L. Hazari Mal Kuthiala versus the Income-Tax Officer, Special Circle, Ambala Cantt.

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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(1961]

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892

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L. HAZARI MAL KUTHIALA

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v.

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THE IXCOME-TAX OFFICER, 8PECIAL CIRCLE, AMBALA CANTT.

¶7

(S. K. DAS, Ill. HIDAYATULLAil, K. c. DAS GUP'l'A, J.C. SHAH a.n<l N. RAJAGOPALA AYYANOAR, ,J,J.)

¶8

/ncomt-tax--Co1111nissionrr's power of transfer-Sfalulor.Y protJision for consulting the Central Board of Reve1u1e-/j mandatOT)'1·ransftr of pending and nonpendi1zg cases-Patila Inconze-tax Act of Samvat 2oor s. 5, sub-ss. (5). (7A). s. 34-Indtan Jncume-ta.t Act, r922 (II of r922), s. 64(r).- -lndia11 Finance Act, r950 (26 of r950), S. IJ.

¶9

The appellant firm which carried on business as forest lessees and timber merchants in tl1e former Kapnrthala State \·as assessed to, and paid, income tax, for the accoqnt year 1945-46 under the Income-tax law which was th•n in force in the said State. Subsequently Kapurthala State integrated into what was known as Pepsu and the l'atiala Income-tax Act, 2001, was made applicable and came into force in the integrated State. Lat•" still the Indian Finance Act, 1950 (i6 of 1c.i50), applied the Indian Income-tax Act to Part B States which had emerged as a result of political changes ands. 13 of the Indian Finance Act repealed the Income-tax laws obtaining in Part B States except for the purposes of levy assessment and collection of income-tax and Super-tax relating to the period mentioned therein. On November 4, 1953, the Commissioner of Incometax, Punjab (r) etc. purporting to act under s. 5, sub-ss. (5) and (7A) of the Indian Income-tax Act ordered theassessment of the appellant firm to be don• by the Income-tax Officer. Special Circle, Ambala and not by the Income-tax Officer. B-Ward, Patiala, who would ordinarily be the competent assessing authority for the firm under s. 64 of the Indian Income-tax Act. On ~larch 12, 1953, the Income-tax Officer. Special Circle, Ambala, issued a notice purporting to be under the Patiala Income-tax Act of Samvat 2001 to the appellant firm for filing a return of its in- come and total world income as he believed that the income had been underassessed. The appellant then filed an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court for writs of prohibition, certiorari, quo warranto etc. against the Income-tax Officer, Special Circle, Ambala, and the Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab (r) etc. regarding the reassessment of the income of the firm for the account year 1945-46. The High Court dismissed the said petition and this appeal was filed on a certificate granted by the High ~ourt. The contentions of the appellant inter alia, were that the Income-tax Officer, Special Circle, Ambala, had no jurisdiction to issue a notice under s. 34

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1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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893

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of the Patiala Income-tax Act of Samvat 2001, and that only the Income-tax Officer, B-Ward, Patiala,•was the competent authority as he was the locally situated Income-tax Officer and would have jurisdiction under s. 64(1) of the Income-tax Act. The transftr of the case by the Commissioner of Income-tax by his order of November 4, 1954. was characterised as ultra vires and incompetent. The argument that the words of s. 13 of the Indian Finance Act, 1950, did not include reassessment was abandoned in view of the decisions of this Court in Lakshmana Shenoy v. The Income-tax Officer, Ernakulam, [1959] S.C.R. 75r. It was further contended that the Commissioner in acting under s. 5(5) of the Patiala Income-tax Act was required to consult the Minister-in-Charge whose place was taken by the Central Board of Revenue under the Indian Finance Act, 1950.

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z960

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L. Hazari ~Wal f{uthjala

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~.

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The lnco1ne~ta:¥ Officer, Special Circle, A1nbala Cantt.

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Held, that although the Commissioner of Income-tax was required to consult the Central Board of Revenue his failure to do so did not render his order ineffective however wrong it might be from the administrative point of view. The provision about consultation must be treated as directory and the Commissioner's power could not be questioned by the assessee on the ground of failure to consult the Central Board of Revenue.

