161

¶38

Billi, Bidi /.e41'1J arvl T,,fuuuJ M trchonts' AntKfation

¶39

.. Tht S~ate of Bombtr1 Oq,¹ 1ndrnzadkar J.

¶40

appeals and Civil Appeals Nos. 417 and 418 are cross appeals. 'l'hese appeals h:we been brought to this Con rt with a certificate granted by the High Court under Art. 132(1) of the Constitution . As will presently appear tho only point which calls for our decision in these appeals i;; one relating to the validity of the impugned notification; and so the certificate might well have been given under Art. 133 ( l)(c) and not under Art. 132 (I) because the c sc docs not involve a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution. For convenience we will refor to the petitioners in the writ petitions as petitioners and the State of Maha1·ashtra as the respondent in these a.ppeals.

¶41

The petitioners are bidi manufacturers in different parts of the Vidarbha region and they employ a large number of persons for the purpose of making bidis for them. It appears that the Government of the State of Madhya Pradesh within whose jurisdiction Vidarbha was then situated had fixed the minimum rates of wages in respect of employment in tohacco (including bidi making) manufactories by issuing a notification on January 11, 1951. This notification had purported to fix tho minimum rates of wages per 1000 bidis by reference to different localities in the State. The rates thus fixed wore inclusive of dearness allowance or compensatory cost of living allowance and they varied from place to place as specified in columns 2 to 4 of the notification respectively. An Advisory Board was thereafter constituted by the said Stat~ in exercise of the powera conferred on it by s. 7 of the Aot. Subsequently, in Hl56 the said minimum rates of wages were revisoo by a notification issued on February 23, 1956. As a result of th11 State Reorganisation Act, 1956 (37of1956) the Vidarbha region became part of the State of Bombay. After Vida.rbha. thus became a part of the State of Bombay the Government of Bombay notified that the Advisory Board appointed by the said Government

¶42

¶43

(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶44

385

¶45

11nder s. 7 shall be the Advisory Board for Vidarbha. This notification was issued on November 1, 1956. The Government of Bombay then issued a notification publishing the draft of the notification whioh was proposed to be issued under s. 5, sub-s. (2) read with cl. (b) of sub-s. (1) of s. 5, and notice was thereby given to :i.11 the bidi manufacturers that the said draft would be taken into consideration on or after Ma~ch I, 1957. Thereafter the procedure prescribed byis. 5 was followed, E>n enquiry wits held, a report of the Advisory Board was received and finally the impugned notification was issued on June 11, 1958. It is the validity of the several clauses contained in this notification that is challenged before us in the present appcll.ls.

¶46

Bitli, Bidi Leaves and Tobacc,7 .\Jerchanl ~, Ass11riation v.

¶47

The Staie 1,f BomblfY Gajendi-1g•:dkar J.

¶48

In their petitions the petitioners alleged that els. 3 t,o 7 of the notification were invalid and '!dtm vires the p•lwers of the respondent under ss. 3, 4 and 5 of the Act. According to them the respondent had no power to make provision for deciding as to the extent to which "chhat" will be permittedor directing the action to be taken by the em{lloyer and employee relating to bad bidis. Their contention was that. the said clauses purported to make provisions for the settlement of disputes between the employer and the employee concerning an Industrial matter and were outside the purview of the respondent's power under the relevant sections. They urged that the different provisions of the notification were so interrelated that it was difficult to dissociate one from the other and so it was neceRsary that the notification as a whole should be qua.shell.

¶49

The respondent disputed the correctness of the contentions raised by the petitioners. It urged that there were constant disputes among bidi manufacturers and bidi workers regarding the minimum wages fixed in the Vidarbha region and so the respondent thought it neceRsary to institute

¶50

386 SUPREME COURT REPORTS fl!l62) SUPP.

¶51

J!Jf;J Bid;, Bidi Lttn!ts t111tl t111tl r obacco obacco Associ4tion ,\fnchanls, ,\fnchanls, Associ4tion ,\fnchanls,

¶52

J!Jf;J an cuquiry int-0 theBe complaints in order to decide Bid;, Bidi Lttn!ts t111tl t111tl "'hether it WW! necessary to revise the minimum r obacco obacco Associ4tion ,\fnchanls, wages prescribed by the earlier notification and the ... mode of determining those 1vagee. It was only 7711 Stait of Bouabay aftt>r a comprehensi1·e enquiry was held at which **_Oajcff<lragaJkar J._** all parties were heard that the respondent issued the notification in qucstiun. Its case wi>s that the minimum rates of \·ages had been fixed on industry cum-regionwise hasiA and that els. 3 to 7 wcro intended to make t.he fixation of minimum rates of wages effective. According to the respondent, the absence of any ru lea regarding the t•xcrciee of the right of "chhat" uy the employers tends to deprive the bidi workers of their right of getting minimum ra!.<lS of \'ag.,~, and so !'.Is. 3 to 7 were deliberately introduced to make the material provisions of th" Act l'ffectivc in their implementation.

