additions to the income-tax depreciation and they are 1957 designed to meet particular contingencies and for a r~ sree limited period. It would, therefore, not be fair to the Meenakshi Mills, workmen that these two depreciations are rated as !· prior charges before the available surplus is ascer- Their !!!:.kmen tained. It is likely tha.t, in many cases, if these. two Gafe11dragadkar J. depreciations are allowed as prior charges no surplus would be left even though workmen may have laboured during the year to the best of their ability and the concern was for all purposes prosperous; In other words, according to this decision, considerations on which the grant of additional depreciation may be justified under the Income-tax Act are different from considerations of social justice and fair apportionment on which the original Full Bench formula in regard to the payment of bonus to the workmen is based. That is why, in the result, this subsequent Full Bench held that only normal depreciation including multiple shift depreciation, but not. initial or additional depreciation, should rank as prior charge in applying the Full Bench forrnula as to the payment of bonus. If it cannot be disputed that in industrial adjudication it is not obligatory fo adopt the very same procedure as prescribed by the Income-tax Act for ascertaining gross profits and then determining the amount of ,net surplus available, it is not easy to accept the appellants' argument that in respect of depreciation alone industrial tribunals must necessarily and in .every case follow the relevant provisions of the lncome-tax Act. If that be the true position, then we see no reason why, in respect of one item of debit only the technical provisions of the Income-tax Act must be followed in industrial adjudications in respect of workmen's claim for bonus. On the whole, the reasons given by the appellate tribunal in the case of The U.P. Electric Supply Co. Ltd. (1) appear to us to be satisfactory; and so we are not prepared to accept the appellant's argument that the appellate tribunal in the present case has erred in law in not allowing the appellant's claim for initial and additional depreciations. In our opinion, therefore, the main point urged by the (I) [1955] L.A.C; 659.