¶18

State of U.P. v. Manbo;J.han Lal Srivastava, [1958] S.C.R. 553, K. S. Srinivasan v. Union of India, [1958] S.C.R. 1295, Montreal Street Railway !Company v. Normandin, L.R. 1917 A. C. 170 and Biswanath Khemka v. The King Emperor, (1945) F.C.R. 99, followed.

¶19

The Commissioner while transferring the case may have referred to the Indian Income-tax Act and not to the Patiala Income-tax Act but the exercise of the power would be referable to a jurisdiction which conferred validity upon it and not to a jurisdiction under which it would be nugatory:

¶20

Pitamber Vajirshet v. Dhandu Navlapa, I.L.R. 12 Born. 486, followed. ·

¶21

A case which was not pending at the time of transfer could not be transferred nnder sub-s. (7A) of s. 5 of the Patiala Act but it could be transferred from one Income-tax Officer to another under sub-s. (5) of s. 5 of the Patiala Act which was kept alive for assessment and reassessment re la ting to previous years. Sub-s. (7A) makes special provision for transfer of pend- ing cases. and is not prejudicial to the general powers granted by sub-s. (5).

¶22

Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India, [1956j S.C.R. 267, referred to.

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CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Ci vii Appeal No. 135 of 1958. Appeal from the judgment and order 'dated

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894 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1961]

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September 4, 1956, of the Punjab High Court in Civil Writ Case No. 325of1955, L, Hazari Mal Kuthiala N. A. Palkhivala and J.B. Dadachanji, for the v. appellant. The Inco1ne-tax Officer, Special G. K. Daphtary, Solicitor.General of India, K. N. Circle, An1bala Rajagopal Sastri and D. Gupta, for the respondents. Can.ft. 1960. September 27. The Judgment of the Hidayatullah ]. Court was delivered by

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HIDAYATULLAH J.-The appellant firm, L. Hazarimal Kuthiala of Kapurthala, moved the High Court of Punjab under Art. 226 of the Constitution for writs of prohibition, certiorari, quo warranto etc., against the Income-tax Officer, Special Circle, Ambala and the Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab (1), Himachal Pradesh, Bilaspur and Simla in respect of reassessment of the income of the firm for the account year, 1945-1946. The High Court dismissed the petition, but granted a certificate under Arts. 132 and 133 of the Constitution, and this appeal has been filed on that certificate.

¶27

The firm carried on business as forest lessees and timber merchants at Dhilwan in the former Kapurthala State: In that State, an Income-tax law was in force, and prior to the integration of the State, on April 10, 1947, the income of the firm for the account year 1945-1946 (Sam vat. 2002) was duly assessed, and the tax was also paid. Subsequently, political changes took place, Kapurthala integrated into what was known as Pepsu, and the Rajpramukh issued two Ordinances in Samvat. 2005, by which all laws in force in Kapurthala including the Income-tax law ceased to be operative from August 20, 1948. The two Ordinances instead applied laws in force in the Patiala State to the area of the new State which included Kapurthala, and the Patiala Income-tax Act, 2001, came into force. Later still, the Indian Finance Act, 1950 (26 of 1950), applied the Indian Income-tax Act to the Part B States, which had emerged as a result of political changes. Section 13 of the Indian Finance Act, 1950, repealed the Income-tax laws obtaining in the area of the Part B States except for the purposes

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l S.C.R. SUPREi\IE COURT REPORTS