¶53

The&' pet it ions wt>re first heard hy llfoclholkar

¶54

and Kotval, JJ. ?lfudholkar, J. held that all the '-'lauses in the impugned notification were valid for,

¶55

. accordin!! to him, though the Aot, had uot conferrcXpreas powers on the respondent to prt>scribe the impugned clauses of the notification yet the respon<lent could prescribe the said rules undor the doctrine of implied powcrn. Kot val, J., agreed that els.I and 2 were valid but he thought that llven under the doctrine of implied powers the remaining els. 3 to 7 could not be sustained. According to him the said clauses were, however, severable from els. I and 2 and so they should be struck down leaving els. I and 2 in tact. Sinco there was a difference of opinion between the two learner! judges the matter was referred to Tambe, ,T. He held that els. I to 5 and the first part of cl. 6 wore intra vires where as the latter part of cl. 6 and cl. 7 as w~,11 RS the explanation added to it wero ultm vires. After

¶56

Mr. Justice Tambe pronounced his judgment the matter was again refrrred to a Division Bench, and the Division Bench, in accordance with the majority opinion, has upheld thP. validity of els. I to 5 and

•

(1) S.C.R.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 387

¶63

11161

¶64

the first part of cl. 6 and has struck down the latter part of cl. 6 as well as cl. 7 and its explanation. It is against this decision that the petitioners and the respondent have come to this Court with a certificate granted by the High Court in that behalf.

¶65

Bidi1 Bitli Leav•.s at.'d Tobaceo M1n·hant11' Association y, TM Stat1 of Bombay Gajendra1adkar J.

¶66

Before dealing with the merits of the controversy between the parties it wonld be relevant to refer to the material provisions of the Act. The Act was passed in 1948 in order to provide for fix. ing minim nm rates of wages in certain employments. Its provisions apply to the scheduled employment which expression under s. 2 (g) means an employment specified in the schedule, or any process or branch of work forming part of such employment. It is common-ground that employment in any tobacco (including bidi making) manufactory is a scheduled employment under the schedule of the Act. Section 2(h) defines wages and it prescribes inter alia, that wages means all, remuneration capable of being expressed in terms of money which would, if the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled be payable to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment, and includes house-rent allowance, but does not include the items specified by els. (i) to (v) of the said definition. Section 3 authorises the appropriate Government to prescribe different minimum rates of wage• for different scheduled employments, different classes of work in the same scheduled employments, adults, adolescents, children and apprentices and different localities. Under s. 4 are prescribed the components of the minimum rates of wages. Section 5 provides for the procedure for fixing and revising minimum wages. Section 7 provjdes, inter alia, that minimum wages payable under the Act shall be paid in cash. Under s. 12 an obligation is imposed on the employer to pay every one of his employees engaged in the scheduled employment wages at a ra.te

¶67

¶68

¶69

388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [I 962] SUPP.

¶70

Hllll not less than the minimum rate or wages fixed by the i1otification issued in that behalf. Section 12 Biii, Ridi Uaou tffltl Tohar,co &1 nelumt•' (2) saves the application of the provisions of the AJ.111riation v. payment of wages Act. Section 20 authorises the Tht Stcltt of Bt1mhay appropriate Government to appoint an authority to GaJtndragadkar J. hear 1nd decide for any specifir.d area all claims arising out of the payment of less than the minimum rates of wages and other claims specified therein. The remaining sub.sections of the said section prescribe the procedure for determining such rlaims. Under s. 21 a single application can be made in respect of a number of employees who wish to prefer a claim for the decision of the authority under R. 20. Section 22 prescribes penalties for the offences therein specified. Section 22A provides that if any employer contravenes any of the provisions of the Act or any rule or order made thereunder he shall, if no other penalty is provided for such contravention, be punishable with fine which may extend to five hundred rupees. Section 22B provides, inter alia the manner in which Courts may take cognizance of a complaint against any person for an offence committed under the Act. That in brief is the scheme of the material provisions of the Act.

¶71

At this stage it would be necessary to read thi> Rrvernl cl a.uses of the impugned notification :

¶72

"No. MWA. 1557-J. In exercise of the powers conferred by eub·section (2) of section 5 read with clause ( b) of suh·eection (I) of that section of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 (XI of 1948) and after consulting the Advisory Board and in supereeesion of the former Government of Madhya Pradesh Labour Department Notification No. 564-451 XXIII, dated 23rd Febrwuy, 1956, thl' Government of Bombay hereby revise the minimum rates of wag~e in respect of the employment in any tobacco (including bidi making) manufactory in the Vidarbha region of the State of Bombay

389

t '

(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶78

as mentioned in the Schedule hereto annexed and directs that this notification shall come into force with effect from lst July, 1958.

¶79

SCHEDULE

¶80

Subject to the other provisions of this Schedule, the revised minimum rates of wages payable to employees per thousand bidis (when leavas are supplied by the employer) shall be as follows:

¶81

BiJi, Bidi Leaves and Tobacco Merchants~ A.!sociation

¶82

v. Th• Stale of Bom•qy

¶83

Qaj1ndragadka.r J,

¶84

Area Re vised rates in Rs.