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895

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' . ' "; l~'. I

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of levy, assessment and collection of i'ncome-tax and 1 960 60 SU per-On March 12, 1955, tax in respect of the the Income· pC'riod defined therein. tax Officer, Special . · L H f(:,~~,;~ . . 1 "J If "J If 0 l Circle, Ambala, issued a notice purporting to be under v. s. 34 of the Patiala Income-tax Act of Sam vat. "2001 The Jucomc-tax to the appellant firm calling upon it to file a return of Office" Spe"at its income and total )VOrld income, because he had c,,cle, .Jmbala Gantt. reason to believe that the income had been under. assessed. Previous to this, on November 4, 1953, the Hidayatu!lah J. Commissioner of Income-tax, Punjab(!), Himachal Pradesh, Bilaspur and Simla, purporting to act under s. 5, sub-ss. (5) and (7 A) of the Indian Income-tax Act, ordered that the assessment of the appellant firm ._ would be done by the Income- tax Officer, Special Circle, Ambu.la and "not by the Income-tax Officer, B-Ward, Patiala, who ordinarily would be the competent authority nuder s. 64 of the Indian Income-tax Act to assess the appellant firm. The appellant firm raised objections, but failed; and then filed the petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, out of which the present appeal arises. · Numerous objections were taken in respect of the competency of the proceedings before the taxing authorities, but some of them are no longer· pressed. An argument under Art. 14 of the ConHtitution has now been abu.ndoncd, though it figured at earli~: stages of the present ca.se. A second point tl;_.t the reassessment cannot be made under the P ,ciala Income-tax Act is not in dispute, because ·;he respondents before us stated that the reassess,.ient, if any, would have to be done in accordance w.' ch the Kapurthala law, as it existed in the assessm• nt year (Sam. vat. 2002). A third argument, name] ', that the words of s. 13 of the Indian Finance Act, ·.q50, did not include reassessment., has also been abaudoned, in view of the decisions of this' <Jourt in La'cshmana Shenoy v. The Income.tax OJficer, Ernakulam (') and The Income-tax Officer, Bangalore v. K. 1-. Guruswamy ('). Only one point has been pressed be'orc us, and it is that the Income-Tax Officer, Special Circle, Ambala, had no jurisdicticn to issue a notice under s. 34, and (•l [1959] s.c.R. 751. (2) [1959] S.C.R. 785 .

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1 960 60 L H . . If l f(:,~~,;~ 1 "J If "J If 0 v.

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S!J6

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1961]

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•·

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1 ~ 60 that only the Income-tax Officer, B- \Tard, Pa.tiala., L. 110,.,. Mal was the competent authority. Reliance is placed in Kr<thiala this conne.ction upon the provisions of s. 64(1) of the v. Indian Income-tax Act, under which the locally situn, I"'o"u-tax a.ted Income-tax Officer would have had jurisdiction in Officer, sp"ial this case. The transfer of the ca.so by t.he CommissionCird~, ~;nbala er of Income-tax by his order dated November 4, 1953, .".'.'... · is characterised as ultra vi res and incompetent, and it Hidayatullah J. is this argument a.lone to which we need address ourselves in this appeal.

¶37

The Pa.tie.la. Income-tax Act contained provisions almost similar to ss. 5(5) and 5(7 A) of the Indian Income-tax Act. Sub-section (5) differed in this that the Commissioner of Income-tax was required to consult the Minister-in-charge before ta.king action under that sub-section. The only substantial difference in the latter sub-section was that the Explanation which was added to s. 5(7 A) of the Indian Income-tax Act as a. result of the decision of this Court in Bidi Supply Co. v. Union of India(') did not find place in the Pa tie.Ia Act. The Commissioner, when he transferred this c.lse, referred not to the Patia.Ia. Income-tax Act, but to the Indian Income-tax Act, and it is contended that if the Patia.la. Income-tax Act was in force for purposes of reassessment, action should have been taken under bha.t Act and not the Indian Income-tax Act. This argument, however, loses point, because the E>xercise of a. power will be referable t-0 a jurisdiction which confers validity upon it and not to a jurisdiction under which \twill be nugatory. This principle is wellsettled. See l'itamber Vajirshet v. Dhandu Navlapa(').

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• "

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The difficulty however, does not end there. The Commissioner, it) acting under s. 5(5) of the Pa.tiala. Income- tax Act. was required to consult the Ministerin-cha.rge. It is contended that the Central Boa.rd of Revenue which, under the Indian Finance Act, 1950, ta.keE the place of the Ministor-in.charge was not consulwd, and proof against the prosumptio11 of regularity of official acts is said to be furnished by the fa.ct that under the Indian law no such consultation was necessary, and the Commissioner, having purported (i) [i 9s6J s:c.R. 267. (2) I.L.R. 12 Bom. 486, 4119.