¶85

( i) Nagpur District 1.69

¶86

(ii) Bhandara District ... 1.62

¶87

(iii) Chanda, Akola, Buldana, Yeotmal, Amravati and Wardha District 1.56

¶88

¶89

For all bidis in which 7 chhataks or more of tobacco mixture is used and for those bidis lthich are known as "Hatnakun" bidis, there shall be an increase of 12 Naye Paise per 1000 bi dis in the rates mentioned aboTe in all the areas.

¶90

It shall be within the ,discretion of the employer to decide which are "chhat" hidis or bad bidis, up to 5 per cent of the bidis prepared by the employee. If the employer decided that any bidis are "chhat" or bed, the "ohhat'' or bad bidis up to 5 per cent sha.U be destroyed forthwith by the employee and whatever tobacco is recovered from them shall be retained by the employer. If, h!)w· ever the employer wants to retain these "chhat" or bad hidis, he shall pay full wages for the same to the employee.

¶91

·If "chhat" or bad bidis are more than 5 per ClCJlt, but less than 10 per cant, and if there is any dispute between the employer

¶92

¶93

1~61

¶94

lfirli, Bidi ltMts and 1'cbarco Mnchr1n1J' :l1Joci&1ion v. 1 ht Stolt of Bum6ay

¶95

390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.

¶96

:mcl the employee as to whether the "chhat" or bad bidis is <lone properly or not, equal number of representatives of the omployer and the employees shall inspect the "chhat" is done properly or not. If there is any difference of opinion among the representatives of the two sides, the majority opinion shall prevail. If tho opinion is equally divided and the employer wants to retain the "chhat" bidis, ho shall pay wagcs for "chhat" bidis between ii per cent to JO per cent at half the rates fixed abo'e. If the employer does not want to retaiu these bidis tho employee shall destroy them forthwith.

¶97

¶98

The employer shall nominate his ropresentatives an<l the employees shall elect their representativt-s.

¶99

ti. In the case of "chhat" above 10 per cent., tho employee shall be entitled to full wages. It shall, however, be open to the employer to take suitable action against the employee if the "chhat" is more than l 0 per I cent for 6 continuous working days in a calenda'r month.

¶100

'.!.'he "chhat" shall be made once in a <lay only, at any premiaes within a distance of not more than 2 miles from the premilles where bidis are manufactured.

¶101

Explanation :-For the purpose of this Schedule the expression "employer" includes his thekedar, centractor or agent as the case may be.'

¶102

The validity of els. J and 2 ia not in dispute. The petitioners, howevar, contend that els. 3 to 7 are outside the powers conferred on the respondent by the relevant provisions of the Act and as such are invalid. It i1 common ground that even if the impugned claUBe8 arc held to be ultra vires they are

¶103

•

¶104

SUPREME COURT REPORTS 391

(I) S.C.R.

1961

severable from els. I and 2 so that the invaliditv of the impugned clauses will not affect the validity of the said two clauses and they will stand even if the other clauses are struck down.

¶110

Bidi, Bidi Leaves and Tobaceo li1erch'ltJ.ts Associatior. v. The State of Bo"•l>a; Gajendra1adkar J,

¶111

In determining the question about t.he validity of the impugned clauses it is necessary to refer to two material facts. The nature and scope of the terms of contract between the petitioners and their employees are really not in dispute. It is alleged by the petitioners that they employ a large number of persons for the purpose of making bidis for them, that these persons are supplied with tendu leaves, tobacco and other necessary . materials, they take the said articles to their respective places where they work and bring back the bidis prepared by them to the employer. The employer then examines the bidis' accepts such of them as are found to have been prepared according to the terms of the contract rejects such of them as a.re found to be of poor quality and not preparad according to the terms of the contract and pays for the bidis actually accepted. The respondent has not traversed these allegations made by the potitioners. It admitted that the workers are paid on piece-fate basis and the payment is made "on the basis of bidis selected and accepted by the employer after rejecting certain portions of bidis prepared by the workers". In fa.ct the respondent has expressly stated that "there is a recognised practice of making payment on the basis of bidis accepted by employers as coming up to a certain standard of skill". It is further admitted that the employers have insisted on their right in principle of rejecting the sub-normal or sub-standard bidis prepared by the employees. Thua, there is no doubt that under the terms of the contract the workers are · entitled to receive payment only for the bidis accepted by the employers, and not for those

¶112

¶113

392 SUPREME COURT REPORTl:i [19ti:l] SUPP.

¶114

1961

¶115

which are rejected. It is also not disputed that the Bidi, Bidi L,..,, and bidis which are rejected by the employers otherwise Toba= M,,dlants' Assoru.1;.. kn own as "c ata are retame hh " · d b y t e emp oyer h J •· though he refuses to take them into account in the T ht S ,.,, of Bomba,1 f h k h d __ matter o payment to t e wor ers on t e groun C..;.nJrqaikar J. that they do not come up to the stan'dard of skill or quality prescribed by the contract.

¶116

,..

¶117

It also appears t6 be true that the employees in this region have been protesting against improper rejection of the bidis by the employers. They have contended that the employers reject an un_reasonably high proportion of bidis falsely dubbing them as of sub-normal quality without paying anything to the workers for their labour spent in rolling such rejected bidis. In it.! affidavit the respondent has emphasised that as a result of this method of discarding bidis on the ground that they are of sub-standard quality bidis workers were deprived of the labour charges for bid.is which are rejecttld by their employers; and so it was urged that the question of · fixing minimum rates of wages for bidi workers necessarily involved the question as to the quantum or percentage of such rejection which should be permissible to the employer. According to the respondent he impugned notification has purported to fix the minimum rates of wages after taking llito consideration the problem presented by the praotioe of discarding bidis and paying wages to the workers only for such bidis ae are accepted. In BUpport of the validity of the notification the repondent aleo relied on the fact that 'the formula prescribed by the notification had been evolved after taking into aooount the respresentstions made both by the employers and the employees. In faot, according to the respondent, the said formula represented a substantial degree of agreement between the parties on this point.

¶118

It would thus be aeen that on ihe two material faote there is really no serious dispute between the

¶119

(I) S.C.R.

¶120

8U.PltEME COURT REPORTS 303

¶121

parties. The respondent agrees tht under the practice which mnst be taken to be consistent wih the implied terms of contract between the bidi manufactufer and his employee, after the bidis are prepared by the employees and brought back to the employer the employer has a right to examine the quality of the bidis, a.ccept only such as have come up to the standard prescribed by the contract and reject the rest. The practice further justifies the payment of wages to the employees only for the bidis actually accepted and not for those which are rejected though the rejected bi'1is may be retained by the employer. On the other hand, it is not, and cannot be, serioru;ly disputed by the petitioners that in some cases this practice may work great hardship on the workers, and in every case the workers do not get wages for the labour put by them in rolling the rejected bidis. The main question which arises for our decision in the present appeals is whether the injru;tice resulting from the practice of discarding bidis and not making any payment for them to the workers can be checked, controlled and regulated by the respondent by issuing a notification under the powers conferred on it by s.5 of the Act. If the relevant provisions of the Act confer upon the respondent the power to check the evil against which the workers complain then of course the validity of the impugned clauses would be beyond challenge. If, on the other hand, the power to prescribe or revise minimum rates of wages does not either expressly or by neoellsary implication include the power to provide for the machinery to check the evil in question, then the impugned clauses would be ultra vire8 however necessary it may be to check and control the said evil in question.

¶122

1961

¶123

Bidi, Bidi Lttw~s and Tobacco Merchants' Association

¶124

¶125

The State of Bombay Gqje.ndragadkar J.

¶126

In 'this connection let us broadly examine the scope and effect of the impugned clauses. Clauses I and 2 prescribe the revised minimum rates distriotwise and provide for the payment of higher

¶127

¶128

:194 SUPREME Cl>lJHT RErOHTS [1962] SUP1'.

¶129

price for tho bidis known as Hatnakhun hidis in 1.111 Bidi. Didi lat·tJ and the said districts. These two dauses arc obviously '/Qta<co .\ltrcliarits" valid and the petitioners have not disputed the AsJCKi 1tton v. conclusion of the High Court in that behalf. Claus- 1 h S1a1e of Bomb•.] es 3 to 6 deal with the problem of the Chhat hidis or bidis which are rejected because they aro bad. Clause 3 leaves it to the discretion of the employer to decide which arc chhat bidis up to 5 percent of the bidis prepared by the "mployees. This cluasc provides that the bidis so rejected would be destroyed and tobacco recovered from them retained by the employer ; and it adds that if the employer wants to retain the rejected bidis he shall pay full wages' for tho same to the employee. In other words this, clause means that the employer may discard bidis up to 5 per cent but if he doCI! not want. to pay the workers for the said bidis he must destroy them. That would show that the discretion exerci.i!ed by him i~ honest and fair. If, on the other hand, he wants to retain the said bidis that would mean that ho thinks that the bidis would find a market and in that case he must pay for them on the basis that they are good bidis. On priciplc this provision may perhaps not be open to any serious criticism and it is not unlikely that if the notification had not made further det~iled provisions by ols. 4 to 6 the present dieputo would not have been brought before the High Court. The employers probably do not have a serious grievance against cl. 3 on the merits.

¶130

Clause 4 deals with cases where the rejection may be more than 5 per cont but less than IO per cent of total work produced by the worker. In regard to this cl1.11111 o~ cases cl. 4 ~rovides for . a machinery to deal with cases fallmg under it. Representatives of the employers and employl.'68 have to be appointed and they havti to decide whether the work has been properly done or not. The decision would bo according t.o the opinion of the majority. If the opinion is equally divided

¶131

(I) S.C.It. 8Ul'REME COURT REPO'ItTS

¶132

395

¶133

and tho employer wants to retain the chhat bidi8, between 5 per cent to 10 per cent he shall pay at half the rates fixed in cl. 1. If the employer does not want to retain them the employees shall destroy them, The clause does not seem to provide for a case where the majority opinion may support the rejection between 5 per cent and 10 percent ; that is a lacuna in the clause. The only comment which can be legitimately made against the clause on it.s merits is th~t the setting up of the machinery for a kind of adjudication of the dispute between the employer and the employee may, instrncl of solving the difficulties in actual working, add to them:

¶134

1V61

¶135

Bidi, Bit!i Leaves anr:I Tobacco M ercha11ts' Association v. 7 he S tote of Bomba; Gajendragadkar J.