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l S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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897

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to act under the Indian law, could not have felt the need of consultation with any higher authority. This, perhaps, is correct.. If the Commissioner did not act under the Patiala law at all, which enjoined consultation with the Minister-in-charge and purported to act only under the Indian law, his mind would not be drawn to the need for consultation with the Central Board of Revenue. Even so, we do not think that the failure to commit the Central Board of Revenue renders the order of the Commissioner ineffective. The provision about consultation must be treated as directory, on the principles accepted by this Court in State of U. P. v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava(') and K. S. Srinivasan v. Union of India('). In the former case, this Court dealt with the provisions of Art. 320(3)(c) of the Constitution, under which consultation with the Union Public Service Commission was necessary. This Court relied upon the decision of the Privy Council in Montreal Street Railway Company v. Normandin (³ ), where it was observed as follows :

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'9⁶⁰ L. Hazari lliuJ Kuthiala v.

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The Income-tax Officer, Special Circle, Ambala Gantt.

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Hidayatulla/i J.

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" ...... The question whether provisions in a statute are directory or imperative ha_s_ very frequently arisen in this country, but it has been said that no general rule can be laid down, and that in every case the object of the statute must be looked at. The cases on the subject will be found collected in Maxwell on Statutes, 5th Ed., p. 596 and the following pages. When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience, or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty, and at the same time would not promote the main object of the Legislature, it has been the practice to hold such prov.isions to be directory only, the neglect of them, though punishable, not affecting the validity of 'the acts done."

¶47

The principle of the Privy Council case was also applied by the Federal Court in Biswanath Khemka v. The King Emperor (¹ ), and there, as pointed out by this (1) [1958] S.C.R. 533. (21 [1958] S.C.R. 1295, 1321. (3) L.R. 1917 A.C. 170. (4) [1945] F.C.R. 99·

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SUPREME COt:RT REPORTS

¶49

898

¶50

(1961]

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1 9°° Court, the words of the provision were even more L Ii . 11 1 emphatic a.nd of a prohibitory cha.ra.cter. The essence · 1/,~~.'.~ 1 ; • of the rule is tha.t wherP consultation has to be ma.de v. <luring the performance of a. public duty and an omis- The Income-tax sion to do so occurs, the action cannot be regarded a.s Offim, Spuial altogether void, a.nd the direction for consultation Circle, Ambala may be treated as director.v a.nd its neglect, a.s of no Cantl. consequence to the result. In view of what has been llida_m11<liah J- said in these ca.ses, t.he failure to consult t-he Central Board of }{eYenue does not destroy the effect iveneRs of the order passed by the Commissioner, however wrong it might be from the administrative point of view. The power which the Commissioner ha.d, was entrusted to him, a.nd there was only a duty to consult the Central Boa.rd of Hevenue. The failure to conform to the duty did not rob the Commissioner of the power which he exercised, and the exercise of the power cannot, therefore, be questioned by the a.ssesscc on the ground of failure to consult the Central Board of R11venue, provision regarding which must be regarded as laying down administrative control and as being d irect-0ry.

¶52

"

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Learned counsel, however, contends that even if a.II this be decided a.ga.inst him, he is still entitled to show tha.t the tra.nsfor of the ca.so ca.n only take place under sub-s. (7A) of s. 5 and not under sub·B. (5). According to him, tho former sub-section deals with the transfer of individual ca.ses, a.nd that inasmuch a.s there wa.s no pending ca.seat the time, then, a.s wa.s ruled by this Court in the Bidi Supply case ('), the tra.nsfor could not be va.lid. In the absence of a.n Expla.na.tion similar to the one a.dded to tho Indian Income-tax Act, he contends that a case which wa.s not pending, could not be transferred under sub-s. (7 A). He contends a.lso that snb-s. (5) deals not with the transfer of individual ca.sea but with the distribution of work.

¶54

Tbe two sub-sections of s. 5 of the Pa.tia.la. Incometax Act read-a.s follows :

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"(5) Income-tax officers shall perform their functions in respect of such persons or classes of persons or of such incomes or classes of income or in respect of (1) (1956] S.C.R. 267.

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899

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l S:C.R. SVPREME COURT REPORTS

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'

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such areas as the Commissioner of Income-tax may in con'sultation with the Minister Incharge direct, and, w.here such directions have assigned to two or more {111.come-tax Officers, the same persons or classes of persons or the same incornes o_r classes of income or t.he same area, in accordance with any orders which tbe Commissioner of Income-tax may in consultation with the Minister Incharge make for the distribution and allocation of work to be performed. The Minister In charge may, with the previous approval of the Ijlasi-Khas, by general or special order in writing, direct that the powers conferred on the Income-tax Officer by or under this Act shall, in respect of any specified case or class of cases, be. exercised by the Commissioner, and, for ·the purposes of any case in respect of which such order applies, references in this Act or in any rules made hereunder to the Income- tax Officer shall be deemed to be references to the Commissioner.