¶136

. That takes us to cl. 6. This clause has been very severely criticised by the petitioners. It pro· vides that in case of chhat above 10 per cent the employees shall be entitled to full wages which means that even if chhat above 10 per cent i1 made reasonably and for a proper cause the employer has to pay for the discarded work as therein prescribed ; the only right given to the employer in such a case is to take suitable action against the employee if the chhat is more than 10 per cent and that too for six continuous working days in a calendar month. Prima facie this clause appears to be unreasonable and unjust.

¶137

The explanation to cl. 7 is also. criticised by the petitioners because the thekedar, contractor or agent, who is appointed by the employer would, if the explanation is valid, be liable to perform all the obligations imposed on the employer by the relevant provisions of the Act such as ss.12 and 18. We have examined the broad features of the notifi· cation and indirated .the comment made on it by the petitioners for the purpose of showing that on the merits some of the clauses do not appear to be fair and just, but that is not the ground on which their validity can be or has been challenged before us. The main argument in support of the challenge

¶138

:~!lfi SUPHEME COURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.

¶139

1961

¶140

1idi, Bidi l4tlr~s ontf Tobac,o Altr,ltants• A ss0<iation .. rn, Stai, of BomHy Gej,1,d1cg1u/A1.r J,

¶141

rests on the as~umption that els. 3 to 7 arc all be· yond the powers conferred on the respondent by the relevant provisions of the Act ; and it is this argument which needs to be examined .

¶142

It is well settled that industrial adjudication uder the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act., 1947(14 of 1947) is given wide powers and jurisdic. tion to make appropriate awards in determining industrial disputes brought before it. An a'lfard made in an industrial adjudication may impose new obligations on the employer in the interest of social justico and with a view to secure peace and ha1mony between the employer and his workmen and full co-operation botween them. Such an award may oven alter the terms of employment if it is thought fit and nece888ry to do so. In deciding industrial disputes tho jurisdiction of the tribunal is not con· fiued to the administration of justice in accordance with the Jaw of contract. Mukherjee, J ., as he then was, has observed in The Bharat Bank Ltd., lJellii v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., Del/ti (¹ ) the tribunal "can confer rights and privileges on either party which it considers reasonable and proper, though they may not be within the terms of any existing agreement. It has not merely to interpret or give effect to the contractual rights and obligations between them which it consid!'Ts essential for keeping industrial peace." Since the decision of the Federal Court in Western India Atltomobile Association v. industrial Tribunal, Bombay('), it h<U! been repeatedly held that the jurisdiction of industrial tribune.ls is much wider and can be reasonably exe1·cised in deciding industrial disputes with the object of keeping industrial peace and progress (Vide: Rohtas lndustriu, Ltd., v. Brijnandan Pandey ('); The Patna Electr·ic Supply Co. Ltd., Patna v. 'J'he l'atna Electric Supply Workers' Union('). Indeed, during the last ten years and more (II [1950 S.C.R.4S~.Sl3, (21 A.l.R. [19•9]F.C. lli,[1949]F.C.32r. (3) [l956J S.CR. 8\JU, (fl [J9S9JSupp.2S.C.R. 761.

¶143

(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS ~7

¶144

industrial adjutlication in this conntrv has made so much progress in determinin~ industrial d sputes &rising between industries of different kinds and their employees that the jurisliction ani auth >rity of industrial tribunals to dna\ with .such disputes with the object of ensuring social justice is no longer seriously disputed.

¶145

1961

¶146

Bidi, Bidi L1twes altd Tobacco Merchm11t A.Sso~ialio.i v-.--· The State of Bomhrg Gqjendrogadk•r J.

¶147

But, it is necessary to remember that no claim can be made for such broad jurisdictional power by the respondent when it purports to issue a notification under the provisions of the Act. These powers and authority would necessarily be conditioned by the relevant provisions under which it purports to act, and the validity of the impugned notification must therefore be judged not by general considerations of social justice or even considerations for introducing industrial peace; they must be judged solely and exclusively by the test prescribed by the provisions of the statute itself. It appears that in 1956 before Vidarbha became a part of the State or Bombay the State Government of Madhya Pradesh had made a com· prehensive reference· for the arbitration by the State Industrial Court between the bidi manu· facturers of Bhandara District and their employees. In this dispute all the material issues arising from the prevailing practice which authorised employers to reject ohhat bidis had been expressly referred for adjudication. Subsequently, when the impugned notification wa~ issued the respondent apparently took the view that wh11t could have been achieved by reference to the arbitration of State Industrial Co11rt may well be accomplished by issuing a notification under s. 5 of the Act. It may be that there is substance in the grievanco made by the employees that ~he practice of rejecting chhat bidis often leads to tho injuatice and deprives them of the wages legitimately earned by them by rolling the said bidis and there can be no doubt that if a comprehensive reference is made for the decision of

¶148

¶149

398 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.