¶60

L. Haza.ri Mal Kuthiala

¶61

v. The 1nco1newtax Offictr, Spicial Circle, Ambala C£lnlt.

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Hidayatullah ].

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(7 A) The Commissioner of Income-tax may transfer -any case from one Income-tax Officer subordinate to him to another, and the Minister Incharge . may transfer any case from any one Income-tax Officer to another .. Such transfer may be made at any stage of the proceedings, and shall not render neces- · sary the re-issue of any notice already issued by the Income-tax Officer from whom the case is transferred."

¶64

There can be _no doubt that sub-s. (7 A) authorises the Commissioner to transfer individual cases. The words "any case from one Income-tax Officer subordinate to him to another ", " such tmnsfer may be made at any stage of the. proceedings " etc., clearly indicate this. Sub-section (7 A) is, however, not applicable here, because in respect of the cognate sub-section of the Indian Income-tax Act it was ruled by this Court that it could apply to a pending .case only. It was to overcome this lacuna that the Explanation was added by the Indian Parliament. This amendment came in 1956, and the Patiala Act did not include a simihi.r Explanation, because prior to 1956 the question had not arisen. There is one other difie'rence between the Patiala Act and the Indian Act. Whereas· sub-s. (7 A) was introduced in the Indian Act by an

¶65

900 SUPRE1~1E COURT REPORTS

¶66

[196iJ

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,·

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amendment, the corresponding sub-section was enacted at the same time as tho rest of the Patia.la Act.

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L. Harari Afal KtlthialiJ

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KtlthialiJ Now, it is quite clear that a case which was not v. pending at the time of transfer could not be trans. Thd l1ico111t-fa1' ferrNI under sub-. (7 A) of s. 5 of the P:>t iala Act Officdr, Special The same reasoning must br- applied to that. sul< Citc/e, Arnba/a Canll section, as it was applied to the Indian Act. Lea.rnf·d counsel reforred us to an affidavit hv the Under Secre- Hidayatul/uli _/. tary, Central Board of Rcvenm., rep;·oduccd in Pa1malal Binjraj v, Union of India (¹ ), which stated the reason for the introduction of sub.s. (7 A). It is a little difficult to accept the affidavit as an aid to find out the intention why a particular law or amendment w1~s enacted, more so where the affidavit concerns quite another Act of a different legislature. It is, however, pertinent to remember that sub-s. (7 A) expressly ga. ve the power to transfer pending cases, but said nothing a.bout ca.se8 which were not pending. The power to transfer such ca.see before they came into being must, therefore, be found in some other enactment. The Department contends that it would fall within sub-s. (5) of s. 5, and points out that this Court was not required to consider that sub-section, br)cause the transfer of the cases dealt with in tho Bidi Supply case(') was by an authority not named in sub-s. (5) and therefor!' the transfer in those instances could not be held to be undor that sub-section. The Department contends that the Commissioner of Income-tax is mentioned both in sub-s. (5) and eub-s. (7 A) and could derive his power from one or the other or both.

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•

¶72

The short question thus is whether an individual case which was not a. pending case could be transferred from one Income-tax Officer to another under sub-s. (5) of s. 5 of the Patia.la Act, which was kept alive for assessment and reassessments relating to previous a.sseBBment yearn. Mr. Pa.lkhivala. a_rgues that the words of the sub-section " such persons or classes of persons or of such incomes or classes of income or in respect of such areas" denote, by the plural employed, a. <lealing with a group rather than (1) [1957] S.C.R. 233, 246. (2) [1956] S.C R. 267.

¶73

1 S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS

¶74

901

¶75

an individual case. He further contends that if individual cases were held to be included in sub-s. (5), then sub-s. (7 A) would be unnecessary and otiose. He ·argues that harmonious construction thus requires that the two sub-sections must be taken to cover different situations.