¶150

1901

¶151

1901 this industrial dispute between the bidi ma.nufao. Jidi, Bidi 1...,,,, .,,d turers and their employees an award ma.y well be Tobauo Mrrch••t•' passed which will resolve this dispute; hut the AHociatUm v. question which falls for our decision is whether the 'r.. S1at<0f Bombay relevant proviaions of the Act authorised the Stnto ojcndrag•dkar J. Government io make rules for the decision of the dispute in that behalf and for the p<~yment of mini· mum rates of wagcR on the basis of such decision? In our opinion, the answer to this question haR to be in the negative.

¶152

Wba.t is the extent of the authority conferred on the respondent in fixing or revising minimum rates of the wages under the relevant provisions of the Act? In dealing with this question we must ncceSBarily bear in mind the definition of the term "wages" proscribed by s. 2(h). As wo have already Aeen the term "wages" includes remuneration which would, if the terms of tho contract of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable to a. person employed in respect of his employment.. In other words, the terms "wages'' r~fcrs to rcmunerat.ion payable to tho employee as a result of the t-0rms of employment. What would be the amount tu which tho employee is entitled if tho other terms of the contra.ct are preferred ? That the question which has to be asked in detennin. i11g what the torm "wages" means under H. 2(h). No doubt ~s. 3, 4 and 5 authorised the appropriate Government to fix the minimum rates of wages. In other words, if the wa.geR fixed by n. contra.et which is either express or implied are found to be low authority is conferred on the appropriate Government to increase them so as to bring them to the level of what the said Government ra.gards as the minimum wages in the particular scheduled employment in the particular area concerned. Thia means that power is conferred on the appropriate Government to modify one term of the contract exprese or implied between the employer and the

¶153

(1) S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 399

¶154

employee and that is a term which has reference to the payment of wages. If for a certain piece of work done by the employee the employer has agreed to pay him either expressly or by implicati 111 a certain amount of wages the appropriate Government can issue a notification and prescribe that for the said work done under the contract the employer must pa,y his employee a much higher rate of wages and the higher rate of wages thus prescribed would be deemed to be the minimum rate of wages between the parties.

¶155

Bidi, Bidi Lta11er find,,. Tobacco Merchant)' Assar:iatiOn v.

¶156

·rhe State of Bomhav Gajendragadk111 J.

¶157

It would, however, be noticed that in defining "wages" cl. 2 {h) postulates that they would be payable if the other terms of the contract of employment are fulfilled. That is to say, in authorising the fixation of minimum rates of wages the other terms of the contract of employment have always to be fulfilled. The fulfilment of the other terms of the contract is a condition precedent for the payment of wages as defined under s. 2 (h} and it continues to be such a condition precedent even for the payment of the minimum rates of wages fixed and prescribed by the appropriate Government. The significance of the definition contained in s. 2(h) lies in the fact that the rate of wages may be increased but no change can be made in the other terms of the contract. In other words, the Act, operated on the wages and docs not operntc on the other terms of the contract between the employer and the employee. That is the biisic approach which must be adopted in determining the scope iind effect of the powers conferred on the appropriate Government by the relevant provisions of the statute ii~tho rising it to prescribe minimum rates of wages or to revise them. What thA appropriiite Government is authorised to do is to prescribe, fix or revise wages and wages are defined to be remuneration piiyablc to the employees if the terms of the contract of employment, express or implied, wore fu !filled.

¶158

•

¶159

400 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.

¶160

1961

¶161

Bidi, Bidi Ltaus onJ Tobacco M,,tlumts' AlJoeiation

¶162

Thie definition nms, as it inevitably must, through the material provisions of the Act a.n•l its import· ance cannot ther<'fore be ignored.

¶163

¶164

1 N S1at1 of Bo~v najtnclro_fadktu J.

¶165

Bf'aring this fa.ct in mind let us examine the inpugned clauses of the notification. Clauses I and 2 dearly fall within the pun i<>w of the' power conferred on the respondent because' they do no more than prescribe the minimum rakR of wages as therein specified; but. els. 3 to 7 clearly and unambiguously purport to deal with tlie terms of the contract between the partieR othrr than that relating to I he remuneration. TheRe clausP.s are obviously intended to deal with the dispute between the employers and their employees as to how hidis should be disr.ardcd and in what proportion and what should lie the procecluro to be follow')cl in regarrl to thP payment for such discarded bidis. In appreciating the true effect of these clauses it is nec<>ssary to recall that tbe parties a.re agrl'ed about the practice a.t present prevailing which muat be taken to represent the terms of the contract either express or implied. According to the said practice the employer decides which bidis should be discarded, he retains the discarded bidis and pays only for such hidis as a.re acl'cpted by him. It is plain that the impugned c111uses of the notification purport to modify these terma in ma.teria.J particular~ and that would be plainly outside the jurisdiction of the authority of the respondent. It may well fo1m the subject-matter of reference for induetrfal adjudication but it cannot fonn the subject-matter of a notification prescribing minimum rates of wages under ss. 3, 4 or 5. It is conceded by the res. ponrlent that there is no express provision in the Act, which authorised the setting up of the machinery as prescribed by els. 3 and 4 or for laying <lo'Wll the manner in which the employer should make payment for the disearded bidis. It is, however, strenuously urged that the validity of these clauses should be upheld on the ground of the

¶166

(1) s.c.n..