¶76

The last argument is hardly open aftrr the decision . of this Court adverted to a1ready. If pending cases alone were within sub.s. (7 A), those cases which were not pending could not be said to have been provided for, there. There is thus no overlapping at least in so far as cases not pending were concerned. An arrangement hr their disposal would be a subject of distribution of work and nothing much turns upon the employment of the p"!ural number, because the plural includeH the singular. Indeed, a single case might well be in a class separate from others. Duplication of powers is sometimes noticeable in statutes, and does not destroy the effectiveness of the powers conferred. Section 24 of the Civil Procedure Code dealing with tmnsfers of cases and the provisions of the Letters Pat mt of the High Court are instances in point. If a p uticular action is valid under one section, it cannot be rendered invalid because the identical action can also be taken under another section, and it makes no difference if the two empowering provisions are in the same statute. In any event, sub-s. (7 A) wonld cut down sub-s. (5) only to the extent the formL'r provides, and it has been held that it was confined to pending cases only. Sub-secti(\ll (5) was thus available for cases which were not pending, and the case which was the subject-matter of the Commissioner's order was not a pending case.

¶77

L. Hazari Mal Kuihiala

¶78

v.

¶79

The Income-tax Officer, Special Circle, Ambala Gantt .

¶80

Hida;;atullah j.

¶81

Mr. Palkhivala contends that sub-s. (5) merely enables distribution of work, and does not deal with transfers. But where a case is not pending, an order relating to it may take the form of transfer or an arrangement for its disposal. There is nothing to prevent the Commissioner, acting under sub-s. (5), to arrange that the case of an assessee shall be disposed of by a particular Income.tax Officer. The words of 115

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, '

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902 SUPREME COURT REPOHTS [ I9&I]

¶84

sub-s. (5) that "Income-tax Offic<•rs shall perform their functiorrn in respect of such persons ...... as the L. llu:an ,\Jal Kath1ulu CommiHioner ...... may ...... direct" <inly show that the , .. CommiAsioner mn.y direct that one Income-tax Officer J'Ju ftlC01Jlf·ltlX Ahall not and !!notlwr lncomr-t-Rx Cfficer sl1all, per- UfJictY, spctaJ form the functions in respect of such and such pnson Circlt, AmlnJ/ll Can!t. or per80lls. The plural i11cluding the singular, the order of thu Commissio11cr waH valid, becausu he arra11ged aud distrilrnted work, and <lid not- se"k to transfer any ca~e. It is, however, contemlcd that this renders suL-s. (7 A) otioso. In 01u· opi11iu11, it does nut. Special 1irovisiu11 for transfer of pe11ding <'ases is ·~JI that i". provided there, aud if ouch a transfer takes pla<'e, the proviBions of sub-s. (7A) will be invoked. Tho8P provisions are to be rllad as 11ut prejudicing the g<'11eral powers granted b) sub-s. (5) and vice versa.

¶85

.-

¶86

For these reasons, tlie appeal fails, r.nd will ho dismissed with eusts.

¶87

Appeal dismi.ssed.

¶88

BURMAH SHELL OIL STORAGE AN'D DISTRIBUTING CO., OF INDIA, LTD, AND ANOTHER

¶89

v.

¶90

THE COMMERCIAL TAX OFJ.<'JCER AND OTHERS

¶91

(A~D CONNECTgD APPEAL)

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(S. K. DAS, M. HmAYATUI.LAn, K. C. Ihs GUPTA, J.C. SHAH and X. HAJAGOPALA AYYA:SOAR, ,JJ.)

¶93

Sales Tax-Sale of motor spirit for aviation purposes lo aircraft "' _Ai"rport-Exemption from taxation-Sale outside custu1ns barrier ---'J.t'hether salt u·itl1in State--A.viatio1i sp;rit loaded 011 board aircraft taken out of cotrnlry-lf exported-" J::xport ", meamng of -Bengal Motor Spint Sal<S Taxation Act, 1y41 (Beu. 5 of 1941), "22, as amcnded-Co11slitutio11 of hidia, Art 286(1)(a)(b). J::xplanation.

L. Hazari Mal Kuthiala v. the Income-Tax Officer, Special Circle, Ambala Cantt.

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L. Hazari Mal Kuthiala v. the Income-Tax Officer, Special Circle, Ambala Cantt.

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