¶167

SUPREME COURT REPORTS

-I

401

implied power of the respondent; and that takes us to the question as to the true scope and effect of the doctrine of implied power.

¶172

"One of the first principles of law with regard to the effect of an enabling act", observes Craies, "is that if a Lagislature enables something to be done, it gives power a,t the same time by necessary implication to do everything which is indispensable for the purpose of carrying out the purposes in view(¹ )". The principle on which the doctrine is based is contained in the legal maxim 'Quando lex aliquid concedit roncedere tJidetur et illud sine q1w res ib1a ease non potest'. This maxim has been thus translated by Broom thus : "whoever grants a tliing is deemed also to grant that without which the grant itself would be of no effect". Dealing with this doctrine Pollock, C.B., observed in Michaely Fenton and James Fraser v. John Stephen Hempton(') "It becomes therefore all important to consider the true import of this maxim, and the extent to \fhic11 it has been applied. After the fullest research which I have been able to ha.stow, I take the matter to stand thus : Whenever anything is authorised, and especially if, as matteP of duty, required to be done by law, an<l it is found impossible to do that thing w1less something else not authorised in express terms be else done, then that something will be supplied by necessary intendment." This doctrine can be invoked in cases "where an Act confers a jurisdiction it also confers by implication the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means as are essentially necessary to its execution (8)." In other words, the rloctrine of implied powers oan be legitimately invoked when it is found that a duty has been imposed or a power conferred on an authority by a statute and it is further found that the duty cannot be discharged or the power cannot be exercised at all unless some

¶173

(I) Craies on Statute Law, p. 239

¶174

(2) (1858) 117 R.R. 32, 41, II Moo. P.C. 347.

¶175

1981

¶176

BiJi, Bidi Uav.er µn·fJ Tobacco Jfcrcl1a111.1' Associa:iun v.

¶177

·rtu /:hate nfBo'Jtb.iy Gaje11Jr11gadkar J,

¶178

(3) Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, lOth ed., p. 361.

¶179

402 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1962) SUPP.

¶180

• ·

¶181

1161

¶182

Bi4i, BiJi letw•s and TMocco AltrcMnls' AssociCJJion

¶183

•• Tiu Si.t• of &m""7 Gajwir'ladUr J.

¶184

auxiliary or incidental power is assumed to exist. In such a case, in the absence of an implied powe1 the statute itself would beco:ne impossible of compliance. The impossibility in question must be of a general nature as that the performance of duty or the exercise of power is randt>red impossible in all cases. It really means that the statutory provision would become a dead-letter and cannot be enforced unleBB a subsidiary power is implied. This position in regard to the scope and effect of doctrine of implied powers is not seriously in dispute before us. The p<irties are at issue, however, on the question as to whether the doctrine of implied powers oan help to ndidate the impunged clauses in the notification.

¶185

The respondent strenuously contends that els. I and 2 of the notification which hwe prescribed the minimum rates of wages per 1000 bidis would become ineffective unless els. 3 to i supplement them. The argument is that by improper or dishonest exercise of the power conferred on t.he employer by the contract of cmplo,vment to discard chhat bidis the employees would be cheated of their legitimate due wages under els. I and 2 r.nd so, in order t-0 make the provisions of els. 1 and 2 l'ffective su;ne subsidiary provisions had to he made for settling the dispute between the employer and his workmen in regard to chhat hidis. As we have already observed, tho grievance made by the em-. ployees on the score of improper rejection of bidis may in many cases be wollfounded; but the seriousness of the said grievance and the urgen.t necessity to meet it would hardly be a proper basis for invoking the doctrine of implied power where the provisions of the statute are quite clearly against the assumption of such implied pow~r. The definition of the term "wages" postulates the binding character of the other terms of the contract and brings within the purview of the Act only one

¶186

403

¶187

(1) S.O.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶188

term and that relates to wages and no other. That being so, it is difficult to hold that by implication tht> very ha.sic concept of the term "wages" can be ignored and the other terms of the contract can be dealt with by the notification issued under the rl'levant provisions of the Act. When the said other terms of the contra.ct a.re outside the scope of the .Act altogether how could they be affected by the notification under the Act under the doctrine of implied powers?

¶189

IHI

¶190

Biii, BiJi Uaries ad Tobacco ll11dumts' .AuoeiMion v.

¶191

Th. 8tat1 of Bo.W.y

¶192

Gajnulr.,a.UW J.

¶193

Besides, in this connection it is also necessary to bear in mind the provisions of ss. 20 a.nd 21 of the Act. These two sections provide for the settlement of claims made by employees in regard to the payment of minimum rates of wages. If for instance, good bidis are rejected by the employer as chhat bidis improperly and without justification the employees can make 11. claim in that behalf and the same would be tried under ss.20 and 21. Therefore the Act has made a specific provision for the enforcement and implementation of the minimum rates of wages prescribed by notifications. The present notification purports tu ignore the said provisions and sets up a machinery to settle the said disp~tes. Clauses l and 2 of the notification have prescribed the revised minimum l'ates of wages. If, in the matter of payment of the said wages, any disputes arise they must be left for adjudication by the authority prescribed bys. 20. That is another reason why the doctrine of implied powers cannot be invoked in support of the validity of the impugned clauses in the noti· fl.cation.

¶194

There is yet another consideration which is relevant in dealing with the question about the implied powers. The doctrine of implied power can be invoked where without the said power the material provision of the Act would become impossible of enforcement. In the present

¶195

404 SUPREME OOURT REPORTS [1962] SUPP.

¶196

IHI

¶197

BiMt aun· Liatws OIJJ Taha<"' M "'ha""' Associ4tiM Y, 77it Stall of Bombay Gojtndrogodkor J.

¶198

case a.II that a. 5 requires is the fixation' or minimum r.atea of wa.gea, and tha.t ha.a been done by the notification hy els. 1 nnd 2. What the subsidiary clauses purport to do is to make the enforcement of the fixed rate effective by providing for a. machinery to deal with the possible disputes a.rising between the parties a.s a result of the practice of discarding chha.t bidis. In other words, ols. 1 and 2 fix tho minimum rates of wages and thus e. 5 ha.a been complied with and enforced. The remaining clauses purport to make the implementation of the provisions of els. I and 2 effective. That is very different from giving effect to s. 5 itself. The enforcement of the notification is clearly not the same thing as exercising the power of fixing or revising the minimum rates or wages under s. 5. A Power may be implied, if necesBAry, in discharging the duty imposed upon the appropriate Govern. mcnt or in exercising the power conferred on the State Government in the matter of fixin& or revising the minimum rates of wages; but RUrcly no pown <>an be implied for making effective the implementation of the notification iBBued under the said power or in the discharge of the sa.id duty. The purpo8e of the Act cannot be said to have failed aft-0r the min\mum rates of wages are pres. cribed and notified. What may turn out to be ineffective is the provision for payment of the said wages by reason of the rejection of good bidis; but that is a matter of an industrial dispute which has to be adjudicat-Od upon under sa. 20 a.nd 21 or under other provisions of the law. It is true that a large section of the workers in the bidi trade is illiterate, uneducat-0d and unorga.nised; and there can be no doubt that their grievance on the ground of improper rejection of the bidis deserves to be redressed, but, in our opinion, the procedure adopted by the respondent in redreBBing the said grievance is outside the scope of the Act, and therefore beyond the powers conferred on it by s. 5. The proper remedy

¶199

• (1) $.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 405

• • =I

1961

in such a case may be to make a comprehensive re- 1961 ference of the di8pute to the competent industrial Bidi, Bidi ltavtt and tribunal and invite the tribunal to make a proper Tobacco .Association A1 erchants' award in that behalf. We are, therefore, inclined to v. take the view that cls.3 to 7 which form an integral The State of Bomb•y scheme are outside the purview of the powers con- G•jendr apndkar J. ferred on the respondent by s. 5 of the Act and must therefore be declared to be ultra vires. It is common-ground that these clauses are severable from els. l and 2 and that their invalidity does not affect the validity of the said two clauRes.

¶204

In the result Civil Appeals Nos. 415 and 417 are allowed and Civil Appeals Nos. 416 and 418 are dismissed. Respondent to pay the costs of the petitioners in Civil Appeals Nos. 415 and 417. One set of hearing costs.

¶205

O. A. Nos. 415, 417 allowed. O. A. Nos. 416, 418 dismissed .

¶206

PROMOD CHANDRA DEB AND OTHERS

1961

October ltl

THE STATE OF ORISSA AND OTHERS

¶211

(B. P. SINHA, c. J., s. IC DAS, A. K. SARKAR N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANGAR and J. l{. J\IuDHOLK~R, JJ.)

¶212

Khor Posh Grant-Maintenance allowance granted by ExRuler of State-Merger of State with the Dominion of lndiaAbrogation of grant by executive act.ion-if an act of StateOonstitutiona/ Validity-Constitution of India, Arts. 14, 19(1) (/), 31-Extra Provincial J,,risdiction Act, 1947(47 of 1947) ss. 3, 4, 5-Administration of Ori.,a States Order, 1948, Para'. 4(b)-8tates' M.rger (Governors' Pmvinces) Order, 1949, ss. 3. 4,-Government of India Act, 1935 (26 Geo. 5, ch. 2) s. 299 ( l).

¶213

The petitioners, who were holders of Khor Posh grants from the Rulers of Talcher, Bamra and Kalahandi before these states merged with the Dominion of India, chall"n.~ed the constitutional validity of certain orders passed by the State

Bidi, Bidi Leaves' and Tobacco Merchants Association v. the State of Bombay

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Bidi, Bidi Leaves' and Tobacco Merchants Association v. the State of Bombay

